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Chapter One considers the shape of Irenaeus' doctrine of the one God, paying 
particular attention to the various attributes which are ascribed to Him : 
power, goodness, richness, patience, mercy, justice, holiness, wisdom, omni- 
science, omnipresence, incomprehensibility. It is concluded that Irenaeus 
had a fuller doctrine of God than has often been appreciated, but that he 
departs somewhat from the New Testament in not fully integrating the mercy and 
justice of God, and in reflecting, to a limited degree, Middle Platonic teaching 
upon His essential incomprehensibility. 
Chapter Two treats aspects of Irenaeus' doctrine of the Trinity, notably the 
relation between the Father and Word/Son, and the pre-existence of Jesus Christ. 
It is argued that Irenaeus severely modifies the 'Logos model' of Justin and other 
Apologists, and, consequently, that he moves towards a reconceptualisation of time 
around the incarnation, rather than seeing a disincarnate Logos pre-existing in 
time. 
Chapter Three examines certain fundamental features of Irenaeus, doctrine of 
creation : the purpose of God in creating, the question of creation out of nothing, 
and the balance between freedom and necessity in God. It is argued that the 
particular emphasis given tothe will of God compromises the created and independent 
rationality of creation. 
Chapter Four focuses upon the Irenaean account of providence and created freedom. 
An element of rationalism is demonstrated in the former, and tensions which were 
later to erupt in the Pelagian controversy are identified in the latter area. 
Chapter Five explores Irenaeus' treatment of the place of man in creation, and the 
fundamental nature of man as body, soul and Spirit (or spirit). It is argued that 
the relation between God and creation, and especially between God and man, is drawn 
too tightly, and the chapter illustrates and further explicates this underlying 
feature of Irenaeus' doctrinesof God and creation, by examining his approaches to 
theodicy. 
Throughout the thesis the theology of St. Irenaeus is discussed in relation to the 
context of Gnostic and Apologetic theology against which he wrote, the New Testament 
and, on occasions, modern theology, particularly asexemplified by Karl Barth. The 
greatness of St. Irenaeus is not diminished, but the tensions and problems, incipier 
and more obvious, in his theology of creation, are emphasised rather more than has 
been customary in previous studies. 
'A 
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INTRODUCTION 
4 
R. D. Williams has justly claimed that, in many areas of theology, 
Irenaeus 'lays a tantalizing trail of allusions andundeveloped 
resonances to await more systematic exploration'. 
1 But to what 
extent should such subsequent exploration be read back into 
Irenaeus himself? It can hardly be doubted that, on manyoccasions, 
later systems of thought have been too readily imposed upon him. 
This is the case whether it has been Nicene orthodoxy or modalist 
heresy which has been the subject of attribution. Where Nicene 
orthodoxy is concerned, we need not doubt that Irenaeus would have 
stood with Athanasius against the Arians, if we still maintain that 
different aspects of Irenaeus, theology are both superior and inferior 
to that exhibited in Athanasius. Whereas Athanasius affirms. the 
identity of essence of father and Son more plainly than some Irenaean 
statements would permit, Irenaeus has a much clearer vision of the 
importance of the historical reality of Jesus Christ than does Athanasius. 
If truth is indeed the daughter of time, the line of descent is less 
than straight. The question of how a historian should do justice to 
the past is a major issue of modern thought which is taken up in this 
thesis, although generally in relation to the concrete subject under 
discussion rather than to the underlying philosophy of historiography. 
If the content of Ireotteus' theology has been subjected to anachronistic 
systematisation, the same could be said of its form. While some scholars, 
chiefly from, the older continent. ýl school (for-example, A. Harnack 
2 
and F. Loofs 3), engaged in a detailed analysis and dissection of 
Adversus Haereses into its component theologies and their 'sources', 
other scholars (for example, G. Wingren 
4, 
and. L.. Thornton 
5) have, 
perhaps partly in reaction to the speculative theses published abroad, 
tended to over-emphasise the unity of both form and content of Adversus 
Haereses. 
It used to be believed that all evolutionary change in the natural world 
was adaptive, but we now know that, although a clear line of evolutionary 
ascent is discernible, there have been many blind alleys which have 
ended with extinction. In the same way, it is possible to identify in 
Irenaeus both an underlying systematic coherence and many tensions or 
I problematic features. As the enormously useful, modern discussion 
and development of the concept of Imodels'has shown, all theologians 
are obliged to use a variety of models, metaphors, analogies or frame- 
works in the attempt to point through language and symbol to the reality 
of God. Because we can no longer conceive of. a univocal relation 
between language or theory and reality, we are aware that all theological 
systems will exhibit limitations and hence (at least) incipient error. 
With Irenaeus, we are dealing with a writer from a relatively early 
stage in the formative period of Christian thought, and inevitably 
we observe him struggling adequately to articulate and formulate 
the experienceýwhich was at the centre of the life of the Church 
the lex orandi was, as always, prior to the lex credendi. 
How, then should we approach the study of the theology of St. Irenaeus? 
The present thesis maintains that the possible choice between a 
theological and a historical approach is false, and that an attempt 
should be made to engage both aspects together. The enormous attention 
devoted over the past century to scriptural hermeneutics would seem 
to be producing at least a limited consensus that theology and history 
cannot be held in separate areas of study. 
6 These conclusions require 
extension into other branches of theology, not least patristics. 
2 
E. F. Osborn. has given recent attention tothe question of the methodology 
of patristic study, ando following J. Passmore, he favours the method 
of 'problematic elucidation'. 
7 While not, wishing to dispute'the 
importance of paying careful attention to the particular problems with 
which a given writer in a given context was concerned, the method 
adopted by Osborn, if unchecked, leads to an underestimation of the 
personal character of much patristic writing, and the participation of an 
author in an on-going tradition. Philosophical and theological 
problems can only be elucidated in dialogue with the personal position 
from which they are perceived. Osborn's methodology does not give 
this sufficient recognition, and hence his own (to a significant degree, 
platonic) presuppositions are assumed, rather than recognised and 
defended. 
In a sense, Osborn's work displays the 'two horizons' approach to 
hermeneutics, with discussions of past and present instances of given 
'problems' being juxtaposed in successive sections of a chapter. 
Notwithstanding the useftilness of the I two horizons I framework 
8 
for the examination of hermeneutical issues, we would wish to insist 
that something akin to 'three horizons' should be recognised, as has 
long been indicated (albeit imperfectly! ), in relation to the 
interpretation of Scripture, by the Anglican conception of Scripture, 
reason, and tradition. For tradition, we'are thinking especially of 
the historical development of theology, which should be allowed to 
interact with both the thought-world of a patristic writer, and ýhat 
of a contemporary scholar. To put this slightly differently, the 
assessment made of the relation between a given author and his or 
her environment, and other authors and their environments, past, present 
or future - that is, an historical assessment - contains an irreducibly 
3 
personal, responsible dimension supplied by the historian concerned. 
The three 'horizons, are related, ultimately, by their inter-locking 
relation to the transcendent realm of truth, the service of which is 
the only valid motive of human endeavour, historiographic or otherwise. 
The present thesis is offered against the background of these 
methodological considerations, but its basic subject matter is 
not methodology. There is a considerable danger in modern theology, 
with its great interest in questions of methodology, of an abstract, 
and thus intrinsically lifeless, discussion of theological issues. 
Is there such a thing as a method of theological enquiry, other than 
the unending attempt to allow the subject matter Himself to speak to 
usthrough the study of the substance of theology? It has been one 
of the great services rendered to theology by Karl Barth that he has 
consistently placed this critical question before us. My exploration 
of the shape of Irenaeus' theology therefore examines the important 
loci of his theology, the doctrines of God and creation. With but 
limited exceptions, these aspects of his theology have received 
surprisingly little detailed attention, for the focus has been much, 
more upon those doctrines, such as of the Trinity and Christology, 
which dominated later patristic debates. As we shall see in relation 
to his doctrine of the Trinity, the retroaction of later questions 
upon Irenaeus has often distorted the actual emphases which are to be 
found in this area of his theology. 
The subjects of the doctrines of God and creation, together with their 
inter-relation, are central to Irenaeus' theology. We shall first 
tackle aspects of his doctrine of God, because it is fundamental to 
Irenaeus that God is not to be understood ex factis, sed ea quae 
4r 
facta sunt ex Deo (11.25.1). We shall cover a good deal of ground, 
and from the doctrines of God and creation only some aspects can be 
selected for consideration. Although there are dangers in researching 
across such a wide field, it is arguably the case that there is a 
certain danger in theological research of excessive, and therefore 
potentially myopic, specialisation. Specialised, narrow studies are- 
undoubtedly important, but heavy concentration upon such studies in 
the overall allocation of research in a given subject can only be 
justified. if there is wide agreement concerning the fundamental 
assumptions which guide the selection ofthe narrower subjects of 
study. This condition is satisfied across large areas of natural 
science, but the same cannot be said of theology, or, indeed, of many 
other subjects in the arts and humanities. The use of aerial photo- 
graphy to identify the macroscopic features of archaeological sites, 
prior to their microscopic examination, has helped to revitalise 
archaeology. In an analogous way, it is a concern of the present 
writer that the sights of theological gunners need careful alignment 
before their analytical salvos will truly engage their target. This 
investigation is an exercise in the identification of, and reflection 
upon, the vital concerns of Irenaeus, in the area of his doctrines of 
God and creation. 
jr 
1. Eucharistic Sacrifice - The Roots of a Metaphor, (Nottingham: 
Grove Books, 1982), p. 11. 
1 
2. History of Dogma, Vol. II, (E. T., London: Williams and Norgate, 1896 
3. Theophilus von Antiochien adv. Marcionem und die anderen theologischen 
Quellen bei Irenäus, Texteund Untersuchungen, 46 (Leipzig: 1930) 
4. Man and the Incarmtion, (E. T., Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1959) 
5. Revelation in the Modern World, (London: A. & C. Black, 1950) 
6. Three examples of such a conclusion reached by prominent contemporary 
scholars may be cited: P. Stuhlmacher, Historical Criticism and 
Theological Interpretation of Scripture, (E. T., Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1977); C. M. Wood, The Formation of Christian Understanding, 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1981); and, in an important essay, 
N. Lash, 'What Might Martyrdom Mean? ', in Suffering and Martyrdom inthe 
New Testament, ed. W. Horbury and B. McNeil, (C. U. P.: 1981), pp. 183-198. 
7. The Beginning of Christian Philosoph , (C. U. P., 1981), pp. 10ff. 
8. As (almost) definitively expounded by A. C. Thiselton, 
. -The 
Two 
Horizons, (Exeter : Paternoster, 1980) 
6 
CHAPTER ONE 
DOCTRINE OF GOD 
Introduction 
A perpetual problem of Christian theology is to reconcile the trans- 
cendence and goodness of an omnipotent God with both the dependence of 
creation on Him and the sheer existence of evil. How far Irenaeus was 
aware of the group of related problems which we encounter here, and how 
successfully he solved or accommodated them ) will 
be the recurrent theme 
of the present thesis. 
One could explore Irenaeus' doctrines concerning these matters by 
starting at any one of several points, but it is reasonable, and indeed 
it is in accord with Irenaeus' own starting point as revealed in the 
early books of his major extant work, to begin with his doctrine of God. 
The chapter that follows is not, however, intended as a comprehensive 
treatise upon Irenaeus' doctrine of God. Space does not permit attention 
to be given to the full range of expressions, involving many different 
combinations of words and phrases, which Irenaeus employs. 
11 
sýall 
confine myself very largely to those aspects of Irenaeus' doctrine 
which are most relevant to his doctrine of creation, taking this latter 
expression in its'broadest sense, while at the same time attempting to 
give an interpretation of Irenaeus' doctrine of God which is faithful 
to the over-allshapeof his theology. Inevitably, this was coloured by 
his opposition to Gnosticism, and we shall therefore take an initial, 
albeit brief, look at some relevant points in its account of the nature 
of God. 
It might be argued that the various schoolsof Gnosticism described by 
7 
Irenaeus did not really have a doctrine of God at all. They certainly 
had theories concerning the Godhead, or Pleroma, but little is actually 
said concerning the character of the various Aeons, 
2 
except that the 
original Aeon (and to some extent all the Aeons) was unknowable and 
quite opposed to material creation. It is almost as if the Christian 
doctrine of God were not to go beyond a rather academic account of the 
doctrine of the Trinity to the traditional 'attributes', or 'perfections' 
of God. Irenaeus realised this weakness of the Gnostic systems and 
hence directs his initial argument against the account of the Gnostic 
Pleroma. In particular he is concerned to expose the consequences of 
their doctrine of the Supreme Aeon, usually known as Bythus (also as 
Propater, Proarche, Arrhetus). He states his intention in the middle 
of the description in Book One of the various Gnostic systems: 
Since, therefore, it is a complex and multiform task to detect 
and convict all the heretics, and since our design is to reply 
to theT all according to their special characteristics, we have 
judged7necessary, first of all, to give an account of their 
source and root, in order that, by getting a knowledge of their 
most exalted Bythus, you may understand the nature of the tree 
which has produced such fruits. (1.22.2) 3 
Which features of the Gnostic doctrine did Irenaeus concentrate upon? 
In the first place we may take the Gnostic attempt to place the origin 
of evil, and hence a radical dualism, within the Godhead itself. 
4 In 
consequence the necessity and nature of redemption is presented as 
wholly a series of events within the life and being of God. 
There was dispute among the Valentinian Gnostics as to whether Abyss 
was originally alone or was matched from the outset with Silence (also 
called Grace and Thought). 
5 Either way, 'eternal and unbegotten, he 
remained throughout innumerable cycles of ages in profound serenity 
I 
9 
and quiescence. ' 
6 
For reasons not, specified, and again according to 
different versions a different pattern, Abyss and Silence produced two 
7 
Aeons, Mind and Truth 4, From these latter two were projected a further 
four Aeons, Word and Life, Man and Church. These Aeons wished to 
glorify Mind (also called Father) and projected in two groups a further 
eleven pairs, making a Pleroma of 30 Aeons, in 15 male/female syzygies. 
The last female Aeon in the chain of emanations is Wisdom (Sophia). 
The Pleroma has a hierarchical structure, and Mind alone can know the 
Abyss, having emanated directly from him. The lower Aeons longed to 
know whence they came, and the unrest caused by, ignorance was too much 
a for the lowest and latest Aeon, Sophia, who fell into frenzy of pre- )7 sumption. In attempting the impossible she faced the risk of dissolution 
into the unknowable depths of Bythus. Sophia was saved by a power 
called Limit (Horos), but in the process her passion or frenzy was 
detached as a formless entity outside the Pleroma. Hence the pessimistic 
Gnostic account of creation begins, to which I shall in due course return. 
This description of a hierarchical and. unhappy Pleroma raised a basic 
issue for Irenaeus. 8 
He opposed the notion that evil could originate from within the Godhead. 
The idea that an Aeon could fall into sin was bad enough, but Irenaeus 
saw that such a suggestion would recoil on the first male Aeon issued, 
called Mind or Father, and ultimately on Bythus himself. 
What sort of a being must that Bythus be, who allows a stain 
to have place in His own bosom, and_, permits another one to 
create or produce within His territory, contrary to His own 
will? (11.4.2) 
Irendeus is not unwilling to answer for the Gnostics: their God either 
contains 'defect and error' (11.4.3) or 'will be found to be the slave 
9 
of necessity and fate' (11.5.4). What else, Irenaeus sarcastically 
enquires, is implied in the Gnostic teaching that the created world 
came into existence apart from the desire of the supreme God? Was 
he callously indifferent to the outcome of the extraordinary events 
outside the Pleroma? Or was he simply powerless to stop, or at least 
control and direct towards a good end, these unfortunate events? 
Either way, he could not be the omnipotent and loving God portrayed 
in the Scriptures. 
Goodness 
Against the first horn of the dilemma 
9 he has exposed, the idea that 
God could either contain or be the author of evil, Irenaeus insists 
upon the absolute goodness of God: 
For with the name of God the following words will harmonize: 
intelligence, word, life, incorruption, truth, wisdom, 
goodness, and such like. (11.13.9) 
God also is truly perfect in all things, Himself equal and 
similar to Himself, as He is all light, and all mind, and 
all substance, and the fount of all good. (IV. 11.2) 
Such assertions may seem to evade rather than to solve the problem, 
for to assume that the supreme power in or over the world is good is 
hardly to prove the point. Who is to say that God is good? Such a 
claim certainly needs careful justification, for it is not enough simply 
to maintain that the fact that God is good is a valid philosophical 
proposition. There is of course more basis to Irenaeus' claim that God 
is good than this, but often he can appear to think that it is obvious 
that God is good, when in fact it is not so obvious to unprejudiced 
reason. How deeply was Irenaeus aware that the Christian belief in the 
goodness of creation, upon which the corresponding confession of the 
goodness of the Creator depends, was an article of faith? Are his 
attempts to prove thereasonableness of this faith a little overdone? 
10 
We shall consider this question as we examine the two main types of 
argument he uses to demonstrate the'absolute goodness of God. 
The most prominent line of argument - indeed, it can be said to 
dominate both Irenaeus' extant works is exegetical. Irenaeus sets 
out to be thoroughly biblical in his arguments, more so than any other 
known writer of the first two'centuries of our era. It is not, however, 
an abstract goodness that Irenaeus sets out to demonstrate, for that God 
is good is rather to be seen from the goodness of all He has made and 
done. Perhaps the key conception he has of God's good work is its co- 
herence. He takes great pains to prove from Scripture the coherent 
unity of God, Christ, salvation histor y, creation in its diversity, man 
in his organic complexity, the witness of Scripture (in spite of problem 
texts), and the Church. We shall return to consider the success of 
Irenaeus' exegesis at various of these points in this and succeeding 
chapters. Because the goodness of God is demonstrated only in His actual 
work of creation and incarnation we shall not pursue the matter here but 
return at the appropriate times to the issue of God's goodness. 
10 
In addition to his extended exegetical demonstration of the essential 
and complete goodness of God, Irenaeus is prepared to appeal directly 
to the harmony and beauty of creation as evidence of God's providential 
goodness. 
11 That such natural theology is sub ordinate to the claims of 
revelation as attested in Scripture is shown by the following passage: 
For if the manifestation of God which is made by means of 
creation, affords life to all living in the earth, much more 
does that revelation of the Father which comes through the 
Word, give life to those who seek God. (IV. 20.7) 
However, such limited use of the demonstration of God's goodness from 
the observed goodness of creation raised the thorny challenge of the 
reality and perversity of evil. How well Irenaeus' theology copes here 
will again be the subject of a later chapter. This area of Irenaeus, 
thought is crucial to its overall integrity. Reflection upon the course 
taken by eighteenth-century optimism should indicate that it is not enough 
to try to persuade oneself that the goodness of God, and hence the good- 
ness of creation, is basically no more than the most valid and hopeful 
philosophical presupposition available. 
Omnipotence 
Against the other horn of the dilemma he has exposed, the idea that God 
was not omnipotent, Irenaeus insists on the absolute power of God. Yet 
it is. instructive to note that he does not insist on such power as simply 
a necessary property of the Supreme Being, 
12 but rather he refers to 
God's sovereign power as it is exhibited in his mighty deeds of creation 
and redemption: 
They do not believe that God, being powerful and rich in all 
resources, created matter itself, inasmuch as they do not 
know how much a spiritual and divine essence can accomplish. 
(11.10.3) 
And then the doctrine concerning the resýrrection of bodies 
will emerge true and certain ..... For God is superior to 
nature, and has in Himself the will (to raise the dead), 
because He is good; and the ability to do so, because He 
is mighty; and the faculty of fully carrying out His purpose, 
because He is rich and perfect. (11.29.2) 13 
I Had Irenaeus wished to stress God's free and sovereign power he had useful 
Scriptural material available. He must have been aware of the old credal 
passages in the Old Testament which extol Yahweh's power over Israel's 
enemies, as found in Exodus 15 and Judges 5. He was certainly aware of 
Paul's use in Romans 9: 20-23 of the Old Testament theme of the potter's 
supreme power over his clay. However, it is interesting to note that 
there are no, references to these passages in Irenaeus' extant works. He 
makes no referenceat all to the Book of Job. Because.. of th(P concrete 
nature of his conception of divine omnipotencey we will not pursue the 
12- 
theme any further at present, because it will surface at various 
points in our discussion of the doctrine of creation. 
14 
Richness 
Just what Irenaeus meant by the attribution of power to God can be 
further illustrated by his frequent mention of the richness of God. 
This was evidently one of his favourite terms for describing God. At 
first sight the Gnostic Pleroma of 30 (or more) Aeons might seem to 
deserve this adjective more than Irenaeus' ruling conception of the unity 
of the Godhead. Such an apparently plausible suggestion to some extent 
underlies the popular appeal of Gnosticism. 
15 
It is-, in response to such 
a challenge that Irenaeus develops his concept of God's richness. As 
with God's power, he does not refer to an abstract richness, but a richness 
which is illustrated by, although not confined to, 
16 
His dealings with 
creation: 
His power in creation (11.10.3 and 11.29.2 - as quoted 
above) 17 
His foreknowledge of all things: 
..... all things which had been foreknown of the Father, 
our Lord did accomplish in their order, season, and hour, 
foreknown and fitting, being indeed one and the same, but 
rich and great. (111.16.7) 18 
His ceaseless care for man: 
For neither does God at any time cease to confer benefits 
upon or to enrich man; nor does man evercease from receiving 
the benefits, and being enriched by God. (IV. 11.2) 
(iv) The diversity and unity of the covenants: 
Thus, in a variety of ways, He adjusted the human race to 
an agreement with salvation. On this account does John 
declare in the Apocalypse, 'And His voice as the sound of 
many waters I (Rev. 1: 15). For the Spirit is truly many waters, 
since the Father is both rých and great. (IV. 14.2) 19 
His ability and desire to recreate this world in the 
millennium: 
'Wolves and lambs shall then browse together and the lion 
shall eat straw like the ox, and the serpent earth as if 
it were bread' (Is. 40: 6 etc. ) .... for God is rich in all 
things. (V. 33.4) 20 
13 
In different but related ways all five of these extracts associate the 
richness of God with His power over, and involvement in, the created 
universe and the salvation history which, for the sake of creation, 
occurs within it. 
This richness of God's operation can be illustrated by a brief reference 
to Irenaeus' doctrine of salvation. If we put to Irenaeus' extant 
writings the question of the Reformation as to whether God or man is 
the subject of salvation, we find a complicated picture. On the one 
11 
side are various statements which seem to affirm the*freedom of man as 
the key determinant, and hence Irenaeus has often been charged with fore- 
shadowing Pelagianism or semi-Pelagianism. This side of his teaching 
we cannot consider at this point. On the other side, however, are more 
numerous statements putting the divine initiative at the centre of the 
picture. Within this latter class of statements we find that Irenaeus 
makes considerable use of what might be called divine instrumentality. 
By this is meant that salvation is mediated by various attributes or 
properties or extensions of God in Christ in His saving activity. We 
may mention Irenaeus' use of the following: virgin (IV. 33.4); law 
(V. 21.2); name (V. 11.1); flesh and blood of Christ (V. 14.3); eucharist 
(IV. 18.5). Most important, however, is Irenaeus' development of the 
doctrine of the Trinity, where he describes the activity of God and His 
two Hands as a complex process with different aspects. This diversity 
of expression directs us to the richness of God as described by Irenaeus. 
21 
The next chapter will return to consider Irenaeus, doctrine of the 
Trinity, and thus the relation between these various approaches to 
describing the action of God in the world. The present chapter attempts 
to exhibit the richness of God more directly from His unity, by considering 
1+ 
Irenaeus' comparatively neglected teachingýon the diversity of 
the attributes of the God revealed to Israel and the Church: 
For the prophets did not ' 
announce one and another God, 
but one and the same: under various aspects, however, 
and many titles. For varied and rich in attribute is 
the Father.... (111.10.6) 
Long-suffering and Patience 
At this point, in order that we can better understand what for 
Irenaeus the goodness, power and richness of God involve, it is 
appropriate to refer to another significant property of God which 
he recognised. For Irenaeus God is -long-suffering or patient ("Kpo&v? Aos , 
22 
vtvo)(jj_; magnanimus, patientia, longanimitas. ). r--T- 
Sometimes Irenaeus refers this long-suffering directly to the life and 
especially to the death of Jesus Christ: 
And from this fact, that He exclaimed upon the cross, I Father, 
forgive ther4, for they know not what they do, (Luke 23: 34) 
the long-suffering, patience, compassion, and goodness 
of Christ are exhibited, since He both suffered, and.... 
(loved) the human race to such a degree, that He even prayed 
for those putting Him to death. (111.18.5)23 
On other occasions Irenaeus is more concerned to emphasise that 
inHis patience God gives space and time for man to grow in stature 
as he learns the responsible use of freedom. Rere he is anxious 
to stress that God in His love does not consume His handiwork, 
even though it is in great need of salvation from its present state: 
And in man, as well as in angels, He has placed. the power 
of choice (for angels are rational beings), so that those who 
had yielded obedience might justly possess what is good, 
given indeed by God, but preserved by themselves. On the 
other hand, they who have not obeyed shall .... deservedly merit 
the just judgment ofGod, which also the Apostle Paul testifies 
in his Epistle to the Romans, where he says, 'But do you 
despise the riches of His goodness, and patience, and long- 
suffering, being ignorant that the oodnessof God leads you to 
repentance? ' (Rom. 2: 14) (IV. 37.1) 
54 
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This side of Irenaeus' teaching concerning the patience of God 
is closely associated with his well-known belief that man heeds 
to 'learn by experiencel,, Adam and Eve having been created in 
a child-like and gullible state. The first part of this approach, 
that man needs to learn by experience, had featured strongly in 
the Church's r esponse to the presence of evil in the world; in 
a later chapter we shall look carefully at Irenaeus' use of such 
apology, and compare it with the similar but perhaps not identical 
thought of a modern author, J. Hick, who has claimed to base his 
theodicy on 'the Irenaean approach'. 
These two sides to Irenaeus' conception of God's long-suffering 
are to some extent brought together when he speaks of the foresight 
of God in planning and patiently executing the successive stages 
in salvation-history, culminating in the incarnation and atonement: 
Long-suffering therefore was God, when man became a defaulter, 
as forseeing that victory which should be granted to him 
through the Word .... For as He patiently suffered Jonah 
to be swallowed by the whale .... so also, from the beginning, did God patiently allow man to be swallowed by the great whale, 
who was -the author of transgression, not that he should 
perish altogether when so engulfed; but He arranged and 
prepared the plan of salvation, which was accomplished by 
the Word. (111.20.1) 25 
We shall return to some of the issues raised here when we consider 
how Irenaeus sees God's interaction with His creation through the 
various stages of the history of creation and salvation. At this 
point, however, we should emphasise that it would be a mistake to 
interpret God's long-suffering as a sign of His weakness or impotence. 
While not making the decision of God to save man an automatic or 
necessary process, Irenaeus never suggests that there was ever any 
possibility that man would not be saved by God's patient but powerful 
1ý 
decree. Arguably, we should go further and speak of God's suffering, 
and even Idefencelessness' as the form which His power takes, 
26 
thus modifying Irenaeus' account. But theologians aretreading on 
thin ice with such suggestions, even if it be agreed that Irenaeus 
does not give adequate attention to the implications of the crucifixion. 
We shall return to the issues here at other junctures, and particularly 
in the discussion of providence. In the meantime, in order to gain 
a better understanding of the place of the concept of God's patience 
in Irenaeus' theology it is helpful to look at the context in which 
he brings this property of God to the forefront. Examination of 
his writings shows that in addition to the usual background of the 
anti-Gnostic polemic, there is also his specific opposition to Tatian. 
27 
The Gnostic system offall, creation and redemption is built around 
the passion of the last (and therefore outermost) of the Aeons, 
Sophia. Sophia is portrayed as moved by various emotions: grief, 
fear, bewilderment, shock, repentance. 
28 The important point for 
the present context is that the passions of Sophia, hypostatised 
in 'Achamoth', are responsible for the hature and existence of material 
and psychic reality. Psychic or animal existence is derived from 
Achamoth's repentance and prayer, while material existence is derived 
from her passions of sorrow, terror, joy, laughter, anger and bewilder- 
ment. 
29 
Irenaeus strongly opposes any admission of these passionate events 
within the Godhead: 
30 
If they had known the Scriptures, and been taught the truth, 
they would have known, beyond doubt, that God is not as men 
are; and that His thoughts are not like the thoughts of men. 
for the Father of all is at a vast distance from those 
affections and passions which operate among men. (11.13.2) 
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The reference here tothe 'vast distance' between God and the passions 
of men is significant. For Irenaeus, to be subject to passion 
implies limitation due to subjection to an external constraint. 
The key issue here for Irenaeus is that for God to be God He must 
be free and independent of all necessity: 
It is not seemly, however, to say of Him who is God over 
all, since He is free and independent, that He was a slave 
to necessity .... For it wouldhave. been much better, more 
consistent, and more God-like, to cut off at the beginning 
the principle of this kind of necessity, than afterwards, 
as if moved by repentance ....... (11.5.4) 
Such teaching upon the sovereign transcendence of God was held in 
one or another form by many theologians and philosophers in the 
second century, particularly those influenced by Middle Platonism. 31 
However, such emphasis is not without well recognised difficulties. 
These centre around the adoption of too strong a distinction between 
the realms of Being and becoming, God and creation. Irenaeus was 
more aware of these difficulties than most of his predecessors and 
immediate successors. 
32 
His teaching upon the long-suffering of 
God illustrates the theological development which is taking place 
in his thought as he encounters the problem of relating uncreated 
to created existence. There is a constancy of purpose but not thereby 
a remoteness in God's dealings with the creation He loves and cherishes. 
This is not to be denied, and is fundamentally biblical. 
33 However, 
it can be asked whether Irenaeus did not remove God a little too 
far from the realm of human passions. On at least twenty-three 
34 
occasions the Gospels refer to Jesus as praying to His Father. Irenaeus 
makes no positive reference to any of these verses, partly because 
the Gnostics did do so. 
35 For the Gnostics, as we have seen, psychic 
creation originated from the prayer and repentance of Achamoth. Simila-ly 
it may well be partly because of the ontological place of the tears 
of Achamoth in the Gnostic system that Irenaeus makes no positive 
Is 
reference to the Gospel accounts of Jesus' tears. 
36 In the Old 
Testament the faithful patience of God is exhibited in the use of 
the term hesed, which is probably best translated 'covenant love'. 
This concept is of major importance in'the Old Testament. However, 
on several dozen occasions the Old Testament makes direct reference 
to God repenting. Abraham intercedes for Sodom and Gomorrah, and 
God repents. 
37 Moses successfully asks God to repent of His anger 
agaimst Israel. 
38 Are we to believe that Abraham and Moses really 
influenced God? In some sense, even if not in the crude sense, 
this must be true, if we are to stand with Irenaeus under and 
not over Scripture. In the story of the potter and his clay in 
Jeremiah 18, Jeremiah does not ask God to repent, but this merely 
serves to emphasise the message of the parable that God may well 
repent of the judgement or good he intends against a particular 
nation. Irenaeus makes no reference to these examples of divine 
repentance. 
39 His only reference to God repenting occurs in the 
story of Jonah and the Ninevites, and he makes no comment upon 
the implications of divine repentance. 
40 
The teaching that God is impassible ( Antkg: ýS is common in post- 
I- 
canonical writings, orthodox and heterodox. Ignatius uses it to 
speak of the divine nature of Christ (f2h-7.2; Polyc. 3,2), though 
in both cases Ignatius also speaks of the passion and suffering 
of Christ. Ignatius believes that a similar combination of passion 
and impassible serenity should characterise the martyrdom he expected. 
Justin als o refers both to the impassibility of God (I Apol. 25.2), 
and to the impassibility of faithful Christians (2 Apol. L. 2). 
Irenaeus is instructed by this now traditional teaching, and is 
further led by the Gnostic account of passion in the Godhead to 
acknowledge that God and His Logos must be impassible: 
19 
It necessarily follows, therefore, both that he who 
springs from Him as Logos, or rather that Nous himself, 
since he is Logos, must be perfect and impassible. 
(11.11 7) 
In all this Irenaeus does less than justice to the biblical notion 
of the living God. The impassible is'not as, such divine. God is 
impassible in His constant and purposeful life as the Creator and 
Redeemer: it is not a question of immobility or abstract unity and 
simplicity. It is in His rich and sovereign life that God is 
impassible, that is, unable to be that which He does not eternally 
41 2 
will. The New Testament itself does not use the word O(TrOk& 
However, just as with Ignatius there are two aspects to God, the 
impassible and the passible, so it is with Irenaeus. Although the 
Gnostics allowed that Aeons were potentially passible, such passion 
was not to be w&lcomed or accepted. The aim of their mythology is 
to demonstrate the removal of passion from the Godhead. This is 
achieved by the secret gnosis, and hence the crucifixion could not 
involve the Godhead. Their Christology thus becomes docetic, and 
against this docetism Irenaeus firmly maintains that Christ truly 
suffered. 
42 We cannot discuss his doctrine of atonement here, but we 
can see that Irenaeus' conception of the long-suffering or patience of 
God is shaped by the Gnostic combination of rejection and crude acceptance 
of passion in God: 
But as our Lord is alone truly Master, so the Son of God 
is truly good and patient, the Word of God the Father having 
been made the Son of Man. For He fought and conquered; 
for He was man contending for the fathers, and through 
obedience doing away with disobedience completely: for He 
bound the strong man, and set free the weak, and endowed His 
own handiwork with salvation, by destroying sin. For He is 
a most gracAous and merciful Lord, and loves the human race. 
(111.18.6) 
The Gnostic, or at least the Valentinian, approach to redemption was to 
zo 
reverse the journey of the fall, which was due to ignorance, by the 
impartation of-gnosis. The fragments of divine Spirit sojourn in 
the world awaiting illumination through the gnosis. The spiritual 
elite among mankind being sufficiently prepared, the gnosis itself 
is finally brought down by Christ, descending upon Jesus at his baptism 
and departing from him before his passion, so that death was deceived, 
the suffering of Jesus being seen as no more than a trick. The real 
passion concerned Sophia before the world was conceived, and made 
salvation necessary, rather than bringing it. 
43 With a certain degree 
of exaggeration, Irenaeus sternly characterises this teaching: 
(This) doctrine is homicidal, conjuring up, as it does, 
a number of gods, and simulating many Fathers, but 
lowering and dividing the Son of God in many ways. (111.16.8) 
Although he dismisses the Gnostic doctrine in this fashion, as is 
usually the case, it acts as a stimulus to the development of various 
aspects of his theology. In IV. 17, in response to the question of what 
did happen at Jesus' baptism if the Gnostic account is false, Irenaeus 
begins to develop his doctrine of the Spirit. Thus far in A. H. it has 
hardly surfaced at all. In stressing the oneness of the Jesus Christ 
who was born of the Virgin Mary, baptised in the Jordan, and crucified 
on Golgotha, Irenaeus opens up space for his doctrine of the Spirit. 
44 
He introduces ideas he will develop at greater length later in the 
treatise: the Spirit unifies the Church, joins believers to God, bestows 
incorruption on body and soul, 
45 is poured out on all the earth, and 
conveys the image of God. 
46 The Gnostics, by contrast: 
.... set the Spirit aside altogether; they understand that 
Christ was one and Jesus another: and they teach that there 
was not one Christ, but many. (111.17.4) 
By developing his doctrine of the Spirit Irenaeus will be able to 
zi 
nurture the doctrine of progressive salvation which is found-in the 
latter half of A. H., and which dominates the Demonstration. The 
Gnostic dualism separated the Creator God of Moses and the prophets 
from the Father of Christ, and in this way it destroyed the integrity 
of the theology of history, which, Irenaeus sa, w, lay at the nerve- 
centre of the Christian Gospel. This development is allied to Irenaeus, 
teaching on the pre-existence of Christ, 'who was always present with 
47 48 
mankind', and on the foreknowledge and plan of the omniscient Father. 
We shall see how these ideas cohere when we consider his doctrine of 
the--Trinity. For the present purpose we can now see why Irenaeus opened 
Chapter 20 of Book Three., 'Long-Suffering, therefore, was God.... I In 
order to emphasise that Irenaeus does not take the-patience of God as 
in any way a sign of weakness, we should note that, immediately after 
his lengthy defence , against his Gnostic opponents, of the unity of 
Jesus Christ as God and man, Irenaeus also marks his position off from 
that of Tatian. The immediate question at issue is the salvation of 
Adam, which, Irenaeus claims, Tatian denied. 
49 
Irenaeus' immediate objection to such teaching is that it confuses the 
devil with Adam, whoahe sees as God's 'own handiwork' (111.23.1). The 
contrast yet connexion between Christ and Adam, taken from St. Paul, 
has been shown to be fundamental to Irenaeus' theology, and especially 
to his opposition to Gnosticism. 
50 
Tatian's apparent disparagement of 
Adam is, however, immediately seen to raise questions concerning the 
nature and character of the Creator Himself, for, in Irenaeus' thought, 
Adam is both distinguished from the rest of mankind, and identified 
with them. 
51 
Irenaeus is thus drawn to defend the constancy of God's 
purpose in creation and redemption. In doing so he again intr6duces 
the attribute 'long-suffering', and, lest such a property might be seen 
22. 
to imply any weakness or impotence in God, he qualifies it with the 
attribute 'invincible': 
For if man, who had been_. created by God that he might live, 
after losing life, through being injured by the serpent 
that had corrupted him, should not any more return to 
life, but should be utterly abandoned to death, God would 
have been conquered, and the wickedness of the serpent would 
have prevailed over the will of God. But in as much as God 
is invincible and long-suffering, He did indeed show Himself 
to be long-suffering in the matter of the correction of man... 
(111.23.1) 
Mercy and Justice 
It is not suprising to find that the God who is good, omnipotent, rich 
and long-suffering, is also merciful. 
52 Before presenting Irenaeus' 
teaching here, however, it is necessary to digress briefly concerning 
his relation to Marcionism. Throughout A. H. and the Demonstration 
there is a generally quiet but occasionally bellicose debate with 
Marcion and his followers. In the long run it was Marcion, rather than 
Valentinus, who posed the greater threat to emerging orthodoxy. The 
Gnostics were undoubtedly popular for a while, but their system was too 
esoteric to strike deep roots. To the second-century world their 
fatalistic outlook could have only a passing appeal. The general air 
of religious scepticism which beset theRoman Empire in the second century 
was not to be dispelled by Gnostic fatalism, even if it did seem to offer 
its adherents a somewhat spectacular exit,. from the surrounding evil 
world. The case with Marcion is certainly different, although the precise 
relationship between Marcion and Gnosticism has been the subject of 
vigorous debate in the present century. The discussion was stimulated 
by Harnack's justly famous monograph, 
53 
with its contention that Marcion 
was no Gnostic at all, but the first Christian reformer and the restorer 
of Paulinism. The main truth in Harnack's opinion is that Marcion 
neither attempted to imitate the Gnostic attempts to span the gulf 
2.3 
between the infinite and finite by a mythological series of emanations, 
nor sought within the life of the Pleroma the reason for the disorder 
in the visible world. Nevertheless, Irenaeus saw clearly that the 
excision by Marcion of the Gnostic myth of the fall of Sophia, allied 
to his retention of a strict division between the just Creator God of 
the Jews and the merciful Redeemer God of Pauline Christianity, merely 
caused the implicit Gnostic attribution of evil to the Creator to 
become more pronounced: 
And, indeed, the followers of Marcion do directly blaspheme 
the Creator, alleging him to be the creator. ofevils, (but) 
holding a more tolerable theory as to his origin, maintaining 
that there are two beings, Gods by nature, differing from 
each other, the one being good, but the other evil. (111.12.12) 
While Irenaeus recognised at least some of the differences between 
Marcion and the Gnostics, he at the same time acknowledged their common 
characteristics. In A. H. he links Marcion with Cerinthus, and especially 
Cerdo. It was from Cerdo, according to Irenaeus, who is our only 
authority, that Marcion while in Rome first learnt the rudiments of his 
own system: 
( Cerdo) taught that the God proclaimed by the Law and the 
prophets was not the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. For 
the former was known but the latter unknown; while the one 
was also righteous, but the other benevolent. Marcion of 
Pontus succeeded him, and developed his doctrine. In so 
doing, he advanced the most daring blasphemy against Him 
who is proclaimed as God by the law and the'prophets, 
declaring Him to be the author of evils, to take delight 
in war, to be-infirm of purpose, and even to be contrary 
to Himself. (1.27.1) 
Irenaeus promised a special refutation of Marcion, but it does not 
survive and may never have been written. Fortunately, we have Tertullian's 
substantial Adversus Marcionem to supply information on the beliefs and 
practices of the Marcionite sect. A certain consistency can be seen: 
Marcion's Christology shows a definite but controlled Gnostic tendency. 
1'ý 
Thus Christ was not the Messiah promised in the Old Testament, and he 
was not born of the Virgin Mary: he simply appeared unannounced and 
unexpected. But he did not evade the cross, as the Gnostics had taught. 
Rather the cross represents the unsolicited grace of the good God in, 
redeeming all souls (not, of course, the bodies in which they are 
trapped) from the power of the Demiurge. There is no real concept of 
atonement, because there is no past relationship to heal. The whole 
theory rests upon 'an irreducible mystery of the divine goodness as 
such. ' 
54 The basic appeal in Marcion's theology derives from the 
answer it supplies to the problem of evil, the blame being laid on the 
intractability of matter and the incompetence of the Creator. 
55 
Marcion would seem to have something in common with Tatian, at least 
in general outlook. 
56 Both were ascetic, and if Tatian does not 
explicitly regard the Creator as the author of evil, he does blame the 
freedom given to His creation. 
57 The difference is not as significant 
as at first sight it may seem. Irenaeus certainly attacks a similar 
aspect of the teaching of Marcion and Tatian. Whereas Tatian's attempt 
to exclude Adam from salvation is opposed, it is Marcion's effort to 
exclude Abraham and his race from salvation which becomes the focus of 
attention in IV. 8. Throughout Book Four of Adversus Haereses Irenaeus 
is concerned to insist that there is one author and one end to both 
covenants. The particular arguments of the Marcionites, that the God' 
of the Old Testament was the author of evil and sin, are present through- 
out and are directly refuted in Chapters 29 and 30. Such arguments 
issued a much more serious challenge to the emerging orthodoxy than 
the flights of Gnostic mythology could ever--- have done, and the theology 
Irenaeus develops in reply has provoked the greatest debate among his 
critics. We shall give some assessment of this controversy when we come 
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to consider Irenaeus' understanding of evil. 
It is against this background that Irenaeus speaks of God as merciful. 
Naturally he associates God's mercy with His disposition to save man- 
kind, but it is clear that such a disposition flows from the very 
nature of God: 
It is indeed proper to God, and befitting His character, 
to show mercy and pity, and to bring salvation to His 
creatures even though they be brought under danger of 
destruction. 'For with Him', says Scripture, 'is 
propitiation' (Ps. 130: 7). Fragment 10, preserved in 
John of Damascus, and probably from Irenaeus' De 
Pp-, iirvi-nti nnP - 
Irenaeus clearly wishes to avoid both an unbalanced stress on God's 
mercy (as exemplified by Marcion) and an equally unbalanced stress 
on God's righteousness (as exemplified by Tatian), and hence he tries 
to hold together in a complex, organic unity the mercy and righteousness, 
or the love and wrath of God: 
Marcion, therefore, himself, by dividing God into two, 
maintaining one to be good and the other judicial, does 
in fact, on both sides, put an end to deity. For he that 
is the judicial one, if he be not good, is not God, because 
he from whom goodness is absent is no God at all; and again, 
he who is good, if he has no judicial power, suffers the 
same (loss) as the former, by being deprived of his character 
of deity. (111.25.3) 
Does this mean that fox, Irenaeus God's justice and mercy co-exist in a 
dialectical tension? That would certainly not solve, but, concentrated 
now in one divine principle, might even increase, the disjunction between 
God's mercy and His justice. Hence he is immediately drawn to assert: 
For He is good, and merciful, and patient, and saves whom He 
ought: nor does goodness desert Him in the exercise of justice, 
nor is His wisdom lessened; for He saves those whom He should 
save, and judges those worthy of judgement. Neither does He 
show Himself unmercifully just; f6r, His goodness, no doubt, 
goes on before, and takes precedency. (111.25.3) 
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However edifying this may at first seem, it is also inadequate, for 
what concept of judgement is implied by Irenaeus? Who are those who 
are 'worthy of judgement" - besides, of course, the Gnostics and 
Marcionites? What is meant by praeeunte scilicet et praecedente 
bonitate? Book Three is now drawing to a close and Irenaeus does 
not elaborate. To the present writer the basic problem seems to be 
that it is still assumed by Irenaeus - in common with his opponents - 
that the exercise of judgement and salvation are in essence mutually 
exclusive possibilities. For Irenaeus, Jesus Christ 'shall come in 
glory, Saviour of those who are saved, and the Judge of those who are 
judged' (111.4.2). 58 The problems with such a sa-paration between the 
judgement and mercy of God, as Irenaeus, when opposing Gnostics and 
Marcionites, knows very well, is that it implies a corresponding division 
in the being of God. To attempt to overcome this merely-- by asserting 
the precedence of God's goodness (or loveý, mercy etc. ) places a question 
over the integrity and reality of God Is judgement and righteousness. As 
a theologian Irenaeus clearly wants to holdtogether the mercy and justice 
of God, and also recognises that his opponents do not. Quite out of 
character he now brings Plato to his defence: 
Plato is proved to be more religious than these men, for 
he allowed that the same God was both just and good, having 
power over all things, and Himself executing judgement, 
expressing himself thus, 'And God ..... does everything rightly 
...... retributive Justice always follows against those who 
dppart from the divine law'. (111.25.5) 
Throughout the following two books of A. H. and the later Demonstration 
59 
a similar attitude to the relation of the mercy of God to His justice 
can be found. This emerges in a striking fashion at the end of A. H. in 
connection with the inauguration of Christ's millennial rule. The 
judgement of God upon those who are damned follows the resurrection of 
the righteous (Irenaeus relies upon Revelation 20 here). Those who are 
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damned 'according to their own choice ....... being in fact destitute 
of all good, do experience every kind of punishment'. 
60 Is God 
then the author of punishment and hence of evil? The Marcionite 
question presses upon Irenaeus, and he immediately continues: 
God, however, does not punish them immediately of Himself, 
but that punishment falls upon them because they are 
destitute of all that is good. 
Should wenot reverse our earlier question and ask what kind of under- 
standing of the mercy and grace of God such a conception of judgement 
implies? Has Irenaeus, in attempting to avoid the pitfalls in which 
the Gnostics and Marcionites were trapped, stumbled into the type of 
error he had detected and opposed in Tatian? The query can be put 
simply: why, on this view, should Adam be saved? What, indeed, has 
become of the pre-eminent goodness of God? 
The relation between the mercy and righteousness of God is a basic 
and pervasive theme throughout the Bible, from the expulsion of Adam 
from Paradise, through the treatment Israel receives at the hands of 
God, to the eschatological teaching of the New Testament. Central to 
the New Testament is St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans, which attempts 
to understand the constancy of God throughout His historical dealings 
with the descendants of Adam in &eneral and of Israel in particular. 
The climax of the Epistle might justly be claimed to be reached at the 
well-known end of Chapter 11: 
For God has consigned all men to disobedience, that he may 
have mercy upon all. 0 the depth of the riches and wisdom 
and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judkements 
and how inscrutable his ways! (Romans 11: 32-33) 
Irenaeus' extant writings contain two references to these verses, 
among numerous references to other parts of the Epistle. The first 
ze 
(1.10.3) refers to the general inscrutability of God's ways, which put 
special demands upon those who would understand the less obvious 
aspects of Christian belief as presented in Holy Scripture. 
61 The 
second reýference is more promising in that it prompts Irenaeus to 
introducethe person and work of the Saviour to explain the implications 
of Romans 11: 32: 
(The believer) ...... looks forward to the time when he shall 
become like Him who died for him, for He, too, 'was made in 
the likeness of sinful flesh' (Romans 8: 3), to condemn sin, 
and to cast it, as now a condemned thing, away beyond the 
flesh ...... (Christ being) the Word of God who dwelt in man, 
and became the Son of man, that He might accustom man to 
receive God, and God to dwell in man, according to the good 
pleasure of the Father. (111.20.2) 
The reference here to the incarnation and atonement allows Irenaeus to 
accord to the judgement and righteousness of God a more consistent place 
in his dealings with man and creation. Rather than falling primarily 
upon Gnostics and others, the judgementof God is presented, true to 
St. Paul, as falling upon sin in the person of Jesus 'who was made in 
the likeness of sinful flesh' (Romans 8: 3). Just how faithfully and 
comprehensively Irenaeus develops St. Paul's teaching upon the relation 
of God's mercy to His righteousness has been a subject of considerable 
debate. Harnack's comment stands for many others: 'It is the thoughts 
of Paul to which Irenaeus tried to accommodate himself without having 
the same feeling about the flesh and sin as this Apostle' (Hist. Dog. 
II, p. 274, n. 3). 
While it would be difficult to maintain that Irenaeus fully appreciated 
Paul's teaching on sin and redemption, more can be said than Harnack 
would allow. Harnack shows little appreciation of the similar theological 
intention of both Paul and Irenaeus to show how the same God exhibits 
both mercy and justice, with His mercy taking a certain precedence. 
62 
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He passes briefly and almost impatiently over Irenaeus' doctrine of 
God (Hist. Dog. II, pp. 253-256), concluding his remarks with the following 
sentence, which contains his only mention of Irenaeus' treatment of 
God's attributes of mercy and justice: 'The early Catholic doctrine 
of God shows an advance beyond that of the Apologists, in so far as 
God's attributes of goodness and righteousness are expressly discussed, 
and it is proved in opposition to Marcion that they are not mutually 
exclusive, but necessarily involve each other. '(Hist. Dog. II, p. 255f). 
As the present chapter attempts to show, there is more to Irenaeus, 
doctrine of God, and his understanding of Paul, than Harnack admits. 
The Pauline thrust of Irenaeus' thought here can be seen from his use 
of Paul to counter the Gnostic belief that only an earthly Jesus 
suffered on the cross, the Aeon Christ having previously left Him. In 
111.16.18 Irenaeus assembles a variety of texts from Paul, together 
with some from the Gospels, to prove that the one Jesus Christ, -the 
Son of God became Son of Man, suffered on our behalf and died for our 
sins. However, IrenaeuslChristological teaching here is not properly 
integrated into his subsequent understanding of man's freB responsibility 
in the face of the future judgement. This problem will occupy us again 
in a later context, but we will examine it further at this point, because 
our discusdon will introduce from a useful perspective the question of 
Irenaeus' dependence upon, and possible plagiarisation ofthose traditions 
to which he was immediately heir. 
In his attempt to show that the God declared by Jesus is a God of love 
and mercy, and not a God of vengeance and righteousness, Marcion removed 
from the emerging collection of New Testament writings those parts he 
felt had been added by Jewish interpreters of the original message of 
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Jesus. He believed that Christ called the Apostle Paul to restore 
this original message, and so made certain of Paul's letters, together 
with parts of the Gospel of Luke, his guiding canon. Even in the 
letters of Paul which he retained he anitted some passages. The 
Gnostics, rather than objecting to established Apostolic writings, had 
tended to compose their own gospels and holy writings. In response to 
both Gnostics and Marcionites the Church proceeded to establish the 
orthodox canon as we know it. The relevant point in the present context, 
however, is that Marcion's position could only be sustained by rejecting 
a good part of the emerging New Testament along with the whole of the 
Old Testament. In response, Irenaeus pointed out that the judgement and 
vengeance of God are declared more forcefully in the New Testament than 
in the Old Testament: 
Inasmuch, then as in both Testaments there is the same 
righteousness of God (displayed) when God takes v, engeance, 
in the one case indeed typically, temporarily, and more 
moderately ; but in the other, really, enduringly, and 
more rigidly: for the fire is eternal and the wrath of Goa 
wkich shall be revealed from heaven ...... entails a heavier 
punishment on those who incur it. (IV. 28.1)63 
Throughout the New Testament it is emphasised that it is precisely 
in the righteous judgement of God that the depth of His mercy and love 
are revealed. If this is a particular theme of Paul in Romans, it can 
hardly be said to be absent elsewhere in the New Testament. This applies 
to the Gospels with their remarkable emphasis on the passion story'as 
much as to the Epistles with their frequent references to the cross or 
blood or sacrifice of Christ, and Revelation is dominated by the central 
figure of the Lamb that was slain. Only if we are able to see the love 
and mercy of God as including rather than excluding his righteous judge- 
ment will we at bottom feel secure in the knowledge of this divine love 
towards us. This problem troubled Luther, his solution coming in the 
A 
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soteriological teaching of the Epistle, to the Romans. It also 
troubled Anselm, whose desire to think together God's mercy and 
justice led to the following puzzling conclusion to a discussion 
covering three chapters of the Proslogion: 
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So, then, Your mercy is begotten from Your justice because 
it is just for You to be good to such an extent that You 
are good even in sparing. And perhaps this is why the one 
who is supremely just can will good things for the wicked. 
But if we can somehow grasp why You can will to save the 
wicked, surely we cannot at all understand why from among 
those who are equally wicked You save some and not others 
because of Your supreme goodness, and condemn some and not 
others because of Your supreme justice. ' (Prosl. 11) 
This passage in Anselm raises - though it does not explore in any 
depth - the persistent question of universalism. There is evidently 
a tension in Pauline theology at this point, with the implications of 
Romans 11: 32,2 Corinthians 5: 14,19, Colossians 1: 20 being balanced 
by the other side of Paul's teaching. Irenaeus was not unaware of 
this tension, but neither does he show a deep appreciation of it. 
Here, as elsewhere,, Irenaeus receives from the tradition teaching he 
does not integrate into his overall theology as neatly as we today 
would wish. F. Loofs, in a substantial but posthumous work, 
65 
claimed 
that Irenaeus took over a great deal from lost works chiefly originating 
from Asia Minor, especially Theophilus' Adversus Marcionem. Loofs 
concludes that as a theologian Irenaeus is Iviel kleiner gewesen, 
als man bisher annahm'. 
66 
The details bfLoofs'theory, and especially 
the extent to which he claimed Irenaeus was a mere plagiarist, have 
been vigorously and successfully contested. 
67 The fact that Loofs. 
theory is almost certainly far-fetched should not eliminate the need 
for awareness of Irenaeus' borrowing from previous authors and, indeed, 
from oral, sources. The same should also be said of other writers before 
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and after Irenaeus, some of whom may not havebeen as willing to 
acknowledge their debt to their sources! 
Justin is probably a case in point, for it has been demonstrated that 
there are considerable inconsistencies in his eschatology. 
68 This can 
be taken to indicate that he drew from several sources. In Justin's 
case, unlike that of Irenaeus, there are significant philosophical as 
well as theological antecedents to consider and this may help to explain 
why the obvious inconsistencies are greater in Justin than in Irenaeus. 
This is also true of the doctrine of God in Justin, where philosophical 
and biblical conceptions lie uneasily juxtaposed. 
69 Justin's view of 
the work of Christ exhibits a similar uneasy diversity. A powerful 
side to his thought emphasises that Christ saves us as our teacher and 
example. 
70 Yet he also states repeatedly 
71 that we are saved by the 
cross, resurrection, blood and sufferings of Christ. Barnard's comment 
is apt: 'Justin accepted this faith (in an objective theory of atonement) 
as fundamental,, although it did not easily fit into the philosophy which 
he had imbibed. ' 72 Irenaeus largely lacks Justin's dependence upon 
Middle Platonism, but like Justin hedoes take over certain traditional 
beliefs concerning the work of Christ which were not properly integrated 
into the structures of theology until a later date. 
73 
Book Five of A. H., 
where Irenaeus sets out to 'subjoin to this composition ....... also the 
doctrine of Paul', 
74 is largely taken up with refuting the heretical 
denial that material creation in general, and flesh and blood in 
particular, had been, and would be, saved by Christ. Certain statements 
of Paul had evidently been misappropriated by the Gnostics as well as 
the Marcionites. 75 While Book Five contains much that is of great 
theological interest, especially as regards Irenaeus' views of the 
nature of man and eschatology, it does not penetrate very deeply into 
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the New Testament's teaching on the death of Christ as the operation 
of God's righteousness and mercy. This leaves the way open to his 
confident but unsatisfactory emphasis on the millennial judgement 
facing those men who are not to be saved, towards which the whole of 
Book Five is oriented. 
It might be argued, with some justification, that much of this un- 
evenness in A. H. is caused by Irenaeus changing his emphasis when he 
tackles different problems posed by his opponents. If this is the case, 
one possible test of the overall coherence of Irenaeus' doctrine is 
to look at the less polemical and later Demonstration. This is indeed 
found to be much more consistently Christocentric than can be claimed 
for A. H., although the multitude of Old Testament texts surrounded by 
only brief explanation can obscure the details of Irenaeus' arguments. 
It is this greater Christocentricity which perhaps causes the millenarian 
teaching of A. H. to play a comparatively minor role, if indeed it is 
present at all. In Dem. 61 there is a belief that at the coming of Christ 
there will be peace and tranquillity in nature, but this is not expressed 
in millennial terms. Indeed on one important point Irenaeus has 
apparently changed his mind completely from A. H.. There 
76 he had 
rejected the view that prophecies of a new Jerusalem, or of a new heaven 
and earth, were to be understood in anything but a future sense. This 
future sense was naturally stressed in opposition to Gnostic application 
of such prophecies to past or present events in the Pleroma. When writing 
the Demonstration, however, with Gnosticism further into the background, 
he applies the eschatological prophecies directly to the present life 
of the Church as well as to the future kintdom to be disclosed at the 
coming of Christ: 
And this has already come to pass, for those who were before 
most perverse, to the extent of omitting no work of ungodliness, 
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coming to know Christ, and believing Him, no sooner 
believed that they were changed to the extent of 
omitting no superabundance, even, of justice; so 
great is the change wrought by faith in Christ, the 
Son of God, in those who believe in Him. (Dem. 61) 77 
Just how far Irenaeus has changed his doctrine rather than just his 
emphasis is not easy to determine, though change there undoubtedly is. 
While this modification is to be wKcomed, the danger is that it could 
lead Irenaeus to draw too great a separation between God's dealings 
with the Church and his dealings with the rest of mankind. This would 
have serious implications for his doctrine of creation. There is some 
evidence that he does not avoid the danger. This can be demonstrated 
with regard to his attitude towards Israel and the Jews. In the 
Demonstration he contends at some length 
78 that the Gentiles have 
replaced Israel. In this section there is no evidence that Irenaeus 
had given much thought to Paul's very different attitude as disclosed 
in Romans 9-11.79 The fact that the argument in the Demonstration is 
drawn almost entirely from the Old Testament, and the repeated insistence 
on the abolition of the old Law in favour of the new law of Christ has 
led to the plausible suggestion that the work is based on a lost collection 
of 'Testimonies against the Jews', that is to say, of Old Testament 
texts intended to convince the Jews out of their own holy writings that 
the abolition of Law had been prophesied. 
80 Even if this dependence 
be admitted we need not doubt that Irenaeus' attitude to the Jews was-that 
indicated in the Demonstration. The practical and theoretical relation- 
ship of the Church to a Judaism which was a live force in the Empire 
was the occasion of considerable debate in the ancient'Church, as it 
is today. 81 
The Jews themselves certainly opposed the emerging Christian Church, 
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and the breach became substantial before 100 A. D. by the official 
exclusion of Christians from the synagogues. 
82 Jews cursed Christians 
daily in their synagogues. 
83 Irenaeus is much less anti-Jewish than 
the authors of the Epistle of Barnabas, the Epistle to Diognetus, and 
the Apology of Aristides. 
84 This is partly because the Gnostics and 
Marcionites were so anti-Jewish, and partly due to his ownýtheological 
perception of the strong relationship between the two covenants. 
We are now in a better position to understand theproblems we encountered 
with Irenaeus' account of the relationship between the mercy and justice 
of God. Is it not the case that the Jewish appreciation of the universal 
extent of sin, and the corresponding need for sacrifice and expiation 
needs to be recognised before we can understand the true depth of New 
Testament and espec-ially Pauline theology? It is not surprising that 
the generations of Church leaders who succeeded the Apostles, who 
seem in the main to have been converted Gentiles, 
85 including Irenaeus, 
fell short of the Apostolic community in their perception of the 
essential and continuing Jewishness 
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of Christianity. It is highly 
suggestive that there is no direct reference or allusion to John 4: 22, 
'Salvation is from the Jews', in the Apostolic Fathers, the Apologists, 
Justin, Irenaeus, or Clement of Alexandria. 
87 
I have sLggested that the post-Apostolic church of the early centuries 
did not appreciate in sufficient depth the 'Jewishness' of Jesus Christ 
and the Church, and this was surely a factor leading to Irenaeus not 
having Ithesame feeling about the flesh and sin' as Paul. This conclusion 
arises from consideration of Ireaneus' treatment of the mercy and right- 
eousness of God. Irenaeus is a more biblical theologian than many of 
his contemporaries, but he too lacks the required Jewish depth in his 
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theology. 89 This can be further illustrated by the lack of attention 
he gives to the holiness of God. 
Holiness 
In the Old Testament it is repeatedly stated that God and all his 
actions and institutions are holy. In the New Testament Jesus Christ 
is called the Holy One of God (Mk. 1: 24; Acts 3: 14), and the sanctified 
community is gathered and upheld by the Holy Spirit. In what does the 
biblical concept or concepts of holiness consist? In the first place 
it cannot be denied that there is the aspect of that which is mysterious 
and awe-inspiring, the mysterium tremendum of R. Otto 
90 
This side of the biblical teaching upon the holiness of God is to some 
extent taken up in the common second-century emphasis upon the transcendence 
of God. In the second place, however, it must not be overlooked that 
the holy God of the Bible is the holy God of Israel, who not only stands 
over Israel as Lord and Judge but will also act to redeem His people. 
The holiness of God now emphasises the fact that the will of God shall 
prevail over all resistance, and characterises the nature of divine 
power. Supreme power would break through all resistance, but only a 
holy power would do so in triumph and grace, redeeming and not destroying 
that which had obstructed the purpose of the holy God. 
It is this holiness of God which in the Bible unites the mercy and 
justice of God. It underlies Paul's claim in Romans 11: 32: 'For God 
has consigned all men to disobedience, that he may have mercy upon all', 
a claim which concludes Paul's discussion-of the relation between the 
Church and Israel. The holiness of God places all men under judgement, 
for all have sinned, yet this same holiness accepts the sacrifice of 
37 
Christ as bringing mercy to all men. If the unity of the mercy and 
justice of God is exhibited pre-eminently. in the person of the 
crucified Son of God, made sin for us, there'are many other examples 
in the Bible of this co-ýexistence of mercy and judgýment- It is as 
Peter sees the grace of God exhibited in the huge catch of fish that 
he cries 'Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, 0 Lord' (Luke 5: 8). 
The call of Isaiah (Is. 6) unites the mercy and judgment of God under 
the apprehension of His holiness in an almost startling fashion. 
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In this light we can see the meaning of Luke 17: 10: 'So you also, when 
you have done all that is commanded you, say, "We are unworthy servants; 
we have only done what was our duty, " Ia verse which is ignored in 
Irenaeus' extant writings. 
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Irenaeus makes little mention of the holiness of God, and he certainly 
does not explore the significance of this important aspect of the 
biblical witness. The same can be said of his apprehension and treat-' 
ment of the graciousness of God. This is to some extent included in 
the concept of the mercy of God, but properly it should exclude from 
the concept of mercy the notion that God rewards merit possessed or 
gained by men. The divine mercy displayed in the Bible is fundamentally 
a gift, characterised by the unique reality of God. 
How conscious was Irenaeus of the fact that he too, like his heretical 
opponents, was a sinner standing under the just and merciful judgement 
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of God? It would be impossible to allege that Irenaeus had no 
consciousness of his own unworthiness, but he does not acknowedge the fact 
with any clarity - unlike St. Paul. We shall have cause to return to 
this area of Irenaeus I theology when we consider his teaching of the 
freedom of the will, and evil. ' 
3S 
Wisdom 
I have argued that a proper integration of the mercy and justice 
of God is lacking in Irenaeus. I have also suggested that for the 
New Testament this integration is secured only in the crucified and 
risen Jesus. Up to a point Irenaeus knew this, and arguably he knew 
the fact better than he was able to express and explain it. Certainly 
there is no suggestion in Irenaeus that the close relation between the 
mercy and righteousness of God is simply an arbitrary or paradoxical 
fact which has to be accepted as such. If the ways of God are indeed 
mysterious (though to avoid being confused with the Gnostics he avoids 
saying so too often or too directly), their mystery is that of His 
wisdom 
94 (a-aTuL , sapientia). For Irenaeus, God in His richness knows 
why and to what purpose He is good, powerful, long-suffering, merciful 
and just. The confidence with which Irenaeus' theology is argued 
and expressed reflects his belief in the wisdom of God which gives to 
all events in the world a meaning and order. Accordingly, this use of 
the concept of the wisdom of God varies as he refers to different aspects 
of this meaning and order. In the present context we shall take only 
a brief glance at this diverse usage. 
God is the wise archite. ct or artist who designed a complex but 
harmonious creation: 
With God there are simultaneously exhibited power, wisdom 
and goodness. His power and goodness (appear) in this, that 
of His own will He called into being and fashioned things 
having no previous existence; His wisdom (is shown) in His 
having made created things parts of one harmonious and 
consistent whole. (IV. 38.3) 95 
If the wisdom of God is indeed exhibited throughout the created universe, 
this is pre-eminently true in the case of man: 
Numbers would fail to express the multiplicity of parts in 
the human frame, which was made in no other way than by the 
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great wisdom of God. But those things which partake of 
the skill and wisdom of God, do also partake of His 
power. (V. 3.2) 96 
This passage occurs in the course of the extensive defence of the 
belief in the resurrection of the body, which dominates the first 
half of Book Five of A*H.. 
Elsewhere 97 he declares that the successive covenants 'show forth the 
wisdom of God. ' We have already referred to his reply to Marcion 
(111.25.3) where the introduction of the concept of divine wisdom to 
some extent eased the tension between the mercy and justice of God - He 
returns to a similar theme later in A. H. : 
Now this being is the Creator, who is, in respect of 
His love, the Father; but in respect of His power, He 
is Lord; and in respect of His wisdom, our Maker and 
Fashioner. (V. 17.1) 
The earlier contrast between the mercy and righteousness of God has 
given way to that between His love and His power, but the role of the 
divine wisdom in mitigating the contrast is essentially the same. 
Because God is wise, His exercise of judgement and mercy must be a wise 
operation. Because God is WiBe, the appearance of conflict and evil in 
creation must be for a good reason, even if we cannot perceive it 
directly. 98 The divine wisdom, then, undergirds and informs the whole 
of creation and redemption. 
How close here is Irenaeus to the Logos or world-idea of the Stoics 
and Middle Platonists? Inasmuch as the world-idea in these philosophies 
is essentially immanent in the world we can say that Irenaeus' conception 
is significantly different. For him the world is meaningful only as 
it is created, ruled and redeemed by the wise God who in His intimate 
care and concern is the sovereign and transcendent Lord. 
99 Irenaeus, 
teaching on the divine wisdom is in this respect fundamentally biblical. 
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Yet we cannot avoid raising certain questions when it comes to 
assessing his faithfulness at this point to the overall teaching 
of the New Testament concerning the wisdom of God. 
In Colossians 100 and Ephesians 
101 
wisdom is more or less identified 
with Jesus Christ Himself. Although he frequently refers to both 
epistles, Irenaeus quotes or alludes to none of the relevant verses. 
The part of the Pauline corpus which presents most clearly St. Paul's 
thoughts concerning the divine wisdom is 1 Corinthians 1-2. Here Paul 
is above all concerned to draw a sharp distinction between the wisdom 
of God and the wisdom of the world. This distinction is drawn where 
the crucified Christ is preached, for this simultaneously embodies 
the divine wisdom and excludes all human wisdom (ICor. 2: 1-5). Again, 
although he refers to these two chapters more than a dozen times in 
his extant writings, there is no mention of thDse verses 
102 
which 
directly associate the wisdom of God with the crucified Jesus. Why 
is this? In part it is because Irenaeus wishes to distinguish his 
position from that of the Gnostics. They evidently made much use of 
1 Cor. 2: 6: 
Yet among the mature 
103 
we do impart wisdom, although 
it is not a wisdom of this age or of the rulers of this 
age, who are doomed to pass away. 
In 1.8.4 and 111.21.1 Irenaeus indicates that the Gnostics used this 
verse tojustify their claim to have received a secret and perfect 
gnosis whereby they were sharply distinguished from all other men. The 
fact that theAeon Sophia was at the centre of their redemption myth 
added a confusing element to the Gnostic interpretation of any passage 
of Scripture which mentioned wisdom. It is interesting, therefore, 
that in V. 6.1 Irenaeus feels free to use I Cor. 2: 6 to support his own 
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contention that our souls and bodies already partake of salvation 
through their reception of the Spirit of the Father. It would not 
be easy to argue that Irenaeus is greatly influenced here by the 
Gnostics, but the fact remains that in common with the Gnostics 
Irenaeus does'less than justice to Paul's association of divine 
wisdom with the foolishness, weakness and scandal of the cross. 
Irenaeus comes nearest to the teaching of St. Paul on the divine 
wisdom when he contrasts the intellectual and speculative Gnostics 
with the illiterate believers he doubtless knew in Gaul, who: 
.... are barbarians, so far as regards. our language; but 
as regards doctrine, manner, and tenor oflife, they are, 
because of faith, very wise indeed; and they do please 
God, ordering their conversation in all righteousness, 
chastity and wisdom. (111.4.2) 
Although we must recognise that Irenaeus does not do justice to the 
specifically christological conception of the wisdom of God as clearly 
expressed by St. Paul, this should not be allowed to detract from the 
positive contribution made by the concept of the divine wisdom to 
Irenaeus' doctrine of God. The idea of the wisdom of God helps to 
clarify our understanding of the other attributes Irenaeus finds in 
God. We have seen how the Wisdom of God can help to unite the mercy 
and justice of God in Irenaeus' theology. It also helps us to see how 
the long-suffering of God does not imply weakness, because all that 
occurs in the history of creation and redemption is according to the 
wise plan of the omnipotent Father. To some extent the concept of the 
wisdom of God in Irenaeus is similar to his use of the concept of the 
richness of God, that God is rich and wise underlying everything else 
he has to say. Our main regret is that he did not consistently start 
his exposition of these concepts from the Christological axis of the 
New Testament. St. Paul brings the concepts of the divine richness 
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and wisdom under an exclusively Christological outlook in 
Colossians 2: 2f: 
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That their hearts may be encouraged as they are knit 
together in love, to have all the riches of assured 
understanding and the knowledge of God's mystery, of 
Christ, in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom 
and knowledge. 
It is appropriate at this point to reflect upon whence we have come 
and where we are going in this exposition of St. Irenaeus' doctrine 
of God. We started from his own rejection of the Gnostic belief that 
the supreme God lacked power and goodness. Then we followed the path 
which would best illustrate what in practice the divine goodness in- 
volved. In doing so we did not leave behind the supreme power of God - 
how could we? - but it has taken something of a back seat. The exception 
to this generalisation concerned the divine mercy where we found 
Irenaeus' exposition of the righteousness of God to be inextricably 
involved with it. Our concluding consideration of the wisdom of God 
exhibited in the harmony of creation and redemption will serve to point 
us back to where we began, with the power and goodness of God. Now, 
without in any sense ignoring the goodness, mercy and long-suffering 
of God we shall consider what might provisionally be described as 
aspects of His power, namely, the divine omniscience, omnipresence, 
and incomprehensibility. Arguably my earlier reference to the richness 
of God belongs to this second part of my exposition, but Irenaeus, 
understanding of the divine wealth tends to undergird everything he 
says about God and hence it was discussed, albeit briefly, near the 
beginning of my overall presentation. 
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We have seen that for Irenaeus the divine wisdom is seen in the relation 
of God to the whole length and breadth of creation. Irenaeus' assertion 
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that God in his omnipotent and rich wisdom'knows all things follows 
naturally enough. 
105 Anything hidden from God, he argues, 
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would 
constitute a realm which is independent of Him, and therefore the 
realm of a second God. Even the sin and evil which afflicts His handi- 
work actually is known by God, even if in this very knowledge he condemns 
it and turns away from it. Even if we do our utmost to reject Him, 
we cannot escape His knowledge and therefore His judgement. Irenaeus 
is particularly concerned to emphasise that the whole process of 
creation and redemption is 'sketched out (by God), like an architect' 
(IV. 14.2). This in part explains why his references to God's omni- 
science nearly always take the form of assertions of His foreknowledge 
of all things. There is a teleological stress here which to some extent 
compensates for the emphasis upon the original and general harmony of 
creation in his treatment of the divine wisdom. This foreknowledge is 
asserted in relation to: 
The fall: 
And that God foreknew that this would happen, the 
Scriptures do in like manner demonstrate, since he 
prepared eternal fire from the beginning for those 
who were afterwards to transgress. (11.28.7) 
(ii) The institutions of the old covenant: 
The first testament ....... contained a prophecy of 
things to come, in order that man mightlearn that 
Go-d has foreknowledge of all things. (IV. 32.2) 
(iii) The events of the new covenant: 
All things which had been foreknown of the Father, our 
Lord did accomplish in their order, season and hour, 
foreknown and fitting, being indeed one and the same, 
but rich and great. (111.16.7) 
Uv) The events at the millennium when the 'fashion' 
(1 Cor. 7: 31), but neither the substance nor the 
essence of creation, passes away: 
And therefore this (present) fashion has been formed 
temporary,, God foreknowing all things. (IV. 36.1) 
(v) Those individuals who choose to separate themselves 
from God, the assertion of divine foreknowledge here 
4 if 
forming an aspect of the refutation of Marcion: 
God, knowing the number of those who will not believe, 
since He foreknows all things, has given them over to 
unbelief, and turned away His face from men of this 
character, leaving them in the darkness which they have 
chosen for themselves.... (IV. 29.2) 
Irenaeus is not simply saying that God is omniscient, though this is 
included. The 'fore' knowledge implies more than that God knows in 
advance. In addition to this there is present anassertion of the power 
and independence of God in relation tothe events of creation and 
redemption. The priority and superiority, yet concern, of God in 
relation to that which He creates and redeems are at stake in the con- 
troversy with the Gnostics. 
107 Therefore, given that Irenaeus' concept 
of divine action is far removed from a merely passive knowledge of events 
determined by other agents, we must ask how Irenaeus relates this fore- 
knowledge to the will of God and therefore to a concept of predestination. 
The paucity of the evidence available from Irenaeus' extant works, along 
with the inherent difficulty of the topic, demands caution, but certain 
aspects of his thought are clear enough. In the first place, a belief 
in the free superiority of God over man leads him to deny that there 
can be any disjunction in God between His thought and action, knowledge 
and will. A contrast is drawn here with the remote and disinterested 
Gnostic Bythos, who detached His thought and will as two separate Aeons: 
(The true God) ..... as soon as He thinks, also performs what 
He has willed; and as soon as He wills, also thinks that which 
He has willed; then thinking when He wills, and then willing 
when He thinks, He thinks, since He is all thought, all will, 
all mind ..... (I . 12 . 2) 
108 
As we shall see in more detail in a later chapter, Irenaeus has some 
strong statements that the will of God is the direct cause of all things 
and events in creation. He naturally extends such thoughts to the divine 
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care for man, and asserts the full control of God over the plan of 
salvation. An expression which occurs on several occasions is that 
God reveals Himself 'to whom He will, when He will, and as He will'. 
109 
Reflecting his belief in the progressive revelation of God throughout 
the history of salvation, this free and sovereign activity of revelation 
on the part of God is seen in trinitarian terms: 
For man does not see God by his own powers; but when He 
pleases He is seen by men, by whom He wills, and when He 
wills, and as He wills. For God is powerful in all things, 
having been seen at that time prophetically through the 
Spirit, and seen adoptively through the Son; and He 
shall also been seen paternally in the lKingdom of Heaven, 
the Spirit truly preparing man in the Son of God, and the Son 
leading him to the Father, while the Father confers incorruption 
for eternal life. ''(IV. 20.5) I 
Although the anti-Gnostic context of his writings, and perhaps other 
influences from the wider philosophical culture of his day, restrained 
Irenaeus from giving much attention to the essential mystery of the 
will of God, when he approaches the question of predestination an 
exception can be observed: 
_ 
But He Himself, in Himself, after a fashion which we can 
neither describe nor conceive, predestinating all things, 
formed them as He pleased, bestowing harmony on all things, 
and assigning them their own place, and the beginning of 
their creation. (11.2.4) 
When Irenaeus carries his thoughts further, towards the question of 
the predestination of individuals, he usually invokes, at least to some 
degree, the idea of what later became known as f ides praevisa, or fore- 
seen merits. This is most explicit in the later chapters of Book Four, 
where it is an important part of Irenaeus' response to the challenge 
of Marcion, 
110 but, as we shall see when we examine his understanding 
of the freedom of the will, the idea of passive foreknowledge has a 
general relevance for his theology. But does this cohere with the 
close relation he posits between the foreknowledge and sovereign, 
ý&l_ 1 KD 
purposeful will of God? 
It is well established that there are two main approaches to the doctrine 
of predestination to be found in the history of theology. 
ill On the 
one side, a concept of the absolute and inscrutable decree of God 
places all the emphasis upon the will of. God either for salvation or 
damnation. On the other side, a greater effort is made to see the will 
and decree of God for salvation or damnation as conditioned by the 
responsible activity of the human beings concerned. The Greek Fathers 
constantly defended the freedom of the human will against the commonly 
held fatalism of their philosophical environment, not to mention the 
more religious fatalism of the Gnostics. However, partly because they 
held that God was active in the redemptionof man, whose redeemed 
existence was essentially a participation in the life of God, the Greek 
Fathers were also drawn to assert that God is responsible for man's 
salvation. There was no challenge from Pelagianism to focus debate 
on how these divergent tendencies could be controlled and reconciled, 
and hence to those who look back to the patristic age through Augustine 
and his many successors there is an ambivalence in patristic teaching 
on predestination. Justin 
112, 
asserts God's foreknowledge in the sense 
of the later doctrine of foreseen merits, explicitly marking his view 
off from a fatalist interpretation of prophecy: 
So that what we say about future events being foretold, 
we do not say it as if they came about by a fatal necessity; 
but God foreknowing all that shall be done by all men, and 
it being His decree that the future actions of men shall all 
be recompensed according to their several value. He foretells 
by the Spirit of prophecy that He will bestow meet rewards 
according to the merit of actions done, always urging the 
human race to effort and recollection, showing that He cares 
and provides for men. 
Origen wrestled with the question of grace and free will, posed to 
him both by Celsus and his exegetical work. He gave agreater place to 
47 
the causative knowledge, that is, will of God, in the salvation of men, 
than Justin did, but maintained at the same time that the efficacy of 
the will of God was conditioned by the subjective free will of men. 
113 
In attempting to strike this balance Origen laid down the basis for 
many subsequent discussions, cE the apparent paradox of grace and free 
will. 
As we have seen, Irenaeus adopts Justin's teaching on divine fore- 
knowledge, yet also modifies it, to give a more prominent role to God 
in achieving the salvation of man than 'urging the human race to effort'. 
However, the two sides of his teaching tend to lie uneasily juxtaposed, 
the underlying reason being that his overall conception has a too 
static, rationalistic feel. This in part derives from his employment 
of the apocalyptic idea that history only continued because God was 
waiting until the fore-ordained number of people had been admitted to 
the Kingdom. 114 Irenaeus avoids the concept of a stationary decree 
which would overwhelm human responsibility, and thus empty history of 
effective reality, but his rather naYve employment of the idea of fore- 
seen merits does limit the scope allowed for the mystery of divine 
election, the mystery of the holy love of God, who determines the acts 
and decisions of free and responsible men, in ways which even the best 
theologians are unable to control or predict, as the parables of Jesus 
make abundantly clear. 
115 As a result, Irenaeus, understanding of the 
omniscience of God, while not without its encouraging features, reflects 
to some degree the concept of a God who is insufficiently free. This 
theme will recur as we investigate further attributes which Irenaeus 
ascribes to God. 
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Omnipresence- 
We will be better able to appreciate the position Irenaeus has adopted 
here by considering his teaching on the omnipresence of God. 
116 
Again 
we are concerned with the implications of the divine omnipotence and 
lordship. Gnosticism was based on a theory of emanation from the 
supreme Bythus, and the process of emanation was evidently considered 
to involve transition through space. To this Irenaeus retorts: 
If they maintain any such hypothesis, they must shut up their 
Bythus within a definite form and space, while He both surrounds 
others, and is surrounded by them; for they must of necessity 
acknowledge that there is something outside of Him which surrounds 
Him. (11.13.6) 
It is in this context that Irenaeus draws the conclusion that the 
Gnostic Bythus is either less than Almighty God or the author of evil, 
as we discussed earlier. Irenaeus associates these problems in Gnostic 
mythology with their conception of how the Godhead is related to space 
and time (for the moment we are confining our treatment to His relation 
to space). Nevertheless, if God is not to be 'shut up within a definite 
form and space', how did Irenaeus relate God to space and time? His 
basic and repeated response is to assert that God contains all things: 
God the Creator ...... there is nothing either above Him or 
after Him ..... of His own free will He created all things, 
since He is the only God, the only Lord, the only Creator, 
the only Father, alone containing all things, and Himself 
commanding all things into existence. 117 
Could this conception of God as containing all things be interpreted 
simply as God acting as a container for the universe, bounding it as 
an exterior limit? Irenaeus excludes this interpretation by affirming 
that God, in containing all things, also fills and penetrates all things: 
For according to them (the Gnostics), the light of týeir Father 
will be changed into darkness and buried in obscurity, and will 
An 
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come to an end in those places which are characterised by 
emptiness, since it cannot penetrate and fill all things. 
Let them then no longer declare that their Bythus is the 
fulness of all things, if indeed he has neither filled 
nor illuminated that which is vacuum and shadow; or, on 
the other hand, let them cease talking of vacuum and 
shadow, if the light of their Father does in truth fill 
all things. (11.8.2) 
Thus for Irenaeus God contains and penetrates all things by His power. 
This is clearly implied in the first of the two extracts above, where 
the relation of God to all things is closely connected to His creation 
of them. Since God is the free and sovereign source of all that is 
created, all creation depends directly upon Him for its existence. 
The direct or immanent dependence of creation upon God rests precisely 
upon His creative transcendence. This view of creation marks off 
Irenaeus' position from the Stoic view that God is present throughout 
creation as its immanent reason, as indicated by the regularity of, the 
universe. The Stoic position, by denying God's power and freedom in 
relation to creation, was no more attractive to Irenaeus than the 
Gnostic transcendentalism he was directly opposing. It is significant 
that in the majority of cases where Irenaeus describes God as 'containing 
all. things', he associates this with His action as Creator. 
119 Here 
it is important to acknowledge that it is creation out of nothing 
which Irenaeus asserts. 
120 Hence space and time are themselves created 
by God and cannot be conceived as limiting God's presence and action 
outside of His own Being, for that would be to see space and time as 
other than simply relations within creation. The closeness of God to 
His creation which Irenaeus wishes to maintain is thus to be seen as 
the expression of divine power, against both Stoics'and'Gnostics. 
121 
The closeness of God to His creation is seen in the New Testament as 
a consequence of Hislove, if indeed it is a holy and just love. As a 
so 
consequence of this, God's presence to creation in love is an active, 
redeeming presence. In the Bible this action is specific as well 
as general; the living God in His freedom and love has specific 
purposes in Israel, the Church, and pre-eminently in Jesus, through 
whom His general creative and redemptive action for all creation is 
disclosed. This particularity of the omnipresence of God is presented 
in the Bible in a variety of'iýays, but fundamentally to speak of the 
particular presence of God to His creation is to speak of His Word, 
Jesus Christ, who 'reflects the glory of God and bears the very stamp 
of His nature, upholding the universe by His word of power' (Heb. 1: 3). 
For the apostolic community it is only the coming of God to His own 
in Jesus Christ that makes sense of the events witnessed to or narrated 
in the Old Testament, and that makes sense of the on-going life of the 
Church. In'Jesus, for the author of Colossians, 
122 the Godhead dwells 
bodily. If anything John 1: 14 puts it more concretely: gcrK21%)ujýr6V 
God pitched His tent among us. 
Does Irenaeus do justice to this side of the biblical teaching? The 
answer is a qualified yes. He refers to John 1: 14 on - six occasions, 
each time when he is asserting that God really did create this world 
and demonstrate His care for it in the incarnation. Towards the end 
of A. H. he writes: 
Now we have repeatedly shown that the incarnate Word of God 
was suspended upon a tree. (V. 18.1) 
Earlier Irenaeus had opposed the Gnostic idea that, 'Jesus was merely 
a receptacle of Christ,. upon whom the Christ, as a dove, descended 
from above' (111-16.1). He insists on the oneness of Jesus Christ as 
God and man 
123 
, thus maintaining (in general)'a close relation between 
His divinity and humanity. 
51 
Irenaeus is clearly influenced by certain biblical affirmations 
of the filling of the universe by God. In 111.12.9 he quotes Acts 
17: 28, 'In Him we live and move and have our being', and in IV. 19.2 
he quotes Jeremiah 23: 24, 'Can a man hide in secret places so that I 
cannot see him? says the Lord. Do I not fill heaven and earth? 
says the Lord'. If a qualification is needed in assessing Irenaeus, 
faithfulness to the biblical teaching upon the presence of God to 
creation, it would arise out of his stress on the unity of God, with 
a consequent tendency to see the divine presence as uniform. In 
opposition, or perhaps reaction, to the Gnostic division of the Godhead 
according to spatial analogies, Irenaeus strongly opposes the view 
that God is 'a compound and corporeal Being' (11.13.5). Without'. in 
any way taking up the Gnostic position, it is possible to suggest 
that Irenaeus has not thought through as far as we would like the 
implications of the incarnation for the relation of created existence 
to the life o: r*God. In practice the posing and answering of such 
questions was closely concerned with the development of trinitarian 
theology, a development which builds upon Irenaeus but also clarifies 
what he has to say. However, just how closely Irenaeus integrated his 
teaching on the presence of God in His suffering Son or Word Jesus 
Christ, with that on the supreme Father, is the subject of debate in 
the light of such passages as the following: 
For the Father 6f all is at a vast distance from those 
affections and passions which operate among men. He 
is a simple, uncompounded Being, without diverse members, 
and altogether like, and equal to Himself. (11.13.3) 124 
Besides the problem of developing an adequate soteriology, there is 
an underlying risk associated with Irenaeus' teaching upon the omni- 
presence of God, which becomes more clearly problematic in his doctrine 
of creation. Does this strongassertion of God containing and filling 
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all things allow sufficient 'space' for the existence of creation, 
with its proper created rationality? Although Irenaeus repeatedly 
states that there is a clear distinction between God and creation, 
it could be argued that he uses this distinction precisely in order 
to emphasise the intimate presence of God to the universe. 
125 
The 
danger then exists that the intimate presence of God becomes subtly 
construed as a necessary presence, that is, the presence of a God 
other than the free, holy, and living God. Irenaeus' intention is 
to establish a proper relation between God and creation, by employing 
the difference of God from creation, His eternal, limitless simplicity, 
to assure his close relation to everything which exists. The question 
which is posed, however, is whether Irenaeus does not attempt to solve 
the problem of dualism by employing, at least in part, the conceptuality 
which gave rise to it in the first place. For Irenaeus, God is 
'always the same', 
126 
but, while there is a proper sense of the 
constancy of God, there is the danger of Irenaeus modifying the dualism 
in the doctrine of God in Middle Platonism and Hellenistic Judaism 
127 
by asserting too close and necessa3ýy a relation between God and the 
world. Paradoxically, this. emphasis readily stimulates, and supports, 
a counter-balancing motif of the unknowability of this all7pervasive 
God by mere creatures: He is not remote, but, to an extent, He is 
wholly other. 
128 Although logically opposed, dualism and monism 
share a common framework, within which anundue stress on one side can 
easily stimulate the other; this, is a situation which can occur else- 
where in theology, for example in respect of faith and doubt, or 
optimism and pessimism. 
Incomprehensibilit 
A crucial issue which Irenaeus has to face when considering the relation 
S3 
between Jesus Christ as the eternal Word or Son who became in- 
carnate, and the Father, is that of the applicability of human 
language to describe or indicate the differences and similarities 
between Father and Son. This question was posed sharply for Irenaeus 
by the Gnostics' use of language, a use which Irenaeus rightly regarded 
as grossly anthropocentric, leading to a correspondingly anthropomorphic 
image of God. We will discuss this here because it will closely link 
our discussion of Irenaeus' treatment of the spatiality of God to our 
consideration of his account of God's comprehensibility. 
According to Irenaeus, the root of the Gnostic error in describing 
God as contained within, or restricted to, a definite place lay with 
their anthropomorphic approach: 
129 
For they do not know what God is, but they imagine that He 
sits after the fashion of a man, and is contained within 
bounds, but does not contain. (IV. 3.1) 
Negatively, Irenaeus wishes to mark himself off from the two extremes 
which are both present in an unrelieved tension in Gnosticism. On the 
one hand, there is the Gnostic emphasis upon the remoteness and hence 
incomprehensibility of God. On the other hand, there is the pre- 
sumption that some human beings have been fully enlightened with 
mystical gnosis. 
130 Irenaeus often exposes the contrast between these 
two sides of Gnosticism: 
Those who have excogitated (the theory of) emissions have not 
discovered anything great, or revealed any abstruse mystery, 
when they have simply transferred what all understand 
(concerning human thought and speech) to the only-begotten 
Word of God; and while they style Him unspeakable and un- 
nameable, they nevertheless set forth the production and 
formation of His first generation, as if they themselves 
had assisted at His birth, thus assimilating Him to the 
word of mankind formed by emissions. (11.28.6) 
One of the characteristics of Gnosticism was its eclectic faculty for 
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appropriating and adapting both the thought and the vocabulary of 
other movements and schools. This is true of the Gnostic use of the 
idea of the transcendence and ineffability of God, where Gnosticism 
presses with unfortunate rigour the emphasis on the transcendence 
of God which is found in Hellenistic Judaism and Middle Platonism. 
The Apologists took over a good deal of this teaching upon God, but 
turned the negative expressions to render a more definite and positive 
meaning. 
131 The chief aim is to express the complete independence of 
God of all creation, either materially or morally, and His free 
sovereignty over everything that exists. Some of the terms were taken 
from the New Testament itself, 132 where, especially with St. Paul, one 
can see attempts to articulate the characteristically Hebrew idea of 
transcendence, which is nowhere systematically expounded in the Old 
Testament. The basic problem with the attempts of the Apologists to 
develop the doctrine of God along these lines is that they tend to 
stress the divine transcendence and self-sufficiency more than the 
fundamentally biblical notion of Fatherhood. To some extent, Irenaeus 
reverses this trend towards an imbalance between the transcendence 
and immanence of God. A parallel shift is seen in Irenaeus' Christology, 
where the chief stress of the Apologists upon the cosmological role of 
the Logos is supplemented by a more direct concern with the redemptive 
work of the Logos-Son. At least in part, it was the Gnostic caricature 
of the transcendent spatial limitation of God, which excluded His 
immanence, allied to their obvious and unhelpful anthropomorphism, 
which stimulated and guided Irenaeus' search for a more biblical via 
media. 
134 
Gnosticism claimed to be a religion based upon a secret but full 
revelation, which, although revealing the unknowability of the supreme 
55 
God, could be explained in human language. How revelation is related 
to reason, and especially how it is related to human language, is 
inevitably considered by Irenaeus, even if he does not always make 
it clear that he knows the implications of what he says. Just how 
hebelieved we used our language in relation to God is indicated in the 
following passage: 
He is all understanding, and all spirit, and all thought, 
and all intelligence, and all reason, and all hearing, and 
all seeing, and all light, and the whole source of all that 
is good. This is how the religious and pious speak concerning 
God. He is, however, above these properties, and therefore 
indescribable. For he may well and properly be called an 
Understanding which comprehends all things, but He is not like 
the understanding of men; and He may most properly be termed 
Light, but He is nothing like that light with which we are 
acquainted. And so, in all other particularsthe Father of 
all is in no degree similar to human weakness. He is spoken 
of in these terms according to the love (we bear Him or He 
bears us? ); but in point of greatness, our thoughts regarding 
Him transcend these expressions. 135 (II. 13.3f) 
Such a position certainly guards against the excessive and uncritical 
anthropomorphism of the Gnostics, but does it avoid an over-emphasis 
upon the unknowability of God? 
136 We are dealing here with a, theological 
question which has arotLsý strong debate down to our own century. The 
difference between such similar theologians as Karl Barth and Emil 
Brunner over the relation of the 'immanent' to the 'economic' Trinity 
revolved around just this issue. A brief consideration of the difference 
between these two modern theologians will help to clarify the question 
we wish to put to Irenaeus. 
Brunner wishes to remain at the level of the economic Trinity, believing 
that the doctrine of the Trinity is a human way of speaking of what 
cannot be spoken of by human beings, while Barth believes it is necessary 
to acknowledge that we should move through the economic Trinity to the 
immanent Trinity. This results from the fundamental axiom of Barth's 
So 
theology, that God is antecedently in Himself what he is towards us 
in His revelation. The difference between them can be put as 
follows: whereas for Brunner the mystery of God stands behind His 
revelation, for Barth it is precisely the mystery of God that is 
revealed to us. 
137 
There are three related reasons why Barth's position should be preferred. 
Firstly, an image of God which did not communicate to us, to a 
significant degree, the real being of God would inevitably verge on 
idolatry. Secondly, how could we be certain that God was eternally 
loving and gracious towards us, if we did not have direct experience 
of His. loveand grace? Thirdly, how is a revelation which does not reveal 
the true nature of God to be recognised? By definition, the criterion 
must be other than God, and hence would naturally tend to be either, an 
exaltation of created existence, or a philosophical, human concept of 
God. 
The avoidance of excessive anthropomorphism thus demands that our 
knowledge of God must derive from, and repose upon, His inner nature. 
Barth's view allows and accepts the emergence of a proper anthrop- 
6morphism, because he sees God as the One who takes up the properties 
and attributes of created existence into Himself in Jesus Christ as 
the representative of all creation, a process which, as far as our 
language goes, will inevitably mix the wheat with the tares. 
It must of course be insisted that we know God only by faith and not 
(yet) by sight. Thus a measure of-apophaticism is necessary inasmuch 
as no human language can capture and present to us God asHe is in 
Himself. It is indeed only through the crucified Christ, and not 
677 
through our statements concerning the crucified Christ, that we can 
claim to know God. Just as the cross 'called into question all that 
men could do or know with regard to God, so it disclosed His inmost 
nature and purpose. In other words, it is precisely in positive 
apprehension of God that we know Him to be incomprehensible by use 
of the natural faculties of man. However, by faith we can claim to 
know - or should we say sense or apprehend? 
138_ God as He truly is in 
Himself. 
It is curious and significant that Barth, whom we are following here, 
insists so strongly upon our knowledge being of God as He is in Himself, 
while rejecting the concept of an analogy of being between God and man. 
It must be admitted that the theory that language and created things 
in general do not image ultimate reality, while they are nevertheless 
empowered by God to signify ultimate reality seems to be difficult to 
grasp. Yet is this 'difficulty' not demanded by the Bible? The 
difficulty we'perceive here is no more and no less than the difficulty 
we all have in accepting and understanding the purpose of the strange 
history of Israel and even more peculiar account of the crucified 
and risen G6d-man in the New Testament. Between God and Israel there 
is an analogy of relation rather than an analogy of being. In a similar 
way, as the basis for the relation between God and Israel, between the 
divine and human natures of Christ there is not an analogy of being 
but rather a hypostatic union, that is, an analogy of relation. 
Underlying the Gnostic anthropomorphism is a belief that the universe 
is hierarchically structured, and that (in a rather ill-defined manner) 
'things below are images of those above'. Irenaeus challenges this 
Gnostic assertion on many occasions. 
139 Its presence is indicated by 
ss 
their choice of names for the various Aeons - Anthropos, Zoe, 
Ecclesia, Ennoea, etc.. Irenaeus claims that here the Valentinians 
adapted ideas of Democritus and Plato, along with the associated 
belief that the Demiurge formed the world out of previously existing 
matter. 
140 The concept of imaging provided the Gnostics with the basis 
for their rich mythology, though this psychological salvation mythology 
is set against a background conception of the universe as a vast prison 
whose innermost dungeon is the earth. Around and above it the cosmic 
spheres are ranged like concentric enclosing shells. This cosmology 
implied an operation of fate which only the gnosis, itself dispensed 
fatalistically, could dispel. The idea that each level of existence 
was related to that above it by being in its image or shadow 
141 (i. e. 
a rather inferior image) was seen by Irenaeus to make the relation of 
God to creation a matter of necessity rather than of free grace: 
(The Gnostics assert that) ...... everything of necessity 
passes away to those things out of which they maintain 
it was also formed, and that God is the slave of necessity, 
so that He cannot impart immortality to what is mortal, but 
everyone passes into a substance similar in nature to 
itself 142 ....... They assertthat God can do no otherwise. 
(11.14.4) 
In Gnostic theory, the production of the Aeons was not associated with 
a desire of the supreme God to create the world of which man was a 
part. 
143 
Creation indeed is seen as intended to benefit the Pleroma, 
and not, as Irenaeus would assert, the other way round. Why, then, was 
the Pleroma generated? Irenaeus introduces this question in order 
to challenge the whole notion of one level of existence imaging the 
next. The problem boils down to that of how to prevent an infinite 
regress: 
If creation be an image of those things (above), why should 
we not affirm that those are, in turn, images of others above 
them, and those above these again, of others and thus go on 
supposing innumerable images of images? (11.16.1) 
59 
The Gnostics attempted to solve this problem by invoking the ultimate 
incomprehensibility of Bythus. Basilides, Irenaeus notes, exhibits 
both sides of the problem in an extrEme form. On the one hand he 
'proclaimed that three hundred and sixty-five heavens were formed 
through succession and similitude by one another', 
144 
and on the other 
hand: 
When asked whence came the image of its configuration to that 
heaven which is above all, and from which he wishes the rest 
to be regarded as having been formed by means of succession, 
he will say, from that dispensation which belongs to the 
Unnameable. He must then say, either that the Unspeakable 
formed it of himself, or he will find it necessary to ack- 
knowledge that there is some other power above this Being, 
from whom the unnameable One derived such vast numbers of 
configurations as do, according to him, exist. (11.16.2) 
Basilides, more than any other Gnostic, stressed the unknowability of 
God. He who, according to Valentinus, is the Abyss, according to 
Basilides is even 'the non-being God'. 
145 The more elaborate the hier- 
archical pattern of images, the greater the stress upon the unknowability 
of the unknown God. This paradox of the knowledge of the unknowable 
God is essential to Gnosticism, providing it with mystery and religious 
146 dynamic. Irenaeus opposes it by attempting to plot a middle course 
between the twih-poles of a monistic stress on the knowledge of the 
unknowability of Bythus and the basic dualism which Gnosticism enshrines. 
The doctrine of creation out of nothing, freely willed by a loving, 
long-suffering God is Irenaeus, answer. It is a creation whose goodness 
is created and therefore not a simple image of God, although the crown 
of creation, man, is made in the image of God, inasmuch as God relates 
to him. The analogy Irenaeus sees set up between God and creation by 
this free and gracious act of God must bedescribed, using Barth's 
147 distinction, as fundamentally an analogy of relation. 
60 
We may contrast the doctrine of IrenaeiB hEre with that of Athenagoras. 
Athenagoras gives no clear account of creation, which is perhaps 
surprising in so philosophical a writer, and he appears to have held 
148 that matter pre-existed in an undifferentiated form. At the same 
time, he is probably the earliest Christian witness to the use of what 
has become known as the analogy of being. 
149 
The main emphasis in Irenaeus is to base our ability to know God upon 
His omnipotent will rather than upon our participation in His Being. 
However, there is a subsidiary element in Irenaeus' theology, which 
he shares with much Patristic theology, to which we will have to return, 
which does maintain a quasi-logical relation between created rationality 
and the rationality of God. Such a conception was difficult to avoid 
for a writer educated in the Greek-speaking world of the second century. 
This subsidiary element in the thought of Irenaeus has a significant 
influence in parts of his doctrine of creation. 
That Irenaeus did not have sufficient confidence in the fact that God 
has fully revealed Himself to us in His Son, is illustrated by his 
emphasis upon the limits of man's possible knowledge, both with regard 
to creation and with regard to God. In respect of the apparent 
mysteries of the tides, the migration of birds, changes of weather, etc., 
he remarks: 
If, therefore, even with respect to creation, there are some 
things (the knowledge of) which belongs only to God, and others 
which come within the range of our own knowledge, what ground 
is there for complaint, if, in regard to those things which we 
investigate in the Scriptures, which are throughout spiritual, 
we are able by the grace of God to explain some of them, while 
we must leave others in the hands of God, and that not only in 
the present world, but also in that which is to come, so that 
God should for ever teach, and man should for ever learn the 
things taught him by God? (11.28'. 3) 
61 
The above passage refers to the 'spiritual' nature of the Scriptures. 
Immediately before and after the above extract reference is made to 
the 'perfection' of Scripture. The implication is that if we wish to 
learn about God we are restricted to what we are told in the Bible. 
However, 
-if 
this is agreed, is Irenaeus correct to assume, as he 
appears to do, that our present ignorance of certain matters is absolute, 
both for time and eternity? What future does Irenaeus see for the 
advance of theology? Man is just a little too passive 
150 
on his under- 
standing of the progress of theology: 
The Scriptures are indeed perfect, since they were spoken 
by the Word of God and His Spirit; but we, inasmuch as we 
are inferior to, and later in existence than, the Word of 
God and His Spirit, are on that very account destitute of 
the knowledge of His mysteries ...... and such as require to 
be made known to us by revelation. (11.28.2) 
The restricted task of theology in the post-Apostolic era is also 
indicated in the following important passage: 
True knowledge is the doctrine of the Apostles, and the 
ancient constitution of the Church throughout all the world, 
and the distinctive manifestation of the body of Christ 
according to the successions of bishops, by which they have 
handed down that Church which exists in every place, and has 
come even unto us, being guarded and preserved, without any 
forging of Scriptures, by a very complete system of doctrine, 
and neither receiving addition nor curtailment. (IV. 33.8) 
The warnings of Irenaeus against the danger of speculation and the 
desire to know everything are in part the result of his reaction 
against the speculations of the Gnostics. However, it would be wrong 
to rule out the presence of other factors. Perhaps Irenaeus did not 
expect the 'last times' to continue this side of the millennium for 
very much longer - there is no clear evidence on this point. The more 
subtle heresies had yet to crystallise into equally subtle theological 
questions, as they were soon to do. He was unlikely to receive in 
Gaul the intellectual stimulus Clement and Origen could hardly have 
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avoided in Alexandria. These and other influences - including, it 
should be added, Irenaeus' own free and responsible choice in the 
matter - doubtless conspired to produce his belief in the limited 
ability of man to extend and expand his knowledge in matters of 
theological as well as of natural science. 
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Two centuries after Irenaeus one question he believed should not be 
examined by men dominated theological debate: the nature of the relation 
152 between the Father and the Son. The New Testament texts which speak 
of the Son alone knowing the Father, the Father alone knowing the hour 
and day ofjudgement, and so forth, were seized upon by the Gnostics 
as indicating the essential unknowability of the supreme God. 
Irenaeus sees that there is an apparent contradiction in maintaining 
both the equality of Father and Son and accepting such a text as 
John 14: 28. He retreats into reverent agnosticism: 
I The Father I, says He, I is greater than I. I The Father, 
therefore, has been declared by our Lord to excel with 
respect to knowledge; for the reason, that we, too, as 
long as we are connected with the scheme of things in 
this world, should leave perfect knowledge, and such 
questions (as have been mentioned), to God, and should 
not by any chance, while we seek to investigate the 
sublime nature of the Father, fall into the danger of 
starting the question whether there is another God 
above God. 153 (11.28.8) 
Had Irenaeus lived in the fourth century he doubtless would have been 
among those who defended the homoousios. However, the need to suggest 
and defend the precise thought behind the homoousios did not arise until 
the more refined Arianism had replaced the cruder Gnosticism as the 
threat to be countered. 
154 Barth stresses the homoousios, and the 
corresponding belief that our knowledge is of God as He truly is in 
Himself, in the face of its denial by liberal Protestantism. 
Athanasius writes in similar vein against Arianism. The basic 
movement of Irenaeus' theology is in the same direction, although 
he naturally cannot achieve the clarity and consistency that emerged 
in the later theologians mentioned. 
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Finally we will briefly indicate the positive account Irenaeus gives 
of our knowledge of God, which can be divided into three parts. 
Most important is his belief that the Logos-Son reveals God the Father, 
who is Himself invisible and indescribable, to His creation. It is as 
Irenaeus starts to develop his trinitarian doctrine that this approach 
to knowledge of God replaces the arguments of natural theology. It is 
the dominant conception found in the later Demonstration. This 
trinitarian thinking develops along with more explicit reference to 
3 the OLkoVgtý: L, ýA. or Idispensations' of God for the salvation of man. 
Irenaeus' treatment of the pre-existence of Christ emerges in this 
context: his doctrine of creation demands that God has progressively 
revealed Himself to man even before the Incarnation: 
God ...... is invisible and indescribable to all things which 
have been made by Him, but He is by no means unknown: for 
all things learn through His Word that there is one God the 
Father, who contains all things, and who grants existence to 
all ........ Therefore the Son of the Father declares (Him) 
from the beginning, in as much as He was with the Father 
from the beginning ....... (IV. 20.6) 156 
To support this passage Irenaeus quotes John 1: 18, 'No one has ever 
seen God; the only Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he has made 
Him known'. The influence of Johannine 
157 theology is also clearly 
evidence in the following extract: 
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For no one can know the Father, unless through the Word 
of God, that is, unless by the Son revealing (Him); neither 
can he have knowledge of the Son, unless through the good 
pleasure of the Father ....... And His Word knows that His 
Father is, as far as regards us, invisible and infinite; 
and since He cannot be declared (by anyone. else), He does 
Himself declare Him to us ...... For the manifestation of 
the Son is the knowledge of the Father; for all things 
are manifested through the Word. (IV. 6.3) 
These passages are closely related to those discussed in connection 
with the Irenaean understanding of election. The chief difference 
is that the revelation of the Father is seen as to all men, so that 
judgement can be universal and equitable: 
The Father therefore has revealed Himself to all, by making 
His Word visible to all, and, conversely, the Word has 
declared to all the Father and the Son, since He has become 
visible to all. And therefore the righteous judgement of 
God (shall fall) upon all who, like others, have seen, but 
have not, like others, believed. (IV. 6.5) 
There is a problem here. Does the revelation of God convey salvation 
(as in IV. 6.3f. ), or is the revelation of God a prelude to the response 
of man which will determine his salvation or damnation (as in IV. 6.5)? 
If it is true that the answer in some way involves 'both/and' rather 
than 'either/or', Irenaeus does not explore the relationship with any 
confidence. 
158 Perhaps as a result of this uncertainty or ambiguity 
Irenaeus allows two other theories of how God is known to men expression 
in A. H.. 
In a manner reminiscent of Tertullian, Irenaeus could appeal to the 
universal character of the innate awareness a man had of the existence 
of God: 
For since His invisible essence is mighty, it confers on all 
a profound mental intuition and perception of His most power- 
ful, yea, omnipotent greatness. Wherefore, although 'No one 
knows the Father, except the Son, nor the Son except the Father, 
and those to whom the Son will reveal Himl(Mt. 11: 27), yet all 
do know this one fact at least, because reason, implanted in 
their minds, moves them, and reveals to them that there is one 
God, the Lord of all ...... And for this reason ....... all beings fear the invocation of Him who created them. (II. 6.1. f) 
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Irenaeus' remarks upon the direct intuition of God by man are rather 
159 isolated,, and it is not easy to determine precisely what he had 
in mind. Did he believe in a pervasive reason by participation in 
which all men were in rational, if instinctive, relation to God? 
Although, for reasons which we shall discuss in the next chapter, he 
does not reproduce Justin's notion of the 
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we may see here echoes of the underlying idea. Perhaps we are merely 
observing a corollary which follows from the belief that God contains, 
fills and penetrates all things. The difficulty arises when one 
attempts to translate this general and constant presence of God to man 
into the basis for knowledge of God; it is rather like, for example, 
gravity and atmospheric pressure : they are constantly around us, and 
we depend upon them, yet precisely for this reason we are hardly aware 
of theml Irenaeus, indeed, makes more use of the a posteriori arguments 
of natural theology. 
We saw earlier how Gnosticism challenged the basic goodness of creation. 
The use Irenaeus makes of what later became known as natural theology 
is confident - perhaps too confident - but largely restricted to 
supporting his belief in the oneness of the God who is Creatorand the 
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goodness of creation: 
That God is the Creator of the world is accepted even by 
those very persons who in many ways speak against Him ...... 
For even creation reveals Him who formed it, and the very 
work made suggests Him who made it, and the world manifests 
Him who ordered it. (11.9.1) 
On another occasion Irenaeus uses this argument to support his view 
that 'the entire Scriptures, the prophets, and the Gospels, can be 
clearly, unambiguously, andharmoniously understood by all ...... since 
they proclaim that one only God, to the exclusion of all others, formed 
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all things' (11.27.2). The problems with such claims about the proof 
of God from the observation of creation were indicated when we 
considered the goodness of creation, and we shall have to return to 
them later in connection with Irenaeus' understanding of providence 
and evil. 
It would be wrong to set the a priori and a posteriori types of 
reasoning against one another. Both reflect a belief that there is 
a real relationship between Creator and creation, even if the details 
of this relationship are seen differently or left largely unspecified. 
In any case, all such reasoning from creation, whether from conscience 
or nature, is d6finitely subordinated to the revelation of God in 
Jesus Christ: 
For if the manifestation of God which is made by means of 
creation affords life to all living in the earth, much 
more does that revelation of the Father which comes through 
the Word, give life to those who seek God. (IV. 20.7) 
From a modern theological perspective, which is acutely aware of 
the ambiguity of evidence for the existence of God culled from the 
sphere of creation, this priority of divine self-disclosure is entirely 
correct. However, we would also wish to see a closer link established 
between the concept of divine self-disclosure, and its mediation 
through the life of man, and events in nature and history, than Irenaeus 
provides. 
Concluding Reflections 
We have attempted to survey the main features of Irenaeus' doctrine 
of God, paying particular attention to those aspects which will help 
us to understand his doctrine of creation. In the face of the meandering 
style and content of A. H. it has not been easy to remain faithful to 
Irenaeus himself. His own inclination was to group statements together 
where subsequent theologians might have tried to simplify and clarify 
what was being said, by adopting a more systematic approach. This fact 
has at times made the process of unravelling into a later style what 
he said a difficult business, given the limited space available here. 
My purpose now is to draw back together the various features I have 
previously attempted to distinguish. 
For Irenaeus God is rich, both in his eternal glory and in his long- 
suffering creative and redemptive activity. This is perhaps equivalent 
to the Biblical assertion that God is the living God. 
160 Certainly, 
when we examine what Irenaeus has to say about created life, he cannot 
avoid bringingthis into close relation with the simple fact that God 
relates Himself to creation. Life implies action and diversity united 
in a complex but integral unity. Such is Irenaeus' conception of God. 
We learn of this rich, living God from his action in creation and 
redemption, but through this action we learn of God, that is, of Him 
who is selfý-sufficient and has no need of creation. Creation expresses 
the richness of God, but Irenaeus never suggests that it adds to the 
richness of God anything that it previously lacked. For Irenaeus it 
is always God with whom we have to do, and not a likely divine hypothesis 
or conception posited by human thought at its most sublime. In this 
sense Irenaeus is antagonistic to philosophy. 
161 However, although we 
discerned a certain tendency to rely upon an idea of God as that which 
man is not, Irenaeus feels compelled by the revelation of God to speak 
of Him in a positive fashion. He makes less use of negative descriptions 
for God than did either the Apologists or Clement and Origen. The 
basic approach Irenaeus adopts can be seen in his own words: 
God is life, and incorruption, and truth, And these and such 
like attributes have not been produced according to a gradual 
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scale of descent but they are names of those perfections 
which always exist in God, so far as it is possible and 
proper for men to hear and to speak of God. For with the 
name of God the following words will harmonize: intelligence, 
word, life, incorruption, truth, wisdom, goodness, and such 
like. (11.13.9) 
The positive emphasis here is inescapable, as is the note of reserve, 
'so far as it is possible and proper for men to hear and to speak of 
God'. Such reserve can be either helpful or unhelpful. The danger 
is of maintaining above and behind the positive 'perfectionsl(v i rtu tes) 
of God a Deus absconditus, whom we cannot truly know, and therefore 
cannot really trust. It can hardly be said that such a conception of 
God is prominent in Irenaeus, though our discussion of his understanding 
of the divine mercy and righteousness showed that elements of such a 
concept of God might be present. What is more certain is that he did 
not guard against the development of a conception of a remote and 
essentially simple divinity as effectively as might have been desirable. 
Later theology too easily pushed the concept of a rich, living God into 
the background, as the seductive Platonic or Aristotelian concept of 
Being came to be more or less equated with God. 
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The aforementioned 
reserve is only appropriate if it is seen as itself a consequence of 
the positive recognition of the revealed 'perfections' of God. In His 
revelation Yahweh appears in tremendous and mysterious power. The 
incarnate Son speaks only in parables (Mark 4: 34). 
Only as the God of the Bible reveals Himself is His unsearchable 
mystery revealed. Only as He makes Himself known is He incomprehensible. 
Only as the God of grace and mercy is He also the God of righteousness 
andjudgement. Only in His long-suffering is His omnipotence disclosed. 
Only as He draws near in love is He known to be omnipresent. The proper 
reserve required of us is not to claim that God is partly revealed and 
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partly concealed, partly merciful and partly righteous. We have rather 
to recognise God in His hiddenness and in His self-revelation, both 
together being seen as revealing the genuine character of God. Our 
reserve in speaking about God must surround everything we say about 
His long-suffering as well as His power, 'His mercy as well as His 
righteousness, His revelation as well as His inscrutability, His love 
as well as His greatness. Otherwise will we not regard ourselves as 
unprofitable servants only on some occasions, rather than at all times? 
Irenaeus does not express himself in this matter as clearly or consist- 
ently as we would like. We saw this to be especially true with regard 
to his treatment of the mercy and justice of God and suggested that a 
basic problem was an inadequate grasp of the essential Jewishness of 
Christianity. Yet it cannot be said that he generally allows either 
the being or the character of God to be divided into qualities which 
compete with one another, or that he is unfaithful-to the biblical 
picture of the God who lives in eternal constancy and richness. Such 
competition and flux was rather a feature of Gnosticism. As we saw, 
basically he sees God as 'wholly understanding, wholly spirit, and 
wholly thought, and wholly hearing, and wholly seeing, and wholly light'. 
We might wish to add that God is wholly mercy and as such also wholly 
justice, but the fact that Irenaeus does not say this must not be 
exaggerated. Recollection that he expounds the divine righteousness 
alongside his exposition of the divine mercy in opposition to Marcion 
should warn us against over-emphasising their mutual independence in 
his thought. 
Our exposition of the Irenaean doctrine of God started from the twin 
denial by the Gnostics of the pre-eminent power and goodness of God. 
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Deliberately we considere4first the attributes of God which most 
naturally expounded and expressed His goodness. For Irenaeus the 
revelation of God is first and foremost good news of a good God who 
has acted in great mercy. His goodness indeed 'goes on before, and 
takes precedency' (111.25.3). It is as God loves man that He discloses 
His holiness and wrath, His power, omnipresence, omniscience and 
mystery. Hence the sequence of our exposition. It is the fact that 
it is. this sequence, and not an unending dialectic, with which Irenaeus 
works, that enables us to see that God is all love just as He is all 
freedom, and not a Being trapped in a confronation and competition 
between His goodness and His power. As we shall see, that we only 
know the almighty freedom of God as a result of his long-suffering 
love, is important for understanding the positive thrust of Irenaeus' 
doctrine of creation. 
One final point needs explanation, and this will serve to orientate 
us to the next chapter. Accounts of the theology of Irenaeus commonly 
emphasise his Christology and Soteriology. Such treatment as may be 
given to his doctrine of God has tended to concentrate upon his doctrine 
of the Trinity, reflecting a desire to relate the theology of Irenaeus 
to the preoccupations of the theology of the centuries which followed 
him. One result of the comparative neglect of his doctrine of God has 
163 been a tendency to over-emphasise inconsistencies in Irenaeus' theology. 
Yet, as we have seen, Irenaeus supplies adequate information to re- 
construct a v'ery full and rich doctrine of God, quite apart from his 
Christology and doctrine of the Trinity. The main reason for emphasis 
upon these latter areas of Christian doctrine is the usual one of 
anachronism: all tooeasily we read back too much of later interests 
and doctrine - or lack of them - into earlier authors. As long as it 
71 
is not carried too far, this procedure can put fruitful questions, 
but if taken too far it distorts the thoughts of the earlier author. 
The general drift of A. H. is to start from the doctrine of God and to 
work towards the doctrine of the Trinity, and we have followed the 
same course. Nowwe shall look at Irenaeus' conception of-the Trinity, 
concentrating upon those aspects which clarify his doctrine of God 
and those which willhelp us elucidate his doctrine of creation. 
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1. A good deal of Adversus Haereses (henceforth, A. H. ) survives only 
in an early Latin translation. Some fragments of the original Greek 
have been preserved by other writers. These fragments are largely 
from Book One. Books Four and Five are also available in an Armenian 
translation. The small later work, Demonstrationof the Apostolic 
Preaching, only surivives in Armenian. Much detailed textual work is 
still required, involving the use of the comparatively recent Armenian 
discoveries, together with the comparatively sparse Syriac fragments. 
2. The Aeons are generally given names bearing a positive signif i-cation, 
e. g. Mind, Truth, Word, Life, Man, Church, Wisdom etc.. The chief and 
first Aeon has more negative titles Bythus (Abyss), Proarche, Propator, 
Arrhetus (Unsaid). However, despite these positive titles, little is 
said concerning the character and essence of the individual Aeons, with 
the exception of Sophia, who is the focus of the Gnostic myth of fall 
and redemption. It is true that, for the Gnostics, that which was of 
positive value here below on earth in some way images the Aeons in 
the Pleroma - hence the particular titles chosen - but beyond this little seems to have been said concerning the essential nature of the 
Godhead, because what little could be known was only knowable through 
the mysterious and secret gnosis. 
3.1 use the traditional chapter division of R. Massuet (Paris, 1710, 
reprinted Migne 7), which is adopted in the two available English 
translations of A. H., rather than the different division proposed by 
W. W. Harvey (Cambridge, 1857). Both the English translations are from 
the latter half of the last century, and were published at approximately 
the same time. Hence they are independent of each other, which can be 
helpful when considering the likely sense of important or difficult 
passages. Generally quoted here is that of A. Roberts and J. Donaldson, 
vols V and IX of T. & T. Clark's Anti-Nicene Christian Library. This 
translation stays as close as possible to the underlying Latin and 
Greek and can on this account be a little awkward or obscure. Yet as 
this only reflects thexommonly involved and prolix style of the original, 
it has usually been preferred to the less meticulous but more freely 
flowing translation by J. Keble in A Library of the Fathers (Oxford: 1872) 
4. The best general account of the Gnostic systems described by Irenaeus 
probably remains that of Hans Jonas, The Gnostic Religion, (Boston: 
Beacon, 1958) espoch. 8. For Irenaeus' specific account of the Gnostic 
systems, see J. R. Nielsen, Adam and Christ in the Theology of Irenaeus 
of Lyons, (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1968), ch. 2. Jonas' classic book summarises 
the fruits of a generation of scholarship. More recently, K. Rudolph, 
Gnosis, (E. T., Edinburgh : T. & T. Clark, 1983) has provided a major 
synthetic work, which takes account of the manifold literature since 
the discoveries at Nag Hammadi. However, many issues are hotly contested, 
and it is too early to judge the accuracy of Rudolph's judgments. For 
example, one may wonder whether, 'The process which is plain from the 
New Testament itself is twofold, the christianising of Gnosis and the 
gnosticising of Christianity' (p. 300). More cautious here are R. Wilson, 
'Nag Hammadi and the New Testament', N. T. S., 28 (1982), pp. 289-302., 
and S. G. Hall, 'Knowing your Gnostics', J. E. H., 36 (1985)pp. 103-108. 
Wherever I refer in this thesis to 1Gnos: F1`cism1, it should be assumed that the primary reference is to the Valentinian version, unless other- 
wise stated. 
5. See A. H. 1.11.5. Henceforth, if no title is mentioned, quotations may be assumed to be from A. H.. 
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6. See I. 1.1. 
7., Again there are various alternative names for these Aeons. 
8. There are two particular errors which Irenaeus identifies in the 
Gnostic theory of the Godhead. In the first place the Gnostics separated 
the unknown source of the Pleroma from the inferior Demiurge who was 
responsible for creating the world. Furthemore, in addition to separating 
the Creator from the Pleroma, they introduced division into. the Pleroma 
itself with their theory of the emanation of Aeons from the supreme Bythus. 
I merely mention this error here, for I shall return to it when dealing 
directly with Irenaeus' doctrines of the Trinity and of creation. In 
the second place, though admittedly closely related to this error, the 
Gnostic theodicy imposed a limitation of power and goodness upon the 
supreme God. It is this association of God with the origin of, and 
responsibility for, evil that I treat in the present context, for it 
bears directly upon the character of God. 
9. Cf. R. A. Norris, God andWorld in Early Christian Theology, (London: 
A. & C. Black, 1966), p. 65: 'At one level, Irenaeus attacks the Gnostic 
systems, by calling attention to what he regards as their logical 
absurdity. This form of argument is characteristic in particular of 
the second book of the A. H., and its special object is the Gnostic idea 
of God. By a diligent use of the quasi-logical, quasi-rhetorical 
device of the dilemma, Irenaeus tries with some success to expose the 
inconsistencies of a view which proclaims the infinity and supremacy of 
the ultimate God while at the same time denying his responsibility for 
the material world. ' Norris believes that although Irenaeus, method 
may have roots in contemporary philosophy, his basic approach was to 
distrust philosophy. It was Scripture that truly put the lie to 
Gnosticism. Norris suggests (op. cit. p. 65), 'that Irenaeus was prone 
to distrust philosophical speculation on the two grounds that it led 
to no certain or reliable conclusions, and that it was in any case the 
source of Gnosticism'. 
10. An interesting contrast can be drawn at this point between Irenaeus 
and his near contemporary Clement of Alexandria. Clement emphasises 
the absolute - and perhaps rather abstract - goodness of God. Here we 
can see the influence of the Platonic tradition. Although Irenaeus 
does not for a moment cast doubt upon the goodness of God, it is not 
emphasised in the same way as in Clement. With Irenaeus we find a 
greater stress upon the power and activity of God in creation and re- 
demption. The direct references to God's goodness are comparatively 
sparse and subsidiary, although not for that reason absent. Thus we 
shall return to the form and content of Irenaeus' teaching on the good- 
ness of God when we discuss the mercy and long-suffering of God, in 
the context of Irenaeus' response to Marcion. On the primacy of the 
concept of goodness in Clement, see E. F. Osborn, Clement of Alexandria, 
(Cambridge: 1957), part II, pp. 63-109. 
11. For example, 11.25.2; 26.3; IV. 38.3. We shall return in greater 
depth to these passages in a later context. 
12. Among Irenaeus' near contemporaries we find such a concept of 
power in Athenagoras. Indeed, Athenagoras''proof of the existence of 
God is based on the Aristotelian principle of causality, as mediated 
through Middle Platonism': see L. W. Barnard, Athenagoras (Paris: 1972) 
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(12. continued) 
p. '48. In Irenaeus there is considerable emphasis upon God's power. 
Seeý1I. 1.1; 11.1; 33.5; IV. 38.1; V. 22.2; 32; Dem. 4 etc.. Often 
the emphasis upon God's power is joined to affirmation of His good- 
ness. Thus in a passage dealing with the power, wisdom and goodness 
of-God he makes wisdom the subject of a separate clause but joins 
power and goodness together (IV. 38.3). Goodness is here an attribute 
of a-supreme act of power, creation out of nothing. In IV. 38.1 
Irenaeus asserts that for God, 'all things are possible', but insists 
that there is no point in speculating upon the hypothetical exercise 
of abstract power. 
13. This argument for the resurrection is also found in Justin, 
1*Apol. 18f; cf. Acts 26: 8. 
14. The omnipotence of God is a major topic in contemporary theology, 
a'signficant strand of which holds that, in various ways, we should 
speak of God's self-limitation. Leaving aside ideas such as the death 
ofýGod, and radical kenosis, we endorse the view that the true form 
of divine omnipotence is that disclosed in the concrete reality of 
Jesus Christ. A major thrust of Irenaeus' theology points in just this 
direction, although the philosophical climate of the second century did 
not allow him to explore the issues in ways that have been feasible 
in modern theology. 
15. - Irenaeus himself admits this plausibility'(II. 14-8) and popularity 
(11.30.2). The modern mind is apt to underestimate the wide appeal of 
the fantastic mythological speculations of the Gnostics. The symbolism 
is in fact largely psychological, representing an interpretation of the 
conflicting urges and aspirations within man. In this way Gnosticism 
injects new life into the dualistic world-view which it shared with the 
common stock of Middle-Platonist philosophy, and from which it was it- 
self-in part derived. 
16. The delimination is important. Although, for Irenaeus, all we 
say about God refers to what God has done, does, and will do in His 
creative and redemptive work, God is in fact greater than we are able 
to comprehend in this way. His repeated rejection of the anthropo-- 
morphism of the Gnostics is based on just this belief. For Irenaeus 
God's patient love for His creation is sovereign and free and thus 
truly the love of God. 
17. In associating the power and richness of God, Irenaeus is claiming 
that God is infinitely resourceful, as he makes explicit in both passages. 
18. Cf. 11.2.4; 35.5; IV. 21.2; 25.3; 28.2; 32.2; 37.7; 39.4; V. 28.2; 36.1. 
19. Cf. IV. 20.11; 111.10.6. Commenting upon IV. 14.2, the editors of 
the Sources Chretiennes edition of A. H., comment with regard to Irenaeus, 
concept of the richness-of God, 'Elle Waffecte pas Dieu dans son etre, 
mais dans son activite salvifiquel (S. C., 100, p. 236). Although, as we 
shall see, - Irenaeus does place a parallel emphasis upon the unity and 
simplicity of God, this does not justify the restriction of the concept 
of the richness of God to His economic activity, as opposed to His inner 
being. 
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20. Cf. V. 32.1. The concreteness of the Irenaean concept of the 
richness of God reflects His trinitarian nature. Attempts to main- 
tain a concept of divine richness along with a non-trinitarian concept 
of God can readily lose content and meaning, as B. Hebblethwaite has 
remarked with specific reference to M. Wiles: I .... Wiles' concept of 
God is that much vaguer, the more he retreats from the differentiations 
of traditional trinitarian and incarnational theology. He is reduced 
to affirming the "richness and complexity" of God's being, without 
being able to justify this assertion, let alone say anything about it'. 
One God in Trinity, ed. P. Toon and J. Spiceland, (London: Bagster, 1980), 
p. 165. 
21. Again it must be said that Irenaeus' conception of the richness 
of God is concrete and specific rather than abstract and general. The 
richness of God is exhibited first and foremost in the history of 
salvation. Thus when Irenaeus states that 'there is one salvation and 
one God; but the precepts which form the man are numerous, and the steps 
which lead man to God are not a few' (IV-9.3), it is in the context of 
his argument that there is aunity between the two covenants, and cannot 
be taken out of this context to defend a theological or religious 
relativism. The 'steps which lead man to God' are numerous but success- 
ive, and not alternatives from which man can pick and choose. The rich- 
ness of God according to Irenaeus is fundamentally a Jewish richness. 
To some extent it should also be seen as evidence of Irenaeus' dependence 
upon the theological tradition which has come to be known, somewhat- 
loosely and broadlyas Jewish Christianity. Irenaeus' millenarianism 
most clearly exhibits his dependence upon this tradition, a dependence 
which resulted passively from the air he breathed as much as actively 
from choice. Jewish Christianity (cf. J. Dani&lou, The Theology of 
Jewish Christianity, (London, D. L. T., 1964)) laid stress upon both 
the transcendence and mystery of the supreme God, and upon a bizarre 
variety of instruments and intermediaries through which He was related 
to the world. Irenaeus transforms - but retains in a modified form - 
both these emphases when he stresses both the unity and the richness of 
God. The formal resemblance here to aspects of Gnosticism is clear, 
and Gnosticism was itself to a disputed extent dependent upon heter- 
odox Jewish Christianity. This dependence is discussed and defended 
by R. Wilson, The Gnostic Problem, (London: 1958), esp. ch. 7. Irenaeus, 
theology is to be seen as the result of a debate with Gnosticism, rather 
than simply as a reaction against it. 
22. In IV. 37.1 Irenaeus refers to Romans 2: 4 'Or do you presume upon 
the riches of His kindness and forbearance and patience'. In his own 
theology Irenaeus follows Paul's association of the richness of God 
with his patience and long-suffering in drawing creation to its appointed 
goal. 
23. Cf. 111.18.6; IV. 21.3; 22.1. 
24. Cf. 111.20.2; IV. 20.8; 37.7; V. 28.4; 32.2. 
25. Cf. 1.10.3. In 111.20 Irenaeus aptly chooses to illustrate the 
divine patience by reference to the story of Jonah. In IV. 20.8 he 
quotes Exodus 34: 6-7 'The Lord God is merciful and gracious and long- 
suffering ..... I His introduction and treatment of the biblical concept 
of the patience of God illustrates very well his considerable freedom 
from the Middle-Platonist doctrine of God which has a much greater 
influence upon his important theological predecessors, the Apologists, 
and his near contemporary Clement of Alexandria. 
7ý 
26. The suggestion, inter alia, of H. Berkhof, Christian Faith, 
(E. T. Grand Rapids : Eerdmans, 1979), pp. 133ff. 
27. Marcion should also be mentioned, but I delay consideration of 
the influence of Irenaeus' opposition to Marcion until consideration 
of the Irenaean understanding of the mercy and justice of God. 
28. Jonas, op. cit., p. 183. 
29. I. 4.2ff. 
30. Admittedly, in the Gnostic system these passions are seen as 
foreign to the Godhead, and the Creator is outside of the Pleroma when 
creation results from the passions. But they do originate from the 
Pleroma and for this reason Irenaeus' accusations to a large extent are 
justifiable. In 11.17 Irenaeus traces the passion of Sophia back to 
Bythus, arguing that God cannot be both impassible and passible. 
31. See, for example, J. Danielou, Gospel Message and Hellenistic 
Culture, (London: D. L. T., 1973), ch. 15. 
32. Irenaeus' achievement here is well though briefly described by 
Norris, op. cit., ch. 3. 
33. In the Bible there is a partial contrast between the early Hebrew- 
idea that God attains his purposes more or less instantaneously, by 
the act of His will, and the increasing insistence in the New Testament 
upon the patience and long-suffering of God, the temptation for Jesus 
being the wrong use of His miraculous power. Of particular relevance 
here are the recurring images of growth and harvest in the parables. 
That is to say, we see in the New Testament a developing emphasis upon 
the reality of time for God : what, for us, may appear to be delay, is 
the time necessary to God for the achievement of His purposes. As 
Greek philosophy developed a clear concept of a supreme God, it solved 
the same problem by increasingly distancihg-, God from time, thus calling 
into question its reality. In Irenaeus, weýsee a tension between his 
stress on the humanity of Christ, with the associated idea of the pro- 
gressive salvation of man, and those aspects of the second-century 
philosophical background which he inevitably took into his theology. 
34., Matthew 14: 23; 26: 36,39,42,44; Mark 1: 35,6: 46,14.32,35,39; 
Luke 3: 21,5: 16,9: 18,28,29,11.1,16: 27,22.41; John 14: 16, 
17: 9,15,20. 
351. ' 1.8.2. 
36. Luke 19: 41; John 11: 35. Gnostic use of Luke 19: 41 is reported 
in 1.20.2. 
37. Gen. 18. 
38., Exodus 32: 11-14. 
39. 'To be accurate, he does refer to the episode of Sodom and 
Gomorrah (IV. 31), but not to Abraham Is pleas on behalf of the cities. 
40. - 111.20.1. 
I- 
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41. There is, therefore, an important-tnuth enshrined in the concept 
of divine impassibility , which contemporary theology can tend to over- 
look. Perhaps the word has been 
4 
so battered, both by the proximity 
of the philosophical concept of OMCLSSLOL, and by the Patripassian 
debates of the early centuries, that it is difficult to employ it in 
a reasonably unambiguous fashion. Clearly the modern discussion of 
the concept of divine suffering raises fundamental questions, which 
are still in process of clarification. For assessments of the debate, 
see W. McWilliams, 'Divine Suffering in Contemporary Theology', S. J. T., 
33 (1980), pp. 35-53, and R. Bauckham, 'Only the Suffering God can Help' 
Themelios, 9 (1984), pp. 6-12. 
42. See for example, 1.7.2; 26.1; 111.18.6. 
43. See 1.7.2 and 111.16. Again there are variations and incon- 
sistencies between different schools., and among our sources for the 
views of individual schools. 
44. In the Gnostic system the Aeon. Christ, being easily detachable 
from Jesus, to an extent occupies the role that might have been allowed 
forthe Spirit. Irenaeus' emphasis upon the unity of Jesus Christ 
thus makes more room for the development of the doctrine of the Spirit. 
That with Irenaeus, 'the doctrine of the Spirit is not overlooked, and 
for, the first time it takes its place in an orderly scheme of Christian 
teaching' (H. B. Swete, The Holy Spirit in the Ancient Church, (London, 




48. E. g. 11.3.1., 11.16.7; 20.1; 23.4; IV. 19.3. 
49.1.28.1; 111.23.7. Whether Tatian did hold this view , and his 
precise relationship to Gnosticism, are debated issues. For an assess- 
ment of the evidence, R. M. Grant, 'The Heresy of Tatian', J. T. S., N. S., 5 
(1954), pp. 62-68 may be contrasted with J. Dani6lou, Gospel Message 
and Hellenistic Culture, pp. 390-398. ' Danie'lou draws attention (p. 387) 
to a significant difference between Tatia-n and certain other writers: 
'For Theophilus the first Adam was, as it were, an imperfect sketch; 
and this basically is the conception found in Irenaeus, Clement, 
Tertullian and Methodius. Tatian, on the other hand, ascribes to Adam 
nobler beginnings., a view in which he displays an affinity with the 
speculations of Philo, the Gnostics,. and the Hermetic writings. ' 
50. J. T. Nielsen, op. cit.. It is a weakness of this book that it does 
not even mention Irenaeus' opposition to Tatian. 
51. For a perceptive discussion of the relation Irenaeus posits between 
Adam and his descendents, see L. S. Thornton, Revelation in the Modern 
World, (London: A. & C. Black, 1950), esp. pp. 149ff. Thornton shows 
how the isolation of Adam would break the coherence of Irenaeus'theology. 
52. Here also it is the Bible rather than Middle Platonism which under- 
lies Irenaeus' doctrine of God. A number of Old Testament texts (Exod. 34; 




7: 18) expressly link in a credal or liturgical fashion Yahweh's mercy 
and long-suffering. These are obviously held to be distinctive marks 
of the God active in the history of Israel. 
53. Marcion. Das Evangelium von fremden Gott, (Leipzig: 1921). 
54. Hans Jonas, The Gnostic Religion, p. 144. Throughout his writings 
Irenaeus opposes any idea that belief in God comes only with the 
historical advent of Jesus Christ. This is brought out with special 
force in the later Demonstration, and could be taken to indicate that 
with the wane of Gnosticism it is Marcionism that Irenaeus chiefly 
resists. 
55. 'For, like many even in. our day, heretics in particular, Marcion 
had an unhealthy interest in the problem of evil - the origin of it - 
and his perceptions were numbed by the very excess of his curiosity, 
(Tertullian, Adversus Mftrcionem, I. 2). Here again we see an underlying 
link between Marcion and Gnostic thought. 
56. Irenaeus opposes Marcion and Tatian in successive chapters of his 
treatise. (I. 27f. ). However, there are differences : for example, 
Tatian, unlike Marcion, believes in the resurrection of-the body (Ad 
Graecos, 6) but it is the resurrection of a body taken from an evill 
world. 
57. Ad Graecos, 7. 
58. C. f. 111.9-1; 16.6; 25.4. 
59. E. g. Dem. 69 
60. V. 27.2. 
61. This passage has often been overlooked by those interpreters of 
Irenaeus who have stressed his teaching on the explicit nature of the 
Church's belief and tradition (against the corresponding Gnostic 
secrecy in such matters). 
62. For mercy as the key theme in the Epistle to theRomans see C. E. B. 
Cranfield, The Epistle to the Romans, (Edinburgh: T. &T. Clark, 1979), 
p. 448. 
63. C. f. Dem. 56 
64. Proslogion 9-11. Origen(De Princ., 11.5) also makes an interesting 
attempt to connect the justice and goodness of God. He points out that 
the Marcionites 
, 
turn the love of God into mere sentimentality, and the 
justice of God into indignant hatred. For Origen judgement is the good- 
ness of God 'wishing well to the bad'. But why then does He not save 
the wicked? 'If He does not desire to do so, He will be no longer good, 
if He does desire it, and cannot effect it, He will not be omnipotent, 
(11.5.2). Thus Origen is drawn to suggest that the explicit Scriptural 
teaching upon judgement must be understood allegorically. His teaching 
upon the A-woK&ro&cr-rcxcr-, -i follows from this impasse. Origen conducts his 
argument at two levels: the exegetical and the philosophical. The latter 
is dominant, and at times anticipates Anselm: 'If justice is a different 
thing. from goodness, then, since evil is the opposite of good, and 
injustice of justice, injustice will doubtless be something else than an 
evil; and, as in (the Marcionite) opinion, the just man is not good, so 
79 
neither will the unjust man be wicked; and again, as the good man is 
not just, so the wicked man also will not be unjust'. (11.5.3) Origen 
lacks the proper Christological horizon that should surround discussion 
of such subjects. Anslem had a more satisfactory (1) doctrine of 
Atonement, but is weak in handling the vicarious nature of Christ's 
sacrifice (cf. G. S. Hendry, The Gospel of the Incarnation, (London: 
SX. M., p. 65). This is to some extent also a problem with Irenaeus. 
65. Theophilus von. Antiochien Adversus Marcionem und die anderen 
theologischen Quellen bei Irenäus, (Berlin: Texte und Untersuchungen 
. 46.2,1930) 
66. 'Loofs, op. cit., p. 432, quoted by M. Widman, 'Irenaus und seiner 
theologische; ý -Witer, Zeitschift far Theologie und'Kirche, 54 (1957) 
p. 157. 
67. M. Widman, op. cit., See also F. Montgomery Hitchcock, 'Loofs, 
theory of Theophilus of Antioch as a source of Irenaeus', J. T. S. 38, 
(1937), pp. 130-139 and pp. 255-266; idem, 'Loofs' Asiatic Source 
(IOA) and the Ps-Justin De resurrectione, Z. N. W. 36 k1937) pp-35-60; 
L. S. Thornton, op. cit., p. 118 f. 
68. L. W. Barnard, Justin Martyr's Eschatology, V. C. 19 (1965), pp. 86-98. 
Cf. E. F. Osborn, Justin Martyr (Tiabingen: J. C. B. MQhr, 1973), pp. 197- 
198. The chief points of uncertainty concern the immortality of the 
soul and the existence of an intermediate state between death and 
resurrection. 
69. See L. W. Barnard, Justin MartXr, (Cambridge, 1967) p. 83. 
70. ibid. p. 123. 
71. ibid. p. 124. 
72. ibid. p. 125. 
73. The New Testament places great emphasis upon the concept of the 
love of God. We are now so used to this emphasis that we are apt to 
overlook the correction of the common philosophies of the early centuries 
which this implies. Some theologians of the early Church did recognise 
the biblical stress upon the love of God - we may mention Ignatius, 
Origen and Augustine. Howeverý, it was all too easy in the second century 
to rely too much upon the distinction between the transcendence of God 
and the limitations of man. Most second-century writers whose work 
survives tendto treat Christ not so much as the revelation of the love 
of God as the 'reason' of His mind. 
74. IV. 41.4. There are of course many references to Paul and to the 
suffering and blood of Christ in the earlier books. ' E. g. -I. 24.4; 
,,, 
', 11.20.3; 111.11.3; 16.5 etc.. 
75. E. g. 1 Corinthians 15: 50, Romans 8: 9. Gnostic use of these texts 
is discussed at various points, in Book Five. 
76. V. 35. 
180 
77.1 use the translation of J. P. Smith, Ancient Christian Writers 
No. 16. (Westminster: Newman Press, 1952) 
78. Dem. 91-96. Such notions are also present in A. H. , albeit with 
less prominence. See IV. 21.3; V. 10.1f; 111.17.3. 
79. C. E. B. Cranfield, op. cit., p. 448: 'It is only where the Church ..... 
fails to understand God's mercy to itself, that it is unable to believe 
in God Is mercy for still unbelieving Israel, and so entertains the ugly 
and unscriptural notion that God has cast off His people. ' Scholars 
often contrast Paul's lenient attitude with that of Stephen as reported 
in Acts 7, but they too easily overlook Stephen's final remark upon his 
own murder at the hands of the Jews: 'Lord, do not hold this sin against 
them. ' (Acts 7: 60) 
80. See J. P. Smith, op. cit., p. 31 
81. L. W. Barnard, Studies in the Apostolic Fathers and their Background 
(Oxford: Basil Blac ell, 1966), p. 129; J. Alvarez, 'Apostolic Writings 
and the Roots of Anti-Semitism', S. P., 13 (Berlin: 1975), pp. 69-76. 
82. ibid p. 53. 
83. E. F. Osborn, op. cit., p. 4. 
84. L. W. Barnard, Studies in the Apostolic Fathers, p. 168. 
85. Barnabas was a converted J* ew who, perhaps for that reason, was 
very hostile to the Jews. Irenaeus refers to his Gentile parentage in 
111.12.15. 
86.1 use thisword in the restricted sense of 'pertaining to the Old 
Testament. ' In books onthe, period with which we are dealing the adjective 
Jewish tends to be applied a little indiscriminately, as critics of 
Danielou's great work The Theology of Jewish Christianity have pointed 
out. 
87. Biblia Patristica I, (Paris; 1975). There are two passing references 
in Tertullian, but no attempt to explore the significance of such a 
verse. Neither reference occurs in his Adversus Judaeos, which illustrates 
well the trend we are describing. 
88. Irenaeus makes frequent reference to Paul's letters, but this does 
not preclude the truth of my contention that he did not fully appreciate 
them. He did not refer to Romans 7: 12: 'The Law is good; and the 
commandment is holy, and just, and good. ' Such omissions may be sig- 
nificant, though arguments from silence must be handled with care and 
restraint. Although Irenaeus clearly knew the Epistle to the Hebrews, 
and he quotes it on five occasions, he never refers to those parts of it 
which present Jesus as the final and true consummation of the sacrifices 
of tlýb Old Covenant. This is a little surprising, given the positive 
support which such passages might have given to his concept of NVO(Ke? -'ýLw(rLs. 
89. While it must be admitted, the inadequacy of Irenaeus' account of 
the relationship bE;: ýween the Church and 
, 
Israel should not be overstated. 
Irenaeus lacks the intensity of the rebuke of the Jews issued by his 
contemporary from Asia Minor, Melito of Sardis. (On this aspect of 
St 
(89. continued) 
Melito's theology, see K. W. Noakes, 'Melito of Sardis and the Jews' 
S. P., 13 (Berlin, 1975), pp. 244-249. ) Stimulated by his opposition to 
Marcion, Irenaeus lays considerable stress upon the unity and con- 
tinuity of the Old and New Testaments. Furthermore, the sociological 
importance of martyrdom will doubtless have coloured the perception 
by the early Christians of their relation to all other groups, 
including the Jews. Perhaps the difficulty in establishing a fruitful 
understanding of the relation between Christianity and Judaism provides 
an important cause of the persistent inability of patristic theology 
to develop a full doctrine of atonement, the legal categories of Anselm 
ultimately filling the vacuum. Irenaeus' inability to find a proper 
place for the cross in his theology will concern us at various points 
in his doctrine of creation. 
90. R. Otto, The Idea of the Holy, (Oxford: 1926) 
91. D. R. Jones, 'Exposition of Isaiah 1: 21-311, S. J. T., 21 (1968) 
pp. 320-329, has put the situation clearly: 'The image of judgement, as 
popularly understood, is a picture of the deliverance of adverse verdicts 
....... Now what this chapter shows is that judgement, properly under- 
stood, is itself part of the saving activity of God. This chapter 
expresses (without explicitly saying so) the holiness of God which consists 
precisely in the unity of His judgement and His grace. God is holy 
because His grace judges and His judgement is gracious' (p. 328). 
92. Notwithstanding thedanger of arguments from silence, this omission 
is worthy of recognition, because Irenaeus is in the company of all 
other writers up to, and including, Clement and Tertullian: Biblia 
Patristica I lists no references to this rather significant verse. 56 
other references to Luke 17 are listed there, including a reference 
in Irenaeus (111.14.3) to vv. llff.. 
93. It is true that the New Testament can speak in harsh terms of 
those who threaten the life of the Christian community. Twice in the 
Epistles we hear of the somewhat obscure event of the handing over of 
certain disruptive members to Satan (1 Corinthians 5; 1 Timothy 1). 
This was evidently a final act of Church discipline, but it is interesting 
that in both cases, despite the harshness of the sentence, hope is held 
out for those handed over. The spirit of the man guilty of incest 
is to be saved in the day of the Lord Jesus. Hymenaeus and Alexander 
are delivered to Satan that they may learn not to blaspheme. Neither 
of these signs of hope is free from obscurity; however, some parallel 
with this ecclesiastical handing over to Satan can be drawn with Irenaeus' 
strictures against Gnostics. What we miss in Trenaeus is the same note 
of hope as we find accompanying the two New Testament incidents. Is 
this , because Irenaeus does not recognise to the same degree as Paul his 
own unworthiness for salvation? 
What we miss in Irenaeus is an acknowledgement that judgement will be 
accompanied by what, from our present perspective, will be surprises. 
This is not to impugn the constancy of God, but merely to recognise our 
limited (and hardly disinterested! ) viewpoints. It has been very 
difficult for the Church to accept that she cannot predict the course 
the faithfulness of God will take through history, let alone into 
eternity. Again, we can perceive the difficulties inherent in the view 
of tradition which was developing in the second century. 
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94. Irenaeus sometimes uses 'Wisdom' as a technical term for the 
Holy Spirit, generally in association with the Second Person of the 
Trinity spoken of as the Word. We shall return to this restricted 
use of the term Wisdom. In the present context I am referring to 
Irenaeus' concept of the 'wisdom' of the whole Godhead. There is 
doubtless a relationship between these different uses of the term 
'Wisdom', but this does not obliterate the distinction. 
95. Cf. 11.11.1; 25.1; 30.3,9; IV. 27.1. 
96. Cf. 111.22.1. 
97. IV. 26.1. cf. IV. 20.9; 16.1. 
98.11.25.2. 
99. We shall return to the question of just how successfully Irenaeus 
linked the transcendence and immanence of God. However, one important 
consequence of Irenaeus' teaching on the immanence of the transcendent 
One is an implicit rejection of the fatalism which beset second-century 
philosophy. This will become explicit elsewhere, but the emphasis upon 
the love and concern of G' od for man opens up an outlook which is other- 
wise closed from one or other side of its dualism, the Stoics from the 
inside of creation and the Platonists from the outside. Whether Irenaeus 
is thus able to free himself entirely from the necessitarian atmosphere 
of second-century intellectual culture is another question we will raise in 
connection with his doctrine of creation. 
100. Colossians 1 28; 2: 3; 3: 16. 
101. Ephesians 1: 9,17; 3: 10. 
102.1 Corinthians 1: 17,21,25,30; 2: 1-5,7,13; cf. lCor. 3: 18f. 
103. -M>, 6LC>L . Scholars disagree over whether Paul intentionally uses 
a technical term taken from the mystery religions, or whether he merely 
draws a contrast with the VITMLOL Of 1 Cor. 3: 1. The latter option is 
adopted here. i 
104. More verses (incidentally) which are not quoted in Irenaeus'extant 
writings. 
105. This is made explicit in 11.18,1: 'For wherever there is a want of 
foresight, and an ig-norance of the course of useful progress, there 
wisdom does not exist'. Naturally, there is an element of mockery of 
the Gnostic account of the misbehaviour of the reckless Aeon Sophia when, 
especia. lly in the early books of A. H., Irenaeus develops his understanding 
of the wisdom of God. 
106. IV. 19.3. 
107. Any conception of divine omniscience on the part of the Gnostics - 
which, given their exaltation of ignorance, is pretty minimal - is 
absorbed-into their fatalism. Irenaeus takes the omniscience of God very 
much for granted, as he did in the case of the omnipotence of God. This 
is illustrated by the comment of, Irenaeus upon the reply of Cain to God: 
, 'But. being asked where his brother was, he said, "I know not; am I my 
S3 
(107. continued) 
brother's keeper? " extending and aggravating (his) wickedness by 
his answer. For if it is wicked to slay a brother, much worse is it 
thus insolently and irreverently to reply to the omniscient God as if 
'he, 
could baffle Him. ' (111.23.4) The superiority of God over man is 
a constant theme with Irenaeus. 
108. Cf. 11.3.2; 13.3,8; 28.4; IV. 11.2. For the division in 
Gnosticism between thought and will, see 1.12.1.. , 
The form of 
these various positive statements by Irenaeus bears some relation to 
a passage from Xenophanes, probably mediated to Irenaeus in a doxo- 
graphical collection, but he has made them his own. 
109. E. g., IV. 6.7; 20.5,6. 
110. E. g. the extract from IV. 29.2 quoted above; cf. IV. 39.4. 
111. Cf. Karl Barth, 
, 
Church Dogmatics 11.2, pp. 34-76; John Farrelly, 
Predestination, Grace and Free Will (London: Burns & Oates, 1963) 
pp. 1-37. Both authors, whose own views on predestination are markedly 
different, reproduce a wealth of historical information. 
112.1 Apol. 44. Cf. Osborn, Justin Martyr, pp. 149-153; L. W. Barnard, 
Justin Martyr, p. 78. 
113. See Farrelly op. cit. pp. 76-78. Cf. H. Chadwick, Early Christian 
Thought and the Classical Tradition, (Oxford: O. U. P., 1966) p. 119. 
114. See 11.33.5. This conception also features in Justin, Upol. 45. 
115. One also has in mind here the reflections of St. Paul upon the 
mystery of election, pre-eminently in Romans 9-11. 
116. For Irenaeus the notion that God knows all things directly involves 
that He is also present to all things. We have here two ways of looking 
at essentially the same thing. The two ideas are explicitly linked in 
IV. 19.3. 
117. Cf. 11.1.5; 3.1; 4.2; 8.2f; 13.7; 35.3; 111.11.8; IV. 6.2; 20.1; 
V. 2.3; V. 18.1. Irenaeus may have been influenced here by the Shepherd 
of, Hermas, whose work in one place he quotes as authoritative. Hermas 
had written: 'First of all, believe that there is one God who created 
and arranged all things, and'made all things out of nothing. He contains 
all things and is alone uncontained. 1 (Mand. 1.1. ) 
118. The idea that God is a light which penetrates and banishes darkness 
is'important for Irenaeus. 
, 
God is active and purposeful. In 11.28.4 
Irenaeus , refers to God as 'all active Spirit, all light'. 
119.11.1.1; 1.5; 3.1; 35.3; 111.11.8; IV. 6.2; 20.1; 20.6. 
120.1.22.1; 10.2,4; 14.4; 33.2; IV. 20.2; 38.3. 
121. - That God fills all things, and not merely the realms of heaven, 
again illustrates the manner in which Irenaeus develops the theology 
commonly held by his contemporaries and predecessors - see, for example, 
Athenagoras, Legatio 8.7 where it is said that 'God fills that which is 
Sl+ 
(121. continued) 
above the world'. R. Norris, op. cit., p. 69f., has also drawn attention 
to a ýertain contrast with Justin Martyr at this point: I ..... it is 
impossible not to notice a significant difference between Irenaeus 
and Justin. For Justin, the chasm between generate and ingenerate existence, 
used to express the transcendence of the Creator over his creation, seems 
to imply a separation of the one from the other -a separation which is 
only overcome by the mediating agency of the Logos'. 
122. Col. 1: 19; 2: 9; a variety of passages present cognate ideas. The 
Spirit or Christ dwells in believers, who can be called the 'temple' of 
God. Irenaeus' anthropology, with its crucial place for the Spirit of 
God, points in the same direction. 
123.111.16 is a good example of his-teaching upon the oneness of Christ 
as God and man, and shows very clearly the Gnostic background against 
which Irenaeus is thinking in his Christology. 
124. The Gnostics based their systems upon the antithetical presence 
within the Godhead of passion, and a profound and deep rest, the passion 
of Sophia being wholly a bad occurrence. With one or two exceptions the 
general cultural and philosophical environment of the early church 
regarded 'passion' as sub-human, let alone appropriate to God. From a 
modern perspective we might wish to oppose Gnostic theology by reference 
to the proper, if differentiated, passion of the whole Godhead. Such 
an option was not readily available to a second-century theologian, as 
is illustrated by the case of Clement of Alexandria, who was even more 
emphatic than Irenaeus that God is above all passion. The view that 
men acquire wrong ideas of God because they are slaves to their passions, 
naturally produces the fundamental notion of God as a bare unity, with 
a consequent description in negative terms. See E. F. Osborn, Clement of 
Alexandria, ch. 2. 
125. E. P. Meijering, God Being History (Amsterdam : North-Holland, 1975), 
p. 56f: discusses the omnipresenceofGod in Irenaeus, but fails to connect 
it with his associated belief that God contains all things. Thus he is 
drawn to claim that, for Irenaeus, a 'gulf' exists between God and creation, 
and that 'God acts from outside the world'. 
126.11.25.3; IV. 38.1; cf. II. 34.2; IV. 5.1; 6.2; 11.1. 
127. For a comparative discussion of the concept of the transcendence 
of God in Middle Platonism and Hellenistic Judaism (with Gnosticism 
assessed inthe same contextI) see J. Danielou, Gospel Message and 
Hellenistic Culture, ch. 15. 
128. A good discussion of the interaction of t hese two concepts of divine 
transcendence is provided by A. H. Armstrong and R. A. Markus, 
' 
Christian 
Faith and Greek Philosophy, (London: D. L. T., 1960), ch. 2. The hints in 
Plato of the limitlessness of God not precluding His immanence were largely 
lost in the increasing stress in philosophical works upon His remoteness, 
as exemplified by the De Mundo, probably from the late first century B. C.. 
One reason for this development was a suspicion that the idea of infinity 
was an irrational concept. 
ss 
129. A brief account of the problems of the use of spatial concepts in 
theology is to be found in T. F. Torrance, Space, Time and Incarnation 
(Oxford: O. U. P., 1969). Perhaps surprisingly this book makes no mention 
of either Irenaeus or his Gnostic opponents. However, his account of 
Athanasius' teaching on the relation of God to space is similar to that 
provided by Irenaeus, except that Athanasius expresses himself in a more 
thorough and consistently trinitarian manner. A problem. with the Gnostics, 
as with the Arians, would then be seen to arise from their uncritical 
assumption of a 'receptacle' concept of space. Irenaeus' arguments are 
less concerned with the origins of the receptacle notion of space in 
Greek philsophy, and bear directly upon the related issue of anthropo- 
morophism. Ultimately Athanasius and Irenaeus overcome the problems 
encountered in Arian and Gnostic thought only by rejecting any concept 
of separation between the sensible (oL%. cr'G--rIroS) and intelligible 
021-ra-5 ) worlds. Origen rejected the 'receptacle' notion of space 
(pp. 12,64), but his retention of this dualism between the sensible and 
intelligible worlds (or Becoming and Being) meant that the sensible 
world was given a greater autonomy than Irenaeus would have allowed. 
From this followed Origen's belief that the universe had existed eternally 
in the mind of God. At the same time, and quite naturally, Origen could 
suggest that God had endowed creation with His own rationality. This 
alternation between dualism and- moni , 
sm 
, 
is still a-problem for Irenaeus 
and Athanasius, but less so, due to their combination of a belief in the 
freedom and transcendence of God, who creates out of nothing, with an 
equally strong affirmation that God holds creation in being and inter- 
acts with it. The unending challenge here is that of articulating the 
relation yet distinction between the freedom and necessity involved in 
the interation of God with creation. 
130. Here, too, Irenaeus mocks the spatial anthropomorphism of the 
Gnostics: 'And that they are truly "spiritual", inasmuch as a certain 
particle ofthe Father of the universe has been deposited in their 
souls ...... 1 (1.19.3) 
131. Just how successfully the Apologists pressed the available 
philosophical accounts of God into the service of theology is considered 
by R. M. Grant, The Early Christian Doctrine of God (University Press of 
Virginia, Charlottesville: 1966) ch. l. A central point of dispute concerns 
the ability of negative descriptionsof God to connote positive attributes. 
G. L. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, (2nd. Edn., London: S. P. C. K., 
1952), p. 41, has claimed that, 'The philologically privative terms connote- 
ultimate self-dependency and universal responsibility, and their connot- 
ation is therefore positive rather than negative'. E. F. Osborn, The 
Beginning of Christian Philosophy, (Cambridge: C. U. P., 1981), p. 66, 
has challenged Prestige's suggestion, which is certainly in need of some 
qualification. 
132. See. R. M. Grant, op. cit. p. 5ff., and J. Daniielou, Gospel Message 
and Hellenistic Culture, p. 328, for some examples. 
134. - Irenaeus does not with any clarity make the point that the stress 
on transcendence is also in its own way the product of an extreme 
anthropomorphism. It is arrived at-by'arguing negatively from human 
existence and perception; hence the two extremes of Gnosticism have the 
characteristic feature of anthropomorphism as their common base. 
IB(O 
135. For a similar distinction between love and greatness as determing 
our ability or inability to speak of God, cf. IV. 20.1,4,5. The attempt 
of R. Gregg and D. Groh, Early Arianism -A View of Salvation, (London: 
S. C. M., 1981), p. 10, to equate these passages with statements of Arius 
is hardly successful, for it fails to perceive the anti-Gnostic context 
of Irenaeus' assertions. 
136. In the Demonstration Irenaeus tends to draw a sharper distinction 
between the Father and the Son than is commonly implied in A. H.. This 
leads to a tendency in the later work to stress the transcendence and 
unknowability of the Father, although at the same time, there is a great 
emphasis-u ponthe role of the Son in revealing God. He begins his credal 
summary: I God, the Father, uncreated, beyond grasp, invisible, one God 
the maker ofall; this is the first and foremost article of our faith'. 
(Dem. 6) 
137. These differences are explored in detail by C. Welch, The Trinity 
in Contemporary Theology, (London: S. C. M., 1953), especially chapters 
2 and 7.1 -select Barth to illustrate the view that our knowledge of 
God genuinely reflects His inner Being, because it is a basic and 
repeated premiss, or exegetical conclusion, in the Church Dogmatics. 
However, it is an axiom which originates in expliciT form in the patristic 
debates during the Arian crisis. It is assumed by the defenders of the 
homoousios, as T. F. T. orrance, Theology in Reconciliation, (London: 
G. Chapman, 1975), p. 222f., has described in relation to Athanasius. 
Cf. also, Hilary, De Trinitate, 11.8., who, like Irenaeus, travelled 
between Gaul and Asia Minor. The contrasting reasons for their journeys 
( missionary zeal and ecclesiastical exile) are perhaps symbolic of other 
differe=es between the second and fourth centuriesl 
138. There is a parallel to what I am suggesting with regard to knowledge 
of God in the epistemology of problem-solving as described by Michael 
Polanyi (e. g. The Tacit Dimension, (London: R. K. P., 1966), pp. 22-24), 
who took his cue from the Platonic dialogue The Meno. Plato argued that 
the task of solving a problem islogically absurd and therefore impossible. 
For if we already know the solution, there is no occasion to search for 
it; while if we do not know it, we cannot search for it, since we do not 
know what we are looking for. The task of solving a problem must indeed 
appear self-contradictory unless we admit that we can possess true 
intimations of the unknown. Thus every advance in knowledge is. guided 
by our power for seeing the presence of some hidden aspect of truth behind 
yet incomprehensible clues pointing increasingly toward this yet unknown 
aspect of reality. In an analogous way I suggest that our seach for under- 
standing or apprehension of God must be guidedby our ability (admittedly 
given by God) to sense that which is true concerning God, and that which 
is true concerning God must reflect in some immediate way how God truly 
is. 
139. E. g. 1.17; 11.6.3; 11.7; 11.8; 11.19.6; 11.20; 11.24. We shall 
return in another context to consider the Gnostic and Irenaean concepts 
of the image of God in creation. The emphatic connection between the 
Gnostic theory of imaging, and their speculative anthropomorophism, is 
well brought out in IV. 19.1f., where Irenaeus recalls and summarises 
the argumentspresented in Book Two: 'For, as I have repeatedly shown, 
such persons will find it necessary to be continually finding out types 
of types, and images of images, and will never fix their minds on one 
and the true God. For their imaginations range beyond God ..... To these 
persons one nV with. justice say .... To what distance above God do you lift 
up your imaginations? '. 
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140. II. 14.3f. 
141.11.8. 
142. This refers to the Gnostic threefold classification of men. 
Only the spiritual men image the Pleroma, to which they shall properly 
and necessarily return. 
143. This does not imply that Irenaeus holds that the Son and Spirit 
were generated as a prelude to, or in association with, the act of 
creation -a view with which theologians before and after Irenaeus had 
difficulty. It is the decision for incarnation, rather than the 
generation of the eternal Logos, which is the act of God determined on 
behalf of man. 
144.11.16.2. The 365 heavens image the 365 days in the year. 
145. Hippolytus, Refut. VII. 8f. 
146. Cf. Jonas, op. cit., p. 288. 
147. There is considerable literature upon this aspect of Barth's 
thought, much of which attempts to narrow the distinction he admittedly 
made early in his theological career and in a somewhat polemical context. 
But the basic distinction remains valid for the present purpose. 
148. See L. W. Barnard, Athenagoras, p. 115. 
149. Ibid. p. 45: 'Athenagoras implies that God, the cause of man, is 
Being and that Being is related by analogy to the being that man has. 
It is doubtful if the Middle-Platonist philosophers by Athenagoras, day 
had evolved this idea of the analogy of being from the hints Plato gave. 
Athenagoras, in fact, may well be a pioneer in this connexion. 1 The 
denial of creation out of nothing goes naturally enough with the concept 
of analogy of being, as Plato and Aristotle witness. Later in the history 
of theology we do indeed find both affirmed, but is it not the case that 
the doctrine of creation out of nothing had been weakened, having become 
part of the theological furniture handed down from generation to generation 
rather than an important and influential axiom? The Reformers certainly 
feltthe need to reaffirm the primacy of the will of God in His relation 
to created existence, and this*involved giving a new precedence (i. e. 
restoring Irenaeus' precedence) to the doctrine of creation out of 
nothing. Cf. T. F. Torrance, Theological Science, (Oxford: O. U. P., 1969) 
P. 101. 
150. A different emphasis is found in Origen, who acknowledges the 
finality of the Apostolic-teaching upon the content of the threefold 
rule of faith, but then goes on to indicate the many gaps in the 
teaching of the Church, gaps in our knowledge and understanding which 
he will try to remove (De Princ. I. Praef. ) 
151. We must be careful not to expect a ratiocinative concept of 
knowledge from Irenaeus. In the paragraph following that quoted 
above he insists that Christian knowledge is a matter of life and love 
as well as of the intellect. Hence Christians, unlike the heretics, 
are willing to be martyred for their faith (IV. 33.9). (The degree to 
which Irenaeus was mistaken when he wrote, or the extent to which future 
se 
events were to prove him mistaken, need not concern us. ) Irenaeus often 
brings into intimate connection the love and knowledge of God by men 
(e. g. IV. 12.2; IV. 20.1). The Gnostic conception of knowledge, although 
presented as a form of mystical enlightenment inasmuch as it takes the 
recipient out of this unpleasant world, is in fact basically speculative 
and intellectual. The New Testament, like Gnosticism, forges a close 
link between knowledge and salvation. The chief difference is that in 
the New Testament it is a matter not of doctrinal enlightenment but of 
knowledge of the Son of God (e. g. Eph. 4: 13). He, Jesus Christ, is the 
mystery of God (Col. 2.2). This knowledge embraces our whole existence, 
and is therefore jAAer*%vOLO- ) 
the repentance of the whole man. We have 
seen that for Irenaeus God contains and pervades all things. St. Paul 
takes this a step further and draws the conclusion that to know God can 
only be the result of being known by Him (Gal. 4: 9; lCor. 8: 3; 13: 12). 
St. Paul can put this in an even sharper fashion: to know God is to have 
the mind of Christ himself (lCor. 2: 16). These are bold expressions 
adopted by St. Paul, and it is not surprising that Irenaeus, faced 
with a Gnosticism which exhibited a certain formal similarity to the 
teaching of St. Paul, chose to emphasise the limits of the knowledge man 
can have of'God. As in the case of his understanding of the wisdom of 
God, Irenaeus does not fully embrace the Christocentricity of the New 
Testament. 
152.11.28.6. Almost certainly Irenaeus would have been prepared to 
say more on this subject if he had had to combat Arianism as well as 
Gnosticism. 
153. The chief question Irenaeus has mentioned in the passage immediately 
preceding 11.28.8 as incapable of solution by human effort is the cause 
and origin of evil. 'It becomes us, therefore, to leave the knowledge of 
this matter to God .... and not to rush to such an extreme danger, that we 
will leave nothing in the hands of God, even though we have received only 
a measure of grace. ' (11.28.7) Again we must maintain that to assert 
that we have received only a measure of grace indicates that Irenaeus 
has not fully understood that in Jesus Christ the mystery of God hidden 
from the ages, while indeed remaininga mystery, has now been revealed. 
154. Many of the arguments used by Athanasius in opposing the Arians 
are prefigured in Irenaeus' opposition to Gnosticism. The Arians did not 
have an elaborate myth of the generation of a pleroma of 30 Aeons, and 
concentrated upon the relation between the Father and Son. Athanasius 
repeatedly challenges their over-literal interpretation of the biblical 
metaphor of paternity and sonship. Athanasius, like Irenaeus before 
him, emphasisedthe need to interpret the Scriptures as a whole, in the 
light of the received faith. It is the importation of biological 
language, understood with a good deal of literalism, into theological 
discussion that the Arians and Gnostics share. Because the worst features 
of Gnosticism are not present in Arianism, Athanasius is required - not 
without a reverent reluctance on his part - to penetrate more deeply into 
what can and cannot be said concerning the nature of the relations 
existing within the immanent Trinity. The resultant defence of the doctrine 
of the homoousios led to less emphasis in Athansius upon the essential 
unknowability of God than we find in Irenaeus. Athanasius remarks upon 
the debt of the Arians to Valentinian Gnosticism inContra Arianos, 111.60. 
155. W. R. Schoedel, 'Enclosing, Not Enclosed : The Early Christian 
Doctrine of God', in Early Christian Literature and the Classical 
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Intellectual Tradition, ed. W. R. Schoedel and R. L. Wilken (Paris: 
Editions- Beauchesne, 1979), pp. 75-86, has drawn attention to Philo's 
reversal of the Platonic connexion between the limited and the rational, 
thus conceiving God as transcending the cosmos, rather than being (as 
in Greek Philosophy) a factor in the totality of things. Yet, as 
Schoedel notes (p. 76), this change also introduced 'the emphasis, 
perhaps for the first time, on the idea that the essence ofGod is un- 
knowable'. Gnosticism would seem both to reintroduce the connexion 
between the limited and the rational with its pervasive system of hier- 
archical demarcation and imaging, and also to take further the speculation 
upon the essential incomprehensibility of the supreme God. We can see, 
then, how Irenaeus, in rejecting the connexion between the rational and 
the limited as this presented itself to him inGnosticism, and in rejecting 
the extreme doctrine of divine incomprehensibility, could nevertheless 
retain the modified type of understanding of the ineffability of God 
which (perhaps) had itsultimate source in Philo. There is supporting 
evidence in Irenaeusltheodicy, which depends upon a dichotomy between 
created and uncreated existence not unlike that which one also sees 
in Philo. 
156. This chapter contains many trinitarian passages, linking the 
activity of the Word and Wisdom, the Son and Holy Spirit, throughout 
salvation-history. 
157. The relation between the Gospel of John and such Johannine sayings 
as those found in Matthew 11: 27 and Luke 10: 22 is not easy to determine, 
but the presence of such sayings in Matthew and Luke should warn us 
against making too sharp a division between the synoptic gospels and the 
Fourth Gospel at this point. 
158. We have already touched upon the underlying issues here in our 
consideration of Irenaeus' teaching upon the mercy and righteousness 
of God, and we shall return to them in the contexts of the divine 
motive for creation, and of the freedom of the will. 
159. Cf. IV. 15.1. 'For God at the first, indeed, warning them by means 
of natural precepts, which from the beginning He had implanted in mankind, 
that is, by means of the Decalogue ...... 1; V. 8.2. I .... those who are 
subject to the Spirit, and who in all things walk according to the light 
of reason, does the Apostle properly term "spiritual", because the Spirit 
of God dwells in them. ' Irenaeus' thoughts are connected with his idea 
that to have life is to possess the Spirit of God, an aspect of his 
anthropology to which we shall return. Irenaeus' attempt to see relation- 
ship with God as the sole basis of the life of man may have influenced 
his remarks upon the universal awareness of God among men. 
160. God is referred to as 'life' in 11.13.9, as we shall see below. 
161. That Irenaeus knew more of ancient philosophy and culture than has 
sometimes been allowed has been recognised in recent years. See R. M. 
Grant 'Irenaeus and Hellenistic Culture', H. T. R., 42 (1949) pp. 41-51; 
W. R. Schoedel, 'Philosophy and Rhetoric in -the Adv-ersus Haereses of 
Irenaeus', V. C., 13 (1959), pp. 22-32. But his fundamental guides are 
Scripture a7n-dtra-dition, alongside which he sees no essential place for 
secular learning. Nevertheless, given his relatively strong doctrine 
of creation, we must be careful not to press Irenaeus' occasional remarks 
too far. One recalls the story concerning Karl Barth, who, when asked 
to explain the place of reason in his theology, is reported to have said, 
simply: 'I Use it1l. 
qo 
162. Here Irenaeus reverses a trend which was apparent in the 
Apologists, and which reasserted itself in Clement and in much 
theology of the third century. 
163. R. A. Norris, has drawn attention to this scholarly neglect 
of Irenaeus' doctrine ofGod, which he regards as Irenaeus' 'central 
concern'; and he adds the suggestive comment: 'It may be the case 
that this neglect of Irenaeus' central concern has a tendency to 
introduce a serious distortion into contemporary appreciations and 
criti6ism-6fhis work' ('The Transcendence and Freedom of God: Irenaeus, 
the Greek Tradition and Gnosticism', in Early Christian Literature and 
the Classical Intellectual Tradition, p. 89). Although useful, Norris, 
essay presents only a very truncated account of Irenaeus' doctrine of 
God, chiefly due to his self-imposed restriction chiefly to examine 
material from Book Two of A. H.,... alone. 
ql 
CHAPTER TWO 
DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY 
Introduction 
'The Trinitarian passages in Irenaeus are numerous, but not all of 
the same kind'. 
1 Such a judgement is empirically correct, although 
recognition of the diversity of expression in Irenaeus can divert 
attention from the inner thrust of his theology. In this area, above 
all, later writers have often attempted to award Irenaeus (perhaps 
limited) marks for orthodoxy, without making sufficient allowance for 
the fact that he wrote in an age which did not, as far as we can tell, 
set examinations upon such subjects. Up to a point, questioning Irenaeus 
from the perspective of later trinitarian theology is fruitful, providing 
that it is done with an openness to the conceptuality and mode of 
expression of a previous century. We shall not attempt in detail to 
exonerate Irenaeus from the charges of modalism and subordinationism, 
although at the appropriate points we shall refer to the continuing 
debates upon such subjects. Our aim is rather to identify and assess 
the basic shape of Irenaeus' doctrine of the Trinity, as this can be 
perceived amid and through the variety of models and expressions which 
he employs. It is commonly agreed that Irenaeus conceives and presents 
his theology of the Trinity in close association with the wider domain 
of his theology of God and creation, and thus our discussion will 
materially bear upon the overarching theme of this thesis. 
The Deity of Christ and the Unity of God. 
So far as we are able to judge from the surviving documents, both 
canonical and extra-canonical, a sense of salvation dominated the life 
ql 
and experience of the Christians of the first 150 years of the Church. 
This may be rather exaggerated by Ignatius, 
2 
or insufficiently emphasised 
by the Apologists, but such variations are within tolerable limits. 
3 
From this sense of salvation the belief arose that with Jesus Christ 
one had to do with God, the Creator and Lord of heaven and earth. 
4 
Jaroslav Pelikan has drawn together intimations of the deity of Jesus 
Christ from different areas of the life and literature of emergent 
Christianity: 5 
The oldest surviving sermon of the Christian Church after 
the New Testament opened with the words: 'Brethren, we 
ought so to think of Jesus Christ as of God, as of the 
judge of the living and dead. And we ought not tobelittle 
our salvation; for when we belittle him, we expect also 
to receive little'. (2 Clement 1: 1-2) 
The oldest surviving account of the death of a Christian 
martyr contained the declaration: 'It will be impossible 
for us to forsake Christ ..... or to worship any other. For 
him, being the Son of God, we adore, but the martyrs ...... 
we cherish'. (Martyrdom of Polycarp 17: 2-3) 
The'oldest surviving pagan report about the Church described 
Christians as gathering before sunrise and 'singing a hymn 
to Christ as though to (a) god'. (Pliny, Epistle 10 96.7) 
The oldest surviving liturgical prayer of the Church was a 
prayer addressed to Christ: 'Our Lord, come! ' (I Cor. 16: 22) 
It was, and is, a long way from this widely held belief that Jesus Christ 
should appropriately be spoken of as divine, to the trinitarian and 
christological credal formulae of the fourth and fifth centuries. 
Considerable controversy, 
6 
investigation and clarification were to 
intervene, and necessarily so, because the doctrines of the Church are 
neither obviously self-evident nor logically derivable from statements 
of Holy Scripture. This latter point, in particular, became apparent 
to-Irenaeus in his reflections upon Gnostic theology. The Gnostics 
were by no means disinclined to appeal to Scripture to prove or support 
their case. 
7A 
considerable part of A. H. is devoted to refuting various 
instances of Gnostic exegesis of the emerging New Testament, and the 
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exposition of Old Testament testimonia dominates the Demonstration. 
This systematic concentration upon exposition of Scripture in Irenaeus 
is, at least to some degree, a new feature 
8 in the evolution of theology; 
in part it is a natural development, but in part it is a development 
influenced by the form of Gnostic theology. Irenaeus makes two inter- 
related main criticisms of Gnostic exegesis. In the first place, the 
Gnostics disregard the order and context, that is, the straightforward 
meaning, of the Scriptures, and, irL the second place, they interpret 
ambiguous and enigmatic passages by those which are even less clear: 
They gather their views from other sources than the 
Scriptures; and, to use a common proverb, they strive 
to weave ropes of sand ..... In doing so, however, they 
disregard the order and connection of the Scriptures, 
and so far as in them lies, dismember and destroy the 
truth. (1.8.1) 
For by the fact that they thus ehdeavour to explain 
ambiguous passages of Scripture ..... they affix a more 
important to a less important question. For no question 
can be solved by means of another which itself awaits 
solution; nor ..... can an ambiguity be explained by 
means of another ambiguity, or enigmas by means of 
another greater enigma, but things of such character 
receive their solution from those which are manifest, ' 
and consistent, and clear. (II. 10.1) 
To the Gnostics Irenaeus puts the counter-claim: 
The entire Scriptures, the prophets and the Gospels, can be 
clearly, uianbiguouslyi-. and harmoniously understood by all.... 
since they proclaim that one only God, to the exclusion of all 
others, formed all things by His Word ..... and since the very 
system of creation to which we belong testifies, by what falls 
under our notice, that one Being made and governs it, those 
persons will seem truly foolish who blind their eyes to such 
a clear demonstration. 9 (11.27.2) 
Irenaeus here brushes over both the obscurity of some parts of Scripture, 
and the mysterious and unusual character of the meaning clearly intended 
elsewhere in Scripture. What he feels is clear above all is the fact 
that there is and can be only, one God. This is argued at length in 
10 Book Two of A. H. , against the charge thafthe Gnostics both divided 
the Godhead, and confessed an unknown Bythus who had no attributes 
capable of expression in human language. This opposition to the 
Gnostic account of God is filled out with a doctrine of the many 
attributes of the one God. However, more needed tobe said in defence 
of Catholic Christianity than a simple appeal to the unity of God 
declared in Scripture and creation. The growing authority of the 
emergent canon of Scripture demanded, in the face of alternative 
exegesis, and especially the sustained alternative offered by Gnosticism, 
an authoritative interpretation. 
11 
In this context, Irenaeus developed 
his conception of the rule of truth, 
12 by reference to which alone 
would Scripture receive accurate interpretation. It is important to 
recognise that by this expression, and its cognates, he did not mean 
a particular credal formula which found (or should find) universal 
acceptance, or indeedany formula as such, but the actual material body 
of the faith which was possessed and cherished by the Catholic Church 
in every time and place. 
13 Obviously, this faith both can and should 
find expression in language and formula, but such expression is seen 
by Irenaeus as subsidiary, and subject to control by the ultimately 
ineffable rule of truth itself. 
Although he does not use the terminology, doubtless due to its easy 
affinity to Gnostic allegorization, there is a type of spirit/letter 
model of Scripture and doctrine in Irenaeus. 
14 Certainly, both Scripture 
and doctrine are spiritual: 
.... what ground is there for complaint, if, in regard 
to those things which we investigate in the Scriptures 
(which are throughout spiritual), we are able by the 
grace of God to explain some of them, while we must 
leave others in the hands of God ..... (11.28.3) 
.... that well-groomed system which tends to man's 
salvation, namely, our faith, which, having been 
received from the Church, we do preserve, and which 
always, by the Spirit of God, renewing its youth, as 
if 
, 
it were some precious deposit in an excellent 
vessel, causes the vessel itself containing it to 
renew its youth also. (111.24.1) 
9s 
It is in this context of the correct exposition of Scripture that 
we should view the Irenaean doctrine of the Trinity. Although there 
are numerous trinitarian passages, the doctrine of the Trinity is not 
an independent theme in his writings. Hence Irenaeus was not concerned, 
as later writers would be, to guard and systematise his expressions. 
All the credal summaries in the Demonstration and the most important 
embodied in A. H. are trinitarian in structure, 
15 but of varying 
content. There are also a surprising number of credal summaries which 
ignore the third article, 
16 
which fact serves to illustrate the flexible 
approach adopted by Irenaeus to a formulation of trinitarian doctrine. 
His trinitarian theology is designed to give organic structure or 
body to his fundamental belief in the unity of God, as this belief is 
tested exegetically in the light of its presence in the liturgical and 
catechetical tradition. Thus it is the case that the problem of 
reconciling the oneness and threeness of God first comes under serious 
discussion in Book Three of A. H., when Irenaeus begins his connected 
exegetical defence of the conclusions reached against Gnostics in Book 
Two. The trinitarian rule of truth functioned, then, to use a modern 
expression, as an exegetical blueprint whose form was as much implicit 
as explicit, securing the truths that salvation was real, of God, and 
addressed to creation as a whole. It was important for Irenaeus that 
the rule of truth was characterised by a structure which directly 
reflected the self-revelation of Father, Son and Holy Spirit in the 
redemption of creation. It--is theuncovering of this structure which is 
Irenaeus' aim in A. H., and hence the frequent occurrence of trinitarian 
motifs and allusions, but no independent trinitarian theme. These 
various points are well illustrated in the following summary of his 
theology which Irenaeus provides: 
And all those other points which I have shown the 
prophets to have uttered by means of so long a series of 
9L 
Scriptures, he who is truly spiritual will interpret by 
pointing out, in regard to every one of the things which 
have been spoken, to what special point in the dispensation 
of the Lord it referred, and (by thus exhibiting) the entire 
system of the work of the Son of God, knowing always the same 
God, and always acknowledging the same Word of God, although 
He has (but) now been manifested to us; and acknowledging also 
at all times the same Spirit of God, though in these last times-ý 
He be newly poured out upon us, and upon mankind itself from the 
creation to the end of the world: from whom such as believe God, 
and follow His Word, obtain the salvation which is of Him. 
(IV. 33.15) 
It is in this overall key that we should consider Irenaeus' doctrine 
of the Trinity. The tradition of the Church demanded that in a real, 
if undefined, sense Jesus was the divine redeemer, and the particular 
challenge of Gnosticism required that certain questions be posed and 
answered. The trust in God as revealed in Jesus, which accompanied 
the experience of salvation characteristic of early Christianity, 
carried implications which necessitated theological expression. The 
peculiar difficulty bequeathed by the implicit equation of God and 
Jesus of Nazareth led theology in the direction of a doctrine of God 
as triune, in order to safeguard the sovereign reality of the God who 
both created and sustains the universe, without prejudice to His 
ability to become incarnate. The doctrine of the Trinity is therefore 
to be seen as an attempt to explicate Christian identity : the identity 
primarily of the God who creates and. redeems, but also of the man who 
experiences this God. 'The process by which the implicit beliefs of 
an individual or cultural group are rendered explicit has been the 
subject of extensive study in the modern era, and with hindsight we 
should not be unduly surprised that the development of trinitarian 
theology was such a slow, even painful, process. 
17 With Irenaeus, we 
are witnessing a relatively early stage in the process of explicit 
d efinition, although, because the implicit underlying experience was 
identical with that of 'later theologians, the outlines of subsequent 
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developments can often be seen. But certain themes were naturally 
dominant in the late second century, chief among them being the basic 
question of the unity of Go . 
18 
Unity is a pervasive theme of A. H., and Irenaeus has often been accused 
of modalism. 
19 Perhaps his contention for the unity of Jesus Christ, 
Old and New Testaments, and so forth, does reflect too automatically 
upon his consideration of the Trinity, especially in passages which 
occur in the earlier part of A. H where Irenaeus reacts forcibly to the 
Gnostic account of the production of separated Aeons. Two examples 
may be cited: 
For if He produced intelligence, then He who did thus 
produce intelligence must be understood, in accordance 
with their views, as a compound and corporeal Being... 
(11.13.5) 
Each one of them must be understood as being completely 
separated from every other, even as men are not mixed 
with nor united with one to the other, but each having 
a distinct shape of his own, and a definite sphere of 
action ..... qualities characteristic of a body, and not 
of a spirit. Let them therefore no longer speak of the 
Pleroma as being spiritual, or of themselves as 
'spiritual', if indeed their Aeons sit feasting with 
the Father, just as if they were men. (11.17.3) 
It is significant that closely associated with both these extracts are 
found instances of the Irenaean distinction between the ineffable 
greatness, and the love of God of which we can at least speak (11.13.4 
and 11.17.11). Such a distinction, whose validity was considered in the 
previous chapter, could easily provoke modalist or 'economic' tendencies 
in Irenaeus' doctrine of the Trinity, but these have to be assessed in 
the light of the polemical and relatively primitive context in which 
he wrote. A great many passages clearly show that Irenaeus carefully 
distinguished the Son from the Father. There is evidence that a 
development occurred in Irenaeus' conception of the distinction between 
Father and Son between A. H. and the later Demonstration. F. R. Montgomery 
CIS 
Hitchcock has shown 
21 that in the Demonstration, 'the Monarchia of the 
Father is more pronounced, while the Being and Initiative of the Son 
assume a unique importance in the economy of creation and man'. Montgomery 
Hitchcock has in mind here, in particular, the comparison between the 
credal summaries in Irenaeus' two works; 
21 but A. H. does not lack 
passages which present the trýnitarian shape of Christian belief in 
direct connection with the economy of creation and salvation. An 
example is given above in the extract from IV. 33.15, and the monarchia 
of the Father is well brought out in the following passage: 
By this arrangement, therefore and these harmonies, and a 
sequence of this nature, man, a created and organised being, 
is rendered after the image and likeness of the uncreated 
God, - the Father planning everything well and giving His 
commands, the Son carrying these into execution and 
peforming the work of creating, and the Spirit nourishing 
and increasing (what is made), but man making progress 
day by day, and ascending towards the perfect, that is, 
approximating. to the uncreated One. (IV. 39.3) 
This passage provides a good summary of Irenaeus' theology as a whole, 
and illustrates why, in a thesis whose orientation is towards his 
theology of creation, substantial attention is being paid to the doctrine 
of God, which cannot be disentangled from it. Furthermore, it shows 
how the concept of the divine unity in Irenaeus is interpreted much 
more in terms of a rich harmony than of a lifeless uniformity. 
The harmony is presented as close, and the concept of the unity of 
God is always near the surface. Irenaeus never uses the expression 
of Justin Martyr 'numerically other to describe the relation of the 
Son to the Father, 22 and does not follow Justin in attributing Old 
Testament theophanies solely to the pre-existent Son. It has been 
argued that Irenaeus was dependent upon Justin's exegesis of Old Testament 
theophanies, 23 and often these are attributed by Irenaeus to the Son 
or Word; but whereas, due to his rigid concept of the transcendence of 
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the Father, derived from Middle Platonism, Justin always refers 
theophanies to the Son or Word, Irenaeus, whose concept of the transcendence 
of the Father is much less rigid, can speak of the theophany of the 
whole Trinity: 
Since, therefore, Abraham was a prophet, and saw in the 
Spirit the day of the Lord's coming, and the dispensation 
of His suffering .... The Lord, therefore, was not unknown 
to Abraham, whose day he desired to see; nor again, was 
the Lord's Father, for he had learned from the Word of the 
Lord, and believed Him; wherefore it was accounted to him 
by the Lord for righteousness. For faith towards God 
justifies a man; and therefore he said, 'I will stretch 
forth my hand to the most high God, who made the heaven 
and the earth. ' (IV. 5.5) 
And so too Rahab the harlot, while she condemned herself 
as a Gentile, guilty of all sins, did nevertheless receive 
the three explorers who were exploring the whole earth, and 
hid them in her house, the Father I mean and the Son, with 
the Holy Spirit. (IV. 20.12) 
This is a most interesting development in Christian theology, and pre- 
figures the later dogma Opera trinitatis ad extra indivisa sunt. 
24 
With Irenaeus we are beginning to see the type of dialectical development 
of the doctrine of the Trinity which characterised later theology, a 
sense of the diverse economic structure of the history of creation and 
salvation being balanced by an emphasis upon the unity of being and 
operation in God. 
25 
An equally interesting development, novel in extant Christian literature, 
which similarly reflects his desire to hold together both the richness 
and unity of the divine being and operation, is Irenaeus' assertion 
of God: 
He is a simple, uncompounded Being, without diverse 
members, and altogether like, and equal to Himself, 
since He is wholly understanding, and wholly spirit, 
and wholly thought and wholly intelligence, and wholly 
reason, and wholly hearing and wholly seeing, and wholly 
light, and the vhole source of all that is good. (11.13.3) 
The choice here, if a nominalist interpretation is ruled out, is 
too 
either to view this passage as highly paradoxical, 
26 
or to ask if 
it does not fit rather well into the Irenaean doctrine of God. 
While I would not wish to insist that Irenaeus is entirely clear and 
consistent, I would contend that the presence of this sentence in the 
important Chapter 13 of Book Two, from which we have already adduced 
several quotations, contributes towards a conceptual reconstruction 
of the doctrine of God as a rich but simple triunity. 'Irenaeus is 
claiming, with a degree of apophaticism, 
27 that the supreme perfection' 
of God, as indicated by the multiplicity and diversity of attributes 
which He not only has but is, is present in its totality in all that 
He is or does. 
28 To deny this, for Irenaeus, is to engage in the 
anthropomorphic projection of spatial and temporal limitations into 
God, which is precisely the Gnostic error he is opposing. 
29 
The Relation between the Father and the Son 
We must return now to the close relationship Irenaeus posits between 
the Trinity and creation, whether in theophanies or in the overall 
shape and progress of creation and redemption. This correlation 
between the doctrines of God and of creation does, however, pose the 
serious question as to whether the relationship is not too close. Does 
Irenaeus speak adequately of God as fully and completely God apart 
from, or even prior to, the sequence of events comprising creation and 
redemption? Although Iremeus most conmxily- approaches the nature of 
God from the perspective of man and, subordinateto man, creation, and 
usually describes the work of the Godhead as 'it' effects the preservation 
and salvation of man and creation, there are passages which refer to 
V. , 30 the Trinity apart from their relations to created reality. Twice in 
A. H. Irenaeus speaks of the Son of God always (semper) existing with 
31 the Father, with no hint of the eternity of creation, even as an idea 
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or plan in the divine counsels. The Gnostic teaching which he 
confronts does not involve the eternity of the world so much as its 
lack of even temporal reality, although some Gnostics did teach in 
an ill-defined fashion that creation images the Pleroma, 
32 
and the 
sparks of the Pleroma temporarily lost in this world could be regarded 
as 'eternal' strangers ensnared in creation. But Irenaeus is careful 
to avoid the thought that the being of God is either complemented or 
determined by the existence of created reality. 
33 
He explicitly guards himself against this in the course of an examination 
of the Gnostic account of the generation of the Pleroma: 
Or, again, if they declare that the Pleroma was so 
produced in accordance with the foresight of the 
Father, for the sake of creation .... then creation 
will have greater honour than the Pleroma, if, for 
its sake, those things (i. e. the Aeons) were 
produced. (11.15.3) 
Irenaeus is equally critical of a transcendentalism which denies any 
contact or kinship between God and creation, for such a position removes 
the possibility of even speaking rationally of God in the language of 
this world. The Gnostics are thus attacked both for the crude anthropo- 
morphism of their theory of the sequential emanation of the Aeons in 
the Pleroma, and for their dualism between the Pleroma and creation. 
A measure of apophaticism is again evident: 
34 
If anyone, therefore, says to us, 'How then was the Son 
produced by the Father? ' we reply to him, that no one 
understands that production, or generation, or utterance, 
or manifestation, or by whatever name one may describe 
His generation, which is in fact indescribable. (11.28.6) 
We are now in a position to see why Irenaeus only employs the so-called 
'Logos model' with reserve and careful qualification to interpret the 
relation between Father, Son and creation, for this model both tended 
to tie the generation (or procession etc. ) of the Word/Son to the 
102- 
divine decision to create the world, and also called into question 
the status and ultimate divinity of the Logos. 
35 
We have already discussed Irenaeus' answer to the first of these 
problems and we need only to emphasise that here Irenaeus stands 
apart from his contemporaries and anticipates later orthodoxy, for 
the Apologists and Tertullian all 
36 
saw the generation of Christ as 
occurring at some point prior to creation, even if the qualification 
is added that the Logos existed potentially (i. e. actually, but not 
released) in the Godhead from all eternity. This development in 
Irenaeus can be illustrated and confirmed by the fact that whereas 
the Apologists tended to avoid attributing to the Logos-Son a 
mediatorial role in creation, Irenaeus repeats this assertion on very 
many occasions 
ý7 
The other, closely related, problem of the Logos model is the question 
mark it placed against the real divinity of the Logos-Son. As we have 
seen, with Justin the Son alone appears in the Old Testament theophanies, 
and it has often been pointed out that his use of the Logos model 
is influenced in part by the theological cosmology current in second- 
century Middle Platonism, 
38 
which drew both a relationship and a fairly 
sharp distinction between a 'First God', who transcends the world, and 
an inferior, secondary deity, who mediates between the First God and 
the world. The modification of Plato in Middle Platonism is highly 
significant: the realm of ideas, a separate and intelligible world 
beyond the visible universe in the thought of Plato, became in Middle 
Platonism eternal and changeless thoughts in the mind of the supreme 
God. In effect, the concept of a supreme God, of which there are mere 
hints in Plato, has been considerably developed and opened up for 
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possible assimilation to the Creator God of the Jewish-Christian 
tradition. Furthermore, the conception in the Timaeus of a World Soul 
takes over some of the functions assigned by Plato to the intelligible 
world of forms or ideas, and develops into a secondary, mediating 
deity who could be assimilated, with modification, to Jesus Christ as 
revealer of-the Father. 
39 However, the use of these conceptions in 
Middle Platonism led Justin to an inevitable dilemma: either the Logos- 
Son is equal in divinity to the transcendent Father, and thus should 
also be excluded from theophanic manifestation, or, if the theophanies 
are maintained and even emphasised, can he really be spoken of as 
God like the Father? Justin does not tackle this question, and' indeed, 
as it was not put to him by the challenges he faced, it is understandable 
that he ignores it. 
40 
Irenaeus' presuppositions concerning the unity and purity of catholic 
tradition, with which Justin the respected teacher at Rome was definitely 
to be associated, would have precluded his taking explicit exception 
to Justin's teaching 41 in a work such as A. H., but there is little 
doubt that he knew of this approach to the Christian doctrine of God 
and that he found it unsatisfactory. His opposition can be identified 
at three levels. 
Firstly, he attempts to defuse or evade the question of the generation, 
production, utterance or manifestation of the Logos-Son 
42 from the 
Father, as we have seen above, by invoking an apophatic reserve (11.28.6). 
Secondly, on occasions he explicitly distances himself from the language 
and concepts of the Logos model. We have already referred to his 
adaptation of the philosophic adage that 'like must be produced from 
10+ 
like' or 'an effect must be implied in its cause', but this brings 
its own problems to a Christian theology which wishes to maintain 
both the freedom of God and the contingency of creation, and Irenaeus 
does not emphasise this line of criticism. Also, his avoidance of 
any link between creation and the emission of the Word-Son involves 
an implicit, indeed almost an explicit, correction of the Logos theology 
of the Apologists. In part, Irenaeus is motivated by his distrust of 
Gnosticism, of which the language of the Logos model was all too 
reminiscent: a derived deity and the inevitable corollary of quasi- 
spatial divisions in the Godhead - and in part, we should not fail to 
suggest, by his fruitful meditation upon the God he experienced in 
scripture and tradition, and thus the positive thrust of his theology. 
In addition, Irenaeus was aware of the ambiguous meaning of Logos in 
43 
the Greek language, and he would have wished to avoid ambiguity in 
responding tothe diverse and constantly shifting formulations of the 
Gnostics. This is especially true here, for the Logos model seemed 
to suggest that an ontological change took place in the Godhead prior 
to creation, and the ambiguity of the normal meaning of logos both 
fed and concealed this problem. 
Further indication that Irenaeus had given careful thought to the 
Logos model as embraced by his Apologetic predecessors, and rejected 





which had been absorbed into at least some 
Apologetic articulations of the Logos theology, 
45 
and may have been 
invoked by Gnostics anxious to defend the respectability of their 
views. These points are illustrated in the course of an examination 
(typical in Book Two of A. H. ). of the internal consistency of the 
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Gnostic account of the Pleroma: 
Where Sige is, there cannot be Logos; and where Logos 
is, there certainly cannot be Sige. But if they say 
that Logos simply exists within (endiathetos), Sige 
also will exist within, and will not the less be 
destroyed by the-Logos within. (11.12.5) 46 
These two levels of opposition to the Logos model as developed by 
the Apologists are primarily negative, and the third level is occupied 
by Irenaeus' attempts to discover and articulate an alternative model 
which would do justice to both the relation between Father and Son- 
Word, and their ordered relation to creation. 
Lest we do not see the wood for the trees, it must be emphasised that 
the whole shape and thrust of Irenaeus' development of trinitarian 
theology is intended by him to provide this alternative model. The 
distinctive components of his positive alternative which we have yet 
to discuss are as follows: Jesus Christ as the visible of the invisible 
Father; the conception of the Son and Spirit as the two hands of God; 
the relation of the human nature to the divine nature of Jesus Christ; 
the doctrine of the Holy Spirit; the pre-existence of Christ and its 
relation to time and to eternity. 
At first sight, Irenaeus' characteristic teaching that, 'the Father is 
the invisible of the Son, but the Son is the visible of the Father' 
47 
might seem imprecise, or even mystical, and it is interesting to note 
that different commentators have pronounced this aspect of his trinit- 
arian theology both modalist and subordinationist. 
48 By contrast, I 
will attempt to indicate how it fits well into the broad sweep of his 
theology. 
In the first place, we must recall the context of Irenaeus' writing. 
lo(, 
Gnosticism drew a sharp distinction between the invisible and visible 
spheres of reality - in effect, a distinction akinto that between good 
and evil. At the head of the Gnostic system 
49 lies the 'invisible 
and incomprehensible' .... 
50 lunoriginated, inconceivable Father, who 
51 is without material substance' , and the other Aeons are also by nature 
invisible, if this invisibility is qualified by the possession of form 
?2 
Irenaeus wishes to avoid any confusion between the Godhead and created 
reality, but at the same time he wishes to assert the existence of a 
close providential and redemptive relationship between them. Thus he 
clearly stresses that by nature the Son is invisible like the Father, 
but became visible in the economy of redemp tion: 
53 
There is one God, who is 'above all principality, and 
dominion, and power, and every name which is named' (Eph. 1: 21); 
and His Word, invisible by nature, was made palpable and 
visible among men, and did descend 'to death, even the 
death of the cross' (Phil. 2: 8). (IV. 24.2). 
There are two sides to this redemptive manifestation of the Father in 
the Son, judgement and salvation, and it is in different ways appropriate, 
even necessary, for each, that the Creator and Redeemer was actually 
manifest to his handiwork: 
.... One and the same God, the Father .... caused His Word 
to be made visible to all flesh .... that in all things 
their king might become manifest. For it is necessary 
that those who are judged do see the judge, and know 
him from whom they receive judgement; and it is also 
proper, that those who follow on to glory should know 
Him who bestows upon them the gift of glory. (111.9.1) 
54 To speak of judgement and salvation is to speak of God , and in his 
use of the visible/invisible concept Irenaeus is exploring the Johannine 
teaching of the Son as the genuine revelation of the Father. 
55 But 
there is a further crucial component in his thought at this point which 
must be recognised if Irenaeus is to be understood. For him, God does 
not simply appear to man as God the redeemer and therefore as God the 
10-1 
judge and saviour - He also appears as man. The fundamental distinction 
between God and creation, which is one pole of Irenaeus' anti-Gnostic 
argument, is complemented by the divine freedom to act in creation, and 
pre-eminently in the history of man. This is not to say that God acts 
in history as an influence or presence, even a controlling one, but 
rather that God becomes man, and acts as man. This is brought out very 
clearly in a passage which has an important anthropological dimension: 
And then again, this Word was manifested when the Word of 
God was made man, assimilating Himself to man and man to 
Himself, so that by means of his resemblance to the Son, 
man might become precious to the Father .... When, however, 
the Word of God became flesh, He confirmed both these 
(i. e. the image and likeness of God): for He both showed 
forth the image truly, since He became Himself what was 
His image; and He re-established the similitude after a 
sure manner, by assimilating man to the invisible Father 
through means of the visible Word. (V. 16.2) 
This teaching that God comes to creation as man, lifting man up to God 
and effecting in the last Adam, from the sideof humanitythe response 
of love and obedience which God failed to elicit from the first Adam, 
is an important feature of the pneumatology of Irenaeus, as we shall 
presently see. For our immediate purpose, we should notice the radical 
meaning Irenaeus gives tothe contrast between the invisible and visible 
existence of God, so radical that, indeed, the absolute distinction 
between God and man is by no means abolished by the divine self-giving 
in Incarnation and Atonement - rather is it properly re-established in 
a living relationship. 
56 
This is the chief thrust of Irenaeus, use of the invisible/visible 
model of the relation between the Father and the Son; such an inter- 
pretation coheres with both the texts which present the concept, and 
the wider shape of Irenaeus' theology, with its close relation between 
los 
God and creation. Yet, as we saw in the previous chapter, a stress 
upon the intimate presence of God to creation can easily foster a 
corresponding dualism, with a tendency io distinguish too much between 
God as He is revealed and God as He is in Himself. The invisible/ 
visible contrast between Father and Son could embody such a tendency, 
as we see, for example, in IV. 20.5, where an explicit link is forged 
between the incomprehensibility and the invisibility of the Father. 
Some writers have seized upon such passages as evidence both that the 
Son does not fully reveal the Father, and that there is a consequential 
question placed against the eternal deity of the Son. 
57 We should not 
deny that there are tensions in Irenaeus' position, but its central 
objective is to overcome the Gnostic disjunction between the visible 
and invisible spheres, by drawing together in the person of the one 
Jesus Christ both'visible and invisible reality, the Word being 
supreme in things visible and invisible alike: 
But in every respect, too, He is man, the formation 
of God; and thus He summed up man in Himself, the 
invisible becoming visible, the incomprehensible 
being made comprehensible, the impassible becoming 
capable of suffering, and the Word being made man, 
thus summing up all things in Himself : so that as 
in super-celestial, spiritual, and invisible things, 
the Word of God is supreme, so also in things visible 
and corporeal He might possess the supremacy.... (111.16.6) 
The intimate presence of God to creation means both that He must be 
invisible - and that He must become visible! Thus, by the language 
of the visible and invisible, Irenaeus is attempting to overcome the 
weakness of the 'Logos model', which too easily tended to make the 
Logos an intermediary in the rather static framework of the generate 
world and transcendent, ingenerate Father, by the more radical claim 
that Jesus Christ is the actual historical presence within creation 
of the transcendent God Himself. The apparently dynamic, if rather 
loý 
impersonal, role of the Logos in the Apologists could readily conceal 
the problematic framework of the relation between God and creation 
which their theology assumed. Irenaeus' reconceptualisation enables 
him to retain a clearer emphasis upon the unity of God than was 
possible, for example, with'Justin. We can see how this approach to 
the relation between God and creation corresponds to the Irenaean 
emphasis upon the richness of God, 
58 
and how it goes some way towards 
explaining the apparent, inconsistency of his teaching upon the 
theophanies, whether they be of the whole Trinity, or merely of the 
Son alone. ýAs is so often the case in theology, the truth is at both 
ends rather than in the middle! 
At this'point we should mention certain other concepts, or pairs of 
contrasting concepts, which are used by Irenaeus in a similar manner 
to the invisible/visible scheme. On the whole they are less suited to 
express both the clear distinction and the close relation between God 
and creation, especially in the context of the Gnostic devaluation of 
the material world, and Irenaeus makes less use of these conceptual 
schemes than of the visible/invisible complementary contrast: 
The greatness and love of God. 
59 
The incomprehensibility and comprehensibility of God. 
60 
Christ as the voice of the Father. 
61 
The Son as the measure of the immeasurable Father. 
62 
Closely related to the use by Irenaeus of the visible/invisible model 
is his well-known teaching upon the 'two hands' of God. There is a 
II 
romantic, almost naive appeal in this imagery, which in part is 
the reason for its being given an excessive degree of attention in 
brief expositions of his theology. 
63 
The background to Irenaeus' conceptualisation of the Son and Spirit, 
or Word and Wisdom, as the two hands of God6,4-undoubtedly lies in the 
Old Testament where such metaphors as the 'arm', 'hand', or 'finger' 
of God are often found, parti, cularly in connection with a special divine 
act or intervention in history. 
65 Such language is also found in the 
New Testament, 66 but no consistent usage develops beyond the natural 
reflection of expressions found in the Old Testament. Theophilus of 
Antioch (Ad Autol. 11.18) refers to the Word and Wisdom as the two 
hands of God, but whether Irenaeus borrowed this expression and ident- 
fication directly from Theophilus is open to doubt. 
67 We can identify 
two reasons why Irenaeus found the expression apt for his purpose. 
In the first place, the expression highlights the creative power of 
the supreme God, who did not need to use Angels or Aeons to create man, 
for he possessed His own powerful hands. A hand is naturally con- 
substantial with the body to which it belongs, and from which it operates. 
Thus, by using this description of the Son and Spirit as the hands of 
God, Irenaeus affirms the co-ordinated presence of the whole Godhead to 
created reality, again pointing to the later doctrine opera trinitatis 
ad extra indivisa sunt, but also retaining by means of a bodily metaphor, 
a sense of organic diversity in God. 
68 
In the second place, the term the hands of God easily evoked a sense 
that the activity of the Godhead in creation and redemption was 
benevolent and especially suitable for the care and preservation of man. 
There is, Irenaeus maintains, a mutual adaptation between God and 
creation which has its source and power in the love of God, but 
creates a genuine reciprocity between God and creation. Within 
creation it is man who has been created for fellowship with God at 
the highest level possible, and man is firmly at the centre of God's 
purpose for, and dealings with, creation, but this anthropocentricity 
includes rather than excludes the wider domain of creation. 
69 The 
connection between conceptualisation of the Son and Spirit as the hands 
of God, and the orientation of Irenaeus' theology towards the creation 
and glorification of man is illustrated by the fact that a significant 
number of references to the two hands of God expressly mention their 
role in creating man after the image and likeness of God. 
70 The 
following splendid passage illustrates this intimate care for man 
exercised by the God who has hands: 
If, then thou art God's workmanship, await the hand 
of thy Maker which creates everything in due time; 
in due time as far as thou art concerned, whose 
creation is being carried out. Offer to Him thy 
heart in a soft and tractable state, and preserve the 
form in which the Creator has fashioned thee, having 
moisture in thyself, lest, by becoming hardened, thou 
lose the impressions of his fingers ..... His hand fashioned thy substance and .... He shall have pleasure in thy beauty. (IV. 39.2) 
The care of man by God is an important aspect of Irenaeus' development 
of the terminology of the hands of God, and in this way the concept of 
the two hands complements the use of the visible/invisible contrast 
between Father and Son. Both models serve to emphasise the presence, 
albeit differentiated, of the whole Godhead to creation. The idea that 
Jesus Christ is the visible presence of the Father brings this point 
home with special clarity, but the teaching of the hands of God both 
adds a clear trinitarian dimension, and adapts easily to express recip- 
rocity of relation between God and created man, which God establishes 
in power and love. 
117- 
It is characteristic of Irenaeus to use a cluster of overlapping 
terms and models to give expression to his theology. Those who do 
not find this theology congenial will naturally speak of his nayvety 
and inconsistency, but to others, including the present writer, the 
methodology used often helps to bring his vision home with additional 
richness and force. In the process, of course, certain allowances 
have to be made, for there are many obscure passages in his writings, 
which, even to an admirer, call for clarification or correction, 
rather than simple agreement. 
71 There is often considerable variation 
of expression within a given strand of his thought, as well as between 
identifiably different strands. Thus, in the example of the two hands 
doctrine, Irenaeus can use the expression hand or hands of God in a 
non-technical, purely metaphorical reference to God as God rather than 
to God as Father, Son and Spirit (or Father, Word and Wisdom). 
72 In 
addition, other concepts and terms are often inter-woven to create an 
almost poetic impression. In the above extract, for instance, in 
addition to the concept of the hand or hands of God, we find the image 
of the Holy Spirit as moisture and a reference to the fingers of God, 
which tends to refer to the Holy Spirit rather than the Son, 
73 
although 
the use of the plural 'fingers' counteracts this, evoking the role of 
both hands, i. e. Son and Spirit, in the ascent of man to God. 
This is not to say that clarification of Irenaeus' statements is not 
possible, and required by the ongoing development of theology, but 
rather to indicate the complexity (whether profound or otherwise) of 
the conceptual patterns and images which he uses. The next strand to 
be identified should be closely related to the two hands model and, 
understandably, has been neglected, when compared with the popular 
emphasis upon the conception of the two hands of God. I refer to the 
113 
notion that the Word-Son and Holy Spirit glorified the Father before 
the creation of the world. 
God is glorified by HisWord who is His Son continually, 
and by the Holy Spirit who is the Wisdom of the Father 
of all: and their powers (those of the Word and Wisdom), 
which are called Cherubim and Seraphim, with unceasing 
voices glorify God; and every creative thing that is in 
the heavens offers glory to God the Father of all. He 
by His Word has created the whole world, and in the world 
are the angels; and to all the world He has given laws 
wherein each several thing should abide, and according 
to that which is determined by God should not pass their 
bounds, each fulfilling his appointed task. (Dem. 10) 
The precise meaning of the Armenian has been a matter of some debate. 
74 
French editors in the early part of this century held that the Cherubim 
and Seraphim denote angelic choirs rather than the Son and Spirit, but 
it is now recognised that, 'The passage must be taken to mean that the 
Word and Wisdom, which are powers of the Father, and are also called 
Cherubim and Seraphim, give glory to God with their unceasing voice'. 
75 
Armitage Robinson dubbed this idea as 'strange to us', 
76 
and Danielou 
puts it firmly in the category of archaic Jewish-Christian imagery. 
77 
Both follow the consensus of scholarship in tracing Irenaeus' use of 
this conception to the influence of the apocryphal Ascension of 
Isaiah. 78 That a literary and, to some extent, a conceptual debt to 
the Ascension of Isaiah is owed by Irenaeus is highly probable on 
several counts, 
79 but I would wish to question the subsequent dismissal 
of this element in Irenaeus to his archaic fringe, which has usually 
followed recognition of a debt. The extrinsic grounds for qualifying 
the degree of dependence of Irenaeus upon theAscension of Isaiah are 
twofold. 
In the first place, those arguing for dependence as the crucial factor 
for the appearance of the conception in the Demonstration have not 
observed or noted the fact, that the idea that the Word glorified the 
11+ 
the Father prior to creation occurs also in A. H. 
80 
In the beginning, therefore, did God form Adam, not as if 
He stood in the need of man, but that He might have (someone) 
upon who,, to confer his benefits. For not alone antecedently 
to Adam, but also before all creation, the Word glorified 
His Father, remaining in Him; and was Himself glorified by 
the Father, as He did Himself declare, 'Father, glorify me 
with the glory which I had with thee before the world was Madp- 
(Jn. 17: 5). (IV. 14.1) 81 
In the second place it would appear that in the Ascension of Isaiah 
the Word and the Holy Spirit worshipped and praised God (ch. 9), which 
may not be quite the same as Irenaeus' conception that they glorified 
God. This point can only be made with caution, partly because we have 
the original versions of neither the Demonstration nor the Ascension 
of Isaiah, 
82 
and partly because recent criticism of the biblical theology 
movement has clearly exposed the limits of etymological arguments. 
83 
Nevertheless, it can be suggested that glorification of God by His 
Son and Spirit implies less separation between them than would praise 
and worship, 
84 
although it must be admitted that these concepts over- 
lap. The distinction for which I am arguing can, however, receive re- 
inforcement from the fact that in the Ascension of Isaiah (ch. 10) there 
is a somewhat greater emphasis upon the ineffability of God, 'whose 
glory I could not see', than would normally be found in Irenaeus - 
hence the Ascension of Isaiah more naturally uses the language of 
worship and praise as characterising the relation of the Son and Holy 
Spirit to the supreme God, than that of glorification. 
Textual study thus suggests that Irenaeus is adapting rather than 
merely plagiarising the Ascension of Isaiah. We have here an example 
of an underlying theme of this thesis, that Irenaeus is much more than 
a compiler of sources. He is certainly a traditional theologian who 
takes his bearings from what has been handed on to him, but super- 
imposed upon the tradition is an imaginative and sustained re-thinking 
ils 
which gives his work its positive feel. He takes the content of the 
Ascension of-Isaiah but partially modifies its meaning in the light 
of Johannine theology, 
85 
where it is explicitly stated that the Father 
is glorified in the Son (Jn. 14: 13, cf. 7: 18). The difference between 
the Father being glorified in and by the Son is not, I would argue, 
of great significance. 
To adopt this assessment, however, poses the question of how this 
strand in Irenaeus' theology coheres with the intrinsic pattern of his 
thought. To answer this I would refer in the first place to the 'two 
hands' model, and to the Irenaean emphasis upon the richness of God, 
which was discussed in the last chapter. The idea that the Word and 
Spirit glorify God enriches the 'two hands' modelwhich left to itself 
could appear modalist and to attenuate the distinction between the 
divine 'persons'. We may find our hands useful, even essential, and 
capable of performing difficult and beautiful tasks, but we would not 
naturally say that we were loved or glorified by our hands. It is 
the possible transfer of such a modalist connotation into the being of 
God which is guarded and modified by the glorification theme. 
86 
The objection might be raised that I am reading too much into two 
isolated passages. That is always the danger when an attempt is made 
to systematise the thought of a writer such as Irenaeus but, while 
acknowledging a certain risk, two major considerations support my case. 
In the first place, with his 'glorification' theme Irenaeus must have 
realised that he was sailing close to a prominent theme in Gnosticism. 
For, when Irenaeus enquired of Gnostic thinkers the reason for the 
production of Aeons in the Godhead, he was told that the Aeons were 
11(o 
produced 'for the glory of the Father' 
87. It would then be under- 
standable that Irenaeus only draws attention to his related, but 
eternal, concept of intra-divine glorification, on limited occasions, 
and in the context of clarifying the nature and purpose of created 
reality. Furthermore, the glorification theme is more clearly stated 
in the Demonstration where anti-Gnostic themes are less prominent than 
in A. H.. 
In the second place, and following from this, it has often been remarked 
that Irenaeus usually develops his trinitarian conceptions in close 
relation to the economy of salvation. 
88 Thus, apart from the presence 
of the Gnostic parallel just described, it would be natural for Irenaeus 
to give more prominence to the 'two hands'-model than to the concept 
that the Son and Spirit eternally 'glorify' the Father, and this is 
the position we observe. 
89 
1 
Having described them separately, we will-now briefly draw together 
these three strands of Irenaeus' exploratory attempt to conceptualise 
an alternative to the 'Logos model' approach to trinitarian theology. 
The visible/invisible model emphasises the reality and truth of 
revelation, while going some way towards a doctrine of divine accomm- 
odation to man. God is not resolved into man, but in the freedom of 
his divinity He assumes flesh and comes among his creatures as Lord, 
but also as man. This may sound paradoxical and it is certainly 'a 
great mystery', 
90 but to tho6e who would accuse Irenaeus of argument 
by assertion, or a literal and naIve interpretation of certain passages 
in the Gospel of John, I would point out, with caution, that modern 
science has uncovered a startlingly similar paradox (if this is the 
III 
right word) inherent in the unique position occupied by light in the 
universe. We will explore these ideas further when we consider 
Irenaeus' treatment of pre-existence and time, for time and light (or 
II 
the revelation of God) are not unconnected, as modern science has 
demonstrated: 
91 
Light .... connects everything. Light is itself timeless, 
as we have seen, but not eternal. Light is in this world 
of manifestation and yet it is not in the world of time. 
Time derives from light. Without light there would be no 
time, and yet light itself is timeless. Light touches us 
in time, connects us with all other times, and in its touch 
both ties us to time and frees us from it. 
The'model of the two hands of God orientates the visibility or 
revelation of God towards a benevolent care for man and creation, 
while the assertion of the eternal richness and glory of God in 
His inner life turns our attention back to the easily forgotten self- 
sufficiency and invisibility of God in his own 'nature. 
92 - 
Aspects of Christology and Pneumatology 
The particular Christological issue which concerns us at this point 
is the relationship between the divinity and humanity of Christ - 
surely the, most intractable of Christological problems, yet one which 
bears directly upon trinitarian doctrine. 
93 As so often is the case 
with Irenaeus, statements are found which, through the conceptual eyes 
of later centuries, might indicate confusion, contradiction or even 
incipient heresy. 94 Without wishing - or needing - to defend every 
sentence that he wrote, a coherence in Irenaeus can be identified. 
In opposition to the Gnostic distinction between the man Jesus and the 
'divine' Aeon Christ, Irenaeus repeatedly insists upon the unity of 
Jesus Christ as, in some sense, divine and human. 
95 Thus it is- the 
IN 
person of Jesus Christ as God and man - what later was to be called 
the 1hypostatic union' - which forms Irenaeus' starting point. There 
is, however, no evidence that Irenaeus attempted to fit the divine 
and human elements or essences together in the manner which characterised 
the later 'Alexandrian' approach to Christology where the unity of God 
and man in Jesus Christ tended to compromise the fullness of his 
humanity. Rather, whatever man was or had, Jesus experienced or assumed 
in the economy of redemption: 
96 
Wherefore also He passed through every stage of life, 
restoring to all communion with God. Those, therefore, 
who assert that He appeared putatively, and was neither 
born in the flesh nor truly made man, are as yet under 
the old condemnation, holding out patronage to sin.... 
(111.18.7) 
The flesh which Jesus Christ had was no ideal or purified humanity, 
but was genuine human flesh, subject to temptation. 
97 That Jesus 
Christ in reality did not sin was due to the closeness of relation 
between the humanity and the Word, a relation which did not connect 
two separate or static entities, but rather a dynamic, moving, historical 
relation wherein, to use Irenaeus' expression, God and man are mutually 
accustomed: 
.... the Word of God who dwelt in man, and became the Son 
of Man, that he might accustom man to receive God, and 
God to dwell in man, according to the good pleasure of 
the Father. (111.20.2) 
It is because the relationship between God and man in the one Jesus 
Christ is primarily history 
98 
rather than metaphysics, that the question 
of a special humanity assumed by Jesus Christ does not arise. It is 
this world, this historical order, which is redeemed by God in Jesus 
Christ; and not by a timeless or instantaneous fiat, 
99 but by the 
patience and long-suffering of God who requires the love and obedience 
of manto, become a reality in the created order. 
119 
Our present concern is christological, but, in order to explore more 
closely what it meansIto emphasise. in this way the historical character 
of Jesus Christ, we must press'an important point which has a strong 
soteriological dimension: is the God who is long-suffering also the 
suffering God? 
Although this sounds a very modern expression, Irenaeus would almost 
certainly have been aware of the writings of Ignatius, which speak 
of the death of Jesus as 'the passion of my God' (Romans 6), and of 
salvation as born from 'the blood of God' (Ephesiarsl). In addition, 
his very opposition to Gnosticism would have raised the issue, because 
central to Gnostic Christology was the sharp distinction between the 
100 1, impassible Christ and the passible Jesus, which Irenaeus relent- 
lessly criticised in the light of his own stress upon 'the one Jesus 
Christ'. Hence Irenaeus closely implicates the Word-Son of God in the 
achievement of salvation through obedience and suffering. Many passages 
101 
would demonstrate this, but we may refer to the conclusion of Aulen 
in his well known book, Christus Victor: 
102 
The teaching of Irenaeus is clear and consistent, and.... 
the work of atonement is regarded as carried through by 
God Himself; and this, not merely in the sense that God 
authorises and initiates the plan of salvation, but that 
He himself is the effective agent in the redemptive work, 
from beginning to end. (p. 50), 
Although there is a good deal of truth in Aulen's remarks, he fails 
to refer to significant passages which would modify his assessment. 
In the first place, Irenaeus argues against the Gnostic account of the 
Pleroma on the basis that, if the Father is 'perfect and impassible', 
this must also. apply to 'those productions which proceed from Him, 
seeing they are of-the same substance with Himself' (II. 17.6f). This 
point is made in passing, but later in A. H., after a long section 
12.0 
vindicating the salvation of 'flesh and blood', he draws a certain 
distinction between the roles of the humanity and the deity of 
Christ in the economy of redemption: 
For if no one can forgive sins but God alone, while the 
Lord remitted them and healed men, it is plain that He 
was Himself the Word of God made Son of Man, 103 
receiving from the Father the power of remission of sins; 
since He was man, and since He was God, in order that 
since as man He suffered for us, so as God He might 
have compassion on us, and forgive us our debts ..... 
(V. 17.3) 
An even stronger distinction is found in the following passage, which 
occurs, significantly, in the very section of A. H. which most stoutly 
defends the unity of Jesus Christ: 
For as He became man in order to undergo temptation, so 
also was He the Word that He might be glorified; the Word 
remaining quiescent, that He might be capable of being 
tempted, dishonoured, crucified, and of suffering death, 
but the human nature being absorbed in it (the divine) 
when it conquered, and endured, and performed acts of 
kindness, and rose again, and ascended. (111.19.3) 
Aulen makes no reference to any of these three passages, each of which 
I implicitly or explicitly, places a certain distinctive emphasis upon 
the role of the humanity of Jesus Christ in redemption. God is 
present as His Word or Son in Jesus Christ, but always in the historical 
reality of the mediator, and thus always in His humanity, a humanity 
which is being redeemed, but which is more actively involved than if it 
were merely the passive receptacle of redemption. 
104 
In response to Gnosticism, Irenaeus' greatest emphasis is upon the 
unity of Jesus Christ. Yet no static unity is involved, for Jesus 
Christ is always the mediator between God and man. When Irenaeus 
distinguishes the 'divine' and the 'human' in Jesus it is always in a 
redemptive context, and the aim is to expound the harmony achieved 
17 ( 
between God and man. Nevertheless, we can see in these statements 
a certain unresolved tension, similar to that which we saw in the-- 
previous chapter in connection with both the knowability of God, and 
the proper relationship between His justice and mercy. Can we speak 
of the Word as quiescent or inactive and'still retain the personal 
unity of Jesus Christ? Can we'not'see here the shadow of the dis- 
junction between Being and becoming which, on the wholehe-rejects? 
105 
A proper emphasis upon divine impassibility secures the sovereignty 
and constancy of God's relation to the world, yet this needs a double 
qualification if the concept of God is faithfully to reflect Christian 
truth. Firstly, by virtue of the decision to create, God has chosen 
a self-limitation which allows His creation to act upon Him, even 
if events, including the action of free agents, remain under His 
control. Secondly, the tragic dimension of creation, however this 
be conceived, must be 'felt' by God, who, at least to some degree, 
must be regarded as suffering, even if in His ultimate purposes this 
suffering will be transformed. Irenaeus I -rather inadequate account 
of the mercy and justice of God indicates that he does not fully 
appreciate the latter point, even given his emphasis upon God as 
long-suffering. The former issue will occupy us in relation to his 
doctrine of providence, where we will see analogous problems. But 
criticism must be muted by the acknowledgment that the Christology 
of later centuries developed many fine distinctions in order either 
to alleviate or to conceptualise the tension in relation between 
the humanity and divinity of Jesus Christ, a tension of which Irenaeus 
was rightly conscious 
106 
as crucial to the process - the history- of 
the redeeming interaction of God with mankind. To claim that Irenaeus 
held a concept of the suffering of God would be to go too far, but we 
112- 
cannot avoid the recognition that, implicitly or1east, he wrestles 
with this problem, which bears so closely upon the shape of trinit- 
arian doctrine. 
I pass now to consider those aspects of the pneumatology of Irenaeus 
which are of direct relevance to his doctrine of God as triune; the 
precise shape and character of this pneumatology will become clearer 
as various dimensions of it are discussed in relation to the loci of 
creation. But Irenaeus' consideration of the Holy Spirit must not be 
detached from his doctrine of God, for the theme of the unity of the 
Godhead is never absent. Indeed, we have already encountered his 
teaching on the Holy Spirit in relation to the concept of the two hands 
of God, which serve and glorify Him. One interesting feature of the 
two hands concept, which we did not mention earlier, is Irenaeus, 
association of the Holy Spirit with the Wisdom, of God. 
107 
What motivated this obviously deliberate move on, the part of Irenaeus? 
The basic motive was, I think, to help secure the relation of the 
Spirit to creation, and thus bring out the differentiated unity which 
embraced the creative Father and His hands: 
108 
Thus there is shown forth One God .... and since God is rational, 
therefore by the Word He created the things that were made; 
and God is Spirit, and by the Spirit He adorned all things .... 
Since then the Word establishes, that is to say, gives body and 
form to the diversity of the powers; rightly and fittingly is ý09 
the Word called the Son, and the Spirit the Wisdom of God. (Dem. 5 
The distinction drawn between the role of the Word in creating the 
substance, and the Holy Spirit in giving order and form to created 
reality, is rather forced, as is the semi-exclusive identification of 
the Holy Spirit with Wisdom in the first place. But the fundamental 
intention of Irenaeus, both to give more emphasis to the Holy Spirit 
than is generally found in the Apostolic Fathersand Apologists, and 
IZ3 
to counteract the tendency in the Apologists to draw too, sharp 
(i. e. quasi-spatial) a distinction between the created and uncreated 
realms, is in itself commendable. 
110 
By identifying the concept of Holy Spirit with the concept of Wisdom, 
Irenaeus makes room for the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, where other 
writers would tend to give more emphasis to Christology. It is widely 
acknowledged that throughout the history of theology there has been a 
tendency to give inadequate attention to pneumatology, and certain 
reasons for this neglect have been recognised. 
112 
These problems have always been present to stimulate confusion in the 
doctrine of the Holy Spirit, but in the second century there was an 
additional problem caused by the common use made of Stoic ideas, which 
contributed to Middle Platonism, where spirit was regarded as a subtle 
material substance which provides the physical basis, or, in some 
versions, the ruling power, of both the individual and the cosmos. 
The Gnostic conception of spirit can be regarded mainly as a development 
of the Stoic. Spirit becomes a divine substance trapped in the bodies 
of theelect, but seeking to return to its home in the Pleroma. In 
catholic writers of the second century one detects both a reaction to 
Stoic/Gnostic ideas when Spirit, which is often no more than a synonym 
for deity, 113 is seen as the opposite of matter, and also a conception 
of the Spirit of God as a power invisibly active within the human sphere. 
GAven the prevailing sense of spirit in intelligent discourse in the 
second century, this latter use would almost certainly carry an 
implication of materiality or physical attributes. There is perhaps 
a danger of this in Irenaeus, where the divine freedom of the Spirit 
might be thought to h%compromised by his role in creation. The chiliasm 
jl+ 
of Irenaeus also illustrates such a point, for it correlates with a 
reduced sense of the immediate eschatological presence of the Holy 
5pirit. These are issues to which we will return. 
Irenaeus does not reflect openly upon the consequences of adopting a 
rational/spiritual or word/wisdom distinction as a guide to apprehension 
of the nature of the eternal distinctions in God. Although the 
association of wisdom with the Spirit might be appropriate to a certain 
degree to His ineffable and self-effacing nature, it too easily obscures 
such crucial themes as the Pauline concept of the cross as divine 
wisdom and human folly. The human concept of wisdom needs modification 
in the light of the whole content of theology, and this might be 
hampered by its semi-exclusive identification with the Holy Spirit. 
However, we should not be too critical, and could perhaps see Irenaeus, 
adoption and development of this equation of Spirit with Wisdom as 
part of his attempt to bring sense and order into the confused and 
neglected pneumatology of his time. 
A basic motive of his pneumatology, as noted above, is to secure 
a full relation of God to creation. We can illustrate this, within 
our present limits set by the doctrine of the Trinity, by reference 
to the role of the Holy Spirit on the one hand in the incarnation, 
and, on the other hand, in revelation and the impartation or realisation 
of salvation, actions ofýthe Holy Spirit which Irenaeus brings into a 
close relationship. 
It has been noted that for Irenaeus the Virgin Birth is more a proof 
of the humanity of Jesus Christ than of His divinity. 
114 But for 
Irenaeus true humanity cannot be separated from the Holy Spirit - 
12.5 
as we shall see - and the role of the Holy Spirit in the incarnation 
is therefore presented by him as guaranteeing the humanity of Christ. 
* 115 This is brought out with particular clarity in the Demonstration: 
.... He must needs be born a man among men; and the 
same God forms Him from the womb, that is, that of 
the Spirit of God He should be born. (Dem. 51) 
And the 'flower' (exegeting Isaiah 11: 1ff) refers to 
His body, for it was made to bud forth by the Spirit.... 
(Dem. 59) 
And by 'shadow' he means His body (exegeting Lamentations 
4: 20) For just as a shadow is made by a body, so also 
Christ's body was made by His Spirit. (Dem. 71) 
This fact ofcreation is re-expressed from the point of view of 
. 1. 
redemption when Irenaeus deals with the role of the Holy Spirit in 
the baptism of Jesus. Gnostic writers readily interpreted this 
episode as the descent of the Aeon Christ into temporary residence 
in the dispensational Jesus. By contrast, Irenaeus interprets the 
descent of. the Spirit at baptism as a special anointing of the humanity 
of Jesus to enable the salvation of the flesh of man to be accomplished! 
16 
For inasmuch as the Word of God was man from the root 
of Jesse, and son of Abraham,. in this respect did the 
Spirit of God rest upon Him, and anoint Him to preach 
the gospel to the lowly .... therefore did the Spirit of 
God descend upon Him, (the Spirit) of Him who had 
promised by the prophets that He would anoint Him, so 
that we, receiving from the abundance of His unction, 
might be saved. (111.9.3) 117 
The association of the Holy Spirit with the humanity of Christ has 
significant implications for the foundation of trinitarian theology. 
Later theology often tended to deal with the doctrine of the Holy 
Spirit almost as an afterthought to christology, the predominant role 
of the Spirit being the mediation to us of the salvation actually 
achieved by Christ. This restriction of pneumatology subtly introduces 
a subordination of the Spirit to Christ, which, in turn, has fostered 
124 
virtual binitarianism. Thus, one of the roots of the full trinitarian 
theology which we observe in Irenaeus lies in the link he establishes 
between the Holy Spirit and the humanity of Jesus Christ. In this, of 
course, he is reproducing the biblical teaching that the Messiah is 
the Christ, that is, one anointed with the Holy Spirit. In attempting 
to think together christology, soteriology and pneumatology, Irenaeus 
can often seem imprecise or confused, but undergirding his efforts we 
can see a perceptive and ! constructive theological mind. 
Therefore, in relation both to the birth and baptism of Jesus, Irenaeus, 
doctrine of the incarnation links, in creation and redemption, Jesus 
Christ as God and as man anointed by the Holy Spirit. In this way he 
brings together in the person of Jesus Christ the two aspects of 
Messianic expectation in the Old Testament: direct redemption by the 
visitation of God and a human Messiah specially anointed with the 
Spirit of God. 
Acceptance of Irenaeus' synthesis, if I have analysed it correctly, 
enables us to see the inner connections which exist between strands of 
New Testament christology which are often considered to be conceptually 
distinct. A recent survey of the different christological titles and 
concepts of the New Testament has been provided by J. D. G. Dunn. 
118 
Of these, Son of God and Word of God roughly correspond to the Old 
Testament hope for, direct visitation of God, whereas the last Adam 
and Epirit christologies roughly correspond to the hope for a human 
Messiah. The rather enigmatic title, Son of Man, which, significantly, 
would appear to have been Jesus' favourite title for himself, more 
naturally indicates the humanity of Jesus Christ ( as it does in such 
early Patristic use of the term that one finds), but also includes at 
12-7 
least an allusion to the figure of a divine redeemer, both in the 
New Testament, and in inter-testamental Judaism (Dunn, op. cit., 
P. 82). The Wisdom motif tends to indicate the divinity of Jesus 
Christ, but again there is some reference also to His humanity, not 
least in Paul's concept of the wisdom of the cross. 
The theology of Irenaeus combines these different elements in a 
reasonably coherent fashion, taking fta-ther the development we Bee in the 
Gospel of John. Dunn pays an unintended tribute to this process, when 
he observes that: 
Evidently then the Fourth Evangelist is moving beyond the 
more limiting confines of a prophet christology - hardly 
surprising in view of his very high Son of God christology. 
What is surprising, however, is that despite this he retains 
so much of the prophet language, and especially that he still 
retains the description of Jesus as one endowed with the Spirit 
at Jordan (John 1: 32f; 3: 34). (op. cit., p. 141) 
If one adopts the theological perspective provided by Irenaeus, arguably 
it is not surprising at all! 
A brief look beyond Irenaeus is also instructive. The orthodox 
emphasis came tp. rest predominantly upon the Word and Son of God 
christologies. As a consequence, the Christian tradition has not given 
sufficient attention to either the Holy Spirit or the humanity of Christ. 
Ti-f, patristic theology this tended to lead to a truncated eschatology on 
the one hand, and to an inadequate theology of atonement on the other. 
In recent theology, a reaction to the emphasis upon the Word/Son of 
God christology has been seen in attempts to make other models bear 
the full burden of christology. 
119 
The type of relationship bstween the Son, Spirit and the created element 
12.9 
in Jesus Christ, which we have discussed, is closely paralleled 
in the distinction Irenaeus draws between the work of the Word-Son 
in creation at large. While this distinction is neither sharp nor 
consistently expressed, within the unified economy of the one Godhead 
he presents the Holy Spirit as the One who brings the Church into 
existence and gives gifts to it. A well known passage connects the 
Spirit with the Church in a most direct fashion: 
For where the Church is, there is the Spirit of God; 
and where the Spirit of God is, there is the Church, 
and every kind of grace, but the Spirit is truth. (111.24.1) 
The role of the Spirit as effecting in mankind the fruits of the 
redemption established in Jesus Christ is often stated, and the following 
passage is typical: 
Since the Lord thus has redeemed us through His own blood, 
giving His soul for our souls and His flesh for our flesh, 
and has also poured out the Spirit of-the Father 120 for 
the union and communion of God and man, imparting God to 
man by means of the Spirit ..... (V. I. I) 
On occasions Irenaeus speaks explicitly of a double movement effected 
in the economy of redemption - the movement from God to man being 
complemented within the same unified action by the presentation of 
man to God, the two hands of God being active on both sides: 
God the Father bestows on us regeneration through His Son 
by the Holy Spirit. For as many as carry (in them) the 
Spirit of God are led to the Word, that is to the Son; 
and the Son brings them to the Father; and the Father 
causes them to possess incorruption. Without the 
Spirit it is not possible to behold the Word of God, 
nor without the Son can any draw near to the Father. 
(Dem. 7) 121 
The primary emphasis is upon the gift of the Spirit to the Church, 
but Irenaeus links this closely with the wider role of the Holy Spirit 
in creation. 
122 In his teaching upon the Spirit Irenaeus is drawing 
12-9 
out the consequences of his maxim, which we considered in the previous 
chapter, that by God alone may God be known. The revelation of 
reconciliation includes the bestowing on man of the gift to recognise 
and participate in it. In this way, the Irenaean doctrine of the 
2 
ýbly Spirit complements the once-for-all AVOkXCcPIA0ALWýrI_S ; the 
emphasis falls equally upon both aspects of the one economy of creation 
and redemption. 
Thus, in the aspects of both his christology and pneumatology which 
we have discussed, we see Irenaeus developing trinitarian modes of 
thought which relate God to creation. We shall now explore from a 
different perspective the issues raised here, as we discuss the 
question of the pre-existence of Jesus Christ - or the Word/Son 
in Irenaeus. On the one hand, this aspect of his thought will help 
clarify the manner in which Irenaeus maintained both the closeness 
of God to creation, and also the fundamental difference between them. 
On the other hand, inasmuch as a consideration of the concept of pre- 
existence inevitably raises a distinctive form of question of the 
relation of time to eternity, this conclusion of our presentation of 
the trinitarian theology of Irenaeus will orientate us towards. the 
following chapters, which will approach his theology from the 
perspective of the doctrine of creation. 
The Pre-existence of Jesus Christ 
The inter-relation between the concepts of pre-existence, time and 
eternity has not always been recognised, and this has tended to foster 
a rather uncritical, ustiof the concept of pre-existence; this is true 
of much classical theology, but the unhappy consequences are more 
evident in modern theology, where issues of time and history have 
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received greater attention. Therefore, although a full discussion of 
the background and foreground of the subject of pre-existence is outwith 
the scope of this thesis, we need to clarify our terms and concepts 
before discussing the approach of Irenaeus. 
At the outset, we must recognise that the very word pre-existence has 
an odd ring about it. While we may accept that things either do, or 
do not, exist (unless we are familiar with the paradoxes of modern 
physics1), it is not obvious that any non-trivial meaning can be given 
to the claim that something, or someone, pre-exists itself. Immediately, 
therefore, we are warned of the difficulties of definition, in the 
light of which we need to combine a careful philosophical and-theological 
analysis with an open approach to the claims of the biblical witnesses. 
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The nature of time and of eternity, and of their possible relationship, 
are hardly more amenable to unequivocal definition than is 'pre- 
existence but at least this fact has emerged from the extensive 
attention which these concepts have received. 
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In the context of our present discussion, we should be especially 
wary of being ruled simply or predominantly by a 'chronological' 
concept of time. Ever since human intelligence evolved to an extent 
that allowed abstract counting to take place, this method of giving 
structure to our reflections upon existence has been important, 
especially since. the very regular movement of the planets in relation 
to the fixed stars was established. Such a concept of time has a 
proper and, indeed, an inevitable place in human affairs, but it can 
easily become too dominant. In the Bible, time is generally viewed in 
relation to action, whether human or divine, and, particularly in regard 
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to divine action, the chronology of the inanimate world can be overlaid 
by measurement from outwith 'clock-time' as such. What to us is a 
thousand years, may be to God but the day, or due season, in which 
His work is done. Because of this relation between time and significance, 
the Bible can regard time related simply to the inanimate activity of 
creation as of comparatively little significance, and handle it very 
freely, without undue attention to our modern conception of accuracy. 
Yet it would be wrong simply to oppose the chronological to other 
concepts of time, if only for the straightforward reason that a chron- 
ological concept of time is itself dependent upon the existence of 
regular c-yalas within nature. 
125 Nevertheless, the linearchronological 
conceptiori'of time has exercised a great influence upon both modern 
theology and our wider culture, and we must briefly indicate why this 
has been the case. 
The development of Newtonian physics, which was closely allied to an 
increased. perception of the regular movement of the planets, involved 
the conception of space and time as infinitely and uniformly extended, 
thus providing an absolute, 
126 fixed and precise mathematical frame- 
work within which both the universe and any reflection upon it must 
occur. The elegant simplicity of this conception greatly reinforced 
the predominance of a linear conception of time which the concept of 
heliocentricity, postulated by Copernicus and developed by Kepler 
and Galileo, had already stimulated. A sense of the inexorably uniform 
flow of time, definable by precise measurement, has been bequeathed to 
us. This mechanical concept of chronological time has been severely 
modified by modern science, but theological debate from the Enlightenment 
onwards has often relied, tacitly or explicitly, upon just this notion. 
Hence, the long search to find a reformulation of the Christian faith 
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which could absorb this concept of time, wherein, if the Deistic option 
is eschewed, God can be seen as automatically and evenly related to all 
space and time. On the one hand, this has led to repeated questioning 
of any belief in the ontological uniqueness of Jesus Christ - the 
so-called 'scandal of particularity' - and, on the other hand, the 
belief that the divine element irT-Christ pre-existed in heaven, or in 
God, has been either attacked or rationalised to cohere with a linear 
view of time. The anthropomorphic presupposition that time is 
essentially a closed, uniform continuum led inevitably to the conception 
of the pre-existence of Christ, and of the incarnation, on the analogy 
of a visitation from outer-space,,. and therefore to their widespread 
rejection. The perspective from which we should examine and assess 
Irenaeus' approach to the pre-existence of Jesus Christ must avoid 
the assumptions of a basically linear view of time, which we observe 
in much discussion of the topic. Further reflections upon the modern 
understanding of the pre-existence of Christ, and its relation to 
discussions in the patristic age, are found in an appendix to this 
chapter (Appendix A). 
These thoughts about the inter-relation of the concepts of time and 
pre-existence should guard us against an uncritical anachronism in our 
consideration of the place of ýpre-existencel in the trinitarian 
theology of Irenaeus. But in a similar manner we also require a 
preliminary consideration of the possible relation between pre-existence 
and eternity. This is because the history ofthe concept of eternity, 
particularly in Western thought, has been deeply affected by an anti- 
thesis between finite and infinite in general, and between time and 
eternity in particular. While it is essential to accept that a funda- 
mental difference exists between time and eternity, it does not follow 
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tliýt eternity is best defined by negation from what is, or appears, 
temporal. This is because one cannot really separate a concept of 
eternity from a concept of God, and if one accepts that our knowledge 
of God is dependent in the last analysis upon the active revelation 
of God as Creator and Redeemer, then arguably time should be under- 
stood in relation to (amid its radical difference from, as indicated 
by creatio ex. nihilo) eternity, and not vice versa. 
127 , If accepted, 
such a position carries a double implication: on the one hand, that 
eternity should be conceived neither as timelessness nor simply as 
unending time, and, on the other hand, that time cannot be fully 
understood apart from its creative derivation from God. Admittedly, 
precisely how we should incorporate temporal images in our concept 
of eternity, and how the created nature of time is secured amid its 
relation to the eternal realm of God, are difficult questions. The 
latter topic will occupy us at various points in succeeding chapters, 
and some further reflections upon the former issue are presented in 
Appendix B, at the conclusion of the present chapter. 
With these various preliminary considerations in mind, the first thing 
we should note about the concept of pre-existence in Irenaeus is the 
interesting fact that he tends to reserve the word 'pre-exist' 
(TrpouTrckeyw 
, -rreorqA. L ; ante sum, praesum, prae-existo) for his 
description of Gnostic thought. 
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Here the connotation of 'pre- 
existence' is 'existence apart from and in antithesis to creation', 
as is shown by the instructions given to Gnostic adherents when they 
were catechized: 
And they instruct them, on their rjeaching the principalities 
---and powers,.; to-ýmake use ofýthese words: II. am a.. son from the 
Father - the Father who had a pre-existence, and a son in Him 
who is pre-existence. I have come to behold all things, both 
those which belong to myself and others, althoujh strictly 
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speaking, they do not belong to others, but to Achamoth, who 
is female in nature, and made those things for herself. For 
I derive my being from Him who is pre-existent, and I come 
again to my own place whence I went forth'. (1.21.5) 
As an extention of this useýGnostics spoke of different degrees of 
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pre-existence, those Aeons which were produced last being the most 
inferior. For this reason any emphasis upon the centrality of the 
human history of Jesus Christ was especially abhorrent to Gnostics. 
What was oldest, as judged by a linear view of time, was best. Here, 
perhaps, we see how Jewish and Hellenic currents of thought-could each 
feed into Gnosticism, for in different ways each contained something 
akin-., to this adage. 
130 Any claim that the Christian faith is new, or 
newly revealed as old, was readily attacked, as Irenaeus discovered 
131 in his discussions with Gnostics. , In respect of the Virgin Birth, 
they raised similar objections to Trypho. - It, is in this context that 
Irenaeus presents his understanding of-the 'pre-existence' of Jesus 
Christ: 
As it has been clearly demonstrated that the Word, who, 
existed in the beginning with God, by whom all things 
were made, who was always present with mankind, was in 
these last days, according to the time appointed by the 
Father, united to His own workmanship, inasmuch as He 
became a man liable to suffering, every objection is 
set aside of those who say, 'If our Lord was born at 
that time, Christ had therefore no previous existence. ' 
For I have shown that the Son of God did not then begin 
to exist, being with the Father from the beginning; 
but when he became incarnate, and was made man, He 
recapitulated in Himself the long line of human beings, 
and furnished us, in a brief, comprehensive manner, 
with salvation; so that what we had lost in Adam - 
namely to be according to the image and likeness of 
God - that we might recover. in Christ Jesus. (111.18.1) 
Compared with Justin's treatment of pre-existence, 
132 Irenaeus both 
associates the Word-Son more closely with the eternal Father, and 
gives greater emphasis to the involvement of the Word-Son in creation. 
133 
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These two emphases are brought together in the concept of ocvk(KE(p*OýXLWOýtS, 
which Irenaeus develops to explain the relation of the historical life 
of Jesus Christ to the ultimate purposes of God in, creation and 
redemption. The 4kV&-Kf-q)w0-ILw(ro. S as referring to the incarnate 
history of Jesus Christ is 'brief', but as referring to theuniversal 
work of the Creator it is 'comprehensive' (the two sides to compendic, 
here). The events of the history of Jesus Christ both sum up and re- 
enact the whole history of mankind, setting it upon a new basis by 
first undoing and reversing the disobedience and fall of Adam. Thus 
Irenaeus-makes the incarnate history both noetically and ontologically 
central for all time and space. Justin tended to see the incarnation 
simply as noetically important, as fulfilling prophecy and-revealing 
.D knowledge, the ontological basis of which is a linear C)LKQVpýxu, 4- 
stretching from the generation of the Son to the 'second' advent. 
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But with Irenaeus it is not-so much that the incarnation is interpreted 
2 -5- in terms of the mkovop-wx- as the reverse: the 01-V. OV=k-- is 
determined from 'beginning' to lend' by the incarnation. In attempting 
to forge expressions to indicate what is involved, Irenaeus works 
towards a new concept of time centred upon the incarnation: 
It was necessary, therefore, that the Lord, coming to 
the lost sheep, and making recapitulation of so vast 
an economy, and seeking after His own handiwork, should 
save that very man who had been created after His image 
and likeness, that is, Adam, filling up the times of 
His condemnation ..... (111.23.1) 
But the Son, administering all things for the Father, 
works from the beginning even to the end .... manifesting 
the Father ..... indifferently (communiter) throughout 
all time. For the Son, being present with His own 
handiwork from the beginning, reveals the Father to all; 
to wh6m He wills, and when He wills, and as the Father 
wills. (IV. 6.7) 
of S (With the Soný ymeon and the Magnificat in mind),.... the 
rejoicing of Abraham descending upon those who sprang from 
him - those, namely, who were watching, and who beheld 
Christ, and believed in Him; while, on the other hand there 
lzýc 
was a reciprocal rejoicing which passed backwards from the 
children to Abraham, who did also desire to see the day of 
Christ's coming. (IV. 7.1) 
nor would the Lord have recapitulated these things in 
H'i m*;; lf , unless He had Himself been made flesh and blood 
after the way of the original formation (of man), saving 
in His own person at the end that which had in the beginning 
perished in Adam. (V. 14.1) 
It would be wrong to attempt to impose upon such passages too precise 
a meaning, but their general drift is towards seeing the incarnation 
as both the expression and enactment in time of the divine will to 
save that which had originally been created. Irenaeus does not 
generally go further, and speculate upon what might have happened had 
Adam not fallen, although there is one passage, in particular, which, 
in the earlier decades of the present century, provoked a lively 
debate between Thomists and Scotists: 
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.... the pedigree which traces the generation of our Lord 
back to Adam contains seventy-two generations, connecting 
the end with the beginning .... Hence also was Adam himself 
termed by Paul 'the figure of Him that was to comel(Rom. 5: 14), 
because the Word, the Maker of all things, had formed beforehand 
for Himself the future dispensation of the human race, connected 
with the Son of God; God having predestined that the first man 
should be of an animal nature, with this view, that he might 
be saved by the spiritual one. For inasmuch as He had a pre- 
existence as a Saving Being, it was necessary that what might 
be saved should also be called into existence, in order that 
the Being whogsaves should not exist in, vain (Cum enim 13 
praeexisterat salvans, oportebat et quod salvaretur fieri, uti 
non vacuum sit salvans. (III. 22.3) 
The reply of Irenaeus to the Gnostic taunt that he compromised the 
pre-existence of Christ culminates in this passage, the following 
paragraph rehearsing similar arguments in connection with a parallel 
between Eve and Mary. 
137 In contrast to the Gnostic account of 
development in the Pleroma, Irenaeus is anxious not to portray the 
incarnation as a response to events in creation, but rather to see 
the will of God expressed in the incarnation as corresponding to a 
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harmonious pattern of the divine will for creation and redemption. 
For this reason, Irenaeus does notýwant to see God as subject to 
events which occur in time, which was the danger with Justin's 
'Logos model' and concept of pre-existence, but rather to see time 
as subject to the eternal will of God disclosed in the incarnation. 
In particular, he wishes to avoid the idea that God's purpose and 
plan for creation is affected by evil, which Irenaeus achieves both 
by underplaying the reality of evil ( as we shall see in a later 
chapter) and by assserting that all events in time are expressive 
of the divine will. 
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Christologically, Irenaeus is concerned not to divide the divine and 
human elements of the one Jesus Christ, and thus while to guard the 
divinity requires the assertion of something equivalent to pre- 
existence, to guard the centrality of the true humanity Irenaeus is 
pushed, towards the claim that the pre-existence is of the incarnate 
Christ. Yet he is somewhat ill at ease with such language, for it 
could too readily imply that time and history are essentially unreal-,. 
and that creation and redemption are necessary actions of a God who has 
become locked into the inexorable logic of the process. With the 
cosmic Aeon anthropos, this wasprecisely the problem with Gnosticism. 
Rather than 'project''the incarnation backwards, and thus downgrade 
the importance of the actual events of the history of Jesus Christ, 
Irenaeus moves towards a reconceptualization of time and space - 
that is, all created reality - around the incarnation itself. The 
problem with Irenaeus is that his overall. conc epti on of the divine 
planý- in creation and redemption can tend to obscure the radical 
centrality of the incarnation, so that the relation of God to the 
universe, which is disclosed in the incarnation, is too necessary or 
(2)? 
close. Where Irenaeus sees the oxerall OLvO= of creation and 
redemption as the background to the incarnation, we would prefer to 
assert a fuller place for the freedom of God attested in the Old 
Testament, in order to provide a better key in which this cosmic 
background could be set. Of course, there are many positive 
references to the Old Testament in Irenaeus, but these tend to be seen 
as merely part of an overarching gamut of creation and progressive 
salvation, conceived in universal terms. We recall here the inadequate 
account he gives of thejustice and mercy of God, discussed in Chapter One, 
which we related to his unsatisfactory grasp of the nature and place 
of Israel in the purposes of God. 
The problem of how Jesus Christ can bepart of the processes of nature 
and of history, and at the same time be Lord of both, has puzzled 
thinkers throughout the Christian era. Viewed scientifically, there 
is no special change observable in the course of evolution consequent 
upon the incarnation, a fact which evidently caused Teilhard de Chardin 
great puzzlement. 
139 Yet the position to which Irenaeus inclined offers 
a possible resolution of the paradox, a resolution, that is, which 
faith might regard as reasonable. Jesus Christ is the unique, but, 
because of His identity with God, also thereby the universal, expression 
of the efficacious will of God in creation and redemption. The co- 
inherence in Jesus Christ of thought and event in God thus leads 
Irenaeus beyond a notional concept of pre-existence, to. locate within 
the life of God 'prior to' creation, the Saving Being who is revealed 
at the end - or in the fulness - of time, in order to re-establish 
the beginning. The struggle of Irenaeus to bring such ideas to 
expression is well illustrated by the following extract: - 
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(In relation to the baptism of Jesus) For Christ did 
not at that time descend upon Jesus, neither was Christ 
one and Jesus another: but the Word ofGod - who is the 
Saviour of all, and the ruler of heaven and earth, who 
is Jesus, as I have already pointed out, who did also 
take upon Him flesh, and was anointed by the Spirit from 
the Father - was made Jesus Christ... (111.9.3) 
In... these, various, extracts, Irenaeus would appear to be attempting to 
see time on two levels, a linear, progressive level being overlaid by 
what we may term a recapitulatory level, in which time and eternity 
definitively meet. Alternatively, we might describe Irenaeus' under- 
standing of time as comprising two aspects: fallen, linear time, which 
is being redeemed, and the redeemed time of the incarnate Christ, 
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by which it is being redeemed. These two aspects correlate with the 
D 
twin Irenaean themes of growth and 0(vAx&q>d-Xa(cwcrtS , between which 
we can thus identify a basic coherence, even if the outwcrking of his 
scheme is not free of tensions, to which we shall return. 
These features of Irenaeus' understanding of the relation of Jesus 
Christ to time help us to understand the considerable development, in 
pneumatology which we see in his theology as compared with that of the 
Apologists. The 'big ugly ditch', to use Lessing's well-known term, 
between the past and present reality of Christ, is often bridged in, 
the New Testament in pneumatological terms. 
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For Irenaeus, as we 
have seen, the action of the Holy Spirit is closely related to the, 
presence of Jesus Christ, and it is this consistent presence of Christ, 
through the Spirit, to all creation, which receives considerable 
emphasis whenever Irenaeus approaches the question of pre-existence. 
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Yet this consistent presence of God through the Spirit needs to be seen 
as an urgent eschatological presence of the God who became incarnate. 
The 'it is finished' of the Gospel of John needs to be, held together 
1+0 
with the provisional, unfinished character of creation of Romans 8. 
Thepresence of Christ means that at a point between thelalreadyl of 
the past and the 'not yet' of the future, we are able to hear and 
experience the eschatological reality of God. 
143 The development of 
pneumatology in Irenaeus thus allows him to express pre-existence in 
trinitarian terms: 
(The true disciple) has a full faith in one God Almighty, 
of whom are all things; and in the Son of God, Jesus Christ 
our Lord, by whom are all things, and in the dispensations 
connected with Him, by means of which the Son, of God became 
man; and a firm belief in the Spirit of God, who furnishes 
us with a knowledge of the truth, and has set forth the 
dispensations of the Father and the Son, in virtue of which 
He dwells with every generation ofmen, according to the will 
of the Father. (IV. 33.7) 
Does this mean that the coming of Jesus Christ in the flesh is new 
or old? This question has often been put to the theology of Irenaeus, 
in part to assess his debt to Platonism. But if the above analysis 
is on the right lines, it is exposed as a false question. 
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Inasmuch 
as the one Jesus Christ has been present with all men from the beginning, 
He is I old ; but inasmuch as all time-and-reality derive true being from 
the incarnation, He is radically 'new'. Both sides of the antithesis 
are drawn into the reconceptualization which Irenaeus explores, if 
the weight is distributed more to the former than the latter, reflecting 
the predominant tendency of the ancient world to distrust that which 
was new. This is not to suggest that Irenaeus in his way rationalises 
the mystery of why God acts as He does, or that all his statements 
here are clear and consistent, but that he had faced the allegation 
that he denied the radical newness of the incarnation is shown from 
his reply to Marcionites: 
But if a thought of this kind should then suggest itself 
to you, to say, What then did the Lord bring to us by 
His advent? - know ye that He brought all novelty, by 
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bringing'Himself who had been announced. For this very 
thing was proclaimed beforehand, that a' novelty should 
come to renew and quicken mankind. (IV. 34.1) 
It is precisely the uniqueness of Jesus Christ which secures His 
universal significance, 'for the uniqueness of Jesus Christ represents 
the unique life of God'over-flowing to create and redeem according to 
a wise and patiently executed plan. It is the shape and rationale of 




We began by noting the strength of the early Christian tradition which 
associated Jesus Christ very directly with 'God'. The subordinationism 
of the third century has too often been ýeld to cast its shadow upon 
the first and second centuries, but the very strength of docetism in 
its many forms in the first two centuries is an indirect testimony to 
a widespread belief in the essential deity of Jesus C. hrist. Such a 
belief seems to have been assumed by Irenaeus to be part of that 
universal and ancient tradition enshrined in the rule of truth or 
faith by reference to which Scripture would find its correct inter- 
pretation. 
As a result, in part, of the incipient polytheism of Gnosticism, there 
is a tendency in Irenaeus to assert the unity of Father and Son in a 
manner which has often provoked the suggestion of modalism. This is 
especially true of the first half of A. H., where Irenaeus' chief 
concern is to refute the concept of spatial separation between members, 
of the Godhead. However, recalling our previous discussion of Irenaeus' 
favourite attribution to God of 'richness', we suggested that living 
harmony rather than mathematical unity was uppermost in Irenaeus' 
J4-2- 
conception of the relation between Father and Son - as it was also 
in his conception of the relation between the different characteristics 
which could be attributed to God. 
Issuing from the observation that Irenaeus, in order to avoid compromising 
this divine richness, carefully rejects the thought that God is either 
complemented or determined by the fact of creation, we considered his 
attitude towards the 'logos model', which forms the basis of the 
trinitarian theology of the Apologists. We saw how partial and qualified 
was Irenaeus' acceptance of this model, inpart due to the question it 
posed to the true divinity of the Son. 
The central section of this chapter then investigated the various 
strands of Irenaeus' attempt to articulate a positive alternative to 
the conceptualization of the 'Logos model'. These are 
The Son as the visible of the invisible Father, together 
with various analogous contrasting pairs of concepts. 
The Son and Spirit as the 'two hands' of the Father. 
The Son and Spirit as glorifying the Father. 
Particular care was given to show how these different themes cohere 
and complement each other, within atension which, at least to some 
degree, can never be avoided in trinitarian theology. An analogous 
tension was observed in Irenaeus' christology, which is closely related 
to his soteriology - consideration of which sheds light upon the link 
between christology and trinitarian theology. The attempt of Irenaeus 
to demonstrate in human speech the harmonious triunity of God as Creator 
and Redeemer was next approached from the perspective of his pneumatology. 
The considerable development of pneumatology in Irenaeus as compared 
with his theological predecessors was seen, on the one hand, as a 
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further refinement of his teaching that 'by God alone may God be 
known', and, on the other hand, as an unfolding of the implications 
of the fact, revealed in Jesus Christ, that the true God is both 
present to creation and known by persons. The former point was 
illustrated by reference to Irenaeus' teaching upon the role of the 
Holy Spirit in the incarnation, and the latter was illustrated by 
reference to the role of the Holy Spirit in the sanctification, or 
the gathering and nourishment, of the Church. 
The closing section of the chapter was concerned with the concept 
of thepre-existence of Jesus Christ. This inevitably brought into 
relief the deep philosophical and theological questions raised by any 
attempt to understand the relation between time and eternity. After 
clearing certain possible avenues of approach of philosophical 
prejudices which have been commonplace in twentieth-century thought, 
we saw how Irenaeus modifies the related concepts of pre-existence 
espoused by Gnostics and Apologists, by incorporating a more direct 
and basic reference to the human history of Jesus Christ, while main- 
taining with greater strength than the Gnostics and Apologists the 
unity of being of the Father and Word-Son. As a result, Irenaeus 
moves towards a reconceptualization of time and history centred upon 
the incarnate and historical Jesus Christ. The consequences in 
Irenaeus of the understanding of the relation of God to creation at 
large which are implied by his position will be tested in the wider 
domain of his doctrine of creation. 
To sum up: the doctrine of the Trinity in Irenaeus is both richer 
and more subtle than has usually been realised. Taken together with 
his doctrine of God as the One God, which we discussed in the previous 
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chapter, we can see in Irenaeus the movement to an interesting 
conceptualization of God as both a Unity and a Trinity, that is, 
to use the modern expression, as a Triunity. As such, it is a 
considerable advance upon the theology of the Apologists and Apostolic 
Fathers, and is no mere repetition of biblical formulas. The chief 
question which we have raised against his doctrines of God and the 
Trinity concerns a certain underlying rationalism or anthropomorphism: 
does his understanding of God adequately capture the profundity of 
the Old and New Testament? Is the Irenaean concept of God not too 
inaccessible to creation, precisely because His omnipresent and 
omnipotent control of creation compromises the contingent independence 
of it? To adopt a modern expression, is creation 'swallowed up in' 
the trinitarian history of God, in His 0LKovoL&tcK- and 0(VCkKe4P(XýLWC-0S 
This is the basic question which we shall carry forward into our 
discussion of aspects of Irenaeus' doctrine of creation. 
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ApppmnTY A 
The Pre-existence of Christ 
We may usefully begin with A. Harnack, whose influence upon biblical 
and patristic studies in the present century has been immense in many 
areas, but not least in the determination of the concepts of pre- 
existence which have been either defended or attacked. R. G. Hammerton- 
Kelly takes Harnack's definitions as still authoritative in his study 
Pre-existence,. Wisdom and the Son of Man, (C. U. P.: 1973, pp. 1-3,274-5). 
Martin Hengel, Son of God, pp. 3-5 is critical of Harnack, but still 
accepts the questions relating to pre-existence in the manner that he 
had posed them, and thus attempted to defend a difficult thesis, as 
Mackey has shown (The Christian Experience of God as Trinity, pp. 51-62). 
The issue of pre-existence arises at many points in the'Prolegomena 
and Presuppositions' to Harnack's History of Dogma, and in recognition 
of this a special appendix is devoted to theccnception (History of 
Dogma, I. pp. 318-332). He attempts to identify a Jewish and a Hellenic 
concept of pre-existence, both of which are said to be taken up by the 
New Testament. 
The Jewish conception is that, 'everything of real value that from 
time to time appears on, eartli has its existence in heaven. In other 
words it exists with God, that is, God possesses a knowledge of it; 
and for that reason it has a real being. But it exists beforehand 
with God in the same way as it appears on earth, that is with all the 
material attributes belonging to its essence. Its manifestation on 
earth is merely a transition from concealment to manifestation 
..... There is no assumptio naturae novae, and no. change or mixture. 
The old Jewish theoryof. pre-existence is founded on the religious idea of 
the- omniscience and omnipotence of God ..... As the whole history of 
the world and destiny of each individual are recorded on his tablets 
or books, so also , each 
thing is ever present before him. The decisive 
contrast is between God and the creature. In designating the latter 
as "foreknown" by God, the primary idea is not to enoble the creature, 
but rather to bring to light the wisdom and power of God'. (p. 318f. ) 
Alongside this Harnack set 'the Hellenic conception ..... of pre-existence 
..... based on the contrast h6tween spirit and matter, between the in- 
finite and finite, found in the cosmos itself. In the case of all 
spiritual beings, life in the body or flesh is at bottom an inadequate 
and unsuitable condition, for the spirit is eternal, the flesh perishable 
.... Now if such spirits resolved for some reason or other to appear in 
this finite world, they cannot simply become visible, for they have no 
"visible form". They must rather "assume flesh", whether they throw 
it about them as a covering, or really make it their own by a process 
of transformation or mixture ..... The characteristics of the Greek ideas 
of pre-existence may consequently be thus expressed. First, the 
objects in questions to which pre-existence is ascribed are meant to 
be enobled by this attribute . Secondly, these ideas have no relation 
to God. Thirdly, the material appearance is regarded as something 
inadequate. 'Fourthly, speculations about phantasma, assumptio naturae 
humanae, transmutatio, mixtura, duae naturae, etc. were necessarily 
associated with these notions' (p. 319). 
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The historical accuracy of these generalised definitions cannot be 
discussed here; rather we should note how influential the hermeneutical 
pattern outlined has been. The'Jewish' idea is closely associated with 
apocalyptic, and scholars have readily invoked the categories of symbol, 
myth and speculation to re-interpet such texts as link Christ with 
mediation at creation or presence to all (and especially Old Testament) 
times as expressions of the omniscience and omnipotence of God (e. g. 
Mackey, op. cit., p. 64). The fore-ordination texts are agreeable to an 
adoptionist christology which emphasises the view of Jesus Christ as 
an inspired prophet and teacher, a theme dear to Harnack. Yet unless 
one downgrades the claims of theologyin toto, it is questionable 
whether the admittedly varied, but nevertheless astonishing, claims 
of the New Testament writers about the relation of Jesus Christ to the 
cosmos are not obscured rather than explained by this tactic. 
Defenders of the Hellenic pattern have modified considerably the 
account Harnack has given, by recourse to the development of the 
classical positionin. Middle Platonism. As we saw in connection 
with the 'Logos model', Middle Platonism was more overtly theistic, 
giving a clearer assertion of the existence of a First God, than one 
finds in Plato, and its proponents were prepared to develop the concept 
of the world-soul into a second, mediating deity. The Apologists, with 
their rational intention, understandably made use of Middle Platonism. 
Yet - and this is what Irenaeus saw or sensed - precisely by its clearer 
, theism, Middle Platonism is actually more dualistic than Plato. The 
Platonic teaching that the Xpovos of the earth reflects as its 'moving 
shadow I, and the XpWOS of the heavens as its 'moving image', the 
eternal realm of oeLwV together with the associated theories of )AA)A-nV-t. S 
and ýAOCý4-5 , maintained a real relation 
between time and eternity, 
while containing also an emphatic sense of their distinction, and a 
strong hint of dualism. The Apologists' use of Middle Platonism is 
well documented, but the distinctive place of a concept of pre-existence 
in their thought has only recently been analysed in depth in a study 
of the concept in the influential Justin (Trakatellis, op. cit. ). The 
chief conclusion of this study which concerns us here is that Justin's 
theology was penetrated throughout by 'chree fundamental christological 
concepts of pre-existence, incarnation and exaltation' (p. 173), with 
the incarnation interpreted in particular as humiliation. Trakatellis 
argues that Justin brings out the meaning of such N. T. passages as 
John 1: 1-14; Phil. 2: 1-6; Hebr. 1: 1-12 and Col. 1: 15-20, although he 
does acknowledge that Justin is also influenced by 'current theological 
problems', and that this influence is most marked 'on the level of the 
concept of Christ's pre-existence in a status of God ..... but other parts 
of the scheme were also affected, particularly the incarnation and also 
the exaltationl(p. 174). I would go further and argue that in Justin 
we see a rationalisation of the New Testament texts, at the bottom of 
which lies a basically linear concept of time and a timeless concept 
of pre-existence. The introduction by Justin of a clear distinct I 
ion 
between the first coming of Christ in humiliation and his second coming 
in glory (Dial. 31f., 51,110f. ) corresponds to this. It is a similar 
rationalisation of pre-existence which one often sees in modern 
discussions which attempt to find a place for the concept in the New 
Testament. R. H. Fuller's seminal The Foundations of New Testament 
Christology, and J. D. G. Dunn's Christology in the Making, which may 
prove to be equally influential, evince this in relation to their 
discussions of Johannine christology. 
Whether the emphasis has been placed upon the more symbolic, quasi- 
Jewish, or upon the more rationalistic, Hellenic approach, or whether 
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the New Testament has been carved up between the two, the common 
factor has generally been a basically linear, chronological approach 
to time which leaves room only for either a metaphysical or a time- 
less concept of pre-existence. Orthodox theology tended to prefer 
the timeless rationalism we see in Justin. In Origen the same ideas 
are expressed in relation to Neoplatonism, which was even more dualistic 
than Middle Platonism. The Platonism of Athanasius is disputed in 
detail but few could deny an influence of some degree, particularly in 
his earlier writings. Arguably the dispute with Arianism concerned the 
extent and nature of the pre-existent Word-Son, both parties tacitly 
accepting the approach to pre-existence worked out by Justin and Origen. 
Thus a certain pre-occupation with the divinity of the Son and Holy 
Spirit diverted attention from the centrality of the earthly history 
of Jesus Christ, and the subtle and difficult issue of the relation 
of this earthly history to all time and eternity was not given due 
attention. Mackey (op. cit , ch. 12 'Arius , Orthodoxy and Pre-existence') 
has argued that Athanasius and Arius both operated with a concept of 
pre-existence which prejudiced proper consideration of the human 
life of Jesus Christ in relationship with His Father. While it can 
be said that Mackey perhaps over-simplifies Athanasius and ignores 
the place given to the humanity of Jesus Christ in such writings as 
Contra Arianos, his basic point carries considerable force. My 
analysis would differ in that behind the shared concept of pre- 
existence I would identify a concept of time which was too linear. 
Then, before dismissing any concept of pre-existence in favour of its 
refinement into adoptionism in the furnace of myth, symbolism and 
speculation, which may be stimulated by a linear view of time in 
Mackey himself, it is worth asking whether greater justice to the 
various New Testament texts traditionally associated with pre-existence 
might not be done by a conceptual reconstruction which takes careful 
note of the basic issue, which New Testament writers are not unwilling 
to -consider, of the relationof God and Jesus to time and eternity. 
Such a reconstruction, which would attempt both to embrace and to get 
behind the alternatives identified and posed by'Harnack, inevitably 
leads in a trinitarian direction, as Macquarrie, who recognised the 
dilemma surrounding the modern discussion of pre-existence, has argued 




Eternity and Time 
Just how one should incorporate temporal images inour concept of 
eternity is a difficult question. Plato seems clear on this point, 
at least, when on approaching the issue he cooly remarks: 'But this, 
perhaps, may not be the right moment for a precise discussion of 
these matters' (Timaeus 38B; ed. Cornford, p. 98). Further consideration 
of the matter in the schools resulted eventually in the classic definition 
of Boethius, which Plato himself would probably not have disputed: 
'Eternity is the simultaneously total and perfect possession of life 
that does not end' Aeternitas est interminabilis vitae tota simul et 
perfecta possessio (De Cons. Phil. V: 6). Although regularly quoted 
in Medieval theology, it was usually interpreted through the Neo- 
platonic opposition between time and eternity, as Karl Barth has 
demonstrated in an illuminating discussion (Church Dogmatics II. 1, 
pp. 608-640). Yet, asit stands, the Boethian definition does not necessarily 
imply that eternity is simply timeless. Rather, eternity is sharply 
distinguished from the passing nature of the present, the separation 
between before and after - much as Plato distinguished theperfection 
of OttwV from the refracted, broken nature of (especially earthly) 
X POVO-S . The theories of ýttpjciý and ýte&+S support this by main- 
taining that time is derived from, and thus to a degree reflects 
the nature of, eternity. 
It is interesting to set alongside this the Old Testament approach 
to the eternity of God. 'From the time that Yahweh appears he is a 
major God whose eternity could be affirmed (Ps-90: 2; 139: 16), but 
the idea of eternity is secondary to that of life. God is not living 
because he is eternal, but he is eternal because he is living. The 
Israelite felt God as an active power before positing him as an eternal 
principle. God is never a problem, he is not the ultimate conclusion 
of a series of reflections; on the contrary, it is he who questions 
and from whom the initiative comes'. (E. Jacob, Theology of the Old 
Testament, Hodder and Stoughton, E. T. 1958, p. 38). This statement is 
very reminiscent of Irenaeus. 
There is an illuminating modern discussion which is primarily 
philosophical, but fully aware-of the scientific and theological 
dimensions of the issue (J. R. Lucas, A Treatise on Time and Space, 
Methuen, 1973). 'Eternity is much misunderstood ..... Eternity is not 
timelessness. For eternity is an attribute of God, and God is a person, 
a conscious personal being, and time is an inevitable concomitant of 
consciousness. To say that God is outside time, as many theologians 
do, is to deny, in effect, that God is a person ..... A timeless Deity 
may be the Truth; and it may possibly provide us with the Way 
or at least with a Goal; but it cannot ever be the Life. It remains 
necessarily -ro SeLov not 8 ED *o-5 . Even Plato, in the Timaeus, 
has to distinguish the Demiurge from the Forms. To be alive, to be a 
person, to be conscious,, to be. active, one must be, in some sense, in 
time. Verbs can conjugate inpersons only if they can conjugate in 
tenses too. 
Nor is eternity changelessness, as theologians have understood the 
term ..... We meet an old friend, and exclaim that he haanot changed 
one bit. But we do not mean by this that he has been in a state of 
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suspended animation since we last saw him ..... We take into account only 
some features, not all features ..... God may not wax old as doth a 
garment, or perish or be changed as a suit of clothes is changed and 
cast off (Psalm 102: 26f). But this is not to say that God cannot 
alter in any respect, and cannot be moved and cannot act ...... 
Theologians, however, are tempted to wish an absolute changelessness 
on God. God, they say, is the same yesterday, today and for ever, not 
only in all essential respects, but inallrespects whatsoever. But 
such a changelessness is open to the same objection as timelessness, 
namely, that it is incompatible with personality ...... It is only an 
improper use of the theological superlative and St. Augustine's 
failure torethink the Neo-platonist doctrines he had earlier espoused 
(his account of eternity is-reminiscent of-that-of Plotinus) that has 
led us to speak of God in an incoherent way, which makes Him out to be 
dead and finished instead of alive and ever new ..... To understand 
eternity, therefore, we should not think of it as timeless or changeless, 
but as free from all those imperfections that make the passage of time 
for us a matter for regret ..... God, unlike men, does not feel the 
future bearing down on Him and pressing upon Him, because He can make 
all His dispositions in good time, and is not going to be caught un- 
awares, and does not feel caught upý, in a rush and in need of extra 
time to take stock and think things out properly .... which is as much 
as to say that God is not one of time's sons, but rather is the father 
of time .... God is the master of events, not their prisoner; time 
passes, but does not press. All time is present in the divine mind, 
in the sense that nohe, is,., remoteý. orý, far, ýawayi. -, or absent, but not in the 
sense that all is simultaneous, nor that eternity is a timelessness 
in which nothing ever happens, nor can be conceived of as happening 
(pp. 300-307). This line of argument may be open to challenge and 
qualification, for the issue it tackles is more mysterious and 
difficult than Lucas always admits (as we shall also identify in his 
treatment of providence and freedom), but his basic points are well 
made. A compatible, if rather more cautious, critique of the idea of 
the timelessness of God has also been provided by N. Pike, God and 
Timelessness, (London: R. K. P., 1970). 
But do such treatments of God's relation to time not need to be 
expanded and modified by the inclusion of divine spatiality? It is 
very doubtful if space and time can be considered separately in this - 
or in any - context, and our discussion of the pre-existence of.. Christ 
must rplate tolbothý2spaceiptndntime-;. Me abptrac_tion4_of-timei-1from space, 
will inevitably introduce. a. rather'abstract; accpunt, of-_bothý, ýas, argvably 
we see even in. Athanasiusý contention for a full doctrine of incarnation, 
where the debates too easily occurred within a framework' of opposition 
bet ween time and eternity provided by Origen. For an interesting and 
suggestive attemptto relate created space and time to the infinity and 
eternity of God, see T. Pierce, 'Spatio-Temporal Relations in Divine 
Interactions!, S. J. T., 35 (1982), pp. 1-11. 
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1. J. Danielou, Gospel Message and-Hellenistic Culture, p. 357. 
2. Exaggerated in the sense that Ignatius adopted a rather cavalier 
approach to martyrdom. In this he claimed to be imitating his Lord 
(Romans 4), but we must ask whether St. Paul's calm willingness to 
avoid unnecessary martyrdom (Acts 22 ff. ) did not express a more balanced 
appreciation of the demands laid upon a Christian by the experience of 
salvation. 
3. It has often been remarked that for the Apologists cosmological 
concerns '. dominate soteriology. Their use and development of the Logos 
theology, with its intellectual respectability and the ease of its 
adaptation to illustrate and interpret a wide range of biblical material, 
tended to divert attention from the-Cross and Resurrection. Nevertheless, 
one should underestimate- the Apologists, own sense of salvation 
neither in their writings (e. g. Justin I- Apol. 18f.; Dial. 26,48f. ), 
nor in their readiness to suffer the consequences of their public 
confession and apology (Justin was flogged and beheaded after a summary 
trial). 
4. One sees this movement from experience of salvation to ascription 
of deity (however we may wish to understand and articulate this) to the 
mediator of salvation already in the New Testament (e. g. Matthew 12: 28; 
14: 30-ý3; 27: 52-54) 
5. The Christian Tradition, Volume I, (University of Chicago Press, 
1971), p. 173. 
6. With hindsight we can see the relative necessity, at least, of 
doctrinal controversy. Blind allies are only mapped as such by those 
who are prepared to follow them to their conclusion at least once. Heresy 
thus performs the double function of both crystallizing error and of 
stirring up a corresponding search for truth. We should prefer that 
the Fathers had recognised this and conducted themselves with a greater 
degree of charity towards those whom they felt called to oppose. One 
consequence of this recognition is a certain relationship between a 
given heresy and that theology which was produced in opposition to it. 
If past studies often underestimated the connection and relationship, 
formal and material, between the 'heresy' and 'orthodoxy' propounded 
in a given controversy, however, the contemporary danger is the opposite 
one of overestimating such mutual dependence. 
In the case of Irenaeus and Gnosticism, the discovery of the Coptic 
Gnostic Library of Nag Hammadi*in 1945, whose works are now appearing,, 
in various editions and translations, has given fresh impetus to comparative 
study, as R. Van Den Broek has recently described ('The Present State of 
Gnostic Studies', V. C., 37 (1983) pp. 41-71). Van Den Broek both praises 
and criticises the ýTs-say of Barbara Aland, 'Gnosis und KirchenvAter', in 
Gnosis-.: Festschrift far Hans Jonas, (Vanden Hoeck Ruprecht in 
G6ttingen: (1978), pp. 158-215, which attempts to argue that,.,.. the Gnostics 
.... understood Paul better than most of their fellow- Chriz; tians who tended 
to express salvation in - 
the ethical categories of merit and reward' 
(P. 70). Further studies of the relationship between Gnostic and early 
Christian thought are evidently needed, and will be facilitated by the 
recent discoveries at Nag Hammadi. Van Den Broek concludes his review 
with the challenging claim that, 'the study of Gnosticism is still in 
its infancy. ' 
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7. It is important to note 
i 
that, unlike Marcion, Val-entihus is not 
accused of having altered the text of Scripture, but of having mis- 
understood and perverted its meaning. 
8.1 refer here to the exegesis of New Testament documents. Justin 
Martyr had previously appealed to 'memoirs of the apostles' in his 
recorded discussion with Trypho (e. g. Dial. 103), but his references 
to our New Testament scarcely go beyond the synoptic gospels, which 
he may have known in the form of a primitive synopsis (see H. Chadwick, 
'Justin's Defence of Christianity', B. J. R. L., 47 (1964-5), p. 283. ) 
The use of Old Testament Testimonia in connected argument is known 
prior to Irenaeus, most especially in Barnabas and Justin, although 
the Demonstration exhibits a more theologically integrated use of the 
proof texts, not least in terms of Irenaeus' doctrine of the Trinity. 
9. On other occasions, Irenaeus admits that Gnostic exegesis is often 
plausible (e. g. 111.15.2) and recognises that the parables present a 
particular problem of interpretation (e. g. 11.27.3; 11.28.3). However, 
he appeals to the very obscurity of parables to ease' the problem 
presented to him by Marcion's trenchant argument that the God of the 
Old Testament was the author of sin because he hardened- the heart of 
Pharaoh and his servants (IV. 29.1f). 
10. On the, other side, the charge is developed that the Gnostics on 
the one hand divided the Godhead and denied the unity of God, and, on 
the other hand, developed a doctrine of the unknown Bythus who has no 
attributes capable of expression in human language. 
ll. "This is the expression employed by R. M. Grant A Short History of 
the Interpretation of the Bible, (University of Chicago Press: 1965), 
especially chs. 5 and 8, to chart the development of exegesis from 
Irenaeus to Augustine. Grant describes Irenaeus (p. 55) as, I the 
Father of authoritative exegesis in the Zhurch I. 
12. This is Irenaeus' favourite expression, although he does on occasions 
speak of 'the substance of the tradition' (1.10.2), or of 'the deposit 
of faith' (111.24.1). No significance should be attached to these 
variations of form which are characteristic of the style of Irenaeus. 
13. This point has been emphasised recently by T. F. Torrance, 'The 
Deposit of Faith', S. J. T., 36 (1983), p. 4ff., and is made by J. N. D. Kelly, 
Early Christian Creeds, (London: Longman, 1972), p. 76. In 11.28.1 
Irenaeus speaks of, 'having the truth itself as our rule'. 
Irenaeus' approach to truth, tradition and the rule of faith is set 
in a wider patristic context by G. Florovsky, Bible, Church, Tradition: 
An Eastern Orthodox View, (Massachusetts: Norl 1972), esp. ch. 5. 
14. The 'strong connection between Spirit and life made by Irenaeus, 
to which we will return in a later chapter, is relevant here. Like a 
body which retains its formal constitution immediately after its 
death, Scripture is dead, i. e. unproductive, for the Gnostics, because 
through and in it they do not discern and relate to life and Spirit. 
On the modern discussion of the spirit/letter distinction in hermeneutics, 
see Charles Wood, 'Finding the life of a Text: Notes on the Explication 
of Scripture', S. J.. T., 21 (1978), pp-101-111 andhismore recent The 
Formation of Christian Understanding, (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 
1981), especially p-108f. Although no specific reference is made, 
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, Wood's understanding 
is similar to that of Irenaeus. A good example 
of Irenaeus' method of exegesis of a disputed passage is found in 
V. 9-14 where Irenaeus disputes the literal Gnostic interpretation of 
lCor. 15: 50, 'Flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God', by 
invoking a relation of strict order, in anthropological terms, of 
Spirit and flesh. 
15. Dem. 3,6,100; A. H. I. 10.1; IV. 33.7,15. 
16. E. g. 111.1.2; 4.2; 6.5; 15.3; 16.6. These passages reflect iCor. 8: 6 
which is also binitarian in structure. To some extent these passages 
can be explained by a strong element in Irenaeus' thought wherein the 
Holy Spirit in a self-effacing manner designates the Father and Son as 
Lord - e. g. 111.6.1, 'Since, therefore, the Father is truly Lord, and 
the Son truly Lord, the Holy Spirit has fitly designated them by the 
title of Lord! 
17. Various insights from such fields as social anthropology, sociology 
and epistemology have contributed to the rise of 'narrative theology', 
which has shed interesting light upon the role of doctrine in the 
Church, and the process of its emergence. G. Stroup, for example, has 
explored links between narrative, identity and trinitarian theology: 
'The metaphysical questions that make up the doctrine of the Trinity 
are not self-generated, but emerge out of the particularity and 
complexity of Christian narrative ..... The Trinity, therefore, is a 
necessary description of God'd identity, but it presupposes those 
narratives which witness to God's relation to the world' (The Promise 
of Narrative Theology, (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1981), p. 246. ) 
18. A question which, it need hardly be said, continues to arise even 
amid the sophistication which the centuries have added to the doctrine 
of the Trinity. See, for example, the dialogue between P. Lapide and 
J. Moltmann, Jewish Monotheism and Christian Trinitarian Doctrine, 
(E. T., Philadelphia: Fortress, 1981). 
19. At various points Irenaeus defends the unity of Scripture, God, 
Jesus Christ, salvation history, tradition and man, as Benoit has 
emphasised: Saint Irenge, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1960), 
pp. 203-217. This section occupies pride of place in his chapter 'Les 
Grand Themes de 11 Adversus Haereses I. 
The influential histories of dogma by Seeberg and Loofs popularised 
the charge of modalism (see the discussion by J. Lawson, The Biblical 
Theology of St. Irenaeus , (London; Epworth, 1948), pp. 129ff. ). Harnack, 
however, vigorously defends Irenaeus and claims, 'it is absolutely in- 
correct to attribute modalistic ideas to him' (History of Dogma, II, p. 264). 
20. 'The Apostolic Preaching of Irenaeus and its Light on his Doctrine 
of the Trinity', Hermathena, 14, (1907), pp. 307-337, the quotation being 
taken from p. 337. 
21. Cf. F. R. Montgomery Hitchcock, 'The Creeds of St. Irenaeus and 
St. Patrick', Hermathena, 14 (1907), pp. 168-182. 
22. Dial. 61,62,128,129. In Dial. 128 Justin explicitly opposes 
modalism. Irenaeus would have been suspicious of asserting a numerical 
distinction between Father and Son lest it imply the type of spatial 
1.53 
distinction in the Godhead which the Gnostics held. However, the 
contrast between Justin and Irenaeus here should not be exaggerated, 
for Justin was writing in the context of a discussion with an orthodox 
Jew, and against the background of a substantial Jewish population at 
Rome. The Jewish influence upon Gnosticism, which has been, and will 
be, much debated, was of the more heterodox type, which gave a greater 
place to the role of angelic intermediaries. - 
23. See. D. C. Trakatellis, The Pre-existence of Christ in Justin 
Martyr, (Harvard: Scholars Press, 1976), ch. 2, where reference is made 
to the detailed study of Prigent, Justin et l'Ancien Testament. It 
cannot finally be proved, of course, that Justin and Irenaeus did not 
share a common source which is no longer extant. 
24. For the fourth-century explication of this maxim, see E. J. Fortman, 
The Triune God, (London: Hutchinson, 1972), p. 142 ff. There were, 
and are, different emphases here in different writers and especially 
in the different traditions of East and West. The western development, 
from Augustine to Aquinas, placed the greater systematic emphasis on 
this maxim, with the consequence that in Aquinas it is assumed that 
the Trinity is perceived in creation only as a unity, and the split 
between De Deo Uno and De Deo Trino becomes established in the schools. 
One effect of this 
* 
development is an increasing conception of the 
remoteness of God tocreation, his relation being reasserted in formal, 
static and sacramental terms. Although we see hints of the dogma opera 
trinitatis ad extra indivisa sunt in Irenaeus, both in the type of 
passage which we have quoted, and in other features of his theology, such 
as the 'two hands of God' motif, which we shall shortly consider, we 
do not see the unfortunate consequences of its over-emphasis. 
25. This may be illustrated in two signficant ways from Book Four, 
chapter 31. The forgiveness of sins is attributed both to the 'advent 
of our Lord' (para. 1) and to 'the Spirit of the remission of sins, 
through means of whom we are quickened' (para. 2). In addition, creation 
is attributed both tb- the Word and to the Spirit of God (para. 2): 
'Now the Father of the human race is the Word of God .... who created you' 
and 'The Spirit of God, by whom all things were made, was commingled 
and united with flesh ...... 1. While it is true that the early Fathers 
could sometimes refer to Christ as 'Spirit of God', Irenaeus nearly 
always maintains a clear distinction between Christ and the Spirit. 
26. 'This is the attitude of G. C. Stead, Divine Substance, (O. U. P.: 1977) 
p. 187f., who attempts to give meaning to the apparent paradox or 
contradiction, on the one hand by interpreting 'wholly' as meaning 'not 
exclusively', and on the other hand by reducing the theological reference 
with the claim that Irenaeus takes this 'highly abstract and philosophical 
discussion' from what is 'probably a pre-Christian development'. Certainly 
the shape of the passage derives from Xenophanes, as Stead explains, 
but Irenaeus replaces Xenophan6s' verbs by nouns, thus increasing the 
referential level of the named attributes. Ab A. Heron has xemark6d(in 
T. F. Torrance, ed. The Incarnation, (Edinburgh: Handsel Press, 1981), 
p. 76, n. 1), Stead deals mainly with historical and philosophical 
analysis of the terms 064-tv-, substantia, and their derivatives. This 
is done with masterful scho arship and one is reluctant to carp at his 
omissions, but one consequence of his method 
4 
of approach is to focus, 
for example, upon Irenaeus' use of the term a, ýxo-i4rto5 which is in 
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contexts other than that of his doctrine of God, because of Gnostic 
use of the term in the doctrine of God. Hence, I would suggest, 
Stead misses the shape of Irenaeus' doctrine of God, which I am 
attempting to uncover. 
27. Immediately prior to this sentence from 11.13.3 he quotes with 
approval the well-known verse from Is. 45: 8 'God is not as men are; 
and His thoughts are not like the thoughts of men'. 
28. In addition to this approach to the divine attributes Irenaeus 
maintains a similar position with regard to what was later, to be called 
the 'trepLXwp, -bj*, iS of the persons of the Trinity. For example, from 111.6.2: 
'Therefore God has been declared through the Son, who is in the Father, 
and has the Father in Himself'. We are witnessing here the influence 
of Johannine theology upon Irenaeus, as T. E. Pollard, Johannine Christology 
and the Early Church, (C. U. P. : 1970) has re-affirmed (p. 48): 'With 
Irenaeus, the Asian who became a bishop in the Wistern Church, the 
Antiochene or Asia Minor theology with its strong Johannine flavour 
becomes a dominant theological influence in the West'. By contrast, it 
is uncertain whether Justin Martyr even knew the Gospel of John (see 
H. Chadwick, Justin's Defence of Christianity: p. 296). 
29. See especially, in close proximity to the above quotation, 
11.13,5,6,8 and 10. 
30. G. Florovsky, 'St. Athanasius' Concept of Creation', S. P., 6 
(Berlin: 1962), pp. 36-57, has demonstrated how hard it was for early 
Christian theology to reach this insight, a difficulty compounded in the 
third century by Origen's subtle combination of truth and error. 
31.111.18.1; IV. 20.3 Cf. also Dem. 10, where an "Armenian word meaning 
'daily, continual, perpetual' is used of the Son's relation to the Father - 
see the edition of Armitage Robinson, p. 79, n. 4. Another important 
indication that Irenaeus believed in the full deity of the Son, in the, 
sense that he was reluctant to draw an ontological distinction between 
Father and Son, is given by his use of the expression: 'So then the Father 
is Lord and the Son is Lord, and the Father God and the Son is God' 
(Dem. 27); cf. also 11.6.1, where the Holy Spirit is included. 
32. E. g. 1.5.5; 18.1f., 30.6; 11.7.4; 14.3; 19.6; 30.4; 111.11.2. 
33. The passage which is sometimes taken to show that for Irenaeus the 
Son/Word and creation have correlative origins is V. 18.2 'For the Father 
bears (portans) the creation and His own Word simultaneously, and the 
Word borne by the Father grants the Spirit to all as the Father wills'. 
But too much should not be read into this (i) because the context is 
strongly soteriological, with Irenaeus defending the genuine redemption 
of this world, and (ii) because the passage comes towards the end of A. H. 
and remote from the chapters where the basic relation of God and Christ 
to creation is most discussed. We should also take into account the 
fact that for Irenaeus 'Father' is not so much a techn. ical term for a 
person of the Godhead, as a means of referring to the fact that the one 
God was the creator of the universe and Father of all mankind. This 
idea has Jewish origins and is used by Paul, or his disciple, in Eph. 4: 6: 
'One God and Father of us all, who is above all and through all and in 
us all 1, a verse which Irenaeus quotes later in V. 18.2. 
The richness of the divine life 'prior to' creation is emphasised in 
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IV. 14.1, in a passage to which we will return: 'For. not alone ante- 
cedently to Adam, but also before all creation, the Word glorified 
His Father, remaining in Him; andwas Himself glorified by the Father 
..... for He is rich, perfect and in need of nothing'. 
34. Irenaeus' criticism of the emanation theories of the Gnostics is 
well analysed by Stead, op. cit. p. 197ff.. The problem for Irenaeus is 
that if he maintains that objectionable consequences follow whatever 
kind of derivation is involved between Father and Son, he will tend to 
confuse the proper distinction between them. Traditional philosophical 
criticism of emanation theories had tended to be based upon the claim 
that any imperfection in emanated subordinates implies imperfection. -in 
their source. This is employed by Irenaeus in 11.17.3, but could be 
turned against his doctrine of creation as a work of a good God. His 
response to such a charge is again to claim that human beings are not 
given an answer to the problem of the origin of evil (11.28.7). 
35. For two good recent assessments of this much discussed christo- 
logical concept see R. A. Norris, God and World in Early Christian-..., -- 
Theology, ch. 2 and A. I. C. Heron, 'Logos, Image, Son: Some Models and 
Paradigms in Early Christology', in Creation, Christ and Culture, ed. 
R. W. A. McKinney, (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1976). For a less broad 
overview, but more detailed analysis of the position adopted by Justin, 
see Trakatellis, op. cit., passim. 
36. There are differences of emphasis, clarity and certainty in the 
different writers, but the generalisation is, I think, acceptable, as 
A. I. C. Heron (op-cit. ) has argued in detail. 
37. To take the case of Justin, with but few exceptions (lApol. 59(? ), 
64; 2Apol 6) he attributes creation entirely to the transcendent 
Father. Justin's attitude might have been affected by his desire to 
give no opportunity for Marcion's acute mind to find a defence for his 
views, and also by his concern to present as reasonable as possible a 
gospel to Trypho and other Jews, as well as by his likely ignorance 
of the Fourth Gospel. 
38. Norris, op. cit. ch. 2 'Justin Martyr and Platonism' brings this 
out with judicious clarity, but several other streams of ancient 
thought fed into the conception of Jesus Christ as the Logos of God. 
Their mutual importance is much debated and I merely mention the 
rich background from which those who assembled the model drew: the 
Old Testament concept of Word of God, mediated through the LXX; Philo's 
extensive modification of Old Testament ideas by their conjunction 
with the philosophical traditions, especially Stoic and Platonic, of 
ancient Greece; the Gospel of John, or those traditions which led to 
its prologue including, perhaps, Ignatius' remarks concerning the 
Word proceeding from silence (Magn. 8. cf. Rom. 2). Ignatius, apparently 
enigmatic thought here is possibly no more than a reflection of such 
Old Testament verses as Psalm 83: 1 10 God, do not keep silence' orý 
Psalm 81: 5b 'I hear a voice I had not known', although the concept 
of silence in Ignatius has been the subject of considerable debate. 
On this, see the remarks and references in C. Trevett, 'Prophecy and 
Anti-Episcopal Activity: a Third Error Combatted by Ignatius? ', 
J. E. H., 34 (1983), pp. 1-18. 
39. Cf. Norris, God and World in Early Christian Theology, and Danielou 
Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture, chs. 4 and 15. For a fuller 
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account of Middle Platonism, see J. Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 
(London: Duckworth, 1977). The more theistic character of Middle 
(and Neo) Platonism as compared with Plato was a mixed blessing, 
because this was bought at the price of a sharper dualism between 
God and the world. 
40. An apologist operated with something akin to the ancient and 
modern concept of legal advocacy, a basic principle of which is 
scrupulous inattention to the weaknesses of the point of view which 
is to be defendedi 
41. Or to that of Theophilus. 'It is not certain that Irenaeus knew 
of Theophilus' work, which containsa particularly clear exposition 
of the 'Logos model' (Ad Autol. 11.22). 
42. It is doubtful whether Irenaeus saw any distinction in meaning 
between the description of the 'second person' of the Trinity as 
Word or Son of God. The credal summaries at the beginning of the 
Demonstration make this especially clear: 'Rightly and fittingly is 
the Word called the Son, and the Spirit the Wisdom of God' (Dem. 6) ... 
'The word of God, Son of God, Christ Jesus our Lord, who was manifested 
to theprophets.... I (Dem. 7). But the same equality is expressed in A. H.: 
'He is the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ: through His Word, who is 
His Son, through Him He is revealed and manifested... *' (11.30.9). 
Other texts which equate Word and Son are discussed by D. J. Unger, 
'The Divine and Eternal Sonship of the Word according to St. Irenaeus 
of Lyons', Laurentianum, 14 (1973), pp. 357-408. One might relate this 
equality between Word and Son to that between logos and nous in God 
which Irenaeus maintains (11.13.8; 28.5). Also, the tendency of 
Irenaeus toemploy a flexible terminology may reflect the reverent 
(rather than the philosophical) apophaticism upon which we have 
already remarked. Irenaeus is reasonably clear that God has genuinely 
revealed Himself, but due both to the created and to the sinful nature 
of man, every human metaphor or symbol is inadequate univocally to 
express the being of God. Hence the advisability of employing images 
which are treated as complementary equals - which is the position 
Irenaeus seems explicitly to employ with regard to Word and Son language. 
43. 'But which Logos? For there is among the Greeks one logos which 
is the principle that thinks and another which is the instrument by 
means of which thought is expressed' (11.28.4 - in the context of 
criticism of the Gnostic theory of emissions). Harvey suggests that 
this may be a scribal interpolation, but does not argue the case. 
However, it fits the context in a natural manner and Harvey's suggestion, 
which has no textual support, may be ignored. 
44. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, vol-I, (Massachusetts:. 
1956). has argued that this concept was taken up and developed by 
Philo before its assimilation by the Apologists. 
45. This is most clear in Theophilus of Antioch, Ad Autol. 11.10.22, 
where the technical terms are employed, but exactly similar conceptions 
in varying terminology are found in Tatian Ad Graecos 5; Athenagoras, 
Legati , 10.3; and Justin, Dial. 61f. 
46. A similar criticism of the irfo(ýOPLXO-5 (amissibilis) aspect of 
the theory is found a little later in 11.13.2. Given these explicit 
criticisms of the concepts employed in the 'Logos model', and the 
attempts made by Irenaeus to develop alternatives, which we shall shortly 
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describe, it is surprising how many scholars appear to assume that 
Irenaeus does employ the I Logos model I. G. C. Stead, for example, 
has claimed that, 'This distinction, developed in the Stoic phrases 
logos endiathetos, and logos prophoriko , was taken over and applied 
to God himself with some confidence by Athenagoras, Theophilus, and 
Irenaeus'. ('The Concept of Mind and the Concept of-God in the 
Christian Fathers', in The Philosophical Frontiers of Christian 
Theology, ed. B. Hebblethwaite and S. Sutherland, (C. U. P.: 19 ), p. 50). 
A similar inability to see the contrast between Irenaeus and the 
Apologists at this point is exhibited in the following selection of 
authors: J. P. Smith, in his edition of the Demonstration, p. 181; 
C. B. Kaiser, The Doctrine of God, (London, M. M. &S., 1982), p. 56f.; 
and J. Ochagavia, Visible Patris Filius: A Study of Irenaeus' Teaching 
on Revelation and Tradition, (Rome: 1964), p. 103. A partial exception 
is provided by R. W. Jenson, The Triune Identity, (Philadelphia: Fortress, 
1982), p. 69f., although Jenson himself fails to appreciate the reversion 
to the Apologetic 'Logos model' by Tertullian. 
47. IV. 6.6. Cf. 111-9.1; 10.2; 11.5f.; 16.6; 20.4; IV. 6.3; 20.5; 
24.2; V. 18.1; Dem. 6. 
48. For the subordinationist charge, see Fortman, op-cit., p. 107 
and for the modalist charge, see Lawson, op. ci-t-, p. 129. 
49.1 refer primarily to theValentinian school, which itself was 
far from homogeneous, but the generalisation impliedin my remarks 
is, I think, supportable. 
50.1.1.1. 
51.1.14.1. 'Without material substance' renders &xvovaxoS , which 
could also mean without being or reality, which meaning Irenaeus, but 
not his opponents, would have endorsed. 
52. The nature of this qualification is not altogether easy to 
determIne, although it is clearly asserted, *e. g. 1.14.1. Cf. the 
duscussion in the early part of Chapter One. 
53. For the invisibility of the Word in the act and economy of 
creation, see V. 18.3. 
54. Cf. Luke, 5: 21, etc.. 
55. There seems little doubt to me that Irenaeus was strongly influenced 
by those verses in the Gospel of John which speak of Jesus Christ as 
the visible presence of the Father, verses that in the Gospel are given 
special prominence: 1: 18; 12: 45; 14: 9. Cf. I John 1: 1-3. 
56. This also illustrates a basic feature in Irenaeus' theological 
method. If the incarnate Christ is not just a reflection of the 
invisible God, but mysteriously embodies the invisible God in a truly 
visible manner, we must faithfully follow the life and teaching of 
the incarnate Christ if we, as fellow visible creatures, are to know 
the invisible God. Hence we should abandon intellectual speculation, 
especially as attempted by the Gnostics, and obediently follow the 
actual revelation of God in space and time, tracing the richness of the 
economy of creation and redemption back to its source in the 
inner life of God. Thus I would maintain that Irenaeus has a concept 
Of an 'immanent Trinity', but not one that is separable in human thought from the 'economic Trinity'. Later theology drove a logical wedge between the immanent and economic trinities and tended to dissolve the inner life of God into timeless and static abstractions. In faithful 
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over-reaction, much modern theology has abandoned any distinction 
between the immanent and economic Trinity, settled simply for the 
latter, and thus risked a loss of contact with the real being of 
God who is Creator as well as Redeemer. 
57. J. Ochagavia, op. cit., argues this case at length, building upon 
various earlier studies by H. Zeigler, Irendus der Bischof von Lyon, 
(Berlin: 1871 ); N. Bonwetsch, Die Theolgie des Irenaus, (Gttersloh: 
1925); and A. Orbe, Hacia la Primera Teologia de la ProcesiOn del 
Verbo, (Rome: 1958). Although he does not acknowledge the tensions 
in Irenaeus' theology, a convincing answer has been provided by 
D. J. Unger, op. cit.. 
58. If I have. understood his thought correctly, Clement of Alexandria 
should be contrasted with Irenaeus here. Although veiled somewhat in 
the symbolism he loved, Clement appears to maintain a strong distinction 
between the transcendent source which is the indivisible and ineffable - 
One, and the many names and symbols which point to the One, (e. g. Strom, 
V. 12 f). Clement appears to be participating in the d: ýift from Middle 
Platonism to Neo-Platonism, whereas Irenaeus is moving from Justin's 
partial espousal of Middle Platonism in precisely the opposite direction; 
Cf. E. F. Osborn, Clement of Alexandria, ch. 2. 
59.11.13.4; 111.24.2; IV. 20.1; 4f. 
60.111.11.5. 
, 
Cf. those passages which speak of the Son as the 
knowledge of the Father: IV. 6.3; Dem. 7 cf. 111.11.6. Irenaeus might 
have made more use of this explicit Johannine theme were the threat of 
Gnostic misrepresentation not so near at hand. 
61, V. 16.1; 17.2. 
62. IV. 4.2. 
63. To some degree, it is this which has led to the popular mis- 
conception that the doctrine of the Trinity in Irenaeus is basically 
modalist, or has strong modalist leanings. There is, of course, 
nothing wrong with bringing into theology language and metaphor which 
has a popular, homely appeal, as long as one is aware of both the 
misconceptions which arise from unguarded anthropomorphism and the, 
imbalance of attention which more popular imagery easily attracts. A 
more scholarly reason for the recent attention devoted to Irenaeus' 
conception of the 'two hands' of God is the fact that Loofs used this 
extensively in his attempt to prove Irenaeus I strong dependence upon 
Theophilus. 
64. The quasi-technical identification of the Son and Spirit, or 
Word and Wisdom, as the hands of God is first found in IV. Praef. 4 and 
occurs on several subsequent occasions: IV. 20.1; V. 1.3; 5.1; 
6.1; 15.2f.; 16il; 28.4; 35.2; Dem. 11 
65. Lawson, op. cit. p. 123f., gives many illustrative examples. 
66. For 'arm', e. g. Luke 1: 51; for 'hand', e. g. Luke 1: 66; for 
'finger' e. g. Luke 11: 20. 
67. Because Ad Autolycum must have been written after March 180. 
F. R. Montgomery Hitchcock, 'Loofs' Theory of Theophil-us of Antioch as 
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a Source of Irenaeus', J. T. S., 38 (1937), pp. 130-139 and 255-266-has 
argued strongly against Irenaean dependence upon Theophilus, and for 
a common source issuing from the LXX and/or Philo, who had called the 
divine Logos and Wisdom the hands of God. The expression 'the hands 
of the Lord which formed you from earth' is found in Melito, On Pascha, 
79; whether this is a deliberately trinitarian use is open to question. 
Often overlooked in'this connection is lClement 33: 'Above all, with 
his holy and pure hands he formed man, his outstanding and greatest 
achievement, stamped with his own image'. 
68. The anti-Gnostic character of the two hands doctrine is prominent. 
It is interesting to note that Athanasius had recourse to the image of 
the Son of God as the hand of God (De Decretis 111.7) to illustrate 
the homoousios of Father and Son, in contrast to the Arian teaching 
that the Son was an instrument detached from the Father. 
69. This becomes particularly clear in Irenaeus' eschatology, which, 
picking up strands of thoughtfrom the Old Testament and Paul, emphasises 
the total renewal of creation. However, the question whether Irenaeus 
perceived the full depth of the relation between man and creation will 
occupy us in a later chapter. 
70. IV. Praef. 4; IV. 20.1; V. 1.3; 6.1; 15.2f.; 28.4; Dem. 11 
71. The use of the term the two hands of God was . not taken up by 
subsequent orthodoxy, although imaginative or descriptive use of the 
symbol 'the hand of God' with reference to Christ is found in various 
writers - e. g. Tertullian (De Res. 5). Cyprian (cited by Danielou, 
The Origins of Latin Christianity, p. 291), and Athanasius (De Decretis 
111.7). 
72. For example, in relation to the question why creation is as it is, 
and afflicted by evil, Irenaeus answers that such questions should be 
left in the hands of God' (11.28.7). The close juxtaposition of 
significant references to the hand of God as non-technical and technical 
terms (IV. 19.2f.; 20.1) illustrates the fluidity of expression. 
73. The image of the Holy Spirit as vivifying moisture is taken from 
the Old Testament and had previously been introduced by Irenaeus in 
his discussion of the incident of Gideon's fleece (111.17.3). The 
finger of God, again following the Old Testament, is associated with 
the mediation-of salvation of man earlier in A. H. (111.21.8; IV. 29.2) 
and expressly identified with the Holy Spirit in Dem. 26. 
74. This is-traced and summarised by Danielou, Theology of Jewish 
Christianity, pp. 134-140. 
75. Danielou, ibid, p. 138, quoting Dom Lanne, 'Cherubim et Seraphim', 
R. S. R. 43 (1955), pp. 527-530, This is the interpretation of the 
English editions of the Demonstration by Armitage Robinson and Smith. 
76. In his edition of the Demonstration, (London: S. P. C. K., 1920), p. 43. 
77. ' Ibid. , p. 140. Despite the fact that he follows the amended reading 
of Dem. 10, Danielou still discusses this conception in the course of 
an extended treatment of 'The Trinity and Angelology', and makes no 
reference to it in his separate treatment of Irenaeusl*doctrine of the 
Trinity. 
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78. See. E. Hennecke, New Testament Apocrypha, Vol. II, (E. T., 
London: Lutterworth, 1965), pp. 642-663. ' The editors date the work, 
whichmaybe composite, as possibly from the second century A. D., 
Various parts or fragments of the book are available in Latin, Greek, 
Old Slavonic, and Coptic, but the entire work has come down to us 
only in Ethiopic translation. A minority view has held that it is 
the influence of Philo that is observable here in Irenaeus, but, as 
Danielou argues convincingly (p. 139), this is difficult to maintain. 
79. Cf. Armitage Robinson, p. 43; Danielou p. 139. 
80. The important point here is that other evidence linking Irenaeus 
to the Ascension of Isaiah, viz. the account of the seven heavens 
and the secret descent of the Saviour, is only found in the Demonstration 
(9 & 84). 
81. Cf. IV. 7.4; 17.6. 
82. This is certainly true of the Demonstration, which only survives 
in Armenian, and probably true of the Ascension whose original language 
is not known with certainty. Ch. 9 is available in Old Slavonic, Latin, 
Ethiopic and, in part, in Coptic. 
83.1 have in mind the several works of James Barr upon this theme. 
84. This can be shown, I think from the different uses of 
'TrPO&-KVV6W and a-6pojAAL in the New Testament. Ze OL is Telatively 
rare and usually refers to pagan or synagogue devotion. TrpcxrKvV&Uj 
is normally used to describe the approach of men to God. But SoýKrw__ 
and--SoVoL , which occur more frequently, are very often associated 
with God in a general way, either denoting (Sot, -K ), or following from 
( SoýotýW ), the revealed presence of God. This difference between 
Soýo. L'rw (and Soýo( ) and Trpoir-jcvvcW is especially clear in Revelation, E_RýNew Testament book which is most relevant to our subject and 
literary genre. Both words occur frequently, but whereas Soý_Tw and 
Soýý are used to denote the divine presence and being, ir_p1wKvveW 
cle'HoMes the worship due from created beings to God. 
85. A verse from the Gospel of John (which is replete'with the theme 
of glory'in various contexts) is, of course, quoted in the extract 
above. The imagery of Revelation may also be in the background; 
arguably linked with the Johannine corpus, with its millenarianism 
endorsed by Irenaeus, it places a special emphasis up-on the glory of 
the Godhead. The contrast between the Gospel of John and the apocalyptic 
ideas present in the Ascension of Isaiah has been well exposed by J. D. G. 
Dunn, I Let John be John I, in Das Evangelium und die Evangelien, hrg. von 
P. Stuhlmacher, (TUbingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1983), eg. pp. 324,329,331. 
86. The link, yet dialectical distinction, between these two elements 
in Irenaeus' thought may be illustrated by the contexts in which they 
are to be found. We have seen how the I two hands I teaching points to 
the care and'benevolence of God towards man. The extracts from IV. 14.1 
and Dem. 10 quoted above are both qualified by creation themes as well, 
but ; 71-t'h' a difference. The emphasis here is upon the self-sufficiency 
as well as the loving action of God ad extra. Created beings must 
always respect the divine freedom which self-sufficiency implies and 
'not pass their bounds, each fulfilling his appointed task' (Dem. 10); 
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they must respect the fact that ýI God did not stand in need of man 
(IV. 14.1). Among commentators upon his doctrine of the Trinity 
there are relatively few who have adequately perceived this anti- 
. Modalist aspect. An exception here is D. J. Unger, op. cit., p. 381. One reason for this neglect has been the unfamiliar feel of such 
ideas to Western ears, influenced by the predominantly 'monarchical' 
model of the Trinity. J. Moltmann, 'The Fellowship of the Holy Spirit - 
Trinitarian Pneumatology', S. J. T., 37 (1984), pp. 287-300, has contrasted 
the 'monarchical' and 'eucharistic' views of the Trinity, and has 
commented upon the 'eucharistic' model in language reminiscent of 
Irenaeus: I The Holy Spirit glorifies the Son and - through the Son and 
together with him - glorifies the Father, until the goal of creation and all 
God's works is reached and the praise of God fills heaven and earth 
and imbues all created beings with bliss' (p. 299). To some degree, 
the two hands of God corresponds to the monarchical model, and the 
glorification motif to the eucharistic model, it being necessary, as 
Moltmann insists, to hold -both together. If Irenaeus puts too great 
an emphasis upon the 'monarchical' aspect, this may reflect his 
tendency to undervalue the contingency and independence of creation, 
a tendency which will occupy us in subsequent chapters. 
87. This claim is introduced right at the beginning of A. H. (1.1.2) 
and undergirds the whole Gnostic position. It is interesting to note 
that in I. 14.8, in relation to the Marcosian branch of Valentinianism, 
reference is made to 'the seven powers who glorify the Word'. 
88. E. g. F. R. Montgomery Hitchcock's 'The Apostolic Preaching of Irenaeus 
and its Light on his Doctrine of the Trinity' , p. 336: 'Irenaeus regards 
the nature of God chiefly from the standpoint of man, and describes it, 
therefore, in terms of man's needs. The Incarnation is his chief concern, 
and his thoughts are fixed on it in such a way that the Divine Persons 
have interest for him chiefly as they effect the regeneration and 
salvation of man. But there are passages .... which show that man is not 
altogether the centre of his system, and that he could think of the 
Trinity apart from their relations to humanity. ' This may over-state 
the position somewhat; I wish to contend for astra-4ager place in the 
theology of Irenaeus for a concept of the 'immanent Trinity'. 
89. Eternally and temporally, in the life of God 'before' creation 
and in the events of redemption. These two elements are intricately 
interwoven in the theme of glorification in the Gospel of John. 
90. Cf. Ephesians 5: 32. It may be that v. 8-14 of this chapter 
influenced Irenaeus' development of the concept of Christ as the visible 
of the Father. Perhaps Irenaeus talks much more of 'visibility, than 
of 'light' because of Gnostic speculation upon the theme of light in 
the Gospel of John and Ephesians - see 1.8.5. 
91. Michael Shallis, On Time, (London: Burnett Books, 1982), p. 195. 
My attention was drawn to this passage by J. R. Lucas in a review of 
this book in the Journal of the Science and Religion Forum, Summer 1983. 
There are, of course, differences between the uniqueness of created 
and uncreated light: I claim no more than an analogy. It is a 'natural 
miracle' that parts of creation, and in particular eyes, are specially 
adapted to see light. Similarly, according to Irenaeus, there is, as 
we shall see, a special adaptability in man to relate interpretatively 
to God -a 'miracle' of both creation and redemption. 
1ý2. 
92. We have in this examination of Irenaeus I alternative (s) to the 
'Logos model' come close to certain concerns in the most recent 
discussions of trinitarian theology and it will help to put Irenaeus' 
conceptions in perspective if passing reference, in an extended note, 
is made to these developments. The agenda was set in large measure 
by the publication in 1953 (E. T. 1956) of Barth's Church Dogmatics, 
Vol. IV. 1, and specifically paragraph 59, 'The Obeýience of the Son of 
God', where the condescension of the Son of God in Incarnation and 
Atonement, was, consistently with Barth Is method, traced back into the 
inner being of God, to the concept of 'obedience which takes place in 
God Himself. Obedience implies an above and below, a prius and a 
posterius, a superior and a junior and subordinate' (p. 195). This 
teaching is a considerable development from the more traditional 
Western doctrine of the Trinity found in C. D. I. 1, a fact which has been 
obscured by repeated assessments of Barth which have ignored the major 
modification of C. D. I. 1 introduced in C. D. IV. l. (Most recently, see 
J. Mackey, The Christian Experience of God as Trinity, (London: S. C. M., 
1983) p. 210. ) 
Those writers who have attempted a proper assessment of the later 
trinitarian theology of the Church Dogmatics have divided, as far as 
I can see, into three basic camps: 
(i) Those who have wanted to go further in the direction of pluralism, 
towards what has sometimes been called the social model of the Trinity 
(e. g. Moltmann, von Balthasar). The danger here is that of starting 
with an all too human notion of division in God, indicated by the Cross, 
and then being bogged down in attempts to overcome this division. 
(ii) Those of a more conservative or traditional outlook, who see Barth 
as exceeding the bounds of revelation or the traditional philosophical/ 
theological understanding of the unity of God (e. g. Berkouwer). The 
danger here is of starting with an all too human notion of the unity 
of God and thus compromising the faithfulness of revelation and 
attenuating a proper concept of the living God. 
The contribution of J. Mackey, mentioneddbove is a curious and 
impressive combination of both (i) and (ii) wýerein a search for a 
straightforward logical account of the nature of God, which leans towards 
(ii), is combined with a search for a 'Christology from below, which 
is a semi-agnostic version of (i). 
(iii) This illustration of how the interests of U) and (ii) above may 
invite a juxtaposition or synthesis brings us to those writers who have 
attempted to defend and enlarge upon Barth, with relatively little 
modification. E. Jtlngel is the bestknown example of this category, 
and in Britain the clearest exposition and defence of Barth has been 
given by J. Thompson, Christ in Perspective in the Theology of Karl Barth, 
(Edinburgh: St. Andrew Press, 1978). 
It is unnecessary in the context of this thesis to examine these different 
approaches (which are only a strategic selection), except to point out 
that if JUngel is correct in his assessment of Barth's contribution here 
as, oneof the crucial developments in modern theology, a reassessment of 
the history of dogma will inevitably be evoked. From his own standpoint 
the recent book by J. Mackey attempts (sketchily, within the limits of 
space available) just this, but it is perhaps significant that he makes 
little reference to Irenaeus and clearly thinks he embraced the Logos 
theology of the Apologists and Tertullian (p. 116). There is truth in 
the contention that contemporary Greek theology/philosophy influenced 
both pre-Nicene subordinationism and the post-Nicene interpretation of 
homoousios as identity of being, but I would suggest that I have 
demonstrated that in Irenaeus, where the philosophical concerns are less 
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obvious (though not absent), we see a useful start in the construction 
of a doctrine of God which points neither to a divided nor to a remote 
unity, but to a rich and living triunity. 
But to call Irenaeus' efforts a start is subtly to overlook the fact 
that the dominant influence here is Johannine. Despite - or because 
of? - his anti-Gnostic concern, Irenaeus did not doubt the importance 
and authority of the Fourth Gospel and quarried chiefly from this 
source his sense of unity and diversity in God. (That there is in the 
Fourth Gospel such a sense has been emphasised in recent times by 
C. K. Barrett in an influential essay, '"The Father is greater than I" 
(John 14: 28): Subordinationist Christology in the New Testament', in 
Neues Testament und Kirche, ed. J. Guilke, (Freiburg: 1975), pp. 144-159. ) 
S. W. Sykes, in Incarnation and Myth: The Debate Continued, ed. M. Goulder, 
(London: S. C. M., 1979), P. 125, remarks with reference to Barrett's 
article: IThere is sufficient evidence that John himself realised the 
severity of the theological problem of a Sonship which was at-once one 
with its Father, and yet wholly subordinate. There has never been any 
final or single resolution of this difficulty. Rather, what the history 
of Christian doctrine reveals is a series of attempts, of greater or 
lesser sophistication and degrees of success, at mitigating the inherent 
difficulties .... Incarnational theology continues to consist of a variety 
of different articulations of the incarnation, whose primary form is 
the story of God's self identification with the human condition'. 
Mackey op. cit., has attempted to chart and divide such mitigation into 
pre-Nicene subordinationist and post-Nicene strict identity of being 
models. My suggestion is that both Irenaeus and Barth attempt carefully 
not to mitigate, but to absorb into the very centre of their thought, 
the theological tension between unity and division in God which we find 
in the Gospel of John. Irenaeus, modifies the Logos theology of the 
Apologists, and Barth classical Western trinitarian doctrine; these are 
very different starting points, but the journeys upon which they embark 
do exhibit some common features. One thinks also here of a certain 
similarity between Irenaean concept Of'DICVAK6"ýAcw&ý5 and the Barthian 
concept of Stellvertretung (as expounded, like the modification to his 
doctrine of the Trinity, in C. D. IV and explained briefly by the 
English editors in C. D. IV. 1; preface). 
But these connections must not be overstated. To give theological 
expression to such a unique reality as the being of God is an ambitious 
task, yet plausibly it can be claimed that the New Testament itself 
presents'. this uniqueness to us. Jesus prayed to God as Father, using 
the word Abba. J. Jeremias, New Testament Theology, Vol. 1, (London: 
S. C. M., 1971), p. 64, has exposed the'striking originality of this 
language: 'In the literature of Palestinian Judaism no evidence has 
yet to be found of "my Father" being used by an individual as an address 
to God ...... it is quite unusual that Jesus should have addressed God 
as"my Father"; it is even more so that he should. have used the dramatic 
form Abbal. 
93. At Chalcedon, a Church wearied by constant debate, argument and 
misunderstanding opted for a fairly broad set of limits within which 
acceptable positions might be taken. Alongside the offical Symbol, 
it. gave recognition to Cyril's two letters and Leo's Tome as guarding 
against Nestorianism and Eutychianism respectively. This breadth, and 
the negative formulation of a crucial section of the Symbol, led to 
further argument and strife, which was revived in the acerbic debates 
between Lutheran and Reformed theologians in the sixteenth and seven- 
teenth centuries. The underlying problem of Chalcedon was its apparent 
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starting point in the dual nature of Jesus Christ, with a corresponding 
assumption that each nature was already understood in its own right. 
Inevitably this led to the importation of foreign conceptions into 
dhristology and theology, not least in regard to the nature of God 
Himself, and therefore to renewed conflict. 
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94. Harnack, History of Dogma, Vol. II, pp. 284ff., attempts to show 
contradiction in Irenaeus at this point; he charges Irenaeus with 
asserting (in Nestorian fashion) 'two independent existences in Christ', 
despite his opposition to the similar views of Gnosticism, and concludes, 
'that one cannot think in realistic fashion of the deus homo-factus 
without thinking oneself out of it' (p. 285). 
95. This is the constantly repeated theme of 111.16-23. 
96. This is well broup_ht out by J. T. Nielsen, Adam and Christ in the 
Theology of Irenaeus of Lyons, who shows the importance 
Adam-Christ typology and anti-typology. 
to Irenaeus of the 
97. Irenaeus quotes Rom. 8: 3, 'who was made in the likeness of sinful 
flesh', to prove this point (111.20.2; IV. 2.7). Cf. 11.20.3: 'But 
the Lord, ' our Christ, underwent a valid, and not a merely accidentEil 
passion; not only was He Himself not in danger of being destroyed, but 
He also established fallen man by His own strength, and recalled him 
to incorruption. 1 
98. In order to clarify what is meant by this noun, we should contrast 
Ireaneus here with certain other patristic writers. Clement of 
Alexandria is not a docetist in the full sense (far from it), but he 
does maintain that Jesus Christ ate and drank not because food was 
necessary to Him, but to prevent the spread of heretical notions (Strom. 
_ VI. 71, quoted by H. Chadwick, Early Christian Thought and the Classical 
Tradition, p. 51). Athanasius had a strong sense of incarnation, but 
can claim (De Inc. 16) that Jesus could have appeared only briefly 
before 'completing the sacrifice on behalf of all and delivering his 
body to death'. While not wishing to join the debate on Athanasius' 
relation to Apallinarianism, and accepting that De Incarnatione is a 
relatively early work which received some modification in Contra Arianos, 
Athanasius'thought here is some distance from that of Irenaeus. With. 
the Athanasius of De Incarnatione there is a metaphysical tendency to 
see salvation as eTfected by the presence of God to humanity, which is 
rather the reverse of Anselm's metaphysical or legal concept of redemption 
granted in reward for the presence of obedient humanity to God. Irenaeus 
takes up both interests, God-manward, and man-Godward in the history 
of Jesus Christ, in the activity and actualisation of the mediator 
between God and man. Although acknowledging Athanasius' , emphasis upon the capacity of God to involve Himself in the historical order, 
R. D. Williams has noted the difference between Athanasius and Irenaeus 
at this point: 'Awkwardness remains, notably in the notion (to become 
a commonplace in both Eastern and WesternFathers) that the activities 
of divinity and humanity are discernible, so to speak, side by side in 
the life of Jesus: "In the case of Lazarus, He spoke as man, in a human 
voice, but raised him from the dead in a divine way, acting as God" 
(Contra Arfanos, 111.32). In this n. aYve distinction we are some way 
from the Irenaean Christ, whose divinity is manifest in his fulfilled 
and perfected humanity' (The Wound of Knowledge, London: D. L. T., 
1979, P. 49f. ). 
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99. This was the Gnostic approach to salvation. Some Gnostics held 
that the Aeon Christ departed from Jesus before the crucifixion 
(e. g. I. 26.1), and others attenuated the duration of Jesus, ministry 
(11.20.1). It was perhaps in reaction to this latter fact that 
Irenaeus was led to assert that Jesus lived until well into His 
forties (II. 22.5f), although this also helped to cement the Adam- 
Christ typology and the sanctification of old age. 
100. E. g. 1.26.1: 'But at last Christ departed from Jesus, and then 
Jesus suffered and rose again, while Christ remained impassible, 
inasmuch as he was a spiritual being'. 
101. The most direct statement that God suffered in Jesus Christ is 
to be found in 111.18.6, but the subject of that paragraph is Jesus 
Christ, rather than 'God., although in the course of affirming the 
real and genuine suffering of Jesus Christ, Irenaeus does refer to 
Him as 'Master', and, 'A most haly and merciful Lord, who loves the 
human race'. 
102. E. T., ' London: S. P. C. K. 193i. 
103. Irenaeus always refers the title 'Son of Man' to the human 
nature of Jesus Christ, and the Apologists never use it. Some Gnostic 
circles used the term (which would appeal to their imaginative 
mythology) to refer to an archetypal Son of Man - e. g. the Sethian- 
Ophites (1.30.1). 
104. Thus Aulen, in his concentration upon Christus Victor, does not 
give enough attention to the elements of Christus Victima and Christus 
Advocatus. The struggle between God and evil involves the loving 
condescension of the Son of God into a redeeming relation with the 
humanity 
, 
He takes to Himself. The richness of God is truly in our 
world, as the Son of God is present in the obedience of Jesus Christ in 
a divine and human obedience, which reflects the eternal glorification 
of the Father by the Son and Spirit. This is the link between Irenaeus' 
Christology, at which we are merely glancing, and his trinitarian - theology. Aulen's one-sidedness is well , 
ill 
- 
ustrated by the following 
remarks, from the conclusion to his chapter on Irenaeus: 'When Irenaeus 
speaks..... of the obedience of Christ, he has no thought of a human 
offering made to God from man's side, but rather that the Divine will 
wholly dominated the human life of the Word of God, and found perfect 
expression in His work' (op. cit., p. 50) 
105. 
- 
As we saw in relation to the Logos model it is in Justin and 
the other Apologists that we see the division between Being and Becoming 
borrowed from Middle Platonism. Also in Justin there is a very 
considerable emphasis upon the incarnation as humiliation (as Trakatellis 
op. cit., ch. 4, has shown), and a corresponding division between the 
two comings of Christ - the first in humility and the second in glory 
(e. g. Dial. 14). We are seeing reflections of this here in Irenaeus, 
but Justin's scheme is qualified, for in 111.19.3, as quoted above, 
the triumph and glorification of human nature in Jesus Christ is 
already occurring during his ministry as he conquered and. endured 
(temptation, suffering etc., ), and as he 'performed acts of kindness'. 
Here Irenaeus is picking up certain themes from the New Testament. In 
the Synoptic Gospels the events of Easter are linked to the ministry of 
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of Jesus both by the predictions of the passion, and the sense of 
movement or journey to Jerusalem. The predictions of the passion 
usually occur at climaxes of the pre-Easter story. This is another 
aspect of Johannine thought which Irenaeus is assimilating into his 
theology, even if the expression here is not as clear as one finds 
in the Gospel of John. Further evidence that Irenaeus could soften 
the mystery of atonement and redemption is found in his reference 
of the term Son of Man to the human nature of Christ - for example 
in the discussion of Mt. 16: 13 in 111.18.4, where suffering and 
rejection are associated primarily with the 'Son ofMan'. The sense 
that the Son of God suffers. in and with (and as? ) the Son of Man is 
not absent in this paragraph, but the sense of mystery which surrounds 
the title Son of Man in the Gospels (tf. Acts 7: 56, the solitary and 
dramatic reference to the Son of Man in that book) is certainly 
diminished by Irenaeus. 
106. It isaDmmonly recognised today that this tension is evident in 
The New Testament, not least between the different Synoptic gospels. 
William Barclay, Gospel of Matthew, (Edinburgh: St. Andrew Press, 
1956), p. xix, summarises three related differences between Matthew/ 
Luke and Mark which relate to our theme: 
U) Matthew and Luke change Mark to remove any suggestion that 
Christ's power is limited; compare Mark 6: 5f and Matthew 13: 57. 
(ii) Matthew and Luke leave out little touches of Mark in case they 
could be taken to belittle Jesus. They omit Mark 3: 5,21; 
10: 14, verses which attribute human emotions of qnger and 
grief to Jesus. 
(iii) Sometimes Matthew and Luke slightly alter things in Mark in 
order to get rid of statements which might seem to show the 
Apostles in a bad light; compare Mark 10: 35 with Matthew 
20: 20. 
This theological tension in writers prior to Irenaeus is also evident 
in Ignatius: (Ephesians7): 'There is one physician, of flesh and of 
spirit, generate and ingenerate, God in man, true life in death, Son 
of Mary and Son of God, first passible and then impassible, Jesus 
Christ our Lord'. 
107. For direct identification, see. II. 30.9; 111.24.2; IV. 7.4; 
20.1, Z3; V. 2.3; Dem. 5,10. This is an interesting feature in Irenaeus, 
because the general attitude of patristic (and biblical) writers is 
to associate or equate Wisdom with the Word/Son. It is generally 
reýcognised that the Logos prologue of the G, ospel of zum s '^ pot ;, j, ý61rQJ- 4.,, --kwisk W; Aý, Fpuý144, o-& 46AL Qpzp4 ot M&O. vaaas IQ' to equate Jesus with Wisdom (see J. D. G. Dunn I Christology in the Making, (London: S. C. M., 1980), p. 197). The identification of Christ 
with Wisdom is particularly prominent in Paul, and is strongly implied 
in Hebrews 1. Justin (Dial. 129), Tertullian (Adv. Prax. 6f), and 
Origen (see Demonstration, ed. J. A. Rob:, -inson, p. 51), to name 
significant patristic writers either si'de of Irenaeus, all equate the 
Word/Son and Wisdom. An, interesting exception is Theophilus of Antioch 
(Ad Autol. 1.7,13; 11.15) although, perhaps due to the apologetic 
nature of Ad Autolycum, he is not as clear as Irenaeus at this point. 
It has sometimes been assumed that Irenaeus issimply dependent upon 
Theophilus, but the fact, that Theophilus wrote in 180, at the earliest, 
must cast doubt upon this, although complete independence is equally 
unlikely. The identification of Christ with Wisdom in Irenaeus certainly 
has greater theological significance than we find in Theophilus' 
passing references. 
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108. At some stage verses such as Job 10 = Psalm 119: 73, 'Thy 
hands fashioned and made me I, must have been influential; an 
influence mediated, perhaps, through Hellenistic Judaism. 
109. The language of 'adorning', and the identification of the 
Spirit and Wisdom, is also found in IV. 20.1f. 
110. Once again, we see here in Irenaeus the emergence of certain 
themes which are prominent in the Fourth Gospel. There, although the 
language and expression is on occasions reminiscent of Gnosticism, 
the stress is on the firmly'anti-Gnostic, 'The Word became flesh, 
(Jn. 1: 14), and the emphasis upon the Holy Spirit is in marked contrast 
with the Synoptic Gospels. (It must be admitted, though, that the 
contrast may be more linguistic than material, as the concept of the 
Kingdom of God in the Synoptic Gospels bears a strong resemblance to 
Johannine teaching on the Holy Spirit. ) 
111. For a summary of current scholarly opinion on this concept, see 
J. D. G. Dunn, Christology in the Making, ch. 6. The extent to which the 
concept of Wisdom is hypostasised in pre-Christian Judaism is a matter 
for debate, but there is little doubt that Irenaeus' concept of 
Wisdom, which he relates to various texts from Proverbs (IV. 20.3f), 
is at least partly hypostasised. This use by Irenaeus of the concept 
of Wisdom should thus be distinguished (if not entirely separated) 
from his general attribution of wisdom as a characteristic to the one 
God, which we examined in the previous chapter. 
112. The identification ofthese reasons depends somewhat upon the 
, theological stance that is taken. Those who are critical of the basis' 
of classical trinitarian theology in any form tend to emphasise the 
spirituality of God qua God and thus point to the hypostatisation 
of the Holy Spirit as the source of confusion and subsequent neglect. 
Among a host of claimants for mention here, I single out as represent- 
ative of this position in recent British theology, Maurice Wiles 
('The Holy Spirit in Christian Theology', originally published in 
Theology, 66 (1963), pp. 223-7, and reprinted in his Explorations in 
Theology, S. C. M., 1979, ch. 6), and Geoffrey Lampe (God as Spirit, 
b. U. P., 1977). 
Writers more sympathetic to the broad pattern of classical trinitarian 
theology tend to point to the unusual nature of the hypostatisation 
of the Spirit as an intrinsic cause of the neglect. I refer to 
T. F. Torrance to illustrate this: 'The Holy Spirit is not cognoscible 
in Himself, but it is in the Spirit that we are confronted with the 
ultimate being and presence of God .... He does not show us Himself, 
but shows us the Face of the Father in the Face of the Son, and shows 
us the heart of the Son in the heart of the Father. By His very mode 
of being as Spirit He hides Himself from us so that we do not know 
Him directly in His own hypostasis'. (God and Rationality, O. U. P., 
1971, P. 167). In addition, and as a consequence, it is often claimed 
that substitutes for the Spirit readily usurp in a more visible fashion 
the true place of the self-effacing Spirit. These''false spirits' 
may be aspects of the Church such as the hierarchy, tradition, Scripture 
etc., or the religiosity and piety of its members, or wider features of 
individual or national culture, such as human reason or the Zeitgeist 
of nineteenth-century Europe. 
While leaving open the question of the degree of hypostatisation of 
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the Spirit as a 'person', but being willing to suggest as worthy of 
greater attention the possibility that, while 'person' is on balance 
an appropriate indication of the nature of the Son, 'mode of being' 
is on balance the most appropriate expression to indicate the nature 
of the Spirit (for why should it be the case, as is usually assumed, 
that the same language must be used of Son and Spirit? ), I would 
support this latter approach to understanding the reasons for the 
neglect of the Holy Spirit. Furthermore, I would suggest that the 
relative neglect of the Holy Spirit correlates in the Apostolic 
Fathers with an over-emphasis on piety, and in the Apologists with 
an over-emphasis upon human reason. 
Irenaeus picks up the rich scriptural background to a doctrine of 
the Holy Spirit (as well expounded in the recent monographs with this 
title by A. M. Ramsey (1977) and E. Schweizer (1978; E. T. 1980))and 
in doing so opposes the Gnostic confusion between Spirit and created 
man. The danger in Irenaeus is a restriction of both the freedom of 
the Spirit, and the freedom of creation, as we shall discuss in later 
chapters. 
113. In distinction from the Stoic conception of Spirit, this usage 
is biblical. The divine ruach of the Old Testament is firmly the 
presence and activity of God, but neither is its being hypostatised 
alongside the Father nor is its activity specified exclusively in 
certain directions. In the New Testament we have the direct description 
of God as Spirit (John 4: 24) and the risen and ascended Jesus is 
called by Paul 'spiritual' and 'a life-giving spirit' (I Cor. 15: 45f); 
alongside such references, of course, are those which clearly distinguish 
Father, Son and Holy Spirit. 
G. L. Prestige has drawn attention to a similar ambiguity in (especially 
early) patristic writings, and he lists a number of occasions where 
Spirit simply denotes divinity (God in Patristic Thought, p. xx; 17ff). 
Some instances of this are found in Irenaeus: e. g. 111.10.3; V. 1.2; 
Dem. 71, but as a rule, unless he is speaking of the human spirit, 
Irenaeus speaks of the Spirit as the third member of the Godhead. 
114. This is shown convincingly bý Wingren, Man and the Incarnation, 
(E. T. Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1959), p. 96f. T, here are passages which 
connect the Virgin Birth with a sign of the divinity of Christ (e. g. 
V. 1.3, in response to Ebionism) but, 'For Irenaeus .... the miraculous 
birth of our Lord testifies rather to His connexion with Adam. Adam 
was taken from the virgin soil and had no earthly father ..... And in 
order to establish this contact-. with Adam, the Son of God received 
human form from the Virgin Mary'. There is amarked contrast here with 
Justin, who links the Virgin Birth with the sign and means of the 
entry of the pre-existent Christ into our world (see Trakatellis, op. cit. 
pp. 146-157). Justin's approach was easily adapted by, or paralleled 
in, Gnostic Christology: A. H. 1.7.2 records the Valentinian belief 
that, 'Christ passed through Mary just as water flows through a tube,. 
115. Reflecting, perhaps, an anti-Marcionite emphasis in this work, 
for Marcion rejected the sending of the Holy Spirit. 
116. This is the point that Harnack missed when, in relation to this 
passage, he accuses Irenaeus of separating the humanity of Christ from 
the Logos in quasi-Gnostic fashion (History of Dogma, II, p. 285). He 
asks the rhetorical questions: 'Of what importance is an anointing 
with the Spirit to him who is God? What is the meaning of Christ 
being born by the power of the Holy Ghost? ' The answer which Irenaeus 
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gives u%is, --ýto conceive the humanity of Christ as having a soteriological 
rather than a metaphysical role. 
Objections more recent than that of Harnack to the christology of 
incarnation have also tended to ignore the important soteriological 
dimension. It is noteworthy, for example, that of the contributors 
to The Myth of God Incarnate, ed. J. Hick, (1ondon: S. C. M., 1977), 
only Frances Young, in one of her essays (ch. 2), gives serious 
consideration to the implications for soteriology of changes in the 
doctrines of incarnation and trinity. 
117. Cf. the extended discussion in 111.17.1-4. 
118. Christology in the Making. 
119. For'an exclusive 'Adam' Christology, see M. Goulder, 'Jesus, 
the Man of Universal Destiny', in The Myth of God Incarnate, and 
for an exclusive concentration upon Spirit - Christology see G. 
Lampe, God as Spirit. An interesting attempt to combine the emphasis 
upon Being in the Son/Word models, and upon Becoming in the Adam/Spirit 
models, is to be found in E. Jtngells Gottes Sein ist im Werden, 
(TUbingen: 1966; E. T. 1976), a book whose style is about as different 
from Irenaeus as one could imagine, but which contains many passages 
which remi , 
nd one of Irenaean concepts - although no debt or relationship 
to Irenaeus is suggested by the author. 
120. This, language, which occurs elsewhere, has been taken to indicate 
that Irenaeus affirms the later doctrine of the filioque, but such a 
claim is at best tenuous. I suspect Irenaeus would have proffered a 
reverent agnosticism on such a question, as he did to other questions 
which tried to specify the nature of relations in the Godhead. Irenaeus, 
statements are, however, compatible with an affirmation of filioque. 
121. This passage expresses the role of the Holy Spirit with a clarity 
that is often lacking in the earlier A. H.. Generally speaking, the 
trinitarian statements in the Demonstration are clearer and more 
concise than in the earlier work, although the thought is basically 
similar. Indeed the Demonstration contains many phrases and expressions 
common in A. H.. The edition of J. A. Robinson (p. 76), for example, 
notes the striking parallels between Dem. 7 and portions of A. H.. 
To illustrate the relative clarity and systematic precision of the 
Demonstration, we may compare an extract from A. H. IV. 20.7 'And for 
this reason did the Word become the dispenser of the paternal grace 
for the benefit of men, for whom He made such great dispensations, 
revealing God indeed to men, but presenting man to God'. The thought 
is the same as in Dem. 7 but the trinitarian structure, while explicitly 
present in IV. 20 on several occasions, could be exhibited with greater 
systematic care. Cf. IV. 14.2.. 
122. We will consider this question further in later chapters. At 
this stage it will suffice to point out that Irenaeus gives more 
prominence than do the New Testament writers to the Old Testament 
teaching on the activity of God in the wider sphere of the created 
world, but, in common with the New Testament, Irenaeus' greatest 
emphasis is upon the new order that the coming of Christ and the Spirit 
has inaugurated. 
170 
123. New Testament specialists, in particular, bave too readily 
attempted either to prove or to disprove the attestation of 'pre- 
existence' in a given passage. Although in many ways a most 
scholarly work, James Dunn's Christology in the Making largely 
identifies 'Incarnation' in texts by the claimed presence of 
'pre-existence'; it is true that he refers (p. 9) to the danger of 
beginning with definitions of pre-existence and incarnation, but 
he offers no discussion of the different possible conceptions of 
time and eternity which in large measure determine the senses given 
to pre-existence and incarnation. In particular, he does not remark 
upon the interesting - and suggestive - fact that the noun -rrpoLmokpý,. S 
and its cognates occurs only once in the New Testament, and that not 
in the prologue to the Gospel of John but in the unpromising context 
of Luke 23: 12i'And Herod and Pilate became friends with each other 
that very day, for before this they had been at enmity with each otherý 
This in itself should warn us that any concept of pre-existence to be 
identified in the New Testament is likely to be subtle and unusual. 
(cf. the remarks of D. M. MacKinnon in his review of Dunn's book, 
S. J. T. 135 (1982) p. 364). 
Systematic theologians hiave been more likely to identify the depth 
of the difficulties which beckon here. Among recent authors, James 
Mackey (The Christian Experience of God as Trinity, ch. 6, 'The 
problem of the Pre-Existence of the Son') has given special emphasis 
to the enigmatic character of the language of pre-existence. This is 
a useful corrective, and his attack upon Martin Hengells argument in 
his Son of God (E. T., London: S. C. M., 1976) is effective. But to 
label any notion of pre-existenceas--merely speculative (p. 64), as 
if all that mattered was the historical Jesus(another tortuous concept 
requiring careful definition), surely obscures the intention of the 
New Testament texts, which certainly indicate something along the lines 
of pre-existence (cf. the conclusion of the review of Mackey's earlier 
Jesus, the Man and the Myth, (London: S. C. M., 1979), by James Dunn, 
(Theology, 83 (1980) p. 293f. ): 'The main defect is a New Testament 
exegesis in which selectivity and special pleading determine the 
results .... the construction of the systematic theologian shows 
itself 
to have exegetical feet of clay. ') The particular feet used in the 
discussion of pre-existence in the latter book are provided by Harnack 
(p. 51) and Kant (p. 63), and they strongly influence the view taken of 
any association of 'pre-existence' with the historical Jesus. 
These contrasting examples of the contributions of prominent biblical 
and dogmatic scholars to the recent discussion of 'pre-existence' 
illustrate the complexities which attend this subject. ' 
124. Many authorities could be cited here. From rather different, 
but influential, philosophical camps, I choose Augustine and Hume. ' 
Augustine puzzles at length (Confessions XI) over the 'most entangled. 
enigma' of time, circling around an almost mystical sense of the 
present moment as the central reality - in a manner which echoes, if 
distantly, the reflections upon the subjpct stimulated by modern Physics. 
Interestingly enough, the same maybe said of Hume's claim (An Enquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Selby-Bigge and Niddit-cý, (O. U. P.: 
1975), p. 156) that, I The chief objection against all abstract reasonings 
is derived from the ideas of space and time: ideas which, in common 
life and to careless view, are very clear and intelligible, but when 
they pass through the scrutiny of the profound sciences (and they are 
the chief object of these sciences) afford principles, which seem full 
of absurdity and contradition. 1 Both of these classic thinkers point 
to an inextricable and mysterious connection of time with experienced 
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reality, a connection which the 'profound sciekices' have indeed exposed 
in this century. However, although clarified, the mysterious and 
paradoxical nature of space, andtime has not been explained. A. C. Ewing 
warns the enquirer (The Fundamental Questions of Philosophy, (London: 
R. K. P., 1951), p. 143) that, 'the subject is far too difficult for any- 
thing faintly approaching adequate treatment to be possible in an 
elementary work onýphilosophyl. This is to leave aside the associated 
problem of eternity, which is closely related to a concept of God. 
125. An insufficiently clear recognition of this has marred much of 
the modern debate about the biblical concept - or concepts - of time, 
and led to an exegesis which has been too selective. This point was 
forcefully made by James Barr (Biblical Words for Time, S. C. M., 1962, 
developing views expressed in The Semantics of Biblical Language, O. U. P., 
1961) in relation to the works of Cullmann, Marsh and Robinson. This 
debate merged with the wider discussion of the theology of, the Old 
Testament, and in particular the concept, of revelation in history. But 
in the Old Testament, as is now widely accepted, there is the claim that 
God acts both in history and in His continual blessing of creation, and 
any attempt to divorce linear from cyclical time will result in severe 
exegetical problems. Barr has rightly exposed the dangers of basing 
exegesis upon supposed contrasts between Greek and Hebrew thought, 
which are supported by strained lexicographical arguments, and he has 
recognised 'the prominence of philosophical-theological considerations, 
bothdnthe posing of the problems about time and the solutions offered' 
(P. 151). However, he offers no contribution on the level he commends, 
and here, at least (as he recognises, p. 44), Marsh has made an interesting 
contribution (The-Fulness of Time, London: Nisbet, 1952). 
126. Thus, in a curious manner, the modern confusion between God and 
the world has developed, because the concept of the 'absolute, is 
surrogate for that of the 'divine'. Yet the idealist and romantic 
response to Deism ensured that the confusion is more that between God 
and man, than between God and nature. Thus caught between materialistic 
and idealistic conceptions of himself, it is little wonder, in the face 
of manifest evils, that the modern experience of the meaninglessness 
of existence has developed pari passu. 
127. In response to the Gnostic form of argument from creation to 
God, wherein words and numbers were held to contain secret symbolism 
of the Pleroma, Irenaeus makes an analogous claim: 'A system does not 
spring out of numbers, but numbers from a system; nor does God derive 
His being from things made, but things made from God' (11.25.1). 
128. The two occasions where he uses the word 'pre-exist', without 
qualification, of the Son are in Dem. 30 and 51. Of-course we have 
here only an Armenian translation, but the English and French 
editors are unanimous that this is the correct translation. As 
remarked earlier, this work was probably written after the heat of 
the Gnostic controversy had. cooled somewhat, at least in the Western 
Mediterranean, and in the compact credal statements of the Demonstration 
Irenaeus may have felt willing to use the language of pre-existence 
without danger of the misunderstanding of the term in a Gnostic 
direction. On the other hand, the dependence of the Demonstration upon 
Justin has been shown to be very likely (the notes to the edition of 
Armitage Robinson emphasise this), and Irenaeus may simply have been 
172 
prepared to take over the exegesis of Old Testamýnt testimonia, 
which included an emphasis upon the 'pre-existence' of the Son, 
which Justin had provided ready at hand. 
129. The supreme Aeon is thus most pre-existent: 'They maintain, 
then, that in the invisible and ineffable heights above there exists 
a certain perfect, pre-existent Aeon ..... Eternal and unbegottýen, he 
remained throughout innumerable cycles of ages in profound serenity 
and quiescence I (1.1.1) . For degrees of pre-existence and honour, 
see 11.4.1. 
130. We can see the influence of this belief in Justin Martyr. In 
his Apologies there is the appeal to analogies and parallels to 
Christian belief in ancient writers, and a rather disproportionate 
appeal to prophecy. In the Dialogue the appeal to heathen writers 
is understandably reduced in favour of an even greater reliance upon 
the argument from the fulfilment of prophecy. That this involved a 
corresponding emphasis upon a rather rationalistic concept of pre- 
existence, timeless precisely because of the need to fit it into 
a linear concept of worldly time, is discussed in Appendix A. It is 
interesting, however, to see how Trypho accepts this concept of pre- 
existence without too much difficulty, even though it involves a 
considerable modification to the late Jewish belief inthe-, pre-existence 
of the Torah (among other things), but cannot understand how it could 
cohere with the birth or baptism of Jesus. For the former, see Dial. 
78: 'And Trypho said, "You endeavour to prove an incredible and well- 
nigh. impossible thing; (namely) that God endured to be born and 
become man". ' Justin accepts that the reasonableness of this cannot 
be demonstrated except by the weight of prophecy which could be brought 
to bear. 
For the latter, see Dial. 87: 'How can He be demonstrated to have 
been pre-existent, who is filled with the powers of the Holy Ghost, 
which the Scripture by Isaiah enumerates, as if He. were in lack of 
them? Justin acknowledges the acuteness of Trypho's point and, 
missing the connection between the Holy Spirit and the humanity of 
Christ, makes no effective reply. 
131. Perhaps this is why Marcion, for all his subtlety and simplicity, 
never had wide popular appeal-. 
132. For some remarks upon Justin's concept of the pre-existence of 
Christ, see Appendix A. For a fuller account, see Trakatellis, op. cit., 
passim. ý 
133. The'former point is obvious from the passage: there is no hint 
of any ontological relation between the generation of the Son and 
creation. The latter point is made in several ways here. Firstly, 
Irenaeus simply maintains that the Word was always present with man- 
kind, preferring this to the partial presence of the XOYOs O'w6p)-r'I4*S . 
Secondly, the mediation of the Wordih creation is stated whereas 
Justin, as we saw, avoids this idea. Thirdly, there is the Adam-Christ 
typology. All three of these themes are constantly repeated by Irenaeus, 
whereas they are either incidental. or qualified in Justin. 
134. A similar view of Christ as the Imi. d-point I of time is found in 
0. Cullmannt Christ and Time, (E. T., London: S. C. M, 1951). 
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135. See Wingren, op. cit. , p. 92f. for various references. 
136. The only use of this word in A. H.. - 
137. Editors and translators have evidently puzzled long over this 
paragraph, the nineteenth-century Scottish translators of the Ante- 
Nicene Christian Library claiming that, ' It is very difficult to follow 
the reasoning of Irenaeus in this passage I. The Latin of the essential 
part is as follows: Et propter hoc lex eam quae desponsata erat viro, 
licet virgo sit adhuc , uxorem eius qui desponsaverat vocat, 
eam quae est a Maria in Evam recirculationem significans: quia non 
aliter quod colligatum est solveretur , nisi ipsae compagines 
alligationis reflectantur retrorsus; utiprimae conjunction2s solvantur 
per secundas, secundae rursus liberent primas. Yet ifone reads this 
as part of Irenaeus' attempt to replace a linear sense of time by one 
which is strictly christocentric, the passage does not seem problematic. 
Thus Keble, who translated A. H. for A Library of Fathers, renders the 
passage smoothly and withouý comment * Irenaeus emphasises this under- 
standing in the sentences which immediately follow: 'And on this 
account the Lord said, "The last indeed shall be first, and first last" 
.... For our Lord being born, the First-born of the dead, and receiving 
the old Fathers into His bosom, regenerated them to the life of God: 
becoming Himself the beginning of those that live, because Adam became 
the beginning of the dying'. 
138. Earlier in A. H. Irenaeus is at pains to maintain the unity of 
God and His will ad extra. We simply have to accept that, 'The advent 
of the Son of God took place in these last times, that is, in the end, 
rather than the beginning' (1.10.3), trusting the wisdom of 'one and 
the same God'. Furthermore, with God thought and action coincide, so 
that, 'as soon as God formed a conception in His mind, that was also 
done which He had thus mentally conceived', which, for Irenaeus, means 
that for the Gnostics, 'to affirm that what was mentally conceived and 
pre-created (praeformatum) by the Father of all, just as it has been 
actually formed, is the fruit of a defect, and the production of 
ignorance, is to be guilty of great blasphemy' (11.3.2). 
139. A point brought out by J. A. Lyons, The Cosmic Christ in Origen 
and Teilhard de Chardin: A comparative_Study, (O. U. P.: 1982) 
140. This concept of 'the redeemed time of the incarnate Christ, 
might be regarded as an explication of the concept of 'divine motion' 
proposed by T. Pierce, op. cit.. 
141. To choose a central example, Romans 8: 11, 'If the Spirit of Him 
who raised Jesus from the dead dwells in you, He who raised Christ 
Jesus from the dead will give life to your mortal bodies also through 
his Spirit which dwells in you'. 
142. The central role given by Irenaeus to the Holy Spirit in mediating 
and revealipgthe presence of God to creation has been emphasised recently 
by R. Tremblay, La Manifestation et la vision de Dieu selon saint Irenee 
de Lyon, ( MUnster: 1978) 
143. Irenaeus' eschatology is not without its problems, as we shall 
see in Chapter Five, but we pass over these for the present. 
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144. A question, nevertheless, which E. P. Meijering, God Being 
History, p. 74, has pressed, charging Irenaeus with an 'apparent 
contradicticn`j which I is either caused by the fact that Irenaeus 
repeatedly argues ad hoc, or can perhaps be harmonized into the 
view that, according to Irenaeus, Pagans could have known that 
there is one God who is the Creator. That they in fact refused 
to acknowledge this makes the Christian doctrine new to them, that 
they had the possibility, to know it makes the Christain doctrine 
not entirely new to them. I But is either suggestion convincing? 
Is the solution not in Irenaeus' christocentric view of time? 
145.1 would wish to suggest that Irenaeus is primarily guided by 
certain passages in the New Testament which indicate an unusual 
relationship of Jesus Christ to time. For the most part the inter- 
pretation of these passages is controversial and they cannot be 
discussed in detail here. An assessment along lines not wholly 
dissimilar to Irenaeus, but more systematic and explicit, is found 
in Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, 11.2. pp. 437-511, the greater part 
of which is given to exegesis of the passages I have in mind. A 
similar, if brief, treatment of many of these passages has also 
been given by C. E. B. Cranfield, 'Thoughts on New Testament Eschatology', 
S. J. T., 35 (1982), pp. 497-512. Cranfield's article has the particular 
merit of capturing in the New Testament that combination of the 
eschatological newness and continuity through time of Jesus Christ, 
which we have also identified in Irenaeus. The Irenaean treatment 
of pre-existence is perhaps another area where the influence of 
Johannine theology is evident., , Arguably the theme of the Gospel of 
John is 'the non-historical that makes sense of history, the infinite 
that makes sense of time, God who makes sense of men and is therefore 
their saviour'. (E. C. Hoskyns, The Fourth Gospel, Faber & Faber, 
2nd edit. 1947, p. 129f., and ch. 8., 'The Theological Tension of the 
Fourth Gospell, 'passim). The tendency in Irenaeus to see the incarnate 
Chri: 5t as 'pre-existent' corresponds to the 'Before Abraham was, I am' 
of John 8: 58. That Gnostics made considerable use of this Gospel 
would have intensifiedthe pressure upon Irenaeus to integrate its 
themes into his theology. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
DOCTRINE OF CREATION : PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 
Introduction 
The previous chapter began with'the claim that a sense of salvation 
dominated the life and experience of the Church in the 150 years 
which passed before Irenaeus wrote A. H.. The rationale of this 
experience of salvation led to a reconceptualization of God towards 
what was later to be called the doctrine of the Trinity. Yet it would 
be a mistake to overlook the fact that, although much modified in 
content, there was no serious move to qualify the basic tenet of 
monotheism. That this was especially the case with Irenaeus has 
been-argued in the previous two chapters, but he does not stand alone, 
and this central point in his theology undoubtedly refects 'a 
distinctive Asia Minor tradition in Christian theology which is now 
1 largely lost'. 
This strong defence of monotheism almost certainly owes a good deal 
to the Jewish context which is thought to have provided the most 
significant background to the Gospel of John, and probably to other 
writings emerging from the churches of Asia Minor. 
2 Thus, although 
the New Testament concerns itself largely with the salvation brought 
by Christ, to the apparent neglect of the motifs of the doctrine of 
creation, the emerging church could readily expand the New Testament 
theme of creation by reference to the extensive heritage provided 
by the Old Testament. A major stimulus for the development of this 
process was provided by the rise of Gnosticism, but the process itself 
doubtless had a dynamic similar to that which scholars have identified 
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in the Old Testament, where belief in creation apparently arose from 
the experience of salvation. 
3 
In this chapter we will survey some of the basic aspects of Irenaeus, 
approach to the doctrine-of creation. After an account of the Gnostic 
background against which he wrote, we will examine Irenaeus' -attribution 
of creation to the one, supreme God. What was the motive of God, if 
creation is not the accident claimed by Gnostics? Where did the nature 
and pattern come 1from19 If from 'nothing', in the sense that only 
from the will of God, what does this imply about the nature of created 
reality? What distinction is and ought to be made between Creator and 
creation? Our general consideration of these questions will undergird 
the more specific topics in Irenaeus' doctrine of creation which will 
occupy the remainder, of this thesis. 
The Gnostic View of Creation 
A bri&f summary must suffice. 
4 
Although individual Gnostic systems 
differ considerably in detail, the central feature of Gnosticism is 
the belief in a radical dualism that governs the relation between 
God and the world, which in turn, due to the division within man himself 
in Gnostic anthropology, results in a corresponding dualism between man 
and his environment. God is the antithesis of the world and naturally 
remote from it; the world is the work of powers 'beneath' the true 
God, which-, although they may in some manner derive from God, do not 
know Him, and indeed tend to obstruct the transmission of such knowledge 
to others 'lower' down theFscale of reality. 
The existence of this chasm between the supreme deity and the world 
provides scope for the speculation concerning the intermediate levels 
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of being and beings which characterises Gnosticism. These 
speculations can take quite differentýforms (as Irenaeus delights 
to point out 
5 ), but uniting them is a view of the universe akin 
to a vast prison whose innermost dungeon is the earth. ' Around and 
above it the cosmic. spheres are ranged like concentric enclosing 
shells - up to 365 in the case of Basilides. 
6 Man is thus separated 
from God both by vast physical distance, and also by the action of 
the misguided or demonic powers who guard the movement from one sphere 
to another. These factors combine in a determinist concept of fate, 
to which we will return when we consider the teaching of Irenaeus on 
the freedom of the will. 
Although he describes various schools and branches of Gnosticism, 
Irenaeus gave most attention to Valentinianism, especially as 
interpreted and developed by Ptolemaeus and Marcus. 
7 In this system 
the act of creation is an indirect and unintentional consequence of 
the error of the lowest Aeon, Sophia, inpassionately seeking to know 
the supreme God (Bythus). She was restrained by the limiting power 
( 6uvo(, Ký. 5 = virtus , not one of the 30 Aeons) Horos, which supports L-r- 
everything outside of, and prevents encroachment upon, the unspeakable 
and unknowable Bythus. 
8 Two of the alternative names for Horos are 
especially significantz Stauros (cross; also stake, indicating the 
confining, limiting function of Horos), and Lytrotes (redeemer). Thus 
there is here the idea that Sophia is redeemed, which involved 
separation from her passion. 
9 This is then conceived as an independent 
'spiritual being', but shapeless and without form, a quasi-Aeon but 
no more (1.2.4). She is called Achamoth (from the Hebrew chockmah, 
wisdom) and suffered much passion and perplexity on account of her 
ignorance. This troubled the other Aeons, whoýunited in prayer to 
0 
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Bythos and obtained from him the emanation of a new pair of Aeons, 
Christos and Holy Spirit. Their function is to restore serenity to 
the Pleroma, which in turn requires the control and impartation of form 
to the wandering Achamoth. This impartation of form effectively 
imprisons Achamoth outside the Pleroma, and her passions eventually 
result in definite states of being in the 'created' world. In order 
to give form to these I substances I, Achamoth fashi oned the Demiurge 
from the intermediate ('psychic'-or 'animal') level of existence. It 
was this Demiurge who, in ignorance of Achamoth and the Pleroma, 
separated the substances into their different types, Achamoth secretly 
supplying the sparks of divinity in some men 'through an unspeakable 
providence'. 
10 
The question of the influences upon the rise and development of 
Gnosticism has been the subject of a lengthy and continuing debate, 
which has been complicated by the unpredictable syncretism characteristic 
of Gnosticism. In relation to the Valentinian cosmology outlined 
above, some. connection with Platonism is generally agreed. Jonas 
acknowledges a formal debt, but argues that a 'vast gulf' separates 
the spirit of Valentinianism from Plato. More recently J. Dillon 
12 
has shown both how certain interpretations of Plato in Middle Platonism 
came close, to radical Gnosticism in their valuation of the material 
world and man's position in it, and how the, Valentinian myth of Sophia 
and her offspring the demiurge has at least a partial dependence upon 
the interpretations of Plato in Middle Platonism. 
Some criticism of Dillon's assessment has been offered by R. Van Den 
Broek 13 who stresses the complex and variegated nature of. Gnosticism, 
and asserts that, 'The spirit of Gnosticism cannot be explained from 
ki I 
Platonism nor from any other Greek school of thought'. Neverthelesst 
there is an important sense in which Gnosticism differs from Plato, 
as far as creation, is. concerned, precisely by proposing a solution 
to a problem recognised but left largely open by Plato himself, 
namely the origin of evil. The Gnostics could claim to offer a new 
cosmological explanation of the misery of human existence, 
14 
and an 
avenue of salvation therefrom, without seeming to depart too radically 
from either Greek cosmic religion, the mystery cults, or some strands 
of contemporary Jewish Christianity. 
15 
One of the attractions of Gnosticism was its ability both to recall 
and develop (or distort) other traditions, and this in part accounts 
for its plausibilitywhich, despite its extravagant mythology, even 
Irenaeus is forced to acknowledge. 
16 The challenge is thus issued: 
how is catholic Christianity to defend its commitment to the reality 
and goodness of creation without compromising the mystery of redemption? 
God the Creator 
However the details might vary, Gnostics agreed that creation was an 
accident emanting directly or indirectly from someone, other than the 
supreme God, who was also the product of an accident. 
17 Irenaeus 
argues strenuously against both mishaps: the supreme God is the creator, 
and creation is carefully planned and executed. Perhaps even the 
expression 'the supreme God is the creator' might bp- misleading unless 
it is understood that the converse is equally true, that the creator 
is the supreme God. For Irenaeus, as we saw when we considered aspects 
of his doctrine of the Trinity, primarily works towards an understanding 
of God from His revealed activity in creation and redemption. This is 
the reason for his extensive exegesis of Scripture to defend the unity 
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of God, and of*creation and redemption as the works of the one God, 
which occupies much of Books Three to Five of A. H. . Book Three opens 
with the statement that the various apostolic authors 
-- have all declared to us that there is 
one God, creator of heaven and earth, 
announced by the law and Prophets. (111.1.2) 
Book Four,. -. continues to defend the attribution of creation to the one 
and only God, but develops the argument by attempting to forge a 
close link between creation and redemption: 
This, then, is the aim of him who envies our 
life, to render men disbelievers in their own 
salvation, and blasphemous against God the 
creator. For whatsoever all the heretics may 
have advanced with the utmost solemnity, they 
come to this at last, that they blaspheme the 
Creator, and disallow the salvation of God's 
workmanship, which the flesh truly is .... (IV. praef. 4. ) 
In Book Five the linkbetween creation and redempLt-lLonis expressed even 
more emphatically; not only is God the creator, but He also came to 
share and experience our created existence: 
..... our Lord Jesus Christ, who did, through His 
transcendent love, become what we are, that He 
might bring us to be even what He is Himself. 
(V. Praef. ) 
Towards the end of this chapter we will consider whether the close 
relation drawn between creation and redemption was at the expense of 
the assumption of the former into the latter. For the moment we should 
emphasise that Irenaeus, although he gives the existence of the Saviour 
a priority over the existence of the creation that is to be saved, 
is 
nevertheless is careful to give a full appreciation of creation a 
position of first importance in his refutation of the Gnostic heresy: 
It is proper, then that I should begin with the 
first and most important head, that is God the 
creator, who made the heaven and the earth, and 
all things that are therein.... (II. 1.1) 
Irenaeus concludes his arguments in Book Two with an extensive 'hymn' 
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to God the creator, from which only a short extract will be quoted: 
.... He is discovered to be the one only God who created 
all things, who alone is omnipotent, and who is the only 
Father founding and forming all things .... He is the Former, 
He is the Builder, He the Inventor ..... He is Father, He is 
God, He the Founder, He the Maker, He the Creator... (11.30.9) 
Irenaeus' belief-- that the doctrine of 'God the creator' was the 
'first and most important head'. of the theology from which Gnosticism 
was to be subject to 'exposure and subversion' (detectio et eversio, 
II. praef. 2), is further illustrated by his claim that successful 
refutation of error at this point would provide the key to the over- 
throw of every kind of heresy: 
For they who duly dispute with these, dispute with all 
who have bad views: and the refuters of these refute 
every heresy. 
For no creed is so blasphemous as theirs, since they 
maintain that the Maker and Former, who is one God,, as 
we have shown, was produced from a defect and apostasy. 
(IV. praef. 2f. ) 
Given this affirmation that the supreme (and only)God is the Creator 
is a corner-stone, arguably even the keystone, of Irenaeus', theology 
as received and developed from the tradition, it is interesting to 
notice that Irenaeus is not unwilling to offer a philosophical defence 
of his credal viewpoint. 
19 A major target is the sharp and spatially 
conceived dualism, between the supreme God and the world. I have 
already drawn attention to Irenaeus' theological critique of the 
limitation of power and goodness which the Gnostic dualism imposed upon 
the supreme Godbut in addition he subjects the Gnostic account of the 
dualism between God and creation to a searching examination., of its 
internal consistency. Throughout Book Two of A. H. Irenaeus repeatedly 
argues , from the presuppositions of Gnostic theology to expose its 
irW, ansistency- and implied or open absurdity. A good example of this 
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procedure is provided by the analysis of the central claim of Ignosis': 
And that they are the truly 'spiritual', inasmuch as 
a certain particle of the Father of the universe has 
been deposited in their souls, since, according to 
their assertions, they have souls formed of the same 
substance as the Demiurge himself, yet that he, 
although he received from the Mother, once for all, 
the whole (of the divine) seed, and possessed it in 
himself, still remained of an animal nature, and had 
not the slightest understanding of those things which 
are above, which things they boast that they themselves 
understand, while they are still on earth; - does not 
this crown all possible absurdity? For to imagine that 
the very same seed conveyed knowledge and perfection 
to the souls of these men, while it only gave rise to 
ignorance in the 'God' who made them, is an opinion 
that can be held only by those utterly frantic, and 
totally destitute of common sense. (11.19.3) 
By this and many analogous arguments Irenaeus identifies a central 
weakness of the Gnostic systems. How can the Gnostics claim to know 
that which they profess to be unknowable? Having asserted that there 
is a radical gulf between the supreme God and created things, they 
generate a speculative mythology of emanated Aeons and deposited 
seeds of spirit in order to bridge the dualism. 
I 
Further aspects of Irenaeus: 1 arguments in Book Two will come into 
focus as we explore the doctrine of creation involving a God who is 
not separated from his world, which Irenaeus maintains and develops 
in response to Gnosticism. For the present, we should note that in 
defending the belief that the supreme God is the creator, Irenaeus 
uses a combination of exegetical and philosophical arguments. 
20 This 
interesting juxtaposition of theological methods has provoked a 
continuing debate over the relative priority which Irenaeus grants to 
each. To a considerable extent the questions here have been framed in 
accordance with theýdistinction between revealed and natural theology, 
which, admittedly in varying forms, has been a commonplace of much 
Roman Catholic and Protestant theology. 
21 
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Commentators have given different assessments of the relative 
importance which Irenaeus ascribes to each side of his theology at 
this point, the modern tendency being to give more emphasis to the 
'philosophical' element in his method, 
22 but it is better to look 
behind the loaded form in which the question has often been put, 
and to ask whether the two approaches to the doctrine of I God the creator 
are not combined yet differentiated precisely in the doctrine of 
creation, arguably neglected in Western theology, which Irenaeus defends 
and develops? The close connection between 'natural' and 'revealed' 
theology which Irenaeus asserts on the basis of his doctrine of 
creation is well illustrated by the following extracts: 
A sound mind .... will eagerly meditate upon those things 
which God has placed within the power of mankind, and has 
subjected to our knowledge., .... by means of daily study. 
These things are, partly, such as fall under our very 
sight, and partly such as are openly and unambiguously 
in express terms set forth in the sacredý scriptures. (11.27.1) 
Since, therefore, the entire Scriptures .... proclaim that 
one only God, to the exclusion of all others, formed all 
things by His'.. 'Word...,. as-, I-have,: lshown from the very words 
of Scripture; and since the very system of creation to 
which we belong testifies, by-. what falls under Qurnotice, 
that one Being made and governs it, - those persons will 
seem truly foolish who blind their eyes to such a clear 
demonstration ..... (11.27.2) 
There is an interesting co-ordination here between 'natural' and 
'revealed' theology. Since, for Irenaeus, Jesus Christ is the 
revelation of the Creator, we cannot deny that outside of His human 
history there is evidence of the Father's creative will. That is to 
say, if Jesus Christ is the key to the understanding of the world, the 
world provides an appropriate keyhol6. Perhaps only a Christian can 
perceive this, and hence there is a polemic in A. H., against a direct 
use of philosophy by heretics, but secular misunderstanding of the 
revelation of God in creation is not the same as an absence of under- 
standing. 
184- 
God the creator, by his sovereign and therefore inexpressible 
power, reveals Himself in the history of salvation, the oLkov, ý"L. -6t_ 
and thereby reveals that He is the source of a good, beneficial 
creation which is well adapted to host the progressive revelation 
of God. But this harmonious and well adapted creation is also 
able to testify for itself to its creator to those who have eyes 
to see, and in this way provides powerful evidence in support of 
the claims of Scripture. 
23 The place of reason is not denied, 
because God is the creator of human beings and their faculties, 
but this place is guaranteed only ,, 
by the God who contains and fills 
all things. Irenaeus is unwilling to grant a place to human reason 
as a phenomenon or faculty which can act independently of God to 
supply or validate knowledge of Him, for the principle 'by God alone 
24 
may God be known' cannot be evaddd-'. 
The close relationship which Irenaeus posits between 'natural' and 
'revealed' knowledge, to use categories which, as we have seen, are 
at least to some extent alien to him, arguably throws an interesting 
light upon a feature of his theology which has concerned many writers; 
the imprecision with which he often uses his terminology. R. A. Norris, 
a perceptive and sympathetic Irenaean scholar, has written: 
While Irenaeus is quick to take over words and ideas from 
other people, he is equally quick to employ them in expanded 
or contracted, or slightly skew senses. One cannot often 
gather what Ireaneus means by understanding what his 'source' 
meant in the same sort of language. His use of 
and its derivatives is a shining example of this type of 
procedure; and indeed so is the content of the concept of 
, YCV6CrjS as 
he develops-At in A. H. IV. 38.1. The fact is 
that Irenaeus is not always very good at accurate use of 
someone else's ideas. He garners and employs notions for 
what they mean to him, or what he can make of them. 
(! The Transcendence and Freedom of God'., op. cit., p. 92f. ) 
Iss 
Norris' observation is accurate in so far as it goes, but is in 
danger of missing an important point, because he does not discuss 
the possible reasons for Ireaneus' unusual method. It seems to the 
present writer that it is Irenaeus' strong affirmation of a doctrine 
of creation, involving the intimate presence of God to. created reality, 
which impels him both to take over without scruples elements of secular 
or non-Christian learning while adapting them freely to his own purposes, 
which are, he believes, the true purpose of the Creator who bears the 
ownership of all truth. Irenaeus' free adaptation of established 
concepts and terminology does not erect a 'smoke-screen' (Norrip, ibid., 
P. 93) to a proper appreciation of this theology; rather this illustrates 
the centrality of his use of the motif of creation, and a feature of 
his doctrine of creation itself. 
Confirmation and illustration of this is provided by Irenaeus when, in 
replying to the Marcionite argument that the God of the Old Testament 
directed the people of Israel to pillage the goods of the Egyptians, 
and thus particlpate. inunrighteousness, 
25 
he defends both the action 
of the ancient Israelites and also the Christian use of possessions 
acquired by the processes of secular life: 
For from what source do we derive the houses in which we 
dwell, the garments in which we are clothed, the vessels 
which we use, and everything else ministering to our 
everyday life, unless it be from those things which, when 
we were Gentiles, we acquired by avarice, 
or received them from our heathen parents, relations, or 
friends who unrighteously obtained them? - not to mention 
that even now we acquire such things when we are in the 
faith. For who is there that sells, and does not wish to 
make a profit from him who buys? ..... (IV. 30.1) 
Irenaeus is not offering here a naive defence of capitalism, as 
he shows in the continuation of the argument. The Israelites did 
not engage in a total plunder of the Egyptians, but acted within the 
IS6 
limits of natural justice (IV. 30.2). It is much the same with the 
Roman Empire; although his predecessor and other Christians at Lyons 
had been unjustly martyred, Irenaeus acknowledges the hand of God in 
the role of the Roman rulers in guaranteeing peace and freedom of 
safe travel (IV. 30.3). This is not to whitewash the dark reality of 
sin, but to acknowledge the power and presence of the creator: 
Not of course that we rebuke not sinners, nor that we 
should-consent to those who act wickedly; but we should 
not pronouce an unfair judgement on the dispensations 
of God, inasmuch as He has Himself made provision that 
all things shall turn out for good, in a way consistent 
with justice. (IV. 30.3). 
Christian use of the 'mammon of unrighteousness' 
26 
is thus no licence 
for selfishness, but an opportunity to use created things in the 
27 
service of God , as Irenaeus illustrates by quoting appropriate verses 
28 
from the Gospels . Resources of questionable origin are thus used, 
because the world is not alien to God, 'to the Lord's advantage' (IV. 30.3). 
Irenaeus' approach to secular learning is rather similar, and in both 
cases the languages of creatiqn and redemption are held closely together: 
And we are proved to be righteous by whatsoever we do well, 
redeeming, as it were, our property from strange hands. But 
thus do I say, 'from strange hands, ' not as if the world 
were alien to God, but that we have gifts of this sort, and 
receive them from others, in the same way as these men had 
them from the Egyptians who knew not God..... (IV. 30.3) 
The Motive for Creation 
29 
If Irenaeus was concerned to establish an orthodox alternative to the 
alleged Gnostic blasphemy against the Creator implied in the assertion 
that creation is the accidental result, of a 'defect', there is little 
evidence that he was tempted to embrace the 'cosmic religion' which 
had developed in varying ways in the Greek tradition, and which in some 
respects, at least, occupied the opposite extreme to Gnosticism. 
30 it 
VB7 
was in the context of, and in dialogue with, these divergent lines 
of thought that the early Christian doctrine of creation was developed 
and expounded. For Irenaeus creation is neither eternal and unchangeable 
as a whole, nor is it necessary to God as a manifestation of His being. 
He is careful to stress that God in no way stands in need of creation, 
either in its existence or in its response to Him pre-eminently, though 
not exclusively, through mankind. If this opposes the necessitarian 
aspect of 'cosmic religion', it also presents a contrast with Gnosticism. 
The lengthy and sometimes rather involved arguments in Book Two of A. H. 
can be reduced to the contention that in. theValentinian system there is 
no God in the strict meaning of the term, but rather groups of Aeons 
with no freedom, who are generated from the incomprehensible and 
unalterable Depth and Silence. The Irenaean emphasis upon the freedom 
and self-sufficiency of God is developed in opposition to these ideas, 
as he argues with particular force when expounding his understanding 
of the eucharist in A. H. IV. 15-18.31 
Irenaeus begins by discussing the role of ordinances and sacrifices 
under the old covenant. These were laid down by God to prepare mankind 
for the greater experience of salvation which was to come under the new 
covenant. As such their purpose was to educate and discipline the 
people of the old covenant. Obedience to the decalogue and the later 
prophetic call for pureness of heart are exalted at the expense of the 
cultic law, which was introduced because of their hardness of heart '(IV. 15). 
God is here pictured as a 'wise artist' (IV. 16.1) who cleverly designed 
and masterminded the ipovement from decalogue to cultic sacrifice to the 
prophetic criticism of sacrifice and the revelation of a new covenant, 
the entire process being for the benefit of man. As a result, the 
change is from the bondage of slavery to the freedom of sonship. 
Ise 
Now these did indeed make man glorious, supplying 
what was wanting to him, namely, the friendship of 
God; but they profited God nothing, for God did not 
stand in need of man's love. For the glory of God 
was wanting to man, which he could obtain in no other 
way than by serving God. (IV. 16.4) 
The context of Book Four, is, in part at least, anti-Marcionite, and 
Irenaeus is careful to avoid seeming to support a radical change 
between the old and new covenants. While the cultic law is abolished, 
the demands of the natural law are increased for Christians. 
These things, therefore, which were given for bondage, 
and. for a sign to them, He cancelled by the new covenant 
of liberty. But He has increased and widened those laws 
which are natural, and noble, and common to all, granting 
to man bounteously and without grudging, by means of 
adoption, to know God the Father, and to love Him with 
the whole heart, and to follow His Word unswervingly while 
they abstain not only from evil deeds, but even from the 
desire after them. But he has also increased the feeling 
of reverence; for sons should have more veneration than 
slaves, and greater love for their father. (IV. 16.5) 
In these chapters Irenaeus presents many Scriptural quotations to 
demonstrate that God does not need sacrifices, but at the same time 
he is careful to emphasise that the increased freedom under the new 
covenant deepens the relation between God and man, andbrings with it 
the need of man to live and act accordingly, to 'serve' and 'venerate' 
God. If He does not seek 'sacrifices and holocausts', this in no way 
reduces the desire of God tocreceive from men 'faith, and obedience, 
and righteousness, because of (propter) their salvation' (IV. 17.4). 
For Irenaeus this intimate relation between God and man in the new 
covenant both explains, and is illustrated by, the true nature of 
the eucharist. 
32 
The-significant thought presented by Irenaeus is that by offering 
bread and wine with the simplicity of a pure heart, we offer to God 
in gratitude the first fruits of His creation. 
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For it behoves us to make an oblation to God, and in 
all things to befound grateful to God our Maker, in 
a pure mind, and in faith without hypocrisy, in well- 
grounded hope, in fervent love, offering the first- 
fruits of His own created things. (IV. 18.4) 
Irenaeus' concern here is in part anti-Gnostic, to use the eucharist 
as an example of a proper appreciation and use of created things. 
33 
Recognition of this motive has tended to defuse the considerable and 
acrimonious debate which, has taken place over the correct text and, 
interpretation of A. H. IV. 18 since the Reformation. Certainly, Irenaeus 
is so careful to oppose the view that mankind should make any offering 
to God save the 'pure sacrifice' of a 'pure consciencel, (IV. 18.3) 
that there is little doubt how far from his mind was the later concept 
of eucharistic sacrifice. 
34 
Yet there is an aspect of his thought at 
this point which bears at least some relation to issues which were to 
come to the fore later in the Pelagian controversy and its medieval 
aftermath. This is well brought out in the paragraph which concludes 
the discussion of the eucharist in Book Four: 
Now we make offering to Him, not as though He stood in 
need of it, but rendering thanks for His gift35, and 
thus sanctifýYing what has been. created. For even as 
God does not need our possessions, so do we need to 
offer something to God; as Solomon says 'He that hath 
pity upon the poor, lendeth to the Lord' (Prov. 19: 17) 
For God, who stands in need of nothing, takes our good 
works to Himself for this purpose, that He may grant us 
a recompense of His own good things, as Our Lord says: 
(Irenaeus quotes the parable of the sheep and goats, 
Matthew 25: 34 ff. ) .... At, therefore, He does not stand in 
need of these (services) yet does desire that we should 
render them f br our own benefit, lest we be unfruitful; 
so did the Word give to the people that very precept as 
to the making of oblations, although He stood in. noneed 
of them, that they might learn to serve God.... (IV. 18.6) 
A certain ambiguity in Irenaeus emerges from these different extracts. 
Is salvation the presupposition of good works, as seems to be implied 
in IV. 17.4, or the reward for good works, as seems to be implied in 
the above extract? If God has no need of man and his sacrifices, as 
110 
Irenaeus frequently states in these chapters, 
36 it would seem that 
one strand of his thought maintained that the achievement of God's 
plan of salvation was dependent upon the 'freedom and power of 
self-government in man' (IV. 15.2). The root of this ambiguity may 
lie in the separation between the mercy and justice of God which was 
discussed in Chapter One, and we will give this further consideration 
in the context of his anthropology and theodicy, but for our present 
purposes we should note that man is drawn intimately into the process 
by which God achieves His purposes in creation and redemption. Thus, 
if 'prior to' creation God stood in no need of creation or man, because 
of His richness and perfection, this does not imply an identical state 
of affairs 'once' God decided to create and redeem. 
37 
The motive of God in creation has thus to be deduced from His whole 
unfolding purpose. As Irenaeus expressed this, the goodness and 
mercy of God who is rich, perfect and in need of nothing, overflows 
in the plan of salvation designed as if by a divine architect. God 
wishes to create those upon whom He could confer His benefits throughout 
the course of creation and redemption. The converse is also stated: 
creation by its very nature is present to God and has a continuous need 
of a correct relation to Him: 
In the beginning, therefore, did God form Adam, not as if 
He stood in need of man, but that He might have (someone) 
upon whom to confer His benefits ...... Nor did He stand in 
need of our service when He ordered us to follow Him; but 
He thus bestowed salvation upon ourselves .... for He is rich, 
perfect and in need of nothing. But for this reason does 
God earnestly seek service from men, in order that, since 
He is good and merciful, He may benefit those who continue 
in His service. For, as much as God is in want of nothing, 
so much does man stand in need of fellowship with God. For 
this is the glory of man, to continue and remain permanently 
in God's service .... Thus-it was too, that God formed man at 
the first, because of his munificence (munificentiam) ... 
He Himself, indeed, having need of nothing, but granting 
communion with Himself to those who stood in need of it, 
IIk 
and sketching out, like an architect, the plan of salvation 
to those that pleased Him ..... Thus, in a variety of ways, 
He adjusted the human race to an agreement with salvation 
.... since the Father is both rich and great. 
(IV. 14.1f. ) 
LaterAn Book Four a clearer distinction between creation and redemption 
is drawn, where creation is seen as 'an attribute of the goodness of 
God', and men are enjoined to 'await the hand of your Maker, who creates 
everything in due time', the goal of the process being 'participation 
in the glory of God' (IV. 39.2). 
38 This differentiation is important, 
but is only made. by Irenaeus within a carefully co-ordinated overall 
conception of the economy of creation and redemption. 
39 
It might be argued, with some justice, that by stating so clearly and 
emphatically that God had no need of man or creation or anything else, 
Irenaeus speculates in an area where clarity, humanly speaking, must 
be bounded and limited by the deep mystery of God. Nygren characterises 
God's motive-forcreation according to Irenaeus as 'unmotivated goodness' 
(op-cit.,, p. 181), butwhile appreciating the truth of this, one cannot 
avoid examining the concept of an unmotivated motivel It is, of course, 
extraordinarily difficult to determine the balance of freedom and 
necessity which, in some form, must inhere in our understanding of God. 
40 
The particular emphasis in Irenaeus upon the fact that God did not need 
to create may reflect his rather unsatisfactory discussion of certain 
aspects of the doctrine of God. For example, he maintains that God 
is 'truly and for ever the same, and always remains the same unchangeable 
Being'. 
41 Although this is clearly directed against the eventful Pleroma 
of Gnosticism, it bears the hallmarks of the Platonic tradition. There 
is a tension here in Irenaeus, for his strong doctrine of incarnation 
implies that history - change - is in at least one sense real for God. 
If God is indeed changeless in His faithfulness and love, His changeless 
197- 
purposes in Jesus Christ, properly conceived and affirmed, would 
seem to embrace change. Furthermore, the very idea of creation 
implies that God wills changes that must surely, in some sense at 
least, affect Him. On occasion Irenaeus raises the question whether 
the revealing activity of God changes Him, 
42 but, emphatically denies 
this. We recall in this context the tensions latent in Irenaeus' 
presentation of God's omnipresence and incomprehensibility; arguably 
in these various areas an aspect of the truth is stated in such a 
manner as to risk compromising another aspect of the same ultimately 
ineffable truth. 43 
The Irenaean stress upon the freedom of God in creating is counter- 
balanced by an emphasis upon His goodwill and mercy in redemption: 
But when this righteousness and love to God had passed 
into oblivion, and become extinct in Egypt, God did 
necessarily, because of His great goodwill to men, reveal 
Himself by a voice, and led the pepple out of Egypt with 
power.... (IV. 16.3) 
To speak of a necessity in the relation of God to creation in this 
context is to risk the opposite error to that whichjexists with 
44 Irenaeus' conception of God's motive inQcreation.. The Old 
Testament can speak of God's compassion upon his suffering people, 
but it can also attribute God's decision to redeem his people to a 
concern for the honour. - of God's holy name. 
45 
We will attempt to shed more light upon the Irenaean understanding 
of freedom and necessity in God, as this affects his doctrine of the 
divine motive for creation, by examining his use of the idea of 
creation out of nothing. 
113 
Creation out of Nothing 
Irenaeus clearly affirms the belief that God created the,,, universe 
out of nothing: 
The rule of truth which we hold is that there is one God 
Almighty, who made all things by His Word, and fashioned 
and formed, out of that which had no existence (fecit ex '6 
eo, quod non erat.... ), all things which exist. (1.22.1) 
It is against the Gnostic conception of God as remote from created 
things, that Irenaeus develops this aspect of his doctrine of creation. 
If God is limited by some other reality, then that befdre which his 
omnipotence and omnipresence is limited, is, in all but name, God. It 
makes little difference to Irenaeus whether matter is the eternal and 
uncreated substratum to creation or whether it resulted from a cosmic 
accident: the point is that in either case our thinking does not 
begin and end with the one supreme God. Indeed, in Gnosticism these 
two concepts of matter interact with each other, the Demiurge fashioning 
matter, which, from his perppective, was pre-existent, 
47 
although from 
the perspective of the supreme God it was the result of an accident or 
defect. Against Gnostic dualism Irenaeus affirms the doctrine of 
creation out of nothing to defend the true divinity of the Creator 
God, as the source of all that exists 'outside' Him. Thus the idea 
of creation3outof nothing is to be closely associated with the arguments 
advanced in Book Two of A. H. against the Gnostic doctrine of God. Irenaeus, 
espousal of this idea sheds light on his development of the doctrine 
of creation, but before we examine this it is necessary to note the need 
for caution. 
In the first place, it is apparent that the idea of creation out of 
nothing was part of the tradition of Christian theology which Irenaeus 
had inherited. This is clear from his interesting quotation from the 
Ili- 
Shepherd of Hermas, which book he regarded as scripture 
48 (scriptura = 
Truly, then, the scripture declared, which says, 'First of all 
believe that there is one God, who has established all things, 
and completed them, and caused that from what had no being, 
all things to come into existence: ' He who contains all things, 
and is Himself contained by no one. (IV. 20.2) 
In the second place, it should be remarked that although part of the 
tradition, it can hardly be claimed that the idea of creation out of 
nothing was yet well established, let alone in a clearly defined form. 
If it is true that in addition to the Shepherd of Hermas Theophilus 
of Antioch attests the doctrine, 
49 it is also the case that Justin 
So cxIS) 
states that God formed the world out of unformed matter U OPTO'J 
Furthermore, although for centuries it was assumed that the New Testament 
clearly asserted creation out of nothing, 
51 
modern biblical study has 
questioned this and also drawn attention to the ambiguity (or silence) 
of the canonical Old Testament in regard to this subject. 
52 In fact, 
Irenaeus does not appeal to any verses of Scripture to justify his belief 
in creation out of nothing. In this context, it is instructive to 
examine briefly the place of the idea of creation out of nothing in 
the credal summaries provided by Irenaeus and by other early Christian 
writers. 
With Irenaeus there is an ambiguous position: sometimes creation out 
of nothing is attested, sometimes not. Thus, for example, in the credal 
passage in I. 10.1 it is omitted, while the analogous confession in 
1.22.1 (qVoted above) provides a clear reference. Similarly, creation 
out of nothing is found iryDem. 4, but not in Dem. 6. 
It is interesting to note that a similar flexibility is evidenced by 
TertLL111an, who includes the expression ex nihilo 
53 
in oneý, of his 
(qs 
chief references to the rule of faith (De Praescriptione 13), but 
omits this elsewhere. 
54 Denial of creation out of nothing is the 
primary charge which Tertullian brought against Hermogenes (Adv. 
Herm. I), and it is significant that the remainder of his attack 
upon Hermogenes is reminiscent of Book Two of A. H., except that 
Tertullian makes more frequent and specific use of the doctrine of 
creation out of nothing in his arguments. 
55 
The exclusion of a reference to creation out of nothing from the 
developed creeds does not mean that the doctrine was denied in 
orthodox circles: it was present in the tradition, 
56 
although not 
generally discussed in detail. Indeed, it was not until the Fourth 
Lateran Council (1215) that the concept of creationzout of nothing 
was made an 'official' part of Christian dogma. Significantly, it 
was a resurgence of heresies of a Gnostic type with the Bogomiles 
and Cathari that occasioned this aspect of the conciliar definitions. 
The third reason for caution may shed light upon the curious place .;: I 
which the idea of creation out of nothing has occupied in Christian 
tradition. The idea is highly philosophical, a fact of which Irenaeus 
would certain have been, aware, given that the prevailing intellectual 
climate of his day encouraged a certain confusion over the status of 
non-being. Hence, perhaps, an underlying reason for the limited 
attention which he and subsequent patristic tradition was to give it. 
It was appropriate that it was left to the more philosophical atmosphere 
of Medieval theology to find an official place for creation out of 
not ing. 
58 
The underlying issue is the ambiguity of the word 'nothing'. Is it 
an ontological concept? If so, creatio ex nihilo can be linked with 
the Greek princýple ex nihilo nihil fit, and made to support a 
view of the cosmos as unstable (as Ehrhardt and Ford argue). 
59 
On. 1the other hand, if 'non-being' does connote non-existence, the 
interpretation of creatio ex nihilo proceeds more in the direction 
of the Voluntarism of Scotus and Occam, serving to highlight the 
foundational nature of the will of God. In different ways, a 
position at either extreme can tend to deny rationality to creation 
qua creation.. 
These zonsIder-ations may indicate why Irenaeus, although clearly 
embracing the idea of creation out of nothing, handled it with a 
certain reserve. Interpreted one way, the principle ex nihilo nihil 
fit, as a specific instance of the more general rule that like must 
be generatdd, -". from like, 
60 
could be used against the very idea of 
creation; alternatively, it could nourish the notion that created 
reality is unstable. For Irenaeus, with his strong concept of 
creation, the former possibility is excluded, but, as we shall see, 
he does allow this latter idea to influence his view of created reality. 
The problem arises when the affirmation of creation ex nihilo is 
unqualified by other affirmations. While the dogma properly indicates 
the dependence of all created reality upon God, it does not so easily 
indicate the proper independence of creation,, -. and consequent relationship 
between God and creation. With his strong doctrine of the sovereignty 
and self-sufficiency of God, Irenaeus is unwilling to consider the 
possible consequences for God of the act of creation, the admittedly 
mysterious possibility thatin choosing to create, God has chosen to 
limit Himself before, and open His inner being to, the venture of 
creation. The consequential tendency of Irenaeus to see creation as 
inherently unstable precisely because of its close dependence upon 
III 
God, has provoked considerable controversy in the context of his 
theodicy, but in the present chapter we will approach the questions 
raised by examining his understanding of the role of the will of God 
in creation. 
Creation as an Expression of the Will of God 
Earlier we saw that Irenaeus maintained that God was entirely free 
to create or not to create. This presupposes that God has free will, 
analogous to the free will which man has, and Irenaeus states this 
explicitly: 
But because man is possessed of free will from the 
beginning, and God is possessed of free will, in 
whose likeness man was created, advice is always 
given to him to keep fast the good, which thin is 
done by means of obedience to God. (IV. 37.4)6f 
Ar. guably, this close relation between human and divine freedom is 
drawn too quickly and univocally. The will of God is so closely 
bound to the nature of God that it must be shrouded in mystery as we 
contemplate it. The will of God has a holiness which marks it as quite 
different from our own, even if it shares some fundamental character- 
istics. 62 Indeed, other passages indicate that Irenaeus was well aware 
of the need to qualify the analogy between divine and human freedom- 
Three elements in this qualification canbe identified. Firstly, he 
strongly opposes the Gnostic projection upon God of human processes 
of change, and-. asserts an identity between divine will and thought. 
Secondly, he draws attention to the infinitely greater power of the 
divine will, which can create out of nothing (e. g. 11.10.3 f), or 
resurrect bodies (e. g. V. 3.5). Thirdly, he qualifies the sovereign 
power of God by making it a direct expression of the divine goodness 
(e. g. IV. 38.3). 
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These various considerations show that Irenaeus maintained rather a 
tense analogy between divine and human freedom. Up to a point such 
a tension is inevitable, for the intelligýtility of the idea of 
creation must remain for man partial and incomplete. We have no 
experience of absolute creation, and our intellects are obliged to 
grope rather uncertainly, with the help of analogy, to try to frame 
concepts to express the relation of the eternal God to the temporal 
world. The question we must raise in relation to Irenaeus, however, 
is whether he does not tend to draw too univocal an analogy between 
divine and human freedom, and assume in too human a fashion that 
'once upon a time' God decided to create, even if he refuses to 
speculate and appeals to our limited knowledge relating to such 
questions: 
For that this world .... received a beginning in time, 
the Scriptures teach us; but no Scripture reveals 
to us what God was employed about before this event. 
(11.28.3) 
I would suggest that the limitations concern the framework within 
which the question is asked, as much as the answer to the question 
itself. The framework, of course, was to an extent given to the 
theologians of the early church from the surrounding intellectual 
climate, and the particular emphasis upon the fact ýhat God has free 
will is of fundamental importance for Irenaeus, both in his defence 
against Gnosticism, but also in distinguishing his doctrine of God 
from that found in contemporary philosophie sP3- 
The fundamental character of the will of God solves for Irenaeus 
the problem of the infinite regress which resulted from Gnostic 
attempts to bridge the unbridgeable dualism between God and creation, 
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and which was the source of its elaborate mythology. It is no 
accident, therefore, that the more remote from the world God is 
conceived to be, the more extensive the mythological bridge which 
is needed to secure at least a minimal relation between them. This 
was the case with Basilides: 
For it must needs be, eitherthat the intention (of 
creating) dwelt in that God who made the world, so 
that of his own power, and from himself, he obtained 
the model of its formation; or, if any departure is 
made from this being, then there will arise a necessity 
for constantly asking whence there came to that one who 
is above him the configuration of those things which 
have. been made; .... This, difficulty presented itself to 
Basilides after he had utterly missed the truth, and 
was conceiving that, by an infinite succession of those 
beings that were formed from one another, he might 
escape such perplexity.... (II. 16.1f) 
Between God and creation, then, lies a decision and act of the will. 
This decision is not arbitrary but rather gracious and loving, yet 
from our human perspective it is irreducible. 
64 We are faced here 
with the mystery of. why there is a created world at all; with the idea 
of creation which is, from our human perspective, basically unthinkable 
from within the categories of creation itself. Philosophically we 
must admit virtual defeat and a necessary-limitation upon our powers 
of thought. Yet precisely by accepting that the idea of creation is 
fundamentally beyond our powers of analysis, we open ourselves to the 
possibility of an honest recognition that our knowledge of creation 
and the Creator can only be revealed to us. Only a God who is not 
'naturally' conceivable by us can make a unilateral covenant with us. 
Only such a God can stand over against us as a Person facing created 
people, for a personal relationship presupposes a genuine discontinuity. 
Not a gulf which cannot be crossed, as in Gnosticism, but a discontinuity 
which respects the genuine truth of creation, a truth which is as much 
65 
an article of faith as the truth of redemption. 
200 
Against the elitism and anthropomorphism of the Gnostics Irenaeus 
insists upon a basic distinction between God and creation, implied 
in the very idea of creation itself. Created reality, earthly and 
spiritual, is carefully distinguished from the gracious God who 
relates to it in creation and redemption. This relationship is 
asserted in strong terms in order that Irenaeus should not fall back 
towards the Gnostic devaluation of created things, which he is attacking. 
66 
Thus Irenaeus is drawn to develop a concept of nature wherein not only 
is creation not alien to God, it is the very expression of his will. 
Indeed, Irenaeus appears to go so far as to claim that the will of God 
is the substance of created things: 
Or, again if (which is indeed the only true 
supposition, as I have shown by numerous arguments 
of the very clearest nature) He made all things 
freely, and by His own power, and arranged and 67 
completed them, and His will is the substance 
of all things, then He is discovered to be the 
one and only God who created all things, who alone 
is omnipotent, and who is the only Father founding 
and forming all things, visible and invisible .... (11.30.9) 
There are different ways of understanding the complex word 'substance' 
which is introduced here and Irenaeus does not elaborate on what he 
intends. 68 What does seem fairly clear, however, is that he wishes to 
express a close relation between God and the nature of created reality, 
while keeping a basic distinction between them. 
This close relation is explored from the different but related 
perspective of redemption when Irenaeus discusses the resurrection of 
the body in Book Five. Here there is a great stress upon the resurrection 
of the actual flesh of our bodies. The basic argument presented is 
that the omnipotent Creator who gives life to created human bodies 
would have no difficulty in giving eternal life to those same bodies. 
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The point in this context is that life, both temporal and eternal, 
is given directly by the God who has power to created out of nothing: 
For if He does not vivify what is mortal, and does 
not bring back the corruptible to incorruption, He 
is not a God of power .... And surely it is much more 
difficult and incredible, from non-existent bones, 
and nerves, and veins, and the rest of man's 
organisation, to, bripg-it -about 
that all this should 
be, and to make man an animated and rational creature, 
than to reintegrate again that which had been created 
and then afterwards decomposed into earth.... (V. 3.2) 
Here, of course, Irenaeus' opponents would include Platonists as 
well as Gnostics, for the Platonic tradition maintained that eternal 
life cannot'belong to the world of change and variation. A Platonist 
would have reacted with incredulity to such realistic talk of the 
resurrection of the flesh to eternal life. It is interesting to 
see how Irenaeus argues here: his basic appeal is not to a special 
goodness or natural eternity of the body, but to the power of God who 
created the world out of nothing as an act ofHis will, and can therefore 
transform it as He decides. Irenaeus is thus putting forward a 
distinctively Judaeo-Christian concept of the world as neither a 
system which includes God at its highest level of being nor an immutable 
order closed to effective change. Creation is the expression of the 
will of God, and hence the will of God provides the basis from which 
we think out the nature 
69 
of creation. Creation is the expression of 
the will of God, and therefore no aspect of Christian teaching can be 
considered as opposed to the 'nature' of things, be it the goodness 
of creation or the realism of redemption. 
It is not at all easy to be'sure exactly what Irenaeus had in mind 
when he spoke of the will ofGod as the 'substance' of created reality. 
The ambiguity inherent in the term 'substance' is compounded by the 
202- 
unsystematic expression of his thought upon this as upon other matters. 
The idea of the sovereign power of God manifest in the redemption of 
creation, is present. In addition it is relevant to observe that 
for Irenaeus creation comprises two types of created reality, the 
visible and the invisible, as stated in the extract from 11.30.9 
quoted above. 
70 
Immediately prior to the assertion that the will of God is the substance 
of created things, we find an interesting. discussion about the nature 
of heaven. The Gnostic claim was that the Demiurge had created heaven, 
conceived as akin to an upper storey of the material creation, while 
all spiritual beings had been emanated 'by a spiritual, process of 
birth' (11.30.6). Irenaeus accepts that there are indeed two dimensions 
to creation, the visible and the invisible, earth and heaven, and 
therefore agrees at one level with the Gnostic claim that heaven is a 
created reality like earth. Yet heaven presents a mystery to earth, 
and from an earthly perspective must remain incomprehensible apart 
from the revelation given through Scripture or by a special vision. 
71 
The information given through Scripture indicates that the heavenly 
realms are immensely rich and varied in their depth and incomprehen- 
sibility. Irenaeus challenges the Gnostics: 
*- let them inform us what is the nature of ; 
hings invisible, recount the number of Angels, 
and the ranks of the Archangels, reveal the 
mysteries of the Thrones, and teach us the 
differences between the Dominations, Principalities, 
Powers and Virtues. But they can say nothing 
respecting them. (11.30.6) 
To illustrate his views, Irenaeus discusses the passage 2 Corinthians 
12: 2-4 which speaks of St. Paul being caught up in the third heaven, 
his chief point being that even St. Paul was allowed only thus far, 
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there remaining a further four heavens beyond to which he was not 
admitted. Irenaeus is uneasy with the symbolism of the seven heavens 
for, although it - or something akin to it - seems to be assumed 
by St. Paul, he is aware of its ease of adaptation to Gnostic use, 
and refers to it as 'according to their manner of speaking' (11.30.7). 
Earlier (1.5.2) he had noted the doctrine of the seven heavens as 
part of Valentinian belief, the implication being that this was as 
much a part of the fanciful Gnostic mythology as anything else. A 
little later, indeed, he denies along with other aspects of Gnostic 
belief, the existence of 'a series of heavens' (11.30.9). However, 
by the time he wrote the later Demonstration he is prepared to give 
unsolicited approval to a belief in the existence of seven heavens. 
The reasons for this change of mind are not easy to specify and need 
not detain us. 
72 For our present concern we should note that for 
Irenaeus heaven is part of creation, invisible and mysterious, yet 
richly populated and present in a direct manner to our earth, being 
visible at its lowest level. 
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The place of heaven in the thought of Irenaeus, expressing the 
closeness and presence of God to creation as a whole, is further 
illustrated by his associated understanding of angels. There are 
scattered references to angels throughout A. H., but the fullest 
statement concerning them is found in the Demonstration, immediately 
following the description of the seven heavens: 
This God, then is glorified by His Word, who is 
His Son for ever, and by the Holy Spirit, who is 
the Wisdom of the Father of all. And their Powers 
(those of the Word and of Wisdom), which are called 
Cherubim and Seraphim, with unfailing voice glorify 
God, and the entire establishment of heaven gives 
glory to God, the Father of all. He has established 
with the Word the whole world, and angels too are 
included in the world; and to the whole world He has 
given laws, that each one keep to his place and 
overstep not the bound laid down by God, each 
accomplishing the work marked out for him. (Dem. 10) 
Angels are thus part of creation, and are neither emanated inter- 
mediaries between the supreme God and the world, like the Gnostic 
Aeons, nor ('even less) creators of the world, like the Demiurge. 
Rather, the angels minister in two directions, both to God and to the 
world. J. P. Smith has suggested that Irena'eus is here distinguishing 
between two sets and types of angels: those belonging to the 
'establishment of heaven' and those belonging to the 'terrestrial 
regions'. 
74 Such a distinction seems improbable, however, because 
it is not at all clear from the text and would seem to conflict with 
Irenaeus' basic intention which is to express the real presence of 
God to creation. Taken this latter way, the teaching on angels 
strengthens the argument: the very angels who glorify God in His 
presence also administer the world in their appointed way, mediating 
the presence of God by carrying out His will. 
75 
In assessing the relation between heaven and earth, as taught by 
' 76 Irenaeus, we should refer again to his account of the eucharist. 
Set in the context of his defence of the goodness of creation and its 
appropriate participation in redemption, the emphasis is firmly upon 
the distinction, yet closeness of relation, between earth and heaven: 
But our opinion is in accordance with the eucharist, 
and the eucharist in turn establishes our opinion. 
For we offer to Him His own, announcing consistently 
the fellowship and union of the flesh and Spirit. For 
as the bread, which is produced from the earth, when 
it receives the invocation of God, is no longer common 
bread, but the eucharist, consisting of two realities, 
earthly and heavenly; so also our bodies, when they 
receive the eucharist, are no longer corruptible, 
having the hope of the resurrection. (IV. 18.5) 
Discussion of this text and those in Book Five which deal briefly 
with the nature of the eucharist 
77 has tended to concentrate upon the 
meaning of the lepiclesis' which seems to be asserted. 
78 More than 
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one interpretation is doubtless possible, and it is safest to 
endorse the opinion that, 'we simply agree that Irenaeus regarded 
an Ilepiclesis" as "consecratory" and admit that the exact nature 
79 
of the Oepiclesis" remains obscure'. Yet the danger with accepting 
this approach is that by putting too much emphasis upon the effect 
of the lepiclesis' we may overlook the basic thrust of Irenaeus, 
argument, which these passages are designed to illustrate and re- 
inforce, namely that God is present to all His creation in sustaining 
and redemptive power. 
It is as if the very relationship between earth and heaven, which 
was and is close in creation itself, is deepened by the incarnation, 
this increased depth being expressed above all in the eucharist. 
80 
That the understanding of Irenaeus, view of the eucharist should be 
approached in this way, and from the wider context of his understanding 
of the relation between earth and heaven in creation and redemption, 
receives support from some interesting remarks about the altar where 
the eucharist is offered: 
Thus it is, therefore, also His will that we, too, should 
offer a gift at the altar, frequently and without inter- 
mission. The altar, then, is in heaven (for towards that 
place are our prayers and oblations directed); the temple 
likewise (is there), as John says in the Apocalypse, 'And 
the temple of God was opened'; the tabernacle also: 'For, 
behold', he says, 'the tabernacle of God, in which He will 
dwell with men'. 81 (IV. 18.6) 
The-closerelationship between earth and heaven which Irenaeus asserts 
throws some light upon his statement that the will of God is the 
substance of created reality. 
82 Although it has considerable value, 
and recalls such New Testament motifs as the Pauline citizenship of 
heaven, and the Johannine bread from heaven, it must be asked whether 
the relation between heaven and earth is drawn too tightly. It might 
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be suggested that the fundamentally Greek idea that God was in need 
of nothing has been conjoined with the Hebrew idea of the will of God 
as determining reality, the latter thus being given a rather static 
quality. Be that as it may, the emphasis upon the will of God raises 
an important question with which our next section will be concerned: 
given that creation is contingent upon God's will, to what extent is 
it rational qua creation? Does Irenaeus in fact draw too close and 
tight a relationship between God and created reality? 
The Rationality of Creation 
Alongside the claim by Irenaeus that the will. of God is the substance 
of created reality, we must place a claim which sounds more conventional, 
that the will of God governs and rules all things. This claim is 
presented and developed at various points throighout A. H. , but is given 
a particular importance at three junctures. 
The first of these occurs in Book Two. We have already recorded the 
manner in which Irenaeus here uses the concept of the will of God to 
replace the Gnostic mythological regress from creation to supreme God, 
but the concept is also invoked to counter the idea of a natural 
eternity of the soul. 
83 
..... the soul, and the life which it possesses, must be 
understood as being separate existences. When God therefore 
bestows life and perpetual duration, it comes to pass that 
even souls which did not previously exist should henceforth 
endure, since God has both willed that they should exist, 
and should continue in existence. For the will of God ought 
to govern and rule in all things, while all other things 
give way to Him, are in subjection, and devoted to His 
service. (11.34.4. )84 
The second occasion in A. H. where this idea is given a particular 
prominence is in the early part of Book Five, in the defence of the 
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resurrection of the flesh. 
Neither the nature of any created things, therefore, 
nor the weakness of the flesh, can prevail against 
the will of God. For God is not subject to created 
things, but created things to God; and all things 
yield obedience to His will. (V. 5.2)85 
Thirdly, in Book Three, a cluster of references present Christ as 
fulfilling, or carrying out, either the 'will of God' or, 'understandably 
in this context, the 'will of the Father'. Here the execution of the 
will of God is related closely to the divine foreknowledge. 
86 
By which is made manifest, that all things which had 
been foreknown of the Father, our, Lord did accomplish 
in their order, season, and hour, foreknown and fitting, 
being indeed one and the same, but rich and great. For 
He fulfills the bountiful and comprehensive will of His 
Father.... (UI. 16.7) 
The christological intepretation of the will of God, and its 
assimilation to divine foreknowledge, should lead to caution in our 
assessment of the place of the will of God in the contexts of Books 
Two and Five of A. H.. Irenaeus is far from presenting a theology of 
the divine will as naked, blind omnipotence or omnicausality. 
87 His 
strong defence of the freedom of the human will should assure us of 
this. Nevertheless, it is clear that, on the whole, he sees a sharp 
distinction between divine and human freedom, and gives the former a 
scope and power which are altogether more important. The basic question 
raised by the position he appears to adopt concerns the existence and 
reality of such 'secondary'. causes or wills as the human will. What 
place do they have inhisScheme? What, therefore, is the general 
ontological status of created reality as he conceives it? 
There certainly need be no necessary quarrel with the claim that the 
will of God rules and governs the universe, and that all things yield 
208 
in obedience to Him. But qualification and explanation is required 
because such statements could be - and frequently have been - made 
by, for example, Islamic theologians, in the defence of ideas which 
verge suspiciously towards a totalitarian concept of divine power. 
The key question is this: does Irenaeus have an appreciation of what 
was later to be called the 'permissive' will of God? 
88 
To put this 
another way, granted that the will of God provides the ultimate basis 
of allcreated reality, does Irenaeus distinguish sufficiently between 
the actuality and the possibility of events in the sphere of creation? 
89 
Does he distinguish adequately between necessity and contingency in 
the nature of created reality? God wills the origin and preservation 
of creation,. but He does this in order to produce and rule neither an 
extension of Himself nor a reality dualistically opposed to Himself. 
He wills creation in its necessity and contingency, with its divinely 
decreed boundaries and character, but also with its genuine creaturely 
freedom and possibilities. In his eagerness to claim creation for God, 
did Irenaeus over-estimate the balance of necessity as against 
contingency required by a Christian concept of creation? 
90 In claiming 
that God fills all things, is enough space left for creation? 
A doctrine of divine omnivolence needs to be handled with care. If 
God wills the existence of created wills which have the possibility of 
thwarting what might reliably be supposed to be the purpose of the 
divine will, it may well be the case that the divine will both does 
and does not rule, depending upon how the concept of will is defined. 
The divine will may rule in judgement or in salvation, but it will 
operate very differently in each case. Therefore, we need to add the 
qualification that if God wills everything, this is in various 
appropriate ways, with a proper differentiation between them. Anticipating 
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a further discussion of this question when we investigate, in the 
context of anthropology, the Irenaean account of human free will, 
we can say that, the will of God operates differently at different 
levels of creation, with God relating in a different manner to each 
level, might have seemed too similar to the hierarchical, emanationist 
aspect of Gnosticism. 
Irenaeus certainly offers a firm defence of the freedom of the human 
will, as we shall see, but he does not attempt to integrate this side 
of his theology with those areas in which he claims the absolute and 
direct sovereignty of the will of God. Of course, this might be 
regarded as an argument from silence, and in any event it would be 
wrong to expect too much consistency from one who could justly be 
called a theological pioneer, whose almost charismatic lack of a 
neat system is clear to all who study him. Nevertheless, there is 
other evidence that the desire of Irenaeus to posit a close relation 
between God and creation could jeopardise the contingent integrity 
of the latter. 
One example is provided by his limited conception of the boundaries * 
of human knowledge of the world. 
..... many of those things which lie at our very feet (I mean such as belong to this world, which we handle, 
and see, and are in close contact with) transcend our 
knowledge, so that we must leave them to God ..... (Irenaeus cites springs, migration of birds, tides, 
weather, the shape of the moon etc. ) .... On all these 
points we may indeed say a great deal while we search 
into their causes, but God alone who made them can 
declare the truth regarding them. (11.28.2) 
Admittedly, this passage needs to be seen in its context, which is the 
rejection of Gnostic claims to know the inner secrets of the mind behind 
the universe. Just as ourknowledge of nature is properly limited, so 
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is our spiritual knowledge. The limits of our possible knowledge of 
created reality is not the chief question at issue; indeed, Irenaeus 
does not himself devise the list of apparent mysteries in the natural 
world, but takes it from a contemporary philosophical doxography. 
91 
Perhaps he did not think carefully about the implications for the 
metaphysics of creation which such an approach to the intelligibility 
of created reality might imply. But against this we must recognise 
that Irenaeus normally adopted a cautious attitude towards the use of 
the common philosophical opinions of his day, and therefore it is 
reasonable to assume that he endorsed the view of creation presupposed 
and expressed here. 
92 
Two closely related metaphysical problems are raised. Questions are 
placed on the one hand against the ability of man to use his rational, 
enquiring mind to understand the world, and on the other hand against 
the genuine independence of a rational creation from God. That such 
ideas are properly part of the Christian doctrine of creation has 
emerged with some clarity in modern research upon the metaphysical 
and historical foundations of natural science. 
93 A key question posed 
if the basic thesis that the rise of natural science required a Judaeo- 
Christian 94 belief in. creation is accepted, is why did it take so long 
for natural science to develop? I Part of the answer is supplied by the 
attitude of Irenaeus to the phenomena of the physical world: even a 
theologian with a basic suspicion of Greek philosophy could adopt some 
of those ideas from the Greek world of thought which modern research has 
shown to have hindered the development of science. 
95 
Other factors doubtless also helped to delay the rise of modern science. 
The strong if admittedly confused eschatological expectation in the 
Zil 
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early church would have tended to divert attention from a detailed 
quest to understand thenatural world. Similarly, the pursuit of 
salvation might easily have led some Christians to a view that there 
was something impious, in its own way even quasi-Gnostic, in attempting 
to comprehend from, motives of mere intellectual curiosity, a world which 
was believed to be the creation of God. 
96 In addition,. there are a 
host of cultural requirements for the rise of science, and the extent 
to which these were satisfied in the early centuries of the Christian 
era is debatable; 
97 
nevertheless, the intellectual attitude which 
Irenaeus supports would have been most unhelpful. I 
The careful scrutiny of the interaction between religious views of 
creation and the rise of modern science has shown that a delicate 
balance is required between the free and necessary rationality of God; 
tip the balance either way and belief tends towards either an un- 
intelligible or a necessary world - both of which are inimical to tfie 
growth of science. In other words, the doctrine of creation properly 
involves both the absolute dependence of created things on God, and also 
their complete differentiation from Him. Irenaeus' attitude in A. H. II. 28 
and parallel passages suggestseither a divine necessity in the rationality 
of creation which, like the rationality of God Himself, is in significant 
measure mysterious from a human perspective, or an exaggerated contingency, 
which sees the world as it is because God in his inscrutable freedom 
has willed it so. Both interpretations are possible, but the latter is 
perhaps more significant; in fact the two positions can easily reinforce 
each other, an apparently contingent will of God locating in God what 
should properly belong to the world itself. 
98 
Recent scholarly discussion of Irenaeus' approach to the understanding 
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of creation by man has focuse4. on the extent to which he adopts 
an epistemological scepticism as a metaphysica 
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principle. R. M. Grant 
99 
suggested that Irenaeus was inclining towards a basic scepticism in 
his concept of knowledge of nature, and he attempted to trace this to 
Stoic influence. W. R. Schoedel subsequently extended the charge, by 
asserting that Irenaeus 'goes far beyond the Sceptics in using 
; 100 philosophical doubt as a device by which to recommend biblical revelation . 
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W. C. Van Unnik has challenged this interpretation of Irenaeus' 
position. He sees him holding a belief that some things are intelligible 
to man while others are not, this being a differentiation set by God in 
creation at large, rather than fundamentally a limitation in human 
intellectual capability. Just as God reveals enough in Scripture for 
man to attain communion with Him, although man will always have more to 
learn, so it is with his knowledge of creation. 
We may agree with Van Unnik that any apparent scepticism is largely 
incidental and not the point Irenaeus wishes to press. Our interest, 
however, is in the wider metaphysical question of what concept of 
creation is employed by'Irenaeus, and we can see the analysis of all 
three scholars as pointing to an unsatisfactory aspect of his thought 
at this point. In over-emphasising, or, rather, emphasising in the 
wrong sense, the dependence of creation on God, Irenaeus fails sufficiently 
to differentiate Pod from creation. As a result, the proper independence 
of man, within a depp relation of dependence, is compromised. 
102 In 
assessing this aspect of his theology, however, we should bear in mind 
that he is reacting to the Gnostic theory of types and examples, of 
which the world is a poor image, these types and examples being superior 
to the Gnostic Demiurge. Irenaeus claims (11.14.3) that the Gnostics 
'manifestly rehearse' the Platonic doctrine of forms, and it is true 
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that in the Timaeus the Demiurge transforms pre-existent chaotic matter 
according to types outside of him. Yet in Middle Platonism, as in 
Philo, these types or models tend totLeregarded aseternal thoughts of 
the First God. Thus, in different ways, Irenaeus here opposes both 
Middle Platonism, by asserting the unity of the 'supreme' and 'secondary' 
deities, and Gnosticism, by lodging the thought and pattern of creation 
firoly in the free decision of the one God. The very close relation 
posited by Irenaeus may therefore be seen as a result of an over- 
reaction on his part to emphases in contemporary culture. 
Another indication that Irenaeus could tend to compromise the proper 
created, contingent rationality of the world is provided by his 
occasional references to magic. On a number of occasions he claims 
that the Gnostics (or at least some of them) practised magic. To a 
considerable extent Irenaeus believed that clever deception was involved, 
but he leaves open the possibility that 'actual' magic has occurred at 
their hands. 103 By contrast, Irenaeus claims, orthodox Christians have 
'often' performed miraculous bodily cures and, 'when the occasion has 
demanded', there have also be resuscitations of the dead. 
104 The logic 
of his comparison with contemporary Gnostics clearly requires us to 
interpret Irenaeus as claiming that these things were continuing to 
happen in his day. 
105 
Away from the context of immediate anti-Gnostic polemic, Irenaeus makes 
two further referenc e3to magic, and on both occasions 'magic' refers 
to actual unexpected physical events. The first of these occurs when he 
is discussing the hardening of Pharaoh's heart, a subject dear to 
Marcion's heart.. What is interesting is the way Irenaeus seems to' 
describe magic as a feature of nature: 
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And for the reason that the Lord spake in parables, 
and brought blindness upon Israel, that seeing they 
might not see, since He knew the unbelief in them, 
for the same reason did He harden Pharaoh's heart; 
in order that, while seeing that it was the finger 
of God which led forth the people, he might not 
believe, but be precipitated into a sea of unbelief, 
resting in the notion that the exit- of these (Israelites) 
was accomplished by magical power, and that it was not 
by the power of God that the Red Sea afforded a passage 
to the people', but that this occurred by merely natural 
causes (sed naturaliter sic se habere). (IV. 29.2) 
The second instance occurs in the apocalyptic conclusion of A. H. 
where, under the inspiration of the Book of Revelation, Irenaeus 
says of Antichrist: 
He shall perform great wonders, so that he can even 
cause fire to descend from heaven upon the earth*in 
the sight of men, and he shall lead the inhabitants 
of earth astray. Let no one imagine that he performs 
these wonders by divine power, but by the working of 
magic. And we must not be surprised if, since the 
demons and apostate spirits are at his service, he 
through their means performs wonders, by which he leads 
the inhabitants of earth astray. (V. 28.2) 
Although there is a reference forward here, to a future crisis and the 
millennium, frequent referencesto Gnosticism in the final chapters 
of A. H. show that Irenaeus to some extent had in mind the state of 
affairs when he was writing; if Antichrist had not yet come, the 
'demons and apostate spirits' were, in Gnosticism, providing a foretaste. 
These different examples illustrate the residual effect of the 
surrounding culture upon Irenaeus, 
106 but it is also the case that his 
particular employment of the concept of the will of God in determining 
the nature of created reality is conditioned by a polemic which opposes 
Gnosticism at a point where it was itself dependent upon a view of the 
relation between divine and created reality present in contemporary 
thought. Throughout Books One and Two of A. H. there are recurrent 
attacks upon the Gnostic belief that created things were images or 
types of the divine Pleroma; 
107 
we have already outlined this aspect of 
Gnosticism in Chapter One. In the present context we should notice 
z1 
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the lack of freedom in the Gnostic account of creation. As events 
unfold, creation, if -nevertheless the accidental fruit of a def ec t,, occurs 
according to a supposedly inevitable, necessary scheme. 
108 The passion 
of Sophia produced matter; her repentance, soul; and the reception of 
light after her purification, spirit. In order to' preserve some sense 
of purpose and meaning in this process, it was claimed to conform to 
patterns and archetypes located in the Pleroma. The Gnostics 
evidently were prepared to elaborate in considerable detail the created 
types and images of the Pleroma. 
109 For example, number symbolism was 
an important source of alleged parallels between the earthly and divine 
worlds: 
They maintain, then, that first of all the four elements, 
fire, water, earth and air, were produced after the image 
of the primary Tetrad above, and that then, if we add their 
operations, viz. heat, cold, dryness and humidity, an exact 
likeness of the Ogdoad is presented. (1.17.1) 110 
Lb. tters and words are also used in this way, especially in Gnostic 
exegesis, which attempted to find secret references to the gnosis 
ill 
in the Scriptures. 
It is against this background that Irenaeus presents his theology of 
the will of God as the basis from which we should understand creation. 
I have argued that he over-reacts to the Gnostic scheme by exalting the 
will of God in a manner which can tend to under-estimate the inherent, 
if contingent, rationality of creation. In so doing Irenaeus allows 
the problem in Gnosticism which he is attempting to avoid to enter 
unnoticed into his own theology. Too great an emphasis either upon 
the necessary rationality of creation which images and typifies the 
divine world, or upon the contingent dependence of creation upon the 
immediate will of God, results, in both cases, in a tendency to under- 
value the 'independent' rationality of creation which a proper under- 
standing of contingency would admit. 
112 
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In Gnosticism this tendency becomes rampant and. pervasive. With 
Irenaeus it is no more than a relatively slight, if significant, 
inclination. It has been examined at some length because the predominant 
view of theological textbooks is genercalýy to emphasise that, in 
opposition to Gnosticism, Irenaeus saw creation as the good product 
of a good God. Such a view is by no means mistaken, but more attention 
needs to be given to the question of whether in Irenaeus' view creation 
has its true (and God given) independence, and an inherent goodness. 
113 
Concluding Reflections 
The slightly critical approach to an aspect of Irenaeus' doctrine of 
creation which was developed in the last section, should not be allowed 
to obscure its basic health and veracity. He does wish to distinguish 
God from creation, and, indeed, a basic element in his theodicy derives 
from a clear distinction between uncreated and created reality. Yet the 
plan - or 0%. KovýeLcK. - of God is presenteA asdeterminative for reality 
in a way which perhaps has its dangers. We need not doubt the ultimate 
triumph of God's will and purpose if we nevertheless consider individual, 
penultimate events at a different level and on a different basis. 
An important aspect of Irenaeus' conception and presentation of the 
divine owovo, "Lo, ý is the mediatorial role of Jesus Christ in creation. 
As we noted in Chapter Two, whereas the Apologists made but scant 
reference to the New Testament concept of the role of the Son in creation, 
Irenaeus makes very many such references. 
114 This considerable change 
in emphasis from the Apologists to Irenaeus serves to underline the close 
co-ordination between creation and redemption which we meet in his 
theology. This finds expression in different uses of the concept of 
3 115 the OLXOVO). WK. of God in Irenaeus and, for example, in Justin. 
Justin 116 gives a central place to a 'theology of history' as part of 
his attempt to place both pagan and Jewish worlds in a meaningful 
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3ý 
relation to the coming of Christ. The term Mkc>V(ýýLwk applies 
primarily to the Incarnation, and especially to the mysteries of Virgin 
Birth and crucifixion-resurrection; but it is also applied to the pre- 
figurement of the Incarnation in the events of the Old Testament. In 
3 Irenaeus there is a double reference of the concept OLKOVOJAAA. - on the 
one hand to the events of the Incarnation, but on the other hand to 
the whole plan of God in creation and redemption. This broader concept 
.7 
of the of God is filled out by the-. concept of AWKETKMILWO"15, 
which, as has often been notedappears to contain the ideas of both 
restoration and development. 
117 
By the interpenetration of the concepts 
.2 . 20 of OLKOVOPLOL and. ' v(VC-LKf-CPwLýoLLWC'tý, the doctrines of creation and 
redemption are brought into a close relation. 
Pointing out that Irenaeus introduces into extant Christian theology 
.3 the expression universa dispositio (c- OuAOvo, &x(cL ) Dei, M. Widman has 
spoken of this interpenetration as follows: 
Die ganze Geschichte hat ein bestimmtes inneres Ziel: 
die Erscheinung des Gottmenschen. Oder umgekehrt: der 
Erlöser bezieht sich innerlich auf die gesamte Geschichte. 
Seine Tat ist dies: omnia in se recapitulari. Erlösende 
Einverleibung der Menschheitsgeschichte, das ist das Innerste 
der Theologie des Irenäus. Und so scheint uns, dass sich 
für Irenäus nicht nur der Okonomie-Begriff "geweitet" 
hat, auch der Begriff der Rekapitulation ist reicher, 
umfassender geworden. Er bedeutet jetzt mehr als in 
der Adam-Christus7ýAntithese. Sofern die Menschheitsgeschichte 
von Anfang an verfehlt war, behält recapitulatio den Sinn: 
Wiederherstellung; sofern die Menschheitsgeschichte aber 
in ihrem Verlauf auf die Erlösung angelegt ist, bekommt 
recapitulatio den Sinn: Vollendung; sofern die Menschheit- 
sgeschichte in der Erlösung ihre Ordnungin Gott bekommt, 
bekommt recapitulatio den Sinn: Unter-ein-Haupt-Fassen. 
In allem aber geht. es um die Einbeziehung in Ihn (in 
semetipsum); alle verschiedenen Nuancen lassen sich 
daher zusammenfassen in dem Sinn: Einverleibung. 118 
There is more than a formal resemblance between this Irenaean juxta- 
.24 
position and combination of the concepts of OLKOVO)Ack and %VO-X, 64PdjALW&'ILS 
in'theuse by Karl Barth of the concepts of creation and covenant. 
119 
ZIS 
This aspect of the theology of Karl Barth has been the subject of 
criticism on the grounds that he underestimates the genuine independence 
and freedom of creation. 
120 We cannot assess the validity of the stock 
criticism of Barth, but it is interesting in that it to some extent 
parallels the criticism of Irenaeus which has been developed in the 
latter part of this chapter. We, will aproach this issue from different 
perspectives when we examine further aspects of Irenaeus' doctrine of 
creation. 
It would be wrong, however, to end the present chapter on a critical 
note. Irenaeus offers many splendid insights into the doctrine of 
creation, building upon anone too extensive basis in the New Testament. 
His attempt to bring into an organic unity the works of God in creation 
f' 
and redemption, to reflect in this way the unity of God as Creator and 
Redeemer is, espqcially in a Gnostic context, highly laudable. If he 
was too quick to affirm a unity without the recognition of a corresponding 
differentiation or diversity in various'aspects of creation and redemption 
he was touching upon issues which are matters of heated debate in 
contemporary theology. 
121 Certainly, we should beware lest we read 
back into the thought of Irenaeus our own mathematical concept of unity 
when he speaks of unity. 
We may recall here a favourite Irenaean attribute of the one God: 
richness. This finds an 'analogy in the richness and variety, yet 
harmony, ofcreation which Irenaeus portrays. 
123 
Perception of this 
rich but concordant diversity is evidence both that creation is the good 
and important product of the will of the one God, who troubled to adorn 
124 
creation, and that creation cannot be the limited image of a limited 
Pleroma. 125 One aspect of Irenaeus' argument here serves to orientate 
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us to a future question: if it is indeed true that 'those things, 
which constitute such a multiform creation, which are opposed in 
nature to each other, and disagree among themselves, and destroy the one 
the other' cannot be 'the images and likenesses of the thitty Aeons of 
the Pleromal (11.7.5), does this recognition of suffering and enmity 
not put a difficult question to his own concept of creation as the 
product of a good and omnipotent God? We will examine this question 
directly in the final chapter, but first we must look more closely 
at Irenaeus' doctrines of providence and man. 
2.7-0 
1. A. I. C. Heron, The Holy Spirit, (London: M. M. &S., 1983), p. 64. 
An example of this theology from a contemporary of Irenaeus can be 
found in the Peri Pascha of Melitp of Sardis; see the edition by 
S. G. Hall, (O. U. P., 1979), Introduction, p. xiiff., for a discussion 
of the'nalve modalism' of Melito. Underlying both Irenaeus and Melito 
is the Gospel of John, a dominant concern of which is arguably the 
defence of monotheism in the light of developing Christian claims for 
the intirnaýte association of Jesus with 'God'. Although he somewhat 
overstates his case (because of a neglect of the soteriological context 
of Johannine Christology), J. D. G. Dunn has recently argued that, 'In 
short, however we may think John's Logos-Son Christology stretches 
monotheism, it is only when we understand John as an expression of 
Christian monotheism that we understand it aright' ('Let John be 
John', p. 337). In connecting Johannine themes with Irenaeus I am 
implicitly, if not necessarily, endorsing the view that, 'All in all, 
none of the arguments for abandoning the, long Irenaean tradition of 
Ephesus as the home of the gospel possesses real cogency' (J. Marsh, 
Saint John, London: Pelikan, 1968, p. 41). 
For an extensive bibliography on Asia Minor and its churches, see 
J. K. Elliot, A Home for the Homeless :A Sociological Exegesis of 
I Peter, (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1981), pp. 88-90. 
2. It is hazardous to speculate upon the precise distribution of 
Jews in the diaspora during the first two centuries of the Christian 
era, but clearly the importance of Jewish-Christian relations, and the 
changes they endured, can hardly be over-estimated. For a recent 
defence of the Jewish background to the Gospel of John, see J. D. G. 
Dunn, op. cit.. The Peri Pascha of Melito of Sardis is steeped in 
Old Testament ideas, and shows strong evidence of contemporary debate 
over the relation of Church to synagogue. A distinctive positive 
influence upon Christian theology from the hellenistic Judaism of Asia 
Minor may perhaps be seen in the application by Irenaeus and Theophilus 
of the concept of Wisdom to the Holy Spirit. 
3. That the assimilation into Christian proclamation of the teaching 
of the Old Testament on creation was already under way in the first 
century is shown by the hymnic celebration of creation included in the 
First Epistle of Clement, ch. 33. 
Creation in the Old Testament, ed. B. W. Anderson, (London: S. P. C. K., 
1984) provides a representative selection of contributors to the lively 
twentieth-century debate over the place of creation-faith in the Old 
Testament. Although G. von Rad's thesis that, 'the doctrine of 
creation.... (is) invariably related, and indeed subordinated, to 
soteriological considerations' (p. 62) has been subjected to considerable 
criticism, not least by H. M. Schmid in his essay in this collection, as 
G. M. Landes observes, von Rad's w, -Iview on this issue continues to pre- dominate within Old Testament scholarship' (p. 137). However, even if a 
certain priority to soteriological considerations is conceded,, the 
situation which confronts us perhaps has the character of a chicken 
omelette, rather than of its separate. ingredients: the liberating God 
of the. Exodus controls the wind and the sea. 
4. A judicious survey of Gnostic cosmology is given by H. Jonas, 
op. cit. p. 42f f.. K. Rudolph, op. cit. pp. 67f f. r-, 317fC. ,- provides a more recent 
account, drawing from fresh research, but thereby pays less attention 
to the particular forms of Gnosticism which were of greatest concern 
to Irenaeus. We will survey Gnostic anthropology in a later chapter. 
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5. E. g. I. 4.3f, whpreheavy sarcasm is employed to make this point. 
6.1.24-3-7. 
7. It* was Marcosian Gnosticism which Irenaeus had encountered at 
first hand in the district of the Rhone (1.13.7) where, if we are 
to believe 1.13.5, Marcus himself was active. However, Irenaeus 
seems to have given a certain precedence to Ptolemaeus, perhaps 
seeing Marcus as his disciple (I. praef. 2). 
8. Cf. 1.2.2. 
9.. That is, a divine Aeon is redeemed, rather than anything created. 
The enormous gulf between Christian and Gnostic thought, especially 
in its Valentinian form, is obvious. Cf. Jonas, 'Evangelium Veritatis 
and Valentinianism' S. P., 6 (Berlin: 1962), p. 109, 'The distinguishing 
mark of that type of Gnosticsm to which the Valentinian School, belongs 
is the bold resolve to place the origin of darkness, and thereby of the 
dualistic rift of being, within the godhead itself. Hence issue the 
various attempts to develop the divine tragedy, the necessity of 
salvation arising from it, and the dynamics of this salvation itself, 
as wholly a sequence of inner-divine events'. 
10.1.5.6. This summary of the Valentinian account of the origin 
of the world is taken from Irenaeus' more extensive description in 
1.2.5. A fuller discussion which draws on other sources besides 
Irenaeus is provided by Jonas op. cit. pp. 179-194. Many details of 
the Gnostic scheme of creation are unclear or even baffling - see 
Jonas' slightly exasperated comments ibid., p. 193. 
11. Op. cit., p. 194; cf. p. 239. 
12. The Middle Platonists, pp. 202ff., 384ff. 
13. Op. cit., p. 66. 
14. That insecurity andpessimism characterised the second century 
more than one might superficially have expected in a time of apparent 
material well-being and outward progress has been shown by E. R. Dodds, 
Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety, (C. U. P.: 1965). 
15. It is generally held that Gnosticism presents the Demiurge as 
evil. Although there is truth in this claim, a qualification needs to 
be entered. Irenaeus records a neutral view of the Demiurge as being 
'incapable of recognising any spiritual essences', and leaves room for 
a separate 'devil, whom they also call Cosmocrator (the ruler of the 
world) ... (who) has knowledge of what is above himself, because he is a 
spirit of wickedness; but the Demiurge is ignorant of such things, 
inasmuch as he ismerely animal. ' (1.5.4). Whether this distinction 
between Demiurge and Cosmocrator is coherent is a moot point, and may 
reflect the importation into Gnosticism of a concept of 'the devil' 
from Jewish Christianity. 
16. E. g. 1.9.2; 31.2; 11.2.4; 13.10; 14.8; 17.8; 111.15.2. The two 
chief grounds of plausibility lie in exegesis and the assimilation of 
divine to human processes. Harnack (Hist. Dogma, I, pp. 233-237) 
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acknowledged that amid and alongside its fantastic mythology 
Gnosticism had a simple and attractive appeal. There are some 
parallels here with the later Arian controversy. 
17. Irenaeus characterised the Gnostic creator as 'the fruit of a 
defect' (e. g. II. praef. 1; 1.1; 3.2; 28.4), the Greek of which is 
u(rTapjtk±Tq5 KoLprcS (see Harvey, I, p. 251n. 1 for the different Latin 
phrases which correspond to this). An interesting. sidelight upon this 
expression, and on the background to the Gnostic myths of creation, has 
been provided by P. Fredriksen, 'Hysteria and the Gnostic Myths of 
Creation', V. C., 33 (1979), pp. 287-290. She demonstrates a link between 
UýrT6 P-4 (defect, deficiency) and 
__ba-rapoý, _ 
(womb), and between Gnostic 
myths of creation and ancient medical superstition concerning respiratory 
difficulties caused by wombs, dried out through lack of intercourse, 
wandering round the body. Fredriksen draws various parallels between 
the suffering (passion? ) of the womb deficient in moisture and Sophia's 
-traA9*5 -rou rv-v--rep)7tA, -cr which results in the coming into being of 
acrT! 2%W±, 
the realm of deficiency (see A. H. 1.18.4). The discovery of these ' 
parallels lends some support to Irenaeus' repeated claim that Gnostic 
theology is highly anthropomorphic. 
18. As illustrated by the passage from 111.2.3 discussed in the 
previous chapter: 'For inasmuch as He had a pre-existence as a saving 
Being, it was necessary that what might be saved should also be called 
into existence, in order that the Being who saves should not exist in vainl, i 
19. In Book Two of A. H. Irenaeus assembles a meandering but nevertheless 
powerful argument to undergird his own view of the relation of the 
supreme God to the world, but he is not dependent upon any one philo- 
sophical tradition. Irenaeus' acquaintance with, and use of, yet 
independence from, the common philosophy of his day has been demonstrated 
by R. M. Grant, who has drawn attention to Stoic, Sceptic, Platonic and 
Aristotelian elements in his argumentation ('Irenaeus and Hellenistic 
Culture', H. T. R., 42 (1949), p. 47). W. C. van Unnik, while supporting 
Grant's basic thesis, has challenged the assertion of Sceptical influence 
('Theological Speculation and its Limits', in Early Christian Literature 
and the Classical Intellectual Tradition, ed. W. R. Schoedel and R. L. 
Wilken (Paris: Editions Beachesne, 1979)). Recently W. R. Schoedel has 
argued that in Book Two of A. H. Irenaeus makes significant use of the 
methodological orientation of Empiric medicine ('Theological Method in 
Irenaeus', J. T. S., N. S., 35 (1984) p. 34). 
20. A striking example of this juxtaposition. is found in 11.13.3, 
where a clear allusion to Isaiah 55: 8 is followed by an equally clear 
adaptation of lines from Xenophanes, to make a common point. 
21. The broad distinctions'needed here might be indicated as follows. 
In Medieval times revelation primarily referred to truths which were not 
accessible to reason - for example, the doctrine of the Trinity. Following 
the Reformation, revelation was associated with Scripture, rather than 
being defined in antithesis to reason. In the twenthieth century, the 
meaning of Revelation has shifted somewhat into a soteriological key, 
to indicate the unveiling of truth which is not naturally accessible to 
man,. but which is of existential, as opposed to intellectual, significance. 
This modern development has rather clearer links with Irenaeus than the 
earlier distinctions, although historians have often not grasped the 
change, as the debate over the place of reason in the theology of Irenaeus 
illustrates. 
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22. See the. articles by R. M. Grant, W. C. van Unnik and W. R. Schoedel 
listed above. 
23. Cf. E. F. Osborn, The Beginning of Christian Philosophy, p. 57, 
'The Gnostics' rejection of the world is a major reason for their 
ignorance of God. No man who misses the many-splendoured goodness of 
God in creation can hope to find God and understand his ways. The 
hand of God gives light to the heavens, tests the hearts of men, 
nourishes and preserves them, and works in secret ways. He who cannot 
discern God's open goodness will never know his secret greatness'. 
24. R. A. Norris is therefore right (God. and World in Early Christian 
Theology, p. 66) to emphasise Irenaeus' hostility toward philosophy qua 
philosophy, but he overstates this hostility with the claim that, 'If 
Irenaeus does make any constructive use of philosophical sources, 
therefore, it is most likely that he does so more or less unconsciously 
and at secondhand'. The articles referred to above by R. M. Grant, 
W. C. van Unnikand. W. R. Schoedel have shown a clear dependence of 
Irenaeus upon philosophical sources, probably in doxographical form, 
although they generally miss the theological key in which the ideas are 
brought into play. The unifying factor which all these writers tend to 
miss is the central and basic role Irenaeus gives to the doctrine of 
God the Creator. A more recent essay by R. A. Norris ('The Transcendence 
and Freedom of God: Irenaeus, the Greek Tradition and Gnosticism', in 
Early Christian Literature and the Classical Intellectual Tradition, 
may be said to exhibit the same limitation inasmuch as it deals with the 
concepts OfGod used by Irenaeus which are held rather separate from the 
doctrine of creation. On the other side, a contrasting critique can be 
offered of E. P. Meijering, who has also given extensive attenýion to 
the question of the influence of pagan philosophy upon Irenaeus (see 
the various essays collected in God Being History). Although he develops 
a series of stimulating insights, two related criticisms are warranted. 
In the first place, Meijering tends to assume that the existence of a 
certain similarity between an argumentof Irenaeus and that of a previous 
philosopher is tantamount to proof of dependence. For example, on p. 35f., 
Irenaeus is said to utilise two of four arguments found in the school of 
Epicure when he defends the resurrection of the flesh. But the arguments 
are relatively obvious, there is no technical vocabulary used, and only 
half the projected I source I is employed. 
In the second place, Meijering concludes from the (true, but overstated) 
fact that, 'the philosophers did provide him with an arsenal of rational 
weapons' that 'analytical research-. into the writings of Irenaeus 
confirms Harnack's famous (and much criticised) statement: "Das Dogma 
ist in seiner Conception und in seinem Ausbau ein Werk des griechischen 
Geistes auf dem Boden -'des 
Evangel iums " (p. 37). But is such an arsenal 
not used by Irenaeus primarily to elucidate, express, and defend dogma, 
rather than in its basic conception and development? 
25. 'Urrighteousness at two levels: on the one hand in the very act of 
plunder, and on the'other hand in the use of goods which bear the character 
of their heathen owners. The relevance of this passage to an under- 
standing of Irenaeus' attitude towards philosophy is well discussed by 
H. B. Timothy, The Early Christian Apologists and Greek Philosophy, 
(Assen: van Gorcum, 1973) pp. 36ff. 
26. IV. 30.3, quoting Luke 16: 9 somewhat inaccurately. This verse is 
taken from theparable of the unjust and unscrupulous steward, a parable 
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which has bEiffled many commentators, but which may find its correct 
interpretation upon the lines laid down in this chapter of A. H.. 
27. A similar combination of openness to the usefulness of established 
goods and institutions, With an attitude of qualification and adaptation, 
is widely exhibited in the Gospel. presentation of Jesus. For example, 
temple, family, political and economic order are all subjected to this 
combination of acceptance and qualification. which has in each area 
stimulated prolonged debate about how seemingly conflicting statements 
can be harmonised. Is such a harmonisation possible unless recourse is 
made to a closebut not confusedrelation between the doctrines of creation 
and redemption? Reference might also bemade to the teaching on the state 
in St. Paul, and theinvDcatiin of this by Irenaeus in A. H. IV. 36.6, 
with the gloss 'because all men are the property of God'. 
28. Luke 3.; 11; Matthew 6: 3; 25: 35f. 
29. That this subject is appropriate for study by human beings is 
acknowledged by Irenaeus in 11.4.1, 'The cause, then, of such a dispensation 
on the part of God, is to be inquired after; but the formation of the 
world is not to be ascribed to any other'. For a brief survey of modern 
approaches to the question, 'Why is there anything and not nothing?,, 
which Heidegger regarded as the first question of metaphysics, see 
G. S. Hendry, 'The Eclipse of Creation', Theology Today, 28 (1970-71), 
p. 414 f. 
30. The chief features of ancient 'cosmic religion' are well summarised 
by R. A. Norris, God and World in Early Christian Theology, ch. 1, and 
A. H. Armstrong and R. A. Markus, Christian Faith and Greek Philosophy, 
ch. 4. Armstrong andMarkus comment: 'The "cosmic religion" had its 
origins in Plato, and right down to the end of paganism we find Platonists, 
Plotinus, Julian, Proclus, Simplicus, vigorously defending its cardinal 
doctrines, the eternity of the visible universe and the divinity of 
the heavenly bodies, against Gnostics and orthodox Christians' (p. 33) 
31. Explicit reference to the eucharist is only found here in chapter 
18, but this forms the conclusion of the discussion of the nature of 
sacrifices which extends across the previous three chapters. As has 
been remarked, 'It is significant here that Irenaeus is not setting out 
to prove something about the eucharist as such, but arguing from it', 
A. I' , C. Heron, Table and Tradition, (Edinburgh: The Handsel Press, 1983), 
p. 64. 
32. 'But our opinion is in accordance with the eucharist, and the 
eucharist in turn establishes our opinion' (IV. 17.5). Such a state- 
ment almost has a Johannine ring, given the interesting integration 
of eucharistic with other themes which one finds in the Fourth Gospel. 
33. This is further illustrated when he returns to the theme of the 
eucharist to support a belief in the resurrection of the body (V. 2). 
Here one finds a recurrence of the theme that God needs nothing from 
man: (We have been) 'redeemed graciously. For we have given nothing 
to Him previously, nor does He desire anything from us, as if He 
stood in need of it; but we do stand in need of fellowship with Him. 
(V. 2.1) 
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34. Cf. R. P. C. Hanson, Eucharistic Offering in the Early Church, 
(Nottingham: Grove Books, 1979) pp. 8ff., and R. J. Daly, The Origins 
of the Christian Doctrine of Sacrifice, (London: D. L. T., ), Pp 91ff. 
35. Or 'governance': the text fluctuates between dominationi and 
donationi. See Harvey II., p. 209 n. 3 
36. E. g. IV. 14.1,2,3; 15.3,4; 17.1.5; 18.1,3,6. The theme that 
'God has no need of man' originates in Book Two, where the Gnostic 
view that Christ and Holy Spirit were generated after the fall of 
Sophia is pilloried: 'Creation will have greater honour.. than the 
Pleroma, if, for its sake, those things (in the Pleroma) were produced' 
(11.15.3, cf. 11.19.9). It also seems to have influenced Irenaeus, 
development of the concept of the Son and Holy Spirit as eternally 
glorifying the Father, which, as we have seen, develops his doctrine of 
the Trinity beyond that which we find in the Apologists. This concept 
first appears in IV. 14 alongside the repeated emphasis upon God's 
eternal richness and lack of need for creation. 
37. Issues of grace and merit have surfaced recently in relation to 
Irenaeus' account of the eucharist, in a response by R. D. Williams, 
Eucharistic Sacrifice - The Roots of a Metaphor, (Nottingham: Grove 
Books, 1982), to the earlier pamphlet by R. P-C. Hanson, Eucharistic 
Offering inýthe Early Church. Williams wishes to retain the use of 
sacrificial language in the context of the eucharist, and he summarises 
IrenaeusIteaching thus: 'Once it is clear that no Christian "sacrifice', 
can be a bribe to God, because nothing can add to his abundance, and 
his mercy never needs to be coerced, we are free to consider the 
eucharist as a gift whose sole motive and purpose is gratitude .... To 
see the eucharist in such terms prevents us from fallingidntothe 
obvious and dangerous traps of treating our prpyer and praise and 
thanksgiving as primarily functional, designed to obtain something, or 
at least to fulfil an obligation whose non-fulfilment would cause God 
to withdraw his grace ..... I (p. 12). Williams misses the tension in Irenaeus' theology of the eucharist as a spiritual sacrifice : as we 
shall note later, this links with a correpponging neglect in Williams' 
account of Irenaeus' understanding of human freedom. 
In his account of Irenaeus' understanding of the eucharist, Williams 
also remarks (op-cit., p. 9) that, for Irenaeus, 'all sacrifice is 
expressive rather than functional', and that he had a 'general lack 
of interest in the imagery of propitiation by bloodshed'. Up 
to a point, this can be granted, but there are many references in 
Irenaeus to the blood and passion of Christ, and it would be better to 
retain an open mind as to their precise meaning. To take one example, 
V. 1.1. would seem to speak of rather more than a merely metaphorical 
sacrifice : 'The Word .... redeeming us by His own blood in a manner 
consonant to reason, gave Himself as a redemption for those who had 
been led into captivity .... Since the Lord has thus redeemed us through His own blood, giving His soul for our souls, and His flesh for our 
flesh.... I 
38. Cf. III. 25.5,,, -where Plato is quoted approvingly, and IV. 38.3, 
where the decision to create is explicitly grounded in the goodness 
of God. 
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39. The unity of creation and redemption in Irenaeus has been 
especially emphasised by A. Nygren, Agape and Eros, Part II Volume I, 
(London: SPCK, 1938, p. 180f. ) who attempts to ground creation solely 
in the loveof God. Although Irenaeus only once alludes directly to 
love as the basis of creation (V. 17.1), it may be said that Nygren 
produces an accurate summary of Irenaeus, position, which he tended 
to express in other terms such as goodness, mercy and glory. At first 
sight the idea, familiar from many traditional catechisms, that God 
created all things for His glorymight sound almost selfish, and 
rather the opposite to an act of love. But the glory of a person is 
the manifestation of their essential being, which, in the case of God 
(at least according to St. John), is love. Thus God's glory in His 
creation is the manifestation of His love. 
40. See, for example, the discussion by H. Chadwick, 'Freedom and 
Necessity in Early Christian Thought about God', Concilium (June 1983) 
pp. 8-13. Chadwick no doubt wisely notes that the difficulty here 
'arises in large part from the anthropomorphic. images which tend to 
lie behind the debate' (p. 10). Cf. G. S. Hendry, Theology of Nature 
(Philadelphia : Westminster Press, 1980) pp. 124-128, 'Freedom and 
Necessity in God'. 
It is likely that new light upon these old issues will come from the 
dramatic changes which are occurring in our understanding of the nature 
of, and relation between, chance and necessity in the physical and 
biological world. Recent Nobel laureates Eigen and Prigogine, in 
pgrticular,,, have shown how, in open. tbermodynamic and biological 
systems 'we see chance and necessity not as irreconcilable opposites, 
but each playing its role as a partner in destiny' (I. Prigogine and 
I. Stengers, Order out of Chaos, Londofti 1934, p. xxxiii). For a wider 
appraisal, see. A. R. Peacocke, Creation and the World of Science, O. U. P.: 
1979, ch. 3. 'Chance and the Life-Game', and the various articles 
collected under the overall title 'Order and Disorder : Thermodynamics, 
Creation and Values', in Zygon, 19.4 (Dec. 1984) 
41.11.34.2; cf. 11.26.3; IV. 11.1; 38.1. 
42. E. G. 111.12.4; IV. 6.2; 9.2. 
43. One may express this point in a different way by saying that the 
d6ctrines of creation ex nihilo and 61*6 YPI(rT*o need to be balanced 
and interwoven. 
44. Cf. 111.23.1., 'For if man, who had been created by God that he 
might live, after losing life, through being injured by the serpent 
that had corrupted him, should not any more return to life, but should 
have been utterly abandoned to death, God would have been conquered, 
and the wickedness of the serpent would have prevailed over the will 
of God'. 
45. Ezekiel 36: 22ff., in thez=ntext of the prophecy of a new covenant, 
and Nehemiah 9: 10 ff., when Ezra read the redýscovered Book of the Law. 
46. Cf. 11.10.2.4; 14.4; IV. 20.2; 38.3; Dem. 4 
47. Irenaeus deals with this point in 11.14.4. The sharpest defence 
of the view that ultimately our thinking about creation must rest in a 
final and ultimate cause, which by definition is God, is given in 11.16 
in the refutation of Basilides' exaggerated doctrine of the 365 heavens. 
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48. Later, Athanasius also quoted this passage from the Shepherd 
of Hermas, to defend the doctrine of creation out of nothing. But 
by that time the book was definitely excluded from the canon (Epistle 39), 
although. it was able to be read as 'a most helpful book' (De Inc. 3). 
A Rousseau (S. C. edn. of A. H., Book IV, p. 629 n. 1) has argued that 
irenaeus did not regard the Shepherd- of Hermas as 'Scripture', but 
his reasoning is rather forced. However, it is very likely that for 
Irenaeus the Shepherd of Hermas was less authoritative than many other 
books of the New Testament. 
49. Ad Autol. 1.4, probably quoting 2 Maccabees 7: 28. 
50.1 Apol. 10. Justin's position has been variously interpreted - 
see the discussion of this and of other relevant passages by L. W. 
Barnard, Justin Martyr, pp. 111 ff. 
51. Reference being made especially to Rom. 4: 17 and Hebrews 11: 3. 
52. For an interesting assessment of the nature of divine creativity 
in the Old Testament, see the contribution of G. M. Landes to Creation 
in the Old Testament, ed. B. W. Anderson. He discusses the use of 
the verb iiýra to denote the unique creative activity of God, both in 
bringing things into existence, and in the fulfilment of His purposes 
in history. 
53. Tertullian was apparently the first to put forward the actual 
expression ex nihilo, although he also used the form de nihilo. See 
S. L. Jaki, Cosmos and Creator, (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1980), 
p. 72 n. 21. 
54. See J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Creeds, 3rd Edition (1972), p. 82ff., 
for the texts. Kelly does not remark upon this variation either in 
Tertullian or in Irenaeus. Indeed, he makes no mention at all of the 
inclusion (or exclusion) of the qualification 'out of nothing' in the 
developing creeds. This is an omission which reflects his basic interest 
in Christological and Trinitarian controversies, In dealing with the 
fourth and fifth centuries such preoccupation is reasonable, because, as 
Kelly notes, 'The original import both of Father and of Almighty very 
early faded into the background. After the fourth century, if not before, 
exegetes and expositors almost always interpreted the Fatherhood as 
referring to the special relation of the first to the second Person within 
the Holy Trinity. Once the theological conception of the triune Godhead 
had begun to become explicit, it was inevitable that churchmen should 
come to regard the creed as a compendious exposition of current 
Trinitarianism' (pý. '372). But it is less than reasonable to devote nine 
pages of discussion to the first article of the old Roman creed (pp. 131-9) 
and omit'any reference to the inclusion or exclusion of the concept 
of creation out of nothing. This is another example of the tendency of 
p, atristic scholarship to view the earlier centuries through the pre- 
occupations of the Nicene period. The doctrine of creation in general 
fares little better in Kelly's other important book, Early Christian 
Doctrines, (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 5th ed, 1978), where the 
focus is also upon Christological and Trinitarian themes. 
55. Adversus Hermogenem contains an almost continuous stream of 
references to the doctrine of creation out of nothing. Other references 
are found, particularly where the power of the Creator and the goodness 
of creation are defended - e. g. De Res. Carn. Z. 
_ 
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56. See, for example, the important reference in John of Damascus, 
De Fide Orth. 11.2. 
57. See S. L. Jaki, op. cit., p. 78. Cf. M. Deansley, A History of the 
Medieval Church, (London: Methuen, 9th edition, 1969) 9 p, 114f o 
58. Historically and conceptually the question of the philosophy of 
creation out of nothing is highly complex and I can only allude to the 
issues. The Reformers would appear to have retained the dogma, but 
not to have given it much prominence - one searches Calvin's Institutes, 
for example, in the vain attempt to discover any reference to creation 
out of nothing, although neither is there any denial of it. But some 
more recent Protestant theology, encouraged no doubt by the recognition 
of the apparent ambiguity of Scripture at this point, has tended to 
criticise the appropriateness of the dogma. A. Ehrhardt (Studia Theologica 
(Lund) 4 (1951), 'Creatio ex nihilol, and The Beginning: A Study in the 
Greek Philosophical Approach to the Concept of Creation from Anaximander 
to St. John, (Manchester University Press, 1968)), has argued strongly 
both for the philosophical origins of the idea of c! reatio exi. nihilo, and 
for the danger of its inclusion in the body of Christian doctrine. 
A powerful attack upon Ehrhardt has been made by S. L. Jaki, (op. cit. 
ch. 3 'The Dogma of Creation! ), upon both historical and philosophical 
grounds. If somewhat overstated, Jaki makes a series of important and 
telling points. From the other side, attacks upon the idea of creation 
out of nothing have also come from process theologians, i. e. from those 
who most self-consciously advocate the admixture of philosophy and 
theology. Most recently, see Lewis S. Ford, 'An Alternative to Creatio 
ex Nihilol, Religious Studies, 17 (1983), pp. 205-213. 
59. There is some evidence that Gnosticism made such use of the concept 
of creation out of nothing. Hippolytus (Refutation 9f ) records that 
Basilides speculated about creation out of nothing to prove or illustrate 
the lnonýexistencel of God, i. e. his absolute transcendence over this 
world and human categories of thought. The discussion of the system 
of Basilides which Irenaeus provides is considerably shorter and does 
not include a specific reference to these speculations. Nevertheless 
one may. perhaps perceive here an additional reason why Irenaeus was 
somewhat restrained in his explicit use of the concept of creation out 
of nothing. 
60. See G. G. Stead, op. cit..,. p. 197f. 
61. Cf. 111.5.4, where God.,, is spoken of as liber et suae potestatis, 
which most likely renders Avrejoua-t*5 , and 111.8.3 where God omnia fecit libere et quemadmodum voluit. A similar train of thought is 
evident in Dem. 11, man became like God in inspiration as well 
as in frame. So he was free, and his own master, having been, made 
by God in order to be master of everything on earth'. 
62, We may recall here the absence in Irenaeus of the explicit 
attribution to God of holiness, discussed in Chapter One, which we 
suggested resulted from (or underlay) his unsatisfactory separation 
of the mercy from the justice of God. 
63. In relation to contemporary philosophies, or to the components 
of the philosophical syncretism which characterised the second century, 
it is from Stoicism that Irenaeus) views here are to be most clearly 
distinguished, as he himself indicates in 11.14.4.. The Stoics did 
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not believe that Zeus had freely created the world. The divine 
'will' is really no more than the unalterable course of history. Fate 
and providence are indistinguishable. Platonism was less hostile to 
the conception of divine freedom, because 'God' was not tied so closely 
to creation as in Stoicism. Yet Platonism fell short of the biblical 
emphasis upon the creative and redemptive freedom of the divine will. 
At this point Irenaeus would seem to be much closer to the biblical 
teaching than Origen or even Augustine, who both 'lay great stress 
on the immutability of God, and on a denial that the creating of the 
world is an act in time' (H. Chadwick, 'Freedom and Necessity in 
Early Christian Thought about God', p. 12). Celsus, who was deeply 
influenced by the Stoic and Platonic traditions, was vehement in his 
rejection of the idea that God had 'free will', on the basis that this 
would be arbitrary and anthropomorphic. 
64. Cf. Rev. 4: 11 where acknowledgement of this passes naturally 
into worship and praise: 'Worthy art thou, our Lord and God to receive 
glory and honour and power, for thou didst create all things, and by 
thy will they existed and were created. ' 
65. The modern age of evolution has seen numerous attempts to conceive 
the relation between Creator and creation as essentially continuous, 
as monistic rather than as dualistic. The evolutionary theme in 
Irenaeus, which holds creation and redemption closely together, may 
lead him towards these modern dangers, but fundamentally, on the basis 
of a strong doctrine of creation, he draws both a sharp distinction 
and a clear relation between God and creation. Even in the millennium, 
and thereafter, the distinction is preserved, for man will still have 
much to learn and receive. One is reminded, perhaps, of the thought 
of D. H. Lawrence, much misunderstood in ecclesiastical circles, which 
is in part a reaction to nineteenth-century naturalism: the true 
depth of the male-female relationship depends crucially upon recognition 
of a basic male-female polarity. 
66. The situation is more complex, because a Platonic strand remains 
in Irenaeus. We will consider this in the context of his treatment 
of evil. 
67. Harvey, surprised by this assertion, proposes to substitute causa 
for substantia, conjecturing that the translator had ovtrLck by mistake 7 for But there is no textual evidence for this, and parallel 
passages in Irenaeus can be found - e. g. IV. 20.1 ipse a semetipso 
substantiam creaturarum .... accipiens. This thought may underlie the basic response to anthropomorphic thinking given in 11.25.1: 'For 
system (regula) does not spring out of numbers, but numbers from a 
system, nor does God derive His being from things made, but things made 
from God'. On the other hand, there are passages which link the substance 
of creation with the will of God in a more traditional manner, along the 
lines of Harvey's proposed emendation. 
68. For a full acount of the range of meanings of and, to some a extent, vTrocr-r-tý. S , see C. Stead, Divine Substance, and the relevant 
entries in G. H. Lampe, A Patristic Greek Lexicon, (O. U. P.: 1961). 
69. Introduction of the concept of 'nature' should not pass unremarked, 
because it is exceptionally ambiguous. R. W. Hepburn advises writers 
who would make significant use of the words 'nature' and 'natural' 
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to choose words of greater precision('Nature, Philosophical Ideas of', 
The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, ed. P. Edwards (Collier-Macmillan, 
London, 1972), Mol. 5, pp. 454-7). 'Nature' points to a fundamental 
human experience, which results in the ambiguity of meaning, because 
its range is as wide as the cultural and conceptual horizon of its 
users. A. 0. Lovejoy and G. Boas, (Primitivism and Related Ideas in 
Antiquity, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1935 , pp. 447-56) have 
listed at least 66 distinct meanings of the term 'nature'. The Shorter 
Oxford English Dictionary devotes a whole column to the noun. 
These references, and a more, extensive survey of the ambiguity of the 
concept of 'nature', can be found in A. R. Peacocke, op. cit., Appendix B, 
pp. 364-66. 
A useful survey of the 'variety of meanings and nuances' of EPU4rIS 
and natura current in second-century Graeco-Roman thought is provided 
by H. Remus, Pagan-Christian Conflict over Miracle in the Second Century, 
(Philadelphia Patristic Foundation: 1983) pp. 14-26. On p. 19 Remus 
quotes from Galen, a second-century physician, a criticism of a concept 
of nature similar to that defended by Irenaeus: Galen wishes to maintain 
that all things are not possible to God, for some things, perhaps many 
things, are 'impossible by nature'. Whether Remus is right in his basic 
aim to interpret the different concepts of nature employed by different 
writers in terms of their socio-cultural conditioning is, however, 
questionable; we shall return to this question. 
70. References to the visible and invisible realms of creation is 
made in Col. 1: 16, but Irenaeus is apparently the first Christian author 
whose writings are extant to use this expression, which was eventually 
included in the Nicene creed. 
71. Even in the Bible the concept of heaven is rather complex, and 
this must be recognised in relation to the Irenaean usage. In the Bible 
broad distinctions can be made between three confluent meanings: 
(1) the visible starry firmament; (2) a higher created reality, in- 
accessible to human observation, where God is praised and served; 
(3) the sphere, the space of God Himself. (See H. Berkhof, Christian 
Faith, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1979), p. 177. For further distinctions 
see Kittel, T. W. N. T., Vol. 5, pp. 497-543). Thus the Gnostic view is 
that only (1) was created by the Demiurge. Irenaeus tends to work with 
one overarching concept of heaven, which encompasses these different 
aspects. 
72. J. P. Smith, in his edition of the Demonstration (p. 146)n - 57) thinks 
it probable that Irenaeus took the concept of the seven heavens from 
contemporary Jewish-Christian writings, notably the Ascension of Isaiah. 
Smith is doubtless correct, but this leaves open the interesting 
existence of strong Gnostic parallels - perhaps the denial of the seven 
heavens teaching inA. H. jin the face of St. Paul's apparent espousal of 
it, is simply an antagonistic response to Gnosticism. 
73. Two interesting differences between the 'seven heavens' as presented 
in the Demonstration and in the Ascension of Isaiah should be mentioned 
here. In the first place, Irenaeus numbers the heavens in an opposite 
manner to that found in the Ascension of Isaiah, with the 'top' heaven 
being the 'first': it could be suggested that Irenaeus approaches the 
seven heavens, perhaps subconsciously, from the perspective of God 
rather than from that of earth. In the second place, whereas in the 
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Ascension of Isaiah the seven heavens are definitely in the invisible 
realm, with 'the prince of this world' (10.29) dwelling in the firmament, 
in the Demonstration the seventh heaven is the firmament which we can 
see, it being illuminated by the Holy Spirit (Dem. 9). 
74. J. P. Smith, ed. Demonstration, p. 148 n. 63. 
75. Smith may well have been influenced in his judgement by the later 
teaching on the hierarchy of angels. This originated in large measure 
from the De Caelesti Hierarchia of Pseudo-Dionysius (ca. 500), and was 
developed in Medieval theology. But the earlier church fathers were 
much more reserved in their references to angels, and it is interesting 
to observe that moves to admit into Christian theology ideas along the 
lines of Judaeo-Christian angel worship were on the whole not taken 
up by the early Fathers. Thus the apologetic of Justin in opposition 
to'the charge of atheism (I Apol. 6), which referred to Christian worship 
of the Father, Son, Spirit and 'the host of good angels' (cf. Dial. 128), 
where Christ is termed 'angel', and also Athenagoras Legatio 10.5), was 
ignored by Irenaeus, who instead emphasised their created nature. Among 
more modern writers it is Karl Barth, (C. D. 111.3, para 5, pp. 368-531) 
who has rekindled interest in the question of angelology. His chief 
thesis is that the main biblical emphasis is upon the concept of angels 
as messengers of God, rather than upon their status in heaven or the 
divine court. We cannot assess this thesis here, but it can be remarked 
that Irenaeus' approach to the question of angels is not wholly dissimilar. 
His emphasis, while not without relation to the prevailing concept of 
cosmic mediators between God and creation, falls upon the role of angels 
in carrying out the will of God, both towards God in worship, and also 
towards creation in providential care. Like the Apologists, Clement of 
Alexandria exhibits the influence of Judaeo-Christian angelology, but 
thereafter the subject falls into relative decline until Pseudo-Dionysius 
(See J. Daniýlou, Gospel Message and Hellenistic culture, p-. 459). 
76. In addition, we should note in advance the relevance of his 
anthropology. For Irenaeus, man stands at the boundary between earth 
and heaven, firmly rooted in the former but open to the latter and 
constituted in being by the Holy Spirit. To understand man is to see in 
him the mystery of earth and heaven, of visible and invisible reality, 
in their diversity yet also in their unity as the creation of God. This 
mystery is manifest in the God-man Jesus Christ, as the mediator of 
creation, who is the visible of the invisible Father. 
77. V. 2.2f. 
78. See J. H. McKenna, Eucharist and Holy Spirit, (Essex: Mayhew- 
McCrimmon, Alcuin Club Collection NO. 57,1975), pp. 51-3 for a survey of 
the main interpretations which have been applied to these passages. 
79. McKenna, op. cit., p. 53. 
80. A good deal of New Testament evidence could be produced which also 
indicates that a change in the relationship between earth and heaven 
was wrought by the saving event of Jesus Christ. See Kittel, op. cit., 
vol. 5, pp. 514-520. 
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81. Rev. 11: 19; 21: 3.. R. D. Williams, Eucharistic Sacrifice - The 
Roots of a Metaphor, p. 11, describes this introduction of the image of 
the heavenly altar as 'slightly unexpected'; in a sense, this is true, 
but I would suggest that it fits well with the overall shape of 
Irenaeus' doctrines of eucharist and of creation. Perhaps Williams, 
in concentrating rather more significance on the eucharist that we see 
in Irenaeus, misses the wider context of the close relation between 
heaven and earth in the doctrine of creation in Irenaeus. 
82. Implicitly, Irenaeus is presenting a conception of the created 
universe which is at considerable variance with that of ancient 
cosmology. In varying degrees, the different strands of ancient Greek 
philosophy posited a dichotomy between heaven and earth. The clash 
between Christian and pagan conceptions varied, of course, between 
different theologians. S. Sambursky, The Physical World of Late 
Antiquity (London: R. K. P., 1962) ch. 6, 'The Unity of Heaven and Earthl, has 
shown that different conceptions of the relation between heaven and 
earth provided a major area of conflict in the sixth century with the 
contribution to the doctrine of creation by John Philoponus. However, 
Sambursky does not note the interesting anticipation of some of 
Philoponus' emphases by Irenaeus. 
83. As Irenaeus notes (11.33.2) this idea was a commonplace of Greek 
philosophy, but it was used in Gnosticism by assimilation to the notion 
of divine 'sparks' temporarily embedded in bodies. 
84. Very similar passages are found in the two preceeding paragraphs 
(11.34.2,3). 
85. Again, very similar statements are found in adjoining passages, 
V. 4.2 and V. 6.2. 
86. For adjacent texts, see 111.16.2; 17.1; 21.7. The introduction 
of the concept of the divine foreknowledge should warn us against 
placing Irenaeus too quickly at the Scotist end of the Thomist/Scotist 
debate. For Irenaeus will and knowledge are closely associated - 
cf. I. 12.1f where he counters the Gnostic division between thought 
and will with a statement of their mutuality. 
87. Frap_ment 4, defended by Harvey as genuine, did seem to speak 
directly of omnicausality: 'The will and the energy of God is the 
effective and foreseeing cause of every time and place and age, and of 
every nature'. But this fragment is among those which were proved by 
A., Harnack. to be forgeries (Texte und Untersuchungen 20.3, Leipzig: 1900). 
88. In medieval theology a series of distinctions in the divine will 
and knowledge were made: See K. B'arth, Church Dogmatics II. 1 pp. 567ff. 
and 590ff. for an extensive description and assessment. I choose the 
distinction between the effective and permissive will as representing 
the key idea which the whole series of distinctions was intended to 
make. 
89 We may note in advance of a fuller discussion the importance-of 
the recognition of the concept of 'possibility' in creation for the 
growth of modern science. The concept of nature assumed there includes 
all phenomena whose existence is not precluded by the laws which govern 
the physical world. Experimental science recognises the existence of 
2-33 
possible states of affairs, which are created artificially to test 
the predictive power of a hypothesis or theory. The Greek mind found 
the concept of possibility difficult to envisage or accept - hence 
the emphasis upon the simple observational science of astronomy, at 
the expense of experimental science, Cf. S. Sambursky, The Physical 
World of the Greeks, (London: R. K. P., 1956), pp. 177f., 235. Confidence 
in the experimental method requires not only the invention of artificial 
possible states, but also the reliable repetition of the states, with no 
interference from demons or a 'surd' element in hature. Among theologians, 
E. JUngel has given particular attention to the ontological significance 
of possibility, as J. B. Webster has recently emphasised : 'It is against 
.... an accordance of ontological primacy to actual states of affairs 
that JýIngel directs himself .... in the programmatic essay "Die Welt 
als Wirklichkeit und M6glichkeit'l. 1 ('Eberhard Jilngel on the Language 
of Faith', Modern Theology, 1. (1985), p. 261. 
90. The terms 'necessity' and 'contingency' require careful definition. 
A mistaken emphasis on the omnivolence of God can take either a 
'necessitarian' or a 'voluntarist' form, depending upon the doctrine 
of God which is invoked or assumed. Here 'necessity' refers to both 
forms of a misiaken concept of the omnivolence of God. 
91. This connection was first noticed by R. M. Grant, 'Irenaeus and 
Hellenistic Culture', p. 43. Elsewhere, also, Irenaeus clearly used 
a philosophical manual - for example, in his survey of philosophical 
opinions given in 11.14. 
92. Parallel passages might be quoted, for example: 'It is therefore 
better, as I have said, that one should have no knowledge whatever of 
any one reason why a single thing in creation has been made, but should 
believe in God, and continue in His love, than that, puffed up through 
knowledge of this kind, he should fall away from that love which is 
the life of man' (11.26.1). This whole chapter, a meditation upon 
lCor. 8: 1,1 knowledge puf fs up, but love builds up I, assumes a quantitative 
mathematical, rather than a qualitative, scientific, concept of 
knowledge. Irenaeus confuses the primarily spiritual knowledge referred 
to in 1 Corinthians, with knowledge of the natural world. 11.26.3 has 
a continuation'. of Irenaeus' attack upon the possibility and value of 
scientific knowledge, and the same theme returns in IV. 19.2. 
93. Modiyfing to some extent an earlier thesis of A. N. Whitehead 
(from his Science and the Modern World, published in 1926), important 
articles by M. B. Foster in Mind, 43 (1934), pp. 446ff.; 44 (1935), 
pp. 439ff.; and 45 (1936) pp. lff., presented the argument that the 
Christian doctrine of creation was the seminal influence upon the rise 
of modern science. This thesis has been refined and to some extent 
qualified by the recognition of the role played by other, chiefly 
cultural, factors, but extensive research has supported Foster's basic 
claim. For details of some of the most important recent publications 
in this area, see A. I. C. Heron, A Century of Protestant Theology, 
(Lutterworth: 1980) p. 206, and D. W. Hardy, 'Natural Science and Christian 
Theology', Kings'Theological Review, 3 (1980), pp64iff.. 
94. A certain distinction must, of course, be made between the Jewish 
and Christian doctrines of creation. The former has tended to give less 
place to original sin, with significant consequences that flow elsewhere 
in the doctrine of creation. This has been emphasised recently by 
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A. P. Hayman: 'Rabbinic Judaism and the Problem of Evil' , S. J. T. 29 
(1976); 'Theodicy in Rabbinic Judaism', Transactions of the Glasgow 
University_ Oriential Society, 26 (1975-6 ); and I The Fall, Freewill 
and Human Responsibility in Rabbinic Judaism', S. J. T. 37 (1984). On 
the other side, the Christian doctrine of creation has been influenced 
by the doctrines of the Incarnation and of the Trinity. 
95. Of course, this is to assume that the development of modern 
science. should be welcomed from a Christian perspective, a position 
which I believe to be defensible. 
96. Cf. E. L. Mascall, Christian Theology and Natural Science, 
(London: Longmans, 1956), p. 98. 
97. A good summary of the cultural requirements is given by P. E. 
Hodgson, 'The Christian Origin of Science', Occasional Paper 4 
(Oxford: Farmington Institute, 1982). One might have thought that 
after Constantine, in particular, conditions would have been 
favourable for the development of science. An interesting discussion 
of this question is provided by T. F. Torrance, The Ground and Grammar 
of Theology (Belfast: Christian Journals, 1980), ch. 3 'Creation and 
Science'. On the one hand, the promising 'scientific' work of John 
Philoponus in the sixth century was without immediate influence, 
partly due to his erroneous designation as a monphysite heretic, but 
partly due also to his own inadequate grasp of the intelligibility of 
the cosmos to man (See Sambursky, The Physical World of Late Antiquity 
p. 152f. ). On the other hand, the great authority of Augustine established 
a 'subtle but admittedly beautiful blending of Christian theology with 
Neoplatonic philosophy and Ptolemic cosmology' (Torrance, ibid., p. 61), 
which, by_ its cultivation of an other-wordly attitude, diverted attention 
from the phenomena of this world. 
98. This is seen in 11.26.3 which argues along similar lines to 
11.28. Here the 'greatness' of the Creator is emphasised, as is the 
'transcendent knowledge' and 'divine intellect' which providentially 
formed the world as it is. 
99. Op. cit., pp. 42-47. 
100. 'Philosophy and Rhetoric in the Adversus Haereses of Irenaeus', 
V. C., 13 (1959) P. 24. 
101. 'Theological Speculation and its Limits, in Early Christian 
Literature and the Classical Intellectual Tradition. 
102. We may refer back to the discussions in Chapter One of Irenaeus' 
unsatisfactory accounts of the impassibility and incomprehensibility 
of God. Such ideas tend to foster the view that the activity of 
creation, including knowledge by created men, is grounded directly in 
God. As Irenaeus himself says, the pattern of creation originates 
from the 'truly divine intellect' (11.26.3); Cf. 'since God is XoytKos 
therefore by *\oyoS he created the things that were made' (Dem. 5, 
the play on words being preserved in the-Armenian). 
103.1.13.7; 15.6; 23.1,4,5; 25.3; II. 31.2f; 32.3. 
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104. 
105. We need not dispute the possibility and actuality of miracles 
both in Irenaeus' day and in our own time, but the ease and 
frequency claimed by Irenaeus for miracles, including resuscitations 
from death, arouses justifiable suspicion. 
106. H. Remus, op. cit., has provided a valuable study, from the 
perspective of the sociology of knowledge, of the place of miracle 
and magic in second-century thought. He emphasises the complexity of 
the situation, with various concepts of 'nature', 'miracle' and 'magic' 
competing for legitimlitioni? yvarious social and socio-religious groups. 
As our own study indicates, there is a relation between Irenaeus, 
theology and the surrounding culture; the danger with Remus, methodology 
is that it can lead to an underestimation of the intrinsic power of 
new ideas. Thus, in relation to Justin, he asks quizzically (p. 144),, 
'how Justin came to positions so uncharacteristic of the Middle Platonism 
which is his general philosophical position'. 
107. The question of Platonic influence upon Gnosticism has been much 
debated, but is clearly present atthis point, which is emphasised in 
Valentinianism. See H. Jonas, The Gnostic Religion, p. 193. As we 
shall see, Irenaeus' use of the concept of the image of God in creation 
is handled differently from the Gnostic use of such language: the image 
of God is restricted toman, and is conceived on a different basis 
from that employed in Gnosticism. 
108. We see how chance and necessity are here conceived in a manner 
which recalls the widely known contemporary work, Chance and Necessity, 
by Jacques Monod (London: Collins, 1972). T. F. Torrance has commented 
as follows upon Monod's basis thesis: 'Sheer randomness is contrasted 
with necessity in the process of natural selection, but since random- 
ness is geared into the necessity of the consequences of purely 
chance events it does not appear to be ultimately different from the 
old dialectic of the accidental and the necessary, in spite of the 
fact that chance is now given the status of a dogmatic metaphysical 
idea! ' (Divine and Contingent Order (O. U. P. 1981) p. 154n. 14). For 
recent (a radical) criticism of Monod by a biochemist who has taken 
account of the fresh discoveries in thermodynamics, see J. S. Wicken, 
'The Cosmic Breath: Reflections on the Thermodynamics of Creation', 
Zygon, 19 (1984), pp. 487-505. 
109. Among the various Gnostic groups, the greatest detail here is 
provided by Valentinianism, as R. Wilson has observed (The Gnostic 
Problem, p. 203f. ) 
110. Irenaeus continues with an account of parallels to all thirty 
Aeons. References to the Gnostic theories of imagery and typology 
in creation are found throughout Books One and Two of A. H., but 
particularly significant discussions are found in 1.14-18; 11.6-8, 
20-25,30. 
111. See especially the series of examples provided by Irenaeus in 
1.3,8,18,19,20; 11.10,21,22,23. He attacks what might be called 
the monistic pole of Gnosticism on three basic grounds: it is speculative, 
anthropomorphic, and inconsistent with the opposite, dualistic pole 
of Gnosticism (for the charge of inconsistency see, for example, 11.7.6). 
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The nature of Irenaeus' arguments has been the subject of extensive and 
disputed research, as we have already noted in the limited respect of 
one passage, 11.28.2. Assessment of this research lies largely outwith 
the scope of this thesis, which is devoted primarily to the more 
neglected area of the substance of Irenaeus' theology. However, negative 
comment must be passed upon a recent essay, 'Irenaeus' Refutation of the 
Gnostics', by Gerard Vallee, in the important collection, Jewish and 
Christian Self-Definition, Vol. I. ed. E. P. Sanders (S. C. M. 1980). 
Vallee's essay makes the double claim that Irenaeus concentrated his 
attack 'almost exclusivelyl(p. 180) on Gnostic dualism, and that the 
reason for this exclusivity is to be found in his socio-political 
conservatism, which contrasted with the 'strong revolutionary impetus' 
ýY. 183) of Gnosticism. If the latter claim needs a more careful 
examination and stronger evidence than Vallee provides, the former claim 
is clearly distorted. Indeed, to account for such a claim, it is 
tempting to ask whether it itself is not motivated by a (modern) desire 
to find socio-political determinants of theological positions! It is 
important that this criticism and correction of Vallýee be heard, both 
because the collection in which it is found is likely to be influential, 
and because his article could tend to obscure the arguments of a much 
better essay in the same collection 'Why the Church Rejected Gnosticism', 
by G. W. Macrae, which confines its attention to possible anti-Gnostic 
argument in the Pauline and Johannine documents of the New Testament, 
explicitly leaving Irenaeus' arguments to Vallee's essay (p. 127). Vallýe 
has extended his own position in A Study in Anti-Gnostic Polemics, 
(Ontario: Waterloo, 1981). Vallee's methodology has similarities with 
that of Remus' . -Pagan-Christian Conflict over Miracle 
in the Second 
C2ntury, and with the various publications of E. Pagels (see, for example, 
her The Gnostic Gospels, London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1979). 
Pagels' contrast between Gnostic radical individualism and Catholic 
institutional uniformity, if not without a measure of truth, can hardly 
be regarded as the 'mainspring' of Irenaeus' 'polemics' without considerable 
distortion of their content. Do the 'religious ideas enshrined in the 
creed... coincide with social and political issues in the formation of 
orthodox Christianity? ' Ideas have more power than Pagels' can admit: 
'Since historians themselves tend to be intellectuals, it is, again, 
no surprise that most have interpreted the controversy between orthodox 
and Gnostic Christians in terms of the"History of Ideas", as if human 
action, battled (presumably in some disembodied state) for supremacy' 
(Op. cit., p. 143) 
112. We may recall here an element in Irenaeus' account of the basis 
of our knowledge of God, which we discussed in Chapter One: 'For since 
His invisible essence is mighty, it confers on all a profound mental 
intuition and perception of His most powerful, yea, omnipotent greatness. 
Wherefore, although "No one knows the Father, except theSon, nor the Son 
except the Father, and those to whom the Son will reveal Him", yet all 
do know this one fact at least because reason, implanted in their 
minds, moves them, and reveals to them that there is one God, the Lord 
of all' (11.6.1). Here a concept of intuitive knowledge of God is 
developed by reference both to the omnipotence of God and 'implanted' 
reason within man, analogous to the pattern of the contingency and 
necessity of Or-wation- as a whole which we have discussed. The anti- 
Gnostic polemic is evident in this passage, with the quotation of 
Matthew 11: 27, a verse which Gnostics could present as 'the highest 
testimony and, as it were, the very crown of their system' (1.20.3). 
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113. The close relationship at this point between doctrines of 
creation and of God has been well emphasised by Mackey, op. cit., 
pp. 254ff. . He draws attention to the need to 
link closely concepts 
of freedom and grace in a Christian theology of God and creation. 
In an age greatly influenced by existentialist conceptualities our 
understanding of freedom needs an appreciation of grace, lest it 
border on the nihilism exhibited by Sartre, but our understanding 
of grace needs a proper sense of the transcendence, of Creator over 
creature, lest the freedom of the latter prove an illusion (p. 260). 
114. E. g. 1.9.2; 15.5; 22.1; 11.30.4,9; 32,5; 111.2.2; 6.5; 8.2f; 
11.8; 22.1,2,3; 23.1; 24.1; IV. 6.2; 7.1,4; 10.2; 18.4; 20.2; 
24.1 etc.. Occasionally, Irenaeus also speaks of the Holy Spirit 
as mediating creation : e. g. IV. 31.2. 
115. In making a comparison between the concepts of the 
of God displayed by different patristic writers we must bear carefully 
in mind the variety of meanings which the word and its cognates could 
convey, and thus guard against the danger of an unwilling substitution 
of linguistic for conceptual analysis. On the range of meaning of 
OL%kOVO, 4!: Lo, - in patristic theology, see G. Prestige, op. cit. ch. 3. 
2 116. See the discussion of the concept of the OLKOV? &ta- of God in 
Justin in J. Danielou, Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture, PP; 157- 
166, and the various references therein. 
117. E. g. R. S. Franks, The Work of Christ, (London: Thomas Nelson, 1918 
and 1962), p. 25. Without the accompanying concept of the ewwwto( of 
God, it would be easy to lay against Irenaeus the charge that the 
concept of "&voOC%! ýaS cannot contain both the elements of restoration 
and development; this charge is brought, for example, by R. F. Brown, 
'On the Necessary Imperfection of Creation' S. J. T., 28 (1975), p. 17. 
Irenaeus' development of the concept of the o-1-vovou-L of creation 
and redemption contrasts strongly with the Gnostic'account of the 
0 . V-0V0/. XLA- of the Pleroma. This contrast, which may help us to 
understand why Irenaeus was drawn to over-emphasise the closeness of 
the relation between God and creation, has been well explored by 
R. A. Markus, 'Pleroma and Fulfilment: The Significance of History 
in St. Irenaeus' Opposition to Gnosticism' V. C., 8 (1954), pp. 193- 
224. Markus summarises Irenaeus' concept as follows 
(p. 213): 'All God's dealings with men throughout historyýare a process 
of "accustoming: - men to bear His Spirit and have communion with God"; 
and thus, in his magnificent phrase, Irenaeus sums up the Old Testament 
history as God's work of "adjusting the human race, in manifold ways, 
to harmony with salvation" (IV. 14.2; cf. IV. 38.1,3; 39.2; 21.3). God 
does nothing "out*. of due time and unfittingly" (111.16.7; cf. IV. 4.2 etc. ) 
- everything, with Him, is apto tempore, - 
in its- own kairos, the moment 
assigned to it in the unfolding of His plan. According to this plan 
or economy, the Word as the Father's steward brings forth his treasure 
for men (IV. 9.1). ' 
118. Op. cit., p. 170. 
119. C. D. III. 1, paragraph 41, 'Creation and Covenant' ; 'Creation 
as the External Basis of the Covenant'; and 'The Covenant as the 
Internal Basis of Creation I. 
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120. Among many contenders, I mention G. S. Hendry who has developed 
this criticism in several books and articles, e. g. The Holy Spirit 
in Christian Theology., (S. C. M., revised edn., 1965), pp. 108 ff., 
and 'The Freedom of God in the Theology of Karl Barth', S. J. T., 31 
(1978), pp. 229-244. 
121. We noted in the last chapter that Irenaeus' doctrine of the 
Trinity could verge towards modalism. Andre Benoit, (op. cit. p. 203f, 
and other notes thereto) has shown how the theme of 'unity' is of key 
importance for Irenaeus: 'Le theme que la lecture de 11ouvrage Contre 
les heresies accentue avec le plus de force est celui de l1unit6 ..... 
Cette affirmation-de 11unite slapplique surtout ý Dieu. Il nly a 
qu I un seul Dieu, elle se rencoritre, frequemment N propos du=Christ: il 
nly a qulun-. seul-. Christ.. -Llexpression unus-Spiritus ou ses equivalents 
sont, part contre, relativement rares. Pius le thZme se ramifie: 
il nly a qu'une seule foi, ilnly a seul salut, i-i;, nlyaqulune seule 
tradition, il n ly a qu I une seule predication de 11 Eglise, il nIya qu I un 
Evangile, il-nly a qulun seul genre humain, un seul corps du Christ. 
Modern study has shown that any claim concerning the unity of 
Scripture, for example, must reckon with a diversity of some degree or 
kind, which Irenaeus clearly failed adequately to recognise. 
122. Here I refer to the popular 'mathematical' concept of unity. 
In fact modern mathematics, for example with the -invention of complex 
numbers, has a complex concept of unity. 
123. E. g. 11.2.4,7,3-7,25.2,28.2,30.1,3; IV. 4.1,38.3; V. 3.2. 
124. Irenaeus speaks of. God 'adorning' creation in 11.30.1,3; 
IV. 20.1,2. 
125. This implication isexplored in detail-, in 11.7.3-7. 
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1, CHAPTER FOUR 
DOCTRINE OF CREATION: PROVIDENCE AND FREEDOM 
Introduction 
In this chapter, we will continue our investigation of various basic 
aspects of Irenaeus' doctrine of creation by looking at his 
treatment of the related subjects of providence and the freedom 
of the will. Obviously, the treatment of each subject cannot 
be exhaustive, but our purpose does not demand this, because 
primarily we are looking for the overall pattern of Irenaeus, 
doctrine of the relation of God with creati6n. 
Providence 
The confession of God asT5KOT'OKfQWwP , or 'Father almighty', was 
one of the first and basic components of the creeds of the early 
1 church. J. N. D. Kelly has demonstrated this in detail , and in 
the process he established a significant delimitation: 
The underlying meaning of 7rAVTOVpot'rWP , in Greek, however, and the meaning taken for granted in the 
second-century Church, was by no means identical 
with that of 'Almighty' in English or omnipotens 
in Latin. The exact equivalent of these would 
have been ra(vm6vvAmos . Tr. OVTVW_PO(rwP is in the first place an active word, conveying the idea 
not just of capacity but of the actualization of 
capacity. More important, the basic conception 
involved is wider than that contained in 'Almighty'. 
IrAvrat, cpetTop has the meaning 'all-ruling', 'all 
sovereign'. This is brought out in the numberless 
patristic contexts, but with particular force in the 
first few chapters of the second book of St. Irenaeus' 
Adversus Haereses. 
(op. cit., p. 137) 
Kelly was fully justified in his reference to Irenaeus' stress 
up on the sovereign, providential power of God, and especially in 
2 the early part of Book Two We recall in this context our 
discussions, in Chapter One, of the attribution to God of supreme 
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power, goodness, richness, omniscience, and oUr discussion, in 
Chapter Three, of the considerable stress laid by Irenaeus upon the 
fundamental nature of the will of God for all created activity. 
We concluded the last chapter by referring to Irenaeus' assertion 
that creation, although diverse, is well adapted for its purpose, 
to the extent that it can be spoken of as 'adorned' by God. That 
belief in the general providence of God was to the forefront of 
his defence against Gnosticism is illustrated by the fact that he 
quotes Matthew 5: 45b, 'for He makes His sun rise on the evil and 
on the good, and sends rain on the just and the unjust' on six 
occasions 
3; 
no verse from the Bible is quoted more frequently, 
and the only other verse quoted six times, Matthew 25: 41 'Depart 
from me, you cursed, into the eternal fire prepared for the devil 
and his angels', with its theme of judgement, is, as we shall see, 
brought into a close connexion with the defence and explication of 
providence. 
4 
Irenaeus' development of the concept of providence needs to be seen 
against the double-sided background of Gnostic and Marcionite ideas, 
on the one hand, and the traditional philosophical defence of Greek 
notions of providence on the other. Marcion and Gnostic writers 
denied any general concept of providence: verses in the Gospel of 
Luke about the Father's being mindful of sparrows and each hair on 
one's head were among those excised by Marcion as Judaistic 
interpolations. 5 Nevertheless, a form of 'special' providence was 
given a prominence which was sharpened precisely by this denial of 
'general' providence. For Marcion, the 'supreme and extraordinary' 
love of the Good God is graciously demonstrated in his sudden 
appearance at Capernaum. 
6 In many Gnostic systems irpovecx. was 
held to be a key component, designating the plan of salvation, or, 




This selective, 'special' notion of providence was bolstered by the 
esoteric Gnostic typology, which Irenaeus discusses at some length, 
wherein features of the visible world 'image' corresponding features 
of the invisible world. In his response, he does not deny that 
there is a connection between God and the detailed arrangement of 
creation, for to do so would have been to approach the underlying 
assumption of Gnosticism itself. Instead, Irenaeus presents a 
close relationship between God and the whole of creation: 
If any one, however, say in reply to these things, 
What then? Is it a meaningless and accidental 
thing, that the assigning of names 8, and the 
election of the apostles, and the working of the 
Lord, and the arrangement of created things, are 
what they are? - we answer them: Certainly not; 
but with great wisdom and diligence, all things which 
God has made have been exactly arranged and adorned, 
His Word forming both things ancient and those of 
the last times. (11,25.1) 
F 
The Gnostics are not to pick and choose which aspects of creation 
speak of God, for this results in the production of an unlimited 
number of diverse theories among different Gnostic writers. We 
see, then, that the emphasis in Irenaeus is upon what became known 
in later theology asIgenerall, as opposed to 'special' providence. 
However, he does not draw clear distinctions between 'general' and 
'special' providence, or between other aspects of the divine care 
and provision for the world such as initial creation, continued 
sustaining, and miracles, which, in contemporary theology, are commonly 
held to be conceptually differentiated. 
9 All are brought together 
in one overarching concept which may be said to be centred in the 
notion of 'general' providence. 
In order to explore more deeply the distinctive features of Irenaeus, 
conception, it is instructive to examine briefly the other background 
dimension against which he wrote, that provided by Greek philosophy. 
For Epicurus there was no question of the gods (whose happy, 
unconcerned existence he affirmed) exercising providential care, for 
2.4-2. 
the whole Epicurean system was based upon the belief that pleasure 
was best sought and found if there was no purposeful creation, and 
no divine judgement to fear! Creation is the result of. an 
accidental sequence of atomic collisions. Irenaeus twice 
10 
accuses the Gnostics of emulating these Epicurean ideas, and 
Meijering 11 has drawn attention to the consideration of Epicurean 
arguments against providence which is implicit in Irenaeus, defence 
of the resurrection of the body: God is both willing and able to 
overcome evil and death, and with supreme providential power He will 
do so. 
By contrast with the Epicureans, the Stoics strongly defended a concept 
of providence. How could pleasure lead to real happiness unless all 
is arranged by God for the best? Evidence of divine providence was 
adduced from the design of the world, with its order and vitality. 
God has necessarily formed the world, He will take it back into 
Himself through a universal conflagration, and this process 
continually repeats itself, with each new world resembling its 
predecessor in all particulars, every individual man, for example, 
occurring in each successive world and performing the identical 
actions that he performed in his previous existence. 
12 By 
affirming providence, the Stoic faces the truth of his situation, which 
he cannot alter, but in which he can actively participate. 
Providence here is hardly distinguishable from a fatalistic conception 
which denies that there is any ultimate distinction between good and 
evil. The totality of the cosmos is perfect, even if, when viewed 
separately, parts of it appear imperfect. This essential determinism 
is modified, the Stoics claimed, by human freedom, which allows a man 
to vary his perception of, and attitude towards, events, to see and 
welcome them as the expression of the -WVCujWO- , Universal Reason, or 
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'will of God', which constitutes Reality. Irenaeus fixes on this 
tough fatalism, and denounces it as no better than Epicurean 
libertinism. 13 As we have seen, among the different philosophic 
schools Irenaeus is least hostile to Platonism. In the Timaeus, 
the Craftsman or Demiurge produces a world which will reflect, albeit 
imperfectly, the beauty of the transcendent Ideas. This creative 
'act' is an overflowing of divine goodness, which nevertheless 
leaves God wholly self-sufficient and in need of nothing: 'creation' 
accords neither with Epicurean chance nor with Stoic necessity. 
This aspect of Plato's teaching is singled out for praise by Irenaeus, 
especially as it is accompanied in Plato by the thought that God 
exercises a just and providential judgement. 
14 
There are two chief tensions latent in Plato's scheme. In the first 
place, 'the presence of evil in the world arguably offers to Platonism 
a challenge even more acute than to Christian teaching which acknow- 
ledges a Fall. Later Platonists attempted to lessen this tension 
by developing further the doctrine of a hierarchy of metaphysical 
and moral being which is sketched by Plato himself. In Neo-Platonism 
the depreciation of matter is much sharper than in Plato, but this 
is distinguished. from Gnosticism, inter alia, by a strong emphasis upon 
the universal agency of soul. In the second place, there is a tension 
within the Platonic doctrine of God: while the created world is the 
outflow of His goodness, He nevertheless remains unconcerned, self- 
sufficient and in need of nothing.:, Later Platonists attempted to 
ease this tension by linking more closely the supreme God and the 
transcendent Ideas, which in Philo and Middle Platonism become lodged 
in the mind of the supreme God. 
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As we have indipated, Irenaeus is relatively favourably disposed to 
the Platonic understanding of God's relation to the world, even if 
his teaching has a distinctively Christian character. This Platonic 
inclination is evidenced, for example, by the fact that both tensions 
which we have identified in Plato, recur in Irenaeus. We have 
already discussed the problem of the changelessness of God, and we 
will consider the relation of created reality to evil in the next 
chapter. 
Although on the surface Irenaeus appears to be hostile towards the 
Stoic conception, to some extend he modifies the dualism inherent 
in Plato's position by adopting a viewpoint with features akin to 
those found in Stoic,, thought. We discussed at some length in the 
last chapter the proposition that partly in reaction to Gnosticism, 
and partly in reflection of contemporary philosophy, Irenaeus 
conceived the relation between God and creation as too close and 
necessary. At the conclusion of Chapter Two we asked analogous 
questions about his view of time as determined by the abiding reality 
z 
of the AvOkKGqýuOIALWrT of all things in Christ. Similar questions 
confront us now in relation to his doctrine of providence, and to other 
areas of the doctrine of creation which will be considered. We will 
examine these influences on his doctrine of providence as they are 
exhibited in his understanding of the relation between providence and 
judgement, his use of secular analogies to explicate providence, the 
argument from providence to the existence of God, and his discussion 
of the relation between created and uncreated Light. 
Providence and Judgement 
Despite their differences, both Stoic and Platonic speculations upon 
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the theme of providence were in large part motivated by a concern to 
find a rational basis for morality. Although partially expressing 
a disillusionment with the traditional myths of the gods, writers in 
both traditions attempted to construct a theological model of the 
cosmos in order to portray the meaning and goal of human life. 
To encourage appropriate moral restraints in men, this embraced a 
system of reward and punishment for good works, and early Christian 
writers readily seized upon such a point of contact with their own 
beliefs. 15 A good example of this recognition is provided by Clement 
of Alexandria, a writer much influenced by Stoic and Platonic ideas: 
But the things which co-operate in the discovery of 
truth are not to be rejected. Philosophy, accordingly, 
which proclaims a Providence, and the recompense of a 
life of felicity, and the punishment, on the other 
hand, of a life of misery, teaches theology comprehensively. 
(Strom. VI. 15) 
Similar thoughts are commonplace in the writings of the Apologists, 
as the following extracts illustrate: 
So then, if we did not think that God presided over 
the human race, would we remain so pure? Certainly 
not! ..... Plato said that Minos and Rhadamanthys . 
would judge and punish evil men; we say that no one, 
not a Minos or a Rhadamanthys or the father of them 
both (Zeus) will escape the judgement of God. 
(Athenagoras, Legatio, 12.2. ) 
For such poets as Homer and Hesiod.... spoke out of 
imagination and error ..... except that sometimes 
some poets, becoming sober in soul and departing 
from the demons, made statements in agreement 
with those of the prophets in order to bear witness 
to themselves and to all men concerning the sole 
rule of God and the judgement and the other 
matters they discussed. (Theophilus, Ad Autolycum, 
11.8) 
Irenaeus makes analogous statements about providence and judgement, 
his interests focussed in part by Marcion's denial of providence 
2+16 
and judgement alike: 
The God, therefore, who does benevolently cause 
His sun to rise upon all, and sends rain upon 
the just and the unjust, shall judge those who, 
enjoying his equally distributed kindness, have 
led lives not corresponding to the dignity of His 
bounty ......... Plato is proved to be more religious 
....... for he allowed that same God was both just 
and good, having power over all things, and Himself 
executing judgement ..... (III. 25.4f), 
We discussed the immediately preceding passage in Chapter One, in 
the context of Irenaeus' treatment of mercy and justice as divine 
attributes. Here we are concerned primarily with the universality 
of the conception of the providence of God, which prompts for 
intellectual coherence the affirmation of a highest common factor 
of 'natural justice' to bind together the history of Israel and the 
Church with that of the wider history of creation. Such an affirm- 
ation is not unreasonable, given the scriptural support in both 
Testaments for a universal judgement according to works, 
16 but in 
Irenaeus, as in the second-century Apologists, it is not put in a 
sufficiently mysterious, Christological key. This is not to claim 
that Irenaeus was unaware of the doctrine of the forgiveness of 
sins, but that he failed adequately to integrate this with his 
17 teaching on providence and judgement. This is illustrated with 
particular clarity in the anti-Marcionite chapters in Book Four of 
A. H. where he is forced into rather tendentious exegesis of Old 
Testament passages which do not condemn, or appear even to acquiesce 
in, what might reliably be identified as sin. For example, in 
IV. 3l'Irenaeus discusses the case of Lot's incest, as presented in 
Genesis 19. Before proceeding to exculpate Lot on the grounds of 
his involuntary participation in the incest, and to plead the 
2+7 
'simplicity and ignorance' of his daughters, Irenaeus sets down the 
basis for interpreting those scriptural passages which relate the 
'misdeeds' of the patriarchs and prophets. One the one hand, we 
should'give thanks to God on their behalf, inasmuch as their sins 
have been forgiven them through the advent of our Lord', and, on the 
other hand, we should not pass judgement where Scripture itself does 
not, 'for we are not more exact than God, nor can we be superior to 
our Master; but we should search for a typological meaning'. 
18 
The underlying issue of the relation between the mercy and justice of 
God, as exhibited and revealed in the peculiar history of Israel, 
culminating in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, is 
undoubtedly among the most difficult in Christian theology. Having 
made a determined effort in chapters 9 and 11 of the Epistle to the 
Romans to think the questions through, St. Paul testifies to the 
mystery in words which have proved a solace to many subsequent 
interpreters: 
0 the depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge 
of God! How unsearchable are His judgements and 
how inscrutable His ways! (Romans 11: 33) 
19 Irenaeus refers to this verse , but uses it to justify theological 
ignorance rather than to stimulate enquiry. In an anti-Gnostic 
context this is understandable, for subtle theological discussion 
could easily be misconstrued, but an avenue is left open for 
simplicity to replace subklety. General affirmations of divine 
providence illustrate this process, as is nicely shown by Irenaeus, 
attempt to extend his anthropological understanding of providence 
and judgement into the animal kingdom: 
2+8 
And on his account all things have been placed 
under the sway of Him who is styled the Most 
High, and the Almighty.... How then could it 
be, that those angels who were superior to us, 
or even He whom they call the Creator of the 
world, did not know the Almighty, when even 
dumb animals tremble and yield at the invocation 
of His name? (11.6.2) 20 
According to the New Testament there is a sense in which God has put 
'everything in subjection to Him, leaving nothing outside His control', 
but Irenaeus does less than justice to the continuation of Hebrews 2: 8f: 
As it is, we do not yet see everything in subjection 
to Him. But we see Jesus, who for a little while was 
made lower than the angels, crowned with glory and 
honour because of the suffering of death, so that by 
the grace of God He might taste death for every one. 
In his emphasis upon the themes of general providence and judgement, 
Irenaeus is typical of second-century Christian writers. It is 
against this background that we should interpret the interesting 
development, towards the middle of the second century, of speculation 
upon the 'cosmic cross', found in both orthodox and Gnostic writers, 
to express the universality of the activity of the risen Christ. 
21 
This is, in part, an attempt to baptise the ideas of general providence 
which we have been considering. Doubtless due to the proximity of the 
Gnostic speculations, Irenaeus introduces the idea of the 'cosmic cross, 
only towards the end of Book Five 
22 
of A. H., and then, even more 
explicitly, in the Demonstration: 
So by the obedience, whereby He obeyed unto death, 
hanging on the tree, He undid the old disobedience 
wrought in the tree. And because He is himself the 
Word of God Almighty, who in His invisible form 
pervades us universally in the whole world, and 
encompasses both its length and breadth and height 
and depth - for by the Word of God everything is 
disposed and administered - the Son of God was 
also crucified in these, imprinted in the form of 
Z4- 
a cross on the universe; for He had necessarily, 
in becoming invisible, to bring to light the 
universality of His cross, in order to show openly 
through His visible form that activity of His: that 
it is He who makes bright the height, that is, what 
is in heaven, and holds the deep, which is in the 
bowels of the earth, and stretches forward and 
extends the length from East to West ..... (Dem. 34) 
There are echoes here of Justin and Plato, as well as of Ephesians 
and Colossians: Christ at the same time gathers together and 
controls heaven and earth, and all that occurs on earth. The 
cosmic cross symbolism of John 12: 32 is also in the background, this 
linking well with the emphasis upon the cosmic cross as bringing 
judgement and giving life, which is found in V. 18.3. Earlier in the 
Demonstration (c. 8) analogous expressions to those in c. 34 are put in 
a context of universal judgement. 
As we have said, the truth in Irenaeus' various statements about 
providence and judgement are compromised by their simplicity) we will 
return to these issues when considering his understanding of the 
freedom of the will. We will now further illustrate this simplicity 
by investigating his use of secular analogies to divine providence'. 
(ii) Secular'Analogies and Illustrations 
The unusual reference in the extract from 11.6.2 quoted above to 
dumb animals trembling and yielding at the invocation of the name of 
God is not explained or expanded by Irenaeus, but on a number of 
occasions he does refer to the divine approval resting upon the Roman 
Empire and its government. This is first introduced in A. H., also 
in 11.6.2., to oppose the Gnostic idea that most people are ignorant 
of the supreme God: Irenaeus replies that just as all people know 
2. So 
and respect (or fear) the Roman Emperor, even if they have not seen 
him, so it is with 
. 
all men, indeed with all creation, and God. 
23 
The same theme reappears in the anti-Marcionite chapters of Book Four, 
partly to counter Marcion's direct arguments against providence and 
the goodness of creation, and partly to argue that if the Roman 
government is basically good, one can hardly quibble at the behaviour 
of the Israelites in Old Testament times. The first exploration of 
this theme in Book Four is in chapter 30, portions of which were quoted 
towards the beginning of the last chapter in connection with Irenaeus, 
attitude towards philosophy. Here he restricts himself to the 
comment that, through the instrumentality of the Romans, 'the world 
is at peace, and we walk on the highways without fear, and sail where 
we will' (IV. 30.3). Church historians have commonly agreed that 
this ease of travel was of significant benefit to the early Christian 
missionary movement, and no question need be raised; but when he 
returns to the theme in chapter 36, further claims are made which 
deserve attention. He introduces a long quotation from Romans 13 as 
follows: 
For He who is good, and righteous, and pure, and 
spotless, will endure nothing evil, nor unjust, 
nor detestable in His wedding chamber. This is 
the Father of our Lord, by whose providence all 
things consist, and all are administered by His 
command; and He confers His free gifts upon 
those to whom it is appropriate; but the most 
righteous Retributor punishes according to 
their deserts, most deservedly, those who are 
ungrateful and insensible of His kindness; and 
therefore does He say, 'He sent His armies, and 
destroyed those murderers, and burned up their 
city' (Mt. 22: 7). He says here, 'His armies', 
because all men are the property of God. 'For 
the earth is the Lord's, and the fulness thereof; 
the world and all that dwell therein' (Ps. 24: 1) ... (IV. 36.6. ) 
Romans 13 receives further exposition in Book Five, chapters 24 and 
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25, ' in Irenaeus' corroboration of his defence of the essential good- 
ness of the human body. Although he acknowledges that there are 
different types of government which have varying attitudes towards 
their subjects, this is explained as determined by God in response to 
the merits of the subjects in question: 
For by whose command men are born, by His command 
Kings also are established, suitable for those who 
at the particular time are ruled by them. For 
some of them are given for the correction and benefit 
of subjects, and the maintenance of justice: others 
again unto fear, and punishment, and rebuke: and yet 
others unto mockery, and reproach, and pride, even as 
men deserve: the just judgement of God, as we said 
before, passing equally over all. ' (V. 24.3) 
In the next chapter, however, Irenaeus does acknowledge a difference 
between 'righteous' and 'legitimate' kings, but contrasts both with 
the sole exception to rulers brought forth by the providence of God, 
that is Antichrist: 
For he being endued with all the power of the devil, 
shall come, not as a righteous king, nor as a 
legitimate king, in subjection to God, but an impious, 
unjust and lawless one; as an apostate, iniquitous 
and murderous; as a robber, summing up (recapitulans) 
in himself satanic apostasy, and setting aside idols 
to persuade men that he is God ...... (V. 25.1) 
Irenaeus supports these statements by quoting from the apocalyptic 
verses in II Thessalonians 2, and from the Book of Daniel. It may 
seem to us a mistake to attempt to identify a specific, literal, 
historical fulfilment of apocalyptic prophecy, 
24 here as in his 
millenarian speculations, although equally we should beware of wishing 
to evacuate hoc est into hoc significat. The better way, surely, is 
to see the mystery of iniquity, symbolised by Antichrist, as under 
the providence of God, along with everything else, and as influencing 
2S2- 
all events in a world which corporately groans in travail. 
25 But 
in the process the concept of providence needs to change somewhat 
from that assumed by Irenaeus to one which perceives in the activity 
of creation a great deal of ebb and flow which is not foreseen or 
predetermined in detail. A simplistic understanding of the role of 
the state does not offer a good analogy to the operation of divine 
providence, unless a simplistic and rather rationalistic concept of 
providence is in view. 
Of course, it is easy to offer anachronistic criticism, however 
merited this may be in relation to the truth as currently perceived. 
26 
But this should not involve significant personal criticism of Irenaeus, 
because there were two features of his environment which encouraged 
him to develop his views in the way that he did. 
In the first place, his basic strategy in countering Gnosticism 
involved the positing of a close relation between creation and 
redemption, and consequently of the goodness of creation. The 
resulting understanding of saving history could too easily threaten to 
sacrifice historical uniqueness to a theoretical divine plan, thus 
pushing, the conception of history and time back towards cyclical Greek 
ideas, to which Gnosticism itself was related. A fully authentic 
Christian confession of the tragedy of sin would have posed too great 
a threat to the rational balance of Irenaeus' scheme, 
_ 
and would have 
demanded a dialogue with, as well as a refutation of, Gnostic and 
Marcionite theology. 
In the second place, the tradition to which Irenaeus was heir contained 
a series of claims about the role of the Roman Empire in God's 
153 fp 
providential plan which pointed Irenaeus in the direction which he 
took. Some writers, for example the Apologists Aristides and Justin, 
and the author of Ad Diognetum, had asserted that God refrained from 
consummating history in the last judgement, with all the negative 
consequences implied therein, because of the existence of the Church. 
27 
Melito of Sardis had made the further claim that by divine providence 
the destinies of Church and Empire were intertwined. 
28 Athenagoras 
does not endorse this specific claim, but almost obsequiously he 
pleads the loyalty of Christians to an Empire which enjoys a 
'profound peace' through the wisdom of its Emperor. 
29 
Typically, Irenaeus attempted a more penetrating integration of these 
ideas into his theology, to provide an analogy to, as well as an 
illustration of, the providence of God. Closely related to this is 
the relationship into which he brings providence and the processes by 
which God is known to man. 
(iii) Providence and Knowledge of God 
We refer back to the concluding section of Chapter One for our 
previous discussion of Irenaeus' account of the revelation of God 
available to man, both from the harmonies of creation and from a 
direct apprehension of God. In the present context we want to draw 
out the connexion between the Irenaean concept of providence and the 
processes by which God is known. The following example indicates 
the closeness of this relation: 
How, again, could either the angels, or the Creator 
of the world, have been ignorant of the Supreme God, 
seeing they were His property, and His creatures, and 
were contained by Him? He might indeed have 
' 
been 
invisible to them on account of His superiority, but 
He could by no means have been unknown to them on 
; Z! 5, i- 
account of His providence. For though it-is true, 
as they declare, that they were very far separated 
from Him through their inferiority, yet, as His 
dominion extended over all of them, it behoved them to 
know their Ruler, and to be aware of this in 
particular, that He who created them is Lord of all. 
For since this invisible essence is mighty, it 
confers on all a profound mental intuition and 
perception of His most powerful, yea, omnipotent 
greatness. (11.6.1. ) 30 
The idea that God is revealed in His works is very common in the 
Fathers, 
31 
and, as we saw in Chap-ter One, this forms an aspect of 
Irenaeus' thought. However, Irenaeus' distinctive way of handling 
the relation between providence and knowledge of God is well 
illustrated by this passage. The invisible Father, who fills all 
things, cannot but be known, if partially and corrigibly, by His 
active presence to His creation. It is not solely that God's 
existence and lordship are to be inferred from the harmony of the 
world and the divine governance, but, in addition, that there is a 
direct apprehension of God by man. In patristic authors this is not 
a common idea, 
32 
and represents a development in Irenaeus from the 
Apologists. 33 An interesting comparison exists here with Theophilus: 
Just as the soul in a man is not seen, since it is 
invisible to men, but is apprehended through the 
movement of the body, so it is that God cannot be 
seen by human eyes but is seen and apprehended 
through His providence and His works ..... As a 
pomegranate, with a rind surrounding it, has 
inside many cells and cases, separated by membranes, 
so the whole creation is surrounded by the Spirit 
of God, and the surrounding Spirit, along with the 
creation, is enclosed by the hand of God. As the 
pomegranate seed, dwelling inside, cannot see 
what is outside the rind since it is itself inside, 
so man, who with the whole creation is enclosed by 
the hand of God, cannot see God. (Ad Autol. 1.5. ) 
Iý 
Irenaeus does not use such spatial analogies to indicate the manner 
of God's relation to the world, and hence his concept of the 
25S 
providence of God undergoes a significant modification. The 
invisible and visible worlds are fully one in the incarnate Son who 
recapitulates the whole history of mankind, expressing perfectly 
that which was only imperfectly true in created reality. A close 
link between the incarnation and creation is thus achieved and exposed, 
which in itself is basically healthy. 
34 However, it is arguably the 
case that Irenaeus offers insufficient safeguards against the opposite 
of the Gnostic danger, and consequently that he asserts too close, or 
necessary, a relation between God and the world. As a final 
illustration of this in the context of the doctrine of providence 
we, will take a brief look at another, related issue. 
(iv) Created and Uncreated Light 
Those verses from the Gospels which speak of God providentially 
sending sun and rain on all men are interpreted by Irenaeus to mean 
that God directly provides the light of the sun. This divine 
provision of light is linked with the intimate presence of God to 
'creation which we have just been discussing: 
To what distance above God do ye lift up your imaginations, 
0 ye rashly elated men? Ye have heard 'that the heavens 
are meted out in the palm of (His) hand' (Is. 40: 12): tell 
me the measure, and recount the endless multitude of cubits, 
-explain to me the fulness, the breadth, the length, the 
height, the beginning and the end of the measurement, - 
things which the heart of man understands not, neither does 
it comprehend them ..... God it is who fills the heavens, 
and searches out the depths; who is also present with every 
one of us ..... For His hand lays hold of all things, and that it is which illumines the heavens, and lightens also 
the reins and the hearts, is also present in hidden things, 
and in our secret thoughts, and does openly nourish and 
preserve us. (IV. 19.2)35 
With the anti-Gnostic context prominent, we are back in the sphere of 
ideas presented in the second half of Book Two of A. H., where the 
tý' 
limits of our scientific knowledge were adduced as evidence for similar 
2.5(0 
limits to our knowledge of God. It is helpful to view Irenaeus' 
remarks from the perspective of modern physics, which understands the 
process of nuclear fusion, by which the sun give light, on the same 
level as its understanding Qf pureý 'earthly' phenomena. Interestingly, 
this perspective arguably is more akin to that found in the Bible than 
that of pre-twentieth-century science, with its sharp distinction 
between organic and inorganic substances, and its materialistic account 
of the latter. In the Old Testament the sun is regarded as neither 
divine nor purely inanimate, 
36 
although a certain change might be 
identified in the New Testament. Nature is now seen to have more 
independence, for example when adverse winds delay and disrupt Paul's 
Journey, 37 and the presence of God to creation takes the explicit 
form of the cross. 
With Irenaeus we are seeing a certain move back towards one aspect of 
the Old Testament witness, with a strong doctrine of providence 
putting the sun under the direct control of God, and even envisaging 
God as the immediate source of the power manifest in its light and 
heart. He is perhaps influenced by the Semitic traditions of Asia 
Minor, 38 as well as by the anti-Gnostic concerns and the philosophical 
influence which we have already discerned. - Espoused by such an 
influential writer as Irenaeus, such ideas easily became established 
in Christian tradition and would not readily be ejected. Thus the 
long delay in the establishment of a view of creation amenable to 
experimental science becomes more easily understood. 
Athanasius provides an interesting illustration of the reproduction 
of these thoughts which we find in Irenaeus. Images of light and of 
the sun are very important to Athanasius, 
39 
and in Contra Gentes 
251 
they play a significant role in his discussion of the harmony of the 
universe. The Irenaean teaching on the direct apprehension of God 
does not appear, but repeatedly Athanasius asserts that God is known 
from the harmony of creation, even if men perverted this knowledge in 
the manner described by Paul in the early chapters of the Epistle to 
the Romans. 40 Having completed a lengthy rejection of idolatry, 
Athanasius develops his argument in an interesting fashion. It can 
hardly be doubted that there is a harmony in the operation of the 
Universe, but when analysed this is remarkable, for there are-so many 
features of created activity which seem to be mutually opposed. How 
can water be carried in clouds, when air is much lighter than water? 
41 
It is precisely this unexpected orderliness 
42 
which points not only 
to a Creator but to a Creator who actively orders the universe: 
He is the good Word of the good Father, and it is He 
who has established the order of all things, reconciling 
opposites and from these forming a single harmony. He, 
the power of God and wisdom of God, turns the heaven, 
has suspended the earth, and by His own will has set it 
resting on nothing. Illuminated by Him, the sun gives 
light to the world, and the moon receives its measure 
of light. Through Him water is suspended in the clouds, 
rains water the earth ..... (C. G. 40) 
Even allowing for the context of opposition to polytheism, there is an 
unsatisfactory feel to these arguments, similar to that which we have 
identified in Irenaeus. There may well be a useful analogy between 
created and uncreated light, but the fundamental distinction between 
Creator and creation must be upheld. 
43 One side of Irenaeus' 
theology does affirm a very clear distinction between God and creation, 
but, as we shall see in connection with his theodicy, this inclines 
towards the platonic dualism between Being and becoming. Partly 
because this dualism is present in a radical form in Gnosticism, the 
other side of Irenaeus' theology, which we are presently examining, 
has a certain tendency towards monism. 
ass 
Individual and General Providence 
The four subjects discussed above have demonstrated the influence upon 
Irenaeus' anti-Gnostic theology of the rather static model of 
providence in the Greek conception of the universe as a harmoniously 
organised cosmos, as influenced and modified by more primitive 
semitic ideas. 
44 
What is missing is an appreciation of the 
mysterious if relative independence of the activity of creation from 
the direct control of God, as this is indicated, above all, in the New 
Testament reflection upon the cross. There a mysterious tension is 
maintained in the perception of the cross as both the work of sinful 
men'but also as a fulfilment of the divine plan. The responsibility 
of men is not denied, but in these same events is disclosed the 
ultimate wisdom of-God, whose power is exhibited in the folly of the 
cross. The Gospel writers present this tension in their narration 
of the parables of Jesus, which tell of the strange and unexpected 
nature of the Kingdom of God. The relation of God to the world is 
indirect, if definite; allusive, if dramatic. 
45 
To offer this criticism of Irenaeus is by no means to assert that his 
understanding of providence was unaffected by the biblical development 
of the theme. In particular, we should note the emphasis he places 
upon the value and freedom of the individual. In their different 
ways both Stoic and Platonic thought asserted a general, but eschewed 
an individual, concept of providence. 
46 
By contrast, the Judaeo- 
Christian tradition tended to approach general providence through and 
in relation to a confession of the particular action of God. This 
encouraged a full doctrine of creation, which in turn reflected back 
upon the underlying conception of divine action. 
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We can see the rationale of the process by briefly reconsidering the 
development of the doctrine of creation out of nothing. On the one 
hand, this indicated the particularity of the divine activity in its 
assertion that creation is fully dependent upon God for its origin 
and continuation alike. But precisely these ideas undercut the 
general philosophical idea of providence, for belief in the pre- 
existence of matter inevitably produced a belief in providence as the 
imposition upon it of universal form. By contrast, the doctrine of 
creation out of nothing stated that matter, the basic principle of 
individuation according to the philosophical conceptuality of the day, 
was as much under the providence of God as the realm of the soul or 
intellect. Christian theology was thereby driven to accord a much 
more central role to the individual than was common in the surrounding 
culture: a creator who creates each individual would surely care for 
each individual 
17 In its early Christian development, this perception 
was compromised by a simplistic understanding of judgement according 
to universal laws, as we have seen, but the thrust towards a develop- 
ment of the concept of the individual person was there, and is clearly 
exhibited in Irenaeus. 
This development in Christian theology was aided by the parallel 
development of a trinitarian concept of God, as a living, acting God. 
For Irenaeus, as we have seen, in the-trinitarian economy of creation 
and redemption there is a double movement from Father through the Son 
and in the Spirit, and in reverse as humanity is re-presented to the 
Father. Individual existence and meaning is established as a person 
iis both constituted by, and caught up in, this dynamic process. 
48 
Today, by a curious inversion, the concept of-the individual, through 
being removed from its proper context of creation and thus being 
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treated as an atomistic unit, is threatened by absorption in a new 
collectivism. Western democracy, if conceived and practised as if 
people are beans rattling in a can, may illustrate this as powerfully 
as the more obvious example of totalitarianism. The true concept of 
the individual person is subtle and open to various misinterpretations. 
It is towards Irenaeus' anthropology that we now turn, beginning our 
discussion with a consideration of the question, closely related to 
that of providence, of the freedom of the will. 
Created Freedom 
Introduction 
According to Kant, the three most intractable problems of philosophy 
are God, freedom and immortality. 
49 The question of the existence 
and nature of created freedom has been the subject of extensive 
discussion, not least in recent decades. 
50 In presenting and 
assessing Irenaeus' understanding of freedom in creation we cannot, 
and should not, avoid an implicit dialogue with the subsequent 
controversies, from Origen, Pelagius and Augustine, to the present day. 
For this reason, a few general remarks in clarification are necessary. 
Broadly speaking, two concepts of freedom have been recognised: on the 
one hand, freedom from constraint, and, on the other hand, rational, 
controlled behaviour which is partly, but not wholly, determined by 
factors external to the agent concerned. They might be called 
'respectively 'negative' and 'positive' freedom, orlireedom from, 
and 'freedom for,. The use of the same word for both forms of 
'freedom' has undoubtedly engendered a good deal of confusion in what 
is, in any case, an intrinsically, difficult area 
51 
. As we shall see, 
tboth ideas are prominent in Ir4pnaeus and it may be that Irenaeus is an 
20 
% important source of subsequent controversy and confusion. A brief 
glance at the place 'freedom' has in the Bible is important. As we 
have been sharply reminded by liberation theology, freedom, in the 
sense of the event rather than the concept of liberation is-. a". basic 
theme of biblical theology. The story of Exodus is at the theological 
centre of the Old Testament, even if such motifs as the fall and the 
exile must not be overlooked. 
52 Among its neighbours, Israel was the 
only nation in which the existence of slavery was radically questioned. 
53 
Yahweh Himself is ýhe free God, who is not bound to any sanctuary or 
image, and He calls His people to freedom. 
Salvation as liberation is also a basic theme of the New Testament, 
especially in John and Paul. 
54 As in the Old Testament, the emphasis 
is on the event, or gift, of liberation, but we also see, especially 
in Paul, the use of a concept of freedom (ZXfiv9GPo-) which had natural 
associations both with the Greek ideal of the free citizen as distinct 
from the slave, and, at least to educated readers, with the inwardly- 
free Stoic sage who is not a slave of his passions. It is no 
surprise that the leader of the Gentile mission should make extensive 
use of this. established conceptuality to commend and explain the reality 
of freedom, which was at the centre of the Gospel message. Clearly 
these ideas received ccnsiderable modification as they were baptised 
into Christian usage, not least by the strongly eschatological key 
into which they were put. 
55 There are signs even within the New 
Testament itself 
56 that the early Church struggled fully to understand 
Pauline theology, and a similar pattern emerges in the second century. 
Justin Martyr illustrates this grappling with the reality and concept 
of liberation, for his theology exhibits 'the supreme importance of 
2Q 
freedom' 57 This emphasis upon the freedom of the will provides Justin's 
chief defence of the power and goodness of God, and the essential good- 
ness of creation, in the face of evil-.. This involved the understanding 
of just judgement which we have already described, and Justin's refer- 
ences to the subject are generally accompanied by assertions of a freedom 
of choice between good and evil granted to manF Clearly in the theology 
of Justin we are seeing a continuation of the interaction between Greek 
and Biblical views of freedom, stimulated by the apologetic context in 
which he wrote. In the process, a significant change in the concept 
of freedom occurred, from a primary emphasis in Paul upon 'positive' 
freedom, to 'negative' freedom in Justin. 59 
In fairness to Justin, he allows a 'positive' view of freedom a place 
alongside the doctrine of autexousia , as is shown by his assertion 
that it belongs equally to men and to angels, 
60 
and by his develop- 
ment of the idea of the 
JvOycS 
, or 
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persuading men freely to perceive and to follow the path of righteousness. 
In addition to the rather difficult background in Justin, Irenaeus had 
to contend with Gnostic views of freedom. The situation here is 
confused, for Gnosticism contained both the radical denial and radical 
affirmation of 'freedom': on the one hand, the world is an alien, 
unredeemed place, ruled by FAte, but, on the other hand, the knowledge 
of this alienation relieves one of responsibility for the world, and 
everything is permitted. Gnostics practised both extremes of asceticism 
and-libertinism, although modern research has tended to give more emphasis 
to the former. Although they have something in c 
61 
. ommon, at least'at 
certain points, these two approaches to freedom assume very different 
views of the created order. - Yet the choice was not simply between the 
W 
optimism of the Apologists and the pessimism of the Gnostics, even if 
the truth approximated more closely to the former. For in a sense, 
judged from the perspective of Paul, the Gnostics were right: the 
world is in a sorry state, as the cross has demonstrated. What the 
Gnostics failed to see was that redemption had come through that same 
cross. While he was not as blind to Paul and John as Justin, we will 
see how Irenaeus failed fully to perceive this particular truth of the 
Gnostic position, when challenged to bring together the truths, or elements 
of the truth, attested by both Apologists and Gnostics. 
Glancing now at the broader background, Irenaeus occupies a very 
interesting position in the development of the notions of freedom and 
authority in the early church. Morality ultimately demands that 
authority should operate by obligation rather than by compulsion, and 
obligation presupposes a certain degree of 'negative' freedom, the 
character of which is transformed in the acceptance of obligation. 
Thus, in the New Testament, there are strong affirmations of both 
apostolic authority, whereby the mind of Christ is expressed, and 
of the spiritual liberty of the Christian. More than anyone else, it 
was St. Paul who tried to think together these two aspects of Christian 
truth, with his interpretation of freedom in terms of spiritual life 
and love. His own possession of the freedom conferred by Roman citizen- 
ship provided a useful analogy to Christian freedom, precisely because 
it was a gift and privilege conferred by the authority of Rome. Thus, 
in a similar way, Christian freedom was for him a gift and privilege 
conferred by the citizenship of heaven, which only those in Christ 
could attain. It could hardly have occurred to St. Paul to construe 
freedom in our modern 'negative' sense, as characterising a sphere of 
toleration where authority refrains from operating. 
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St. Paul's remarkable attempt to demonstrate how authority and freedom 
were properly to be understood as correlative did not lack its own 
tensions, and was soon threatened by the gradual demise of a key 
component of his position, the belief that the Spirit was vividly 
alive in the whole body of Christians. The Church began to include 
many for whom St. Paul's conception of spiritual liberty meant relatively 
little, and, in addition, the leaders of the Church embraced a rather 
different understanding of their apostolic ministry from that of St. 
Paul. Missionary zeal to establish new Churches in the eschatological 
power of the Spirit gradually gave way to a guarding of the faith with 
which the Church had been entrusted, a faith which received further 
definition when the misinterpretations of heretics demanded. In the 
pr ocess, faith came gradually to be identified less with the joyful 
embracing of new life in Christ than with correct opinion concerning Him. 
Gradually, subtly, but inevitably, the test of such orthodoxy was 
regarded as assent to propositions. As a result, freedom lost its 
sense of release from false constraints into the 'glad service' of the 
Creator and Redeemer who had adopted Christians as His children, and became 
interpreted as the right to hold private opinions in matters 16ft undefined 
by authority, the presence of the Spirit being more often associated with 
the established authorities. Thus, freedom and authority, instead of 
being correlative, were seen as opposed to each other. This development 
reached its zenith beyond the patristic age, but its roots-. struck early 
in the history of the Church, and it is against this overall background 
that we should view the competing notions of freedom which are espoused 
by Irenaeus, as he wrestles with the immediate questions posed by the 




Freedom in Irenaeus 
A series of passages in the last two books of A. H. and in the 
2 Demonstration refer to man as atur6ýcorlotS , and other passages assume 
such attribution, especially when a 'free-will' theodicy is being 
advanced. 
63 In part he simply follows the tradition which we have 
observed in Justin, in part he wishes to assert a close relation 
between God and man, and therefore between divine and human freedom, 
64 
and in part he is reacting to the fatalism of his opponents. 
Perhaps due to-the-rather confused picture which we have noted in 
Gnostic thought, the strong emphasis upon the freedom of the will 
emerges most clearly in his refutation of Marcion. According to him, 
the Good God's relation to the world was completely unexpected and 
undeserved: a paradoxical act of pure grace quite apart from any call 
I 
to repentance, or from any appreciation of atonement and judgement. 
It is in response to this radical and distorted neo-Paulinism that 
Irenaeus presents the three remarkable chapters of A. H. IV. 37-39, 
which deal extensively with the theme of the freedom of the will. 
These chapters are closely, if repetitively, argued and it is not 
necessary to quote from them to demonstrate the points being made. 
Marcion's God is coercive, and unjustly ignores the consequences of 
sin, which are real and result from a misuse of free will. The 
gratuitous and instantaneous salvation effected by Marcion's Good God 
does not respect the nature of persons, who, as creatures of flesh 
and blood, need to mature slowly to be enabled to overcome the 
inevitable drawbacks associated with their creatureinature. Here we 
see even within these chapters evidence of ideas which modify the pure 
concept of autexousia, for the freedom of man is limited both by his 
inevitably imperfect created nature 
65 
and his need to await 'a 
Z(Of. 
faculty of the Uncreated, through the gratuitous bestowal of eternal 
existence upon them by God' (IV. 38.3). The apparent 'Pelagianism' 
of his teaching upon judgement and autexousia will be discussed in the 
next section, and the interesting remarks about the imperfection of 
created things in our later consideration of his theodicy. For the 
present, we will illustrate how Irenaeus has departed from certain 
prominent aspects of biblical teaching by examining his view of the 
ability of man to know the difference between good and evil. 
For after His great kindness He graciously conferred 
good (upon us), and made men like Himself, in their 
own power .... that man should be made after the image 
and likeness of God, having received the knowledge 
of good and evil. (IV. 38.4) 
Man has received the knowledge of good and evil.... 
that the eye of the mind, receiving experience of both, 
may with judgement make choice of the better things... 
(IV. 39.1) 
Clearly Irenaeus does not anticipate the tradition springing from' 
Augustine, and embraced by the Reformers, that the prohibition of the 
fruit of the tree of good and evil was a neutral test, failure in 
which by Adam occasioned a radical fall. Rather, he views the know- 
ledge of good and evil as approximating to divine knowledge, and 
therefore to divine power and freedom. With this interpretation 
Irenaeus anticipates the predominant view of modern exegetes that to 
know the differentiation of good and evil is to become like God. 
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Irenaeus presents this as unambiguously a good thing, and it-i§, here 
that there is a sharp contrast with Genesis 1-3, where man is prohibited 
from grasping this knowledge. According to these chapters, man is 
forbidden from seeking the autexousia which would enable him to choose 
and decide for himself in the matter of knowledge of ' and 
therefore 
power over, good and evil. Man can eat of every tree, including the 
tree of life, provided that he abstains from claiming that equality 
U7 
with'-God symbolised by the tree of good and evil. Once he has eaten, 
from the tree of knowledge of good and evil, he is prevented from 
eating from the tree of life, for having presumed to be the source of 
life, a mortal conflict would ensue if he came into direct contact with 
the true Source of Life. This is surely how these chapters of Genesis 
should be interpreted, and hencethe possession of the knowledge of good 
and evil is not unambiguously beneficial to man. It is as if, when 
Genesis I and 3 are put together, we obtain a confrontation between 
two differing conceptions of the divine image, with Irenaeus failing 
properly to appreciate the emphasis of Genesis 3, and therefore on 
occasion lapsing into suspiciously 'Pelagian' statements. 
68 With this 
aspect of Irenaeus' theology we are seeing again that curious, if 
understandable, process whereby an insufficient distinction between God 
and man provokes a counterbalancing dualism. For man to have freedom 
analogous to that of God inevitably constitutes man as existent over 
against God, if not as His enemy, then on neutral territory. 
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However, if this tendency is regrettable, we must set it alongside 
another feature of Irenaeus' thought which points in a different 
direction. 
(iii) Positive Freedom in Irenaeus 
Alongside the disputed Gnostic teaching on the 'neutral' freedom of the 
WUYLKOL, 
, we find the assertion that the IrV6výAoL-r%v-cL have been freed 
from bondage to this world, and especially to the body, by the coming 
of the Aeon Christ. 
70 
Irenaeus frequently claims that under the new 
covenant Christ brought freedom to the world, although he is careful 
to. avoid any suggestion that this freedom liberated man from the 
demands and limitations of created existence. 
71 
The idea that the 
preaching of the Gospel has, by an act of God, brought liberty, is 
ZGS 
clearly of considerable importance for Irenaeus. We should note some 
characteristic emphases here, before looking more broadly at the 
coherence of the different concepts of freedom employed by him with 
his doctrine of providence. 
In the first place, given the anti-Gnostic and anti-Marcionite context, 
Irenaeus often draws a surprisingly sharp contrast between freedom 
under the new covenant and bondage under the old covenant. This 
theme is particularly prominent in the early chapters of Book Four, 
where he tries to explain the true meaning of various verses and 
incidents from the Bible which appeared on the surface to support 
Gnostic and Marcionite positions. In order to link and to distinguish 
the two covenants, Irenaeus develops his idea of the progressive 
unfolding of the revelation of God as one covenant is superseded by 
the next: 
Further, also, concerning Jerusalem and the Lord, 
they venture to assert that, if it had been 'the 
city of the great King' (Matt. 5: 35), it would 
not have been deserted. This is just as if any 
one should say, that if straw were a creation of 
God, it would never part company with the wheat; 
and that the vine twigs if made by God, would 
never be lopped away and deprived of the clusters 
* *** So also Jerusalem, which had in herself borne ; 
he'yoke of bondage ... when the fruit of liberty had 
come.... was deservedly forsaken.... For all things 
which have a beginning in time must of course have 
an end in time also. (IV. 4.1)72 
We see here another example of that rationalisation of the mystery of 
God's dealings with Israel upon which we have already commented. In 
a similar way, in order to avoid falling into that very denigration 
of the old covenant which he was anxious to avoid, Irenaeus can speak 
of the new covenant of liberty deepening the moral or natural 
aspects of the old law. 
73 Arguably both the ordinances of the old 
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covenant, and the eschatological teaching of the Sermon on the Mount, 
require a more Christological interpretation than Irenaeus allows. 
.D 
The theme of and the linking of creation and 
redemption in the Adam-Christ typology, point to this Christological 
interpretation, but the integration is not fully achieved by Irenaeus 
himself. 74 
We should note, however, that in Book Five of A. H. the theme of the 
present liberty of the new covenant largely disappears from view. 
The predominant emphasis of the early chapters, upon the salvation of 
the flesh by the omnipotent action of God, leads to a stress upon 
the presence of God as Holy Spirit to man. That His presence 
produces liberty 
75 is not denied, but the emphasis is more upon 
the dependence of man upon God than upon his liberation as man. 
Indeed, the eschatological perspective which is opened up in Book 
Five leads to the assertion that the liberation of creation fundamen- 
tally will only be revealed in the future consummation. 
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Clearly there is a considerable measure of fluidity and ambiguity in 
Irenaeus' account of created freedom, even within the confines of his 
understanding of the 
4cuU" brought by Christ. Often the 
different themes are simply developed in isolation, but there are 
indications of attempts to relate them in a coherent fashion. 
Three strands may be discerned here. First, there are occasions 
while he speaks, in effect, of a co-operation between God and man 
which deepens a relationship initiated and made possible by God 
Himself. 
For He did not set us free for this purpose, that 
we should depart from Him (no one, indeed, while 
placed out of reach of the Lord's benefits, has 
ýZlo 
power to procure for himself the means of salvation), 
but that the more we receive His grace, the more we 
should love Him. Now the more we. have loved Him, 
the more glory shall we receive from Him, when we 
are continually in the presence of the Father. (IV. 13.3)77 
We examined related passages from the subsequent chapters of A. H. 
in the last chapter, where we identified certain ambiguities in 
Irenaeus' discussion of the divine motivation for, and need of, 
creation. The positive contribution which should be noted here is 
Irenaeus' orientation towards a dynamic, historical view of personal 
development: man is characterised by freedom and self-responsibility, 
growing to maturity through the exercise of that freedom which, by 
divine gift, is his privilege. This growth issues in the develop- 
ment of freedom itself from possiblity to actuality, from a negative 
self-orientation to a positive relation to God, both stimulated and 
evidenced by a growing mastery over sin. Secondly, potentially 
more fruitful light is shed upon the relation between autexousia and 
J% eU 9-S P Lot- from the link established between creation and redemption 
in the Adam-Christ typology. As has often been noted, the Irenaean 
concept of the of all things in Christ contains both 
the notion of the restoration of what was lost in Adam and the 
elevation of Adam to a higher state of being. Thus through the use 
of this concept, the created autexousia of man is seen as restored and 
'2 transformed into GýSVDEPIOL in Christ, the action of Christ being at 
the centre of time and thereby effective both for all time, as the 
basis of created autexousia, and for the special time of the Church, 
the new covenant of liberty. Irenaeus does not attempt such a precise 
analysis, but there are passages which point in this direction , for 
example: 
But this is Adam ..... the first formed man ..... and 
211 
as we are from him, therefore have we inherited 
his title. But inasmuch as man is saved, it 
is fitting that he who was created the original 
man should be saved ..... For God is neither 
devoid of power nor of justice, who has 
afforded help to man, and restored him to his 
own liberty. (111.23.2. ) 
The important question here concerns the relation between Adam as 
an individual and as the representative man. In Irenaeus there 
is-always a tendency for these two aspects of 'Adam' to merge, thus 
facilitating the conceptualization of the relation between creation 
and redemption which sketched above. 
78 This almost mystical view of 
the redemptive recapitulation of creation qualifies the strand of 
Irenaeus' theology involving ideas of merit and judgement. Just as 
the contemporary Eastern Fathers did not easily understand the 
questions involved in the Pelagian controversy, but preferred to think 
in categories of a progressive and never ending growth towards God, so 
Irenaeus' ostensibly 'pre-Pelagian' espousal of the concept of 
autexousia, with the associated idea of judgement by merit, has to be 
viewed within the overarching scheme of a theology of the whole 
history of mankind which fulfils the divine plan. Therefore we 
should beware of reading back into Irenaeus the unfortunate extremes 
of later Western theology, even if the seeds are nevertheless visible. 
The third way in which Irenaeus begins to link the human possession 
of freedom with the divine liberation of man develops the insights 
provided by the Adam-Christ typology, and involves the idea of God as 
patient and long-suffering. This aspect was explored in more detail 
in Chapter One in connection with his doctrine of God, but in the 
present context we should draw out the implications for the relation 
between divine and human action. God has created man as free, that 
is, in His likeness, 79 and therefore as both freely independent 
272- 
of God and yet naturally orientated towards Him. In other words, 
although God is not coercive in His dealings with man, there is a 
proper sense in which He is persuasive. 
80 
The form of this 
persuasion is the skilfully executed plan of creation and salvation, 
encompassing both the action of God in sending the prophets and 
Jesus Christ, and the action of God in continmally testing and 
disciplining man in the exercise of his freedom. 
And indeed those things are not esteemed so highly 
which come spontaneously, as those which are 
reached by much anxious care. Since, then, this 
power has been conferred upon us, both the Lord 
has taught and the apostle has enjoined us the more 
to love God, that we may reach this (prize) for 
ourselves by striving after it ..... The Lord has 
therefore endured all these things on our behalf, 
in order that we, having been instructed by means 
of them all, might be in all respects on our 
guard for the time to come, and that having 
been rationally taught to love God, we may continue 
in His perfect love: for God has displayed long- 
suffering in the case of man's apostasy ..... that 
the Church may be fashioned after the image of 
His Son, and that man may finally be brought to 
maturity at some future time, becoming ripe 
through such privileges to see and comprehend God. 
(IV. 37.7) 
These three approaches to relating the concepts of divine and human 
activity in the liberation of man show both the breadth and subtlety 
of Irenaeus' theology, and its relatively undeveloped character. 
Each is characterised, however, by a certain tendency towards 
rationalism: the co-operation of God with man, the all-encompassing 
recapitulation of man in Jesus Christ, and the 'rational education, 
of man to love God. Irenaeus' understanding of God ultimately fails 
to do justice to the mystery of the holy love of God who freely acts 
and chooses; for Irenaeus the anti-Gnostic emphasis upon God as 'one 
and the same' 
81 
tended to foster a rather Stoic view of God in His 
universal activity, despite all the forces leading him . to a fuller 
. 1,13 
appreciation of the living God attested in the Bible. Once again, 
I 
we see how monistic and dualistic tendencies can reinforce each other., 
Concluding Reflections 
I have argued that the various attempts of Irenaeus to understand the 
providential ordering of the created universe, although containing many 
splendid insights, are compromised by the adoption of a doctrine of 
God which is ultimately too static, and a relation between God and 
the world which is too necessitarian. The teaching on human 
autexousia, while formally in contrast, in practice supports this 
scheme. 
Irenaeus' theology of creation needs to recognise that there is a 
sense in which God put Himself, as it were, 'at risk' in creatively 
evoking the'natural world, and especially self-conscious man within it. 
This is not to advocate the existentialist view that man has such 
radical freedom that it would not be possible for him to act freely 
and at the same time fulfil the providential plan of God, except by 
coincidence. Modern analysis of the concept of freedom has shown how 
free actions are not necessarilly uncaused in all or most details, 
82 
but, if men have free willthen it follows both that complete explan- 
ations of their actions cannot be given, and that it is possible that 
they could frustrate the achievement of the divine plan. Arguably, 
Irenaeus does justice neither to the-mystery of free action nor to the 
vagaries of its income. We can see here the influence upon him of 
the general belief of the ancient world that the entire system of 
natural causes could be understood by analogy from human action: for 
example, a man using a stick. On the one hand, such a conception 
breeds an optimism which is opposed by the stark reality of life; but 
Z-7, j- 
on the other hand, in order to bring the theory into balance with 
observable facts, a belief isEtimulated that something, somewherehas 
gone badly, even hopelessly or inevitably, wrong with parts of the 
universe. A conception of the world which is too optimistic (in the 
technical sense) readily breeds a counter-balancing pessimism. 
Where does this leave the doctrine of providence? Is God ultimately 
subject to frustration by human activity? What are the proper limits 
of a concept of divine vulnerability? At this point a full theology 
of the cross is essential, for just as suffering and love are 
corollaries in human experience, so the infinite love of God for His 
creation involved the 'infinite' vulnerability demonstrated on the 
cross. The vulnerability of the cross, implied in the very act of 
creation, is reflected throughout history, as the purposive love of 
God encounters resistance and frustration. To continue to speak of 
providence in the traditional sense then requires us to attribute to 
God an attitude of 'flexible response' to the somewhat unpredictable 
situations thrown up by the course of history. The nature of such 
'flexible response' is not easy to specify in human language, and we 
must always beware of importing distortion from analogous ideas in 
human society - one thinks, immediately, of the place a notion of 
'flexible response' has in NATO nuclear planning! But we can, I think, 
affirm that, in a manner of speaking, God has chosen to'come to terms' 
with the world, as a result of this free choice to create. This 
coming to terms with creation is focused in the event of Jesus Christ, 
who is to be understood by reference to the central co-ordinates of 
incarnation and atonement, the uniqueness of which cannot fully be 
captured in words or theories. To suggest that the God disclosed in 
the incarnation is vulnerable to the choices exercised by His creation 
does not necessarily imply that God is weak; the converse could be 
I 
asserted: vulnerability is freely accepted by God in the act and 
consequence of creation precisely because, as the God who is capable 
of the novelty of creation, He is infinitely equipped with a resource- 
fulness which will allow him to secure a wholesome outcome to the adven- 
ture-of creation and redemption. That is to say, rather than speak 
with Irenaeus simply of the plan of God for His world, we should also 
recognise the infinite number of sub-plans which God will employ to 
secure a satisfactory fulfilment of His overall plan. The God who, 
in Irenaean terms, is rich, is thereby resourceful and adaptable. 
On occasions, Irenaeus can begin to forge a link between the riches 
and resourcefulness of God, but the axiom of unchangeability ensures 
that the understanding thus achieved retains a static quality. 
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However, it should be recognised that any talk of the divine plan for 
creation would have been offensive to the philosophical ears of the 
second century, because of the natural association of planning with 
contingency and arbitrariness. Even if influenced by the prevailing 
culture, Irenaeus' theology is profoundly Christian. 
The view of the operation of providence which we are suggesting is 
true to the Bible, where the inexorable sense that the free God will 
achieve His purposes is the result, in part, of the lack of ready 
co-operation from His creation in general, and mankind in particular. 
When the biblical witness was quarried for theological purposes, it was 
a natural mistake to read the overall sense of divinecontrol into all 
individual events, although the flexibility of the concept of cause 
does allow some sense of divine causality to be attributed to all events 
in creation. 
84 The encounter with Greek philosophy, with its aversion 
to the concept of the 'possible', consolidated, this transfer from a 
85 
general to a particular understanding of providence. 
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From this perspective, a relatively straightforward account of 
petitionary prayer is available, because the problem of determinism 
does not generally arise at the level of particular events. 86 
krelatively straightforward place for petitionary prayer is assumed 
in, the Bible, of course, and it is perhaps suggestive to observe the 
almost complete absence of any reference to prayer in Irenaeus' extant 
writings. 
I am arguing that we should recognise divine and human activity as 
occurring on two levels, which are separate but coordinated, the 
meaning of events at the 'lower' level of creation being determined 
by Godýat the 'higher' level, the action of God at this 'higher' level 
being flexible and adaptive in the'face of aberrations at, the 'lower' 
87 
level. Such a conception is an extension of the traditional 
concepts of providence: secondary causes are affirmed but the primary 
cause, although omnipotent, in the sense of being infinitely adaptive, 
has, to, contend with secondary causality which thwarts the intention 
of, the primary cause. Similarly, I am suggesting a revision, or 
further explication, of the traditional notion of the divine succursus, 
that following of the activity of creation by which God directs it 
towards its appointed end. Irenaeus points us in this direction, 
with his doctrine of the divine richness and the good, varied nature 
of creation, but the influenceswhich we have described limited the 
development of hiB theology in thiB area. 
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One further aspect of the doctrine of providence needs to be identified. 
The danger in the above account is that the operation of providence is 
limited to the macroscopic purposes of the world, and barely operative 
at the level of the individual. We want to believe not only that God 
2.77 
will. be all in all, but that His purposes for us as individuals will 
be fulfilled. These questions are surrounded by a proper 
eschatological mystery, in the light of which we cannot afford to 
affirm long-term providence at the expense of individual providence, 
and our critique of Irenaeus does not imply that we should do so. 
Similarly, a belief that God generally relates to the world in the 
manner sketched here does not preclude the special intervention of 
God, provided that this does not occur with such frequency as seriously 
'to 
compromise the contingent intelligibility of the created universe. 
This is not simply to suggest that we allow divine intervention in 
creation providing that it is statistically undetectable, for the 
issue is more subtle and theological than such a conception would 
'indicate. But, within our overall conception of the relation between 
divine and human activity, there is rational scope for the unique 
action of God, in the incarnation and elsewhere. Again Irenaeus is 
not unaware of this, with his strong sense of ofvIKKETcAý"*"S , but the 
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by Torrance, and the more extrinsic orderliness described by Athanasius 
(and Irenaeus). 
43. Renewed attention has recently been given to 'The Theology of 
Light' by T. F. Torrance, Christian Theology and Scientific Culture 
(Belfast: Christian Journals, 1980) ch. 3.. Irenaeus and Athanasius 
would appear to be at least partial exceptions to his claim that, 'In 
the early centuries of the Christian era there emerged a clear-cut 
distinction between uncreated and created light.... I (p. 85). Torrance 
outlines various fascinating parallels and contrasts between the 
theological understanding of divine light and created light, as under- 
stood since Einstein. A significant correction, however, is needed to 
his statement that, 'If we commonly speak of light as "visible", it is 
not because it really is, but because the human eye is adapted to see, 
not the radiation itself, but its effect in lighting up whatever 
reflects it. I recall in this connection a visit I paid several years 
ago to a meteorological station where photographs of the cloud cover 
over the earth were being received regularly from a man-made satellite. 
The concentrated stream of light signals was quite invisible, but when 
I cut the stream with a sheet of paper immediately there appeared on 
it a spot of light : the invisible became indirectly visible' (p. 91f). 
Had Professor Torrance placed his eye in the beam of light he would 
certainly have seen it, so much so that it might have damaged his 
retina. Created light of the range of wavelengths of the 'visible, 
spectrum is certainly visible (! ), if rather uninteresting when 
viewed directly. There is a greater distinction between created and 
uncreated light than he, Irenaeus, and Athanasius generally allow. 
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44. Which may, of course, have had significant. influence upon Greek 
philosophy, especially in its Stoic form. 
45. The struggle between emerging natural science and the conception 
of the universe adopted, at least in part, by Irenaeus may be 
illustrated by a passing reference to two deeply held erroneous 
opinions, which were eventually discarded :, the assumptions that the 
orbits of planets must be spherical, and that species could not have 
become extinct. 
46. Justin perhaps intended at leastZ partial excuse of Platonism 
when, in response to Trypho's commentý/the philosophers repeatedly 
speak of God, he remarked : 'But the most have not taken thought of 
this, whether there be one or more gods, and whether they have a 
regard for each one of us or no, as if this knowledge contributed 
nothing to our happiness; nay, they moreover attempt to persuade us 
that God takes care of the universe with its genera and species, but 
not of me and you .... But it is not difficult to understand the upshot 
of this; for fearlessness and licence in speaking result to such as 
maintain these opinions, doing and saying whatever they choose, 
neither dreading punishment nor hoping for any benefit from God, 
(Dial. 1). 
However, in Platonism there is also a predominant stress upon a general 
notion of providence, as Chadwick has observed in relation to Celsus 
'The nerve-centre of the Platonist onslaught in Celsus lies in his 
denial of freedom in God and his insistence that the immutability of 
the cosmos and the immutability of God are correlative. A universal 
providence exercises a general benevolence that excludes all 
particularity, and the concept of a unique Incarnation is unthinkable' 
(Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition, p. 49). 
47. For recent discussion of the (somewhat over-maligned) place 
assigned to the individualin the Judaeg-Christian tradition, see S. W. 
Sykes, The Identity of Christianity, (London : S. P. C. K., 1984), esp. 
ch. 2. 
48. The danger of Irenaeus seeing the universe as a falsely unified 
harmonious cosmos therefore corresponds to the danger of an undue, 
modalistic stress in his doctrine of the Trinity. 
49. For the references in Kant, see J. R. Lucas, The Freedom of the 
Will, P. l. 
50. The publication of Ryle's The 
6oncept 
of Mind, (London: 1949) ' 
provided a major stimulus to those alike who have defended and'attacked 
traditional views of freedom. The unresolved state of the debate was 
well attested recently by the 1984 Reith Lecturer J. Searle, Minds, 
Brains and Science, (London: B. B. C., 1984), ch. 6. 
51. For an interesting development of the charge that Karl Barth 
confused different forms or aspects of freedom, see G. S. Hendry, 'The 
Freedom of God in the Theology of Karl Barth', S. J. T., 31 (1978), 
pp. 229-244. Hendry is concerned with the freedom of God rather than 
of creation, but the analysis of the concept of freedom which he 
develops is germane for our theme. 
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52. A critical, but sympathetic assessment of the use and inter- 
pretation of the Exodus motif in liberation theology is provided by 
J. A. Kirk, Liberation Theology, (London: M. M. & S. 1979). This is 
assessed in relation to the wider concepts of freedom by J. Lochmann, 
Reconciliation and Liberation, (Belfast: Christian Journals, 1980). 
53. Practice did not always match the theory, but even if compromised, 
the institution of the Jubilee Year pointed towards an eschatological 
promise of liberation and justice. 
54. Freedom from bondage and oppression is also the theme of the key 
Lukan pericope, Luke 4: 18-21. The central passage in John is 8: 31- 
38 : The 'Son' and the 'truth' bring freedom. 
55. E. g. Romans 7 and 8. A similar stress on eschatology characterises 
the promises of liberation found in the later prophets of the Old 
Testament. 
56.2Peter 3: 16. 
57. Daniblou, Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture, p. 34. 
58. From the First Apology, for example, see chs. 10,28,43. Justin 
links this side of his thought with his great stress upon the fulfil- 
ment of prophecy, by recourse to a doctrine of divine foreknowledgel 
for the juxtaposition of freedom, prophecy and foreknowledge, see 
1 Apol. 44. 
59ý. Paul could never have written, 'For as in the beginning He 
created us when we were not, so do we consider that, in like manner-, 
those who choose what is pleasing to Him are, on account of their 
choice, deemed worthy of incorruption and of fellowship with Him, 
(1 Apol. 10). The theme of the freedom of the will in Justin has 
received considerable attention, for example from E. F. Osborn, Justin 
Martyr, (C. U. P., 1973), ch. 11. An interesting point in his 
introduction of the description of the free man as fttv-raýoucrccýS- 
that is, as having self-determining authority over himself. This 
introduction without explanation indicates that the word was in use 
before Justin, but he brings it into prominence in Christian literature. 
W. Telfer, Autexousia (J. T. S., N. S., 8 (1957), pp. 123-129), has traced 
the rise of this concept, noting its ambiguity: 'like "independent", 
0(VT6V0U(r-kqS was susceptible to tones of a good, neutral, or 
disparaging kind' (p . 123). Although useful, however, Telfer's study 
misses the theological tension we have identified; for example, 
we may cite his claim that, 'The notion of autexousia as a prerogative 
of all men is so abundantly present in scripture, and particularly in 
the New Testament, that it, is an essential of Christian thoughtl(p. 124). 
60. This is interesting, and has wider consequences for his theodicy 
and anthropology, to which we will return. Justin's espousal of the 
concept of autexousia would seem to have relations with Jewish, or 
Jewish-Christian angelology, and with the idea that evil originated 
from the fall of angels. After Justin, Clement of Alexandria discusses 
autexousia as something shared: by angels, -and-men, and; heteven-attributes 
autexousia to the devil, (Telfer, op-cit. p. 125). Origen took such 
speculations much further. 
2-2 'jr 
61. We can only touch upon this complex subject. A lively 
controversy surrounds the freedom of the intermediate class of men, 
the TvYLW)L. In the same paragraph Irenaeus appears to assert both 
their freedom and their bondage in fate (1.7.5). Returning to the 
question later (11.29.1), Irenaeus claims that this confusion is present 
in Valentinianism itself. E. Pagels, 'Conflicting Versions of 
Valentinian Eschatology: Irenaeus' Treatise vs. The Excerpts from 
Theodotus', H. T. R., 67 (1974), pp. 35-53, has challenged Irenaeus' 
account as Simplified and distorted. But even if the týOXIKOL of 
Valentinian theology had the freedom of the will which Pagels claims, 
the inconsistency in the Gnostic treatment of the %VvYLKOc- and the 
`Xt-locou is enhanced rather than diminished, as is that between the V 
ýV)(CKOL, and the strictly elected 
62. For a'perceptive discussion of authority and freedom, to which I am 
indebted, see the Cambridge University Sermon of 1937, 'The truth 
shall make you free' (John 8: 32), by O. C. Quick, published in The 
Cambridge Review, 22.1.37., pp. 195-197. 
63. IV. 4.3; 15.2; 37.3,4,5(x2); 38.4; 39.3; V. 29.1; Dem. 11. The 
Greek is preserved in IV. 37.3 and IV. 39.3, and the us,;, of -eZ"&*fou&, os 
can be recognised by the distinctive Latin circumlocutions employed 
by the translators. R. D. Williams (The Wound of Knowledge, p. 25) is 
therefore less than accurate when he states that, 'Irenaeus .... does not 
deny the unfreedom of the empirical human condition'. Williams largely 
picks up the aspect of Irenaeus' teaching which we will consider in 
the next section. 
64. As discussed in chapter 3, where we noted the qualification of 
dissimilarity expressed in other passages. Nevertheless, the closer 
relation between God and man in Irenaeus as compared with Justin 
served to underline both the freedom of man and the dependence of man 
on God. 
65. The strong statement of human autexousia in Dem. 11 is likewise 
closely followed in Dem. 12 by the qualification that Adam was a child 
and, 'wherefore also he was easily misled by the deceiver'. 
66. Similar statements are found in Justin, e. g. II Apol. 7. 
67. See, for example, G. M. Landes, 'Creation and Liberation', in 
Creation in the Old Testament. This interpretation is based upon the 
predominant meaning of 'the knowledge of good and evil' elsewhere in 
the Old Testament. 
68. A failure to acknowledge this side of Irenaeus' discussion of 
freedom mars the interesting work of G. Wingren, Man and Incarnation: 
'Irenaeus frequently says that the man who is not in Christ has no 
freedom - he is a captive .... For this man there is no freedom, but the 
opposite of freedom, and by his choice his very humanity is dislocated. 
Irenaeus does not begin by thinking of pure humanity as being complete 
and finished and then go on to argue whether or not this humanity will 
be saved. Salvation would then be something supernatural, an addition 
to man's humanity. But salvation is life, human life, lived under the 
hands of God. To be saved is to be man. To resist God is to destroy 
one's very manhood' (p. 199f). Wingren systematizes a side of Irenaeus' 
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teaching on freedom which we will shortly consider, and in the process 
misses the aspect we are considering at present. He thereby exhibits 
the same danger as that found here and elsewhere in Irenaeus' theology, 
that is, of conceiving the relation between God and man as too close and 
, 'necessary'.. 
69. The problem here is also illustrated sharply by the Book of Job, 
where the hero's 'friends' affirm a theology 'similar to that which 
we have been observing here in Irenaeus. In fact, at no point in his 
extant writings does Irenaeus make any reference to the Book of Job. 
70. E. g. 1.22.2; 24.4; 25.4; 30.3. 
71. E. g. 111.5.3; 10.5; 12.14; 13.3.; 15.3; 19.1; 20.1,2,3,4; 
22.4; 23.1,2,7; IV. 4.1; 7.4; 9.1,2; 11.1,3,4; 13.1,2,3,4; 16.5; 18.2; 
20.4,11; 22.2; 33.1,14; 34.1,2,3; 37.1,4; 39.3; V. 32.1; 33.3; 36.3. 
The Latin in these passages is either the noun libertas, or the verb 
libero, the underlying Greek generally being 16X-6-vDeptak or 6600epoW 
this varying if the idea of - salvation 
or deliverance is 
particularly prominent. A modern writer who has expressed views 
similar to those found in this extensive range of passages from 
Irenaeus is Erich Frank, 'Letter and Spirit', in Creation: The Impact 
of an Idea, ed. D. O'Connor and F. Oakley, (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1969), p. 153f.: 'The Christian .... through repentance 
becomes aware of his genuine ego; he envisions a new and higher self, 
which he must actualize in his life .... Modern man does not accept such 
a concept of repentance. He is prone to say: Let us not repent, let us 
rather amend our wrongs.... (but) true repentance does not concern our 
various actions only, but is aimed at a complete change in our very 
essence. Repentance means that process through which man is 
transformed into his true self by renouncing the stubborn resistance 
of his merely particular and subjective personality. Through 
conscience and repentance man acquires a new dimension, that of depth - 
a new awareness of himself and his own freedom'. 
72. A similar contrast is drawn in succeeding chapters, e. g. IV. 9.1f; 
11.3f; 13.1ff; 16.5. 
73. For the expression 'the new covenant of liberty', see, for 
example, 111.10.5; 12.14; IV. 16.5; 34.3. For the new covenant 
involving a stricter law than the old covenant, see pre-eminently 
the extended discussion in IV. 13; cf. also, IV. 18.2; 34.4, and the 
presentation of the new law in Dem. 86-96. 
74. Indeed, his teaching that the old covenant is characterised by 
bondage is somewhat undercut by his recognition (IV. 7.4) that God 
liberated his people from Egypt. 
75. Which is directly stated in 2Cor. 3: 17, a verse, incidentally, 
which Irenaeus nowhere uses. 
76. V. 32.1; 33.3; 36.3. In V. 32.1 and 36.3 there is a direct 
reference to Romans 8: 21, 'Because the creation itself will be set 
free from its bondage to decay and obtain the glorious liberty of the 
children of God. ' 
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77. Similar affirmations of a divinely ordained co-operation 
between God and man are found elsewhere. In IV. 37.1 it is stated 
as follows: 'And in man, as well as in angb1s, He has placed the 
power of choice (for angels are rational beings), so that thosewho 
had yielded obedience might justly possess what is good, given indeed 
by God, but preserved by themselves'. In V. 11.2 a similar ambiguity 
may be perceivedt 
, 
'In these members, therefore, in which we were going 
to destruction by working the works of corruption, in these very 
members are we made alive by working the works of the Spirit'. 
78. Two authors have given particular attention to this question. 
J. T. Nielsen, Adam and Christ in-the Theology of Irenaeus of Lyons, 
ch. 4, identifies the importance of the Adam-Christ typology to 
Irenaeus, but he fails to elucidate the difference between created 
and redeemed freedom, autexousia and ±Xtu&SpwL . More profound, if 
nevertheless somewhat speculative, is L. S. Thornton, Revelation and 
the Modern World, (London: 1950), especially pp. 139-167. Curiously, 
Thornton's book is one of the few not included in Nielsen's biblio- 
graphy, although a later article by Thornton, which refers to his book, 
is included. Thornton's book contains-a sustained exposition of 
Irenaeus along the lines indicated here. 
79. Freedom and the divine likeness are explicitly linked in IV. 37.4: 
'But because man is possessed of free will from the beginning, and God 
is possessed of free will, in whose likeness man was created, advice 
is always given to him to keep fast the good, which thing is done by 
means of obedience to God'. By reference to the modern philosopher 
John MacMurray, rather than to Irenaeus, this-point has been explored 
by A. Shutte, 'Indwelling, Intersubjectivity and God', S. J. T., 32 (1979) 
p. 203f.: 'That beings with a power of free choice are created poses 
the paradox inherent in the doctrine of creation at its sharpest... 
It is precisely because persons participate most fully in the being 
of God that they are most free of, and to that degree distinct from 
him. The more a creature is like God, the more he possesses his own 
being'. 
80. These ideas are already present in the tradition, as is 
illustrated by Ad Diognetum, 7: 'Was He sent, think you, as any man 
might suppose, to establish a sovereignty, to inspire fear and terror? 
Notso, but in gentleness and meekness has He sent Him, as a king might 
send his son who is a king. He sent Him, as sending God; He sent Him, 
as a man unto men; He sent Him as Saviour,, as using persuasion, not 
force : for force is no attribute of God. He sent Him, as summoning, 
not as persecuting; He sent Him, as loving, not as judging. 
81. The expression 'one and the same' is frequently applied by 
Irenaeus to God; see, for example, 1.10.3; 11.25.1; 35.3; 111.9.1,2; 
10.6; 11.4; 12.11,13,15 etc.. 
82. For discussion of the ambiguity 
compare O. C. Quick, Doctrines of the 
and J. R. Lucas, Freedom and Grace, p. 2ff. 
83. A link between richness and resourcefulness can be seen, for 
example, in 11.10.3; 29.2. 
of the concept of 'cause', 
Creed, (London: 1938), pp. 35ff., 
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84. Thus, while there are senses in which it is true to say, with 
Matthew 5: 45, that God 'makes his sun rise on the evil and on the 
good, and sends rain on the just and. on the unjust', there are also 
senses in which such a statement is misledding, because incomplete. 
85. Arguably, this process was sharply reversed at the, Enlightenment, 
where a different combination of Greek and Christian insights produced 
an opposite result to that which we have identified in Irenaeus. Our 
response, then, is to welcome the removal at the Enlightenment Of the 
fetters which had long been laid upon the human spirit, and the 
subsequent respect for freedom of conscience and of intellectual 
enquiry. In consequence, much cruelty, oppression and ignorance was 
removed from human society, and the scientific enterprise, which was 
already underway, received a substantial boost from the associated 
cultural changes. It has to be admitted that, on the whole, the 
Church resisted these changes, and our analysis of Irenaeus, theology 
has shown how, from a very early stage, the Church had failed 
adequately to grasp the message of liberation enshrined in the Gospel. 
Yet, because the basic ingredients of the synthesis were the same, 
the problem with Enlightenment thought, its great stress on 'negative, 
freedom, the 'Dare to know! '. (sapere aude) of Kant, already has its 
counter-part in Irenaeus. The resolution lies in a proper combination 
and juxtaposition of the levels of human and divine freedom, as I 
shall shortly argue. A similar analysis and proposal underlies the 
recent popular, but profound, book by L. Newbigin, The Other Side of 
1984, (Geneva: W. C. C., 1983). 
86. Cf. the stimulating recent book by V. BrUmmer, What Are We Doing 
When We Pray , (London : S. C. M., 1984). BrUmmer is one of the few 
theologians to have perceived the importance of Lucas' work; on 
p. 66ff there is a good discussion of Lucas' 'brilliant essay', 
'Freedom and Grace'. 
87. This problem of relationship between 'higher' and 'lower' is not 
specifically concerned with religion. In recent centuries, in one way 
or another, it has been a key problem of philosophy. In the seven- 
teenth century, in particular, it came to be assumed that two entities 
of different orders (such as matter and mind) could not easily interact. 
In order to make sense of such a situation, it was readily assumed that 
an apparent conjunction of two contrasted entities should be understood 
rather in terms of one entity with two aspects, that entity being 
either matter or spirit. Contemporary philosophy is still engaged 
with these issues, as evidenced by the 1984 Reith Lectures, op. cit.. 
88. We can identify a tension in Irenaeus' theology concerning the 
category of the permissive will of God. In 11-5.4 a clear rejection 
is apparent : 'It is not seemly, however, to say to Him who is God 
over all, since He is free and independent, that He was a slave to 
necessity, or that anything takes place with His permission, yet 
against His desire; otherwise they will make necessity greater and 
more kingly than God... I Yet even in Book Two, and more clearly in 
later Books, Irenaeus wrestles with the implications of his view that 
the created nature of the world places (God given) limits upon what 
God can achieve, or at least upon the pace at which He can achieve it. 
We will consider this aspect of his doctrine of creation in connection 
with his theodicy. We should note, however, that by the end of A. H., 
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in the eschatological chapters, the existence of Antichrist, and all 
those who prefigure him, from Noah's contemporaries onwards, is 
justified precisely by an appeal to the permissive will of God: 'In 
the previous books I have set forth the causes for which God 
permitted these things to be made, and have pointed out that all such 
have been created for the benefit of that human nature which is saved, 
ripening for immortality that which has its own free will and its own 
power, and preparing and rendering it more adapted for eternal 
subjection to God' (V. 29.1). 
89. These concluding remarks indicate my divergence from the, phil- 
osophical account of providence supplied by J R. Lucas, opera cit., 
much of which I endorse. He is too preoccupied with a rather anth- 
ropomorphically conceived ability of God to manoeuvre events, or the 
aftermath of events, to achieve His ultimate cosmic purpose. His 
God is, to adopt the critique offered by a colleague, too much akin 
to a celestial Dale Carnegie, who has an infinite ability to win 
friends and influence people. God acts not only to respect meta- 
physical freedom (that is, autexousia), but also to grant existential 
freedom (that is, 'e>4V06Pt_c(- ). 
The distinctions appropriate here are illuminated by the current 
understanding of the progress of evolution. Darwin thought that all 
change was adaptive, but evolution theory now recognises a vast amount 
of non-adaptive change, and long periods when change towards the 
evolution of man was not occurring. The evolutionary map has many 
dead-ends, and it is yet possible that major extra-terrestrial events 
will be identified as necessary to punctuate the long per , 
iods of 
apparent equilibrium, or stasis, identified by palaeontologists. 
The two types or levels of change assumed in the contemporary, theory 
bears an analogous relation to the account of providence rendered 
above, from which Irenaeus' understanding of providence has been 
perceived. Finally, from the considerable recent debate over the 
nature of divine action in the world, I would refer to the interesting 
discussion of the relation between events in the world and acts of 
God given by C. M. Wood, 'The Events in Which God Acts', Heythrop 
Journal, 22 (1981), pp. 278-284. He shows how it is possible to 
identify, or affirm, a variety of degrees of divine action in the 
events of creation. Although I have approached the question of 




DOCTRINE OF CREATION: ANTHROPOLOGY AND EVIL 
Introduction 
In this chapter we will examine two further aspects of Irenaeus, 
doctrine of creation: his teaching upon the place and nature of 
man, and, less extensively, his understanding of evil. The 
discussion of both subjects will cast further light upon the general 
theme of the relation between God and the world, for, in their different 
ways, each provides a sensitive focus for the larger issue. Although 
to some extent separate, the subjects are related inasmuch as the 
challenge of the existence of evil is greatest to man as the highest 
form of created existence. We will begin by examining Irenaeus' 
understanding of the relation of man to the wider area of creation. 
The Place of Man in Creation 
One aspect of Irenaeus' polemic in the earlier part of A. H. objects 
to the sense of superiority claimed by the Gnostics, and in response 
he emphasises the limited, created nature of man as 'infinitely 
inferior to God'. 
1 
But why, the Gnostics would have asked, should 
the God who, according to Irenaeus, had no need of creation, have made 
anything and anyone, especially if the crowning part of croation, man, 
was only 'infinitely inferior to GodI9 Irenaeus refuses to speculate 
directly upon such questions, but on occasion he does remark upon the 
relation of man to the rest of creation, stating that creation was 
made for man: 
..... all things have, been created for the benefit of that 
human nature which is saved, ripening for immortality that 
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which has its own free will and its own power, and 
preparing and rendering it more adapted for eternal 
subjection to God. And therefore the creation is 
suited to man; for man was not made for its sake, 
but creation for the sake of man. (V. 29.1) 2 
His understanding of the place of man also emerges in the often 
quoted claim: 
For the glory of God is a living man; and the life 
of Man consists in beholding God. (V. 20.7) 
These two sides to Irenaeus' approach to the place of man, as both 
infinitely inferior to God yet called to exhibit, or even become, the 
glory of God, mirror the wider tension in his understanding of the' 
divine motive for creation which we identified earlier, and are 
reflected in the well-known verses from Psalm 8, which may in part 
have evoked this latter statement from Irenaeus: 
What is man that thou art mindful of him, 
and the son of man that thou dost care for him? 
Yet thou., hast made him little less than God, 
and dost crown him with glory and honour. 
We will best be able to see the shape of Irenaeus' understanding of 
the place of man if we probe this tension, inherent in the very idea 
of creation, from a variety of perspectives. 
In the first place, we should note that a basic aspect of Irenaeus' 
perception of the nature of man is as a physical being of flesh and 
blood, as described in Genesis 2.3 When Irenaeus refers to flesh, 
he refers to the earthy reality of man, rather than using flesh as 
a mere circumlocution for man, thus leaving open the question of his 
essential nature. This earthiness of man is not contrasted with his mental 
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or spiritual, nature, for it is as life invigorates the-body of man 
that he exhibits - or even becomes - the glory of God. 
The earthiness of this anthropology implies that Irenaeus held a close 
relation between man and the wider sphere of creation, but against 
this must be set the distinction between them which emerges in the 
statement that creation is made for man, but not man for creation. 
It is interesting to note in this connection that, despite the 
emphasis upon the physical nature of man, Irenaeus generally uses 
a different verb for the creation of man from those employed for the 
creation of the world. 
4 Despite all that he has in common with the 
broad domain of creation, man is given a special place as he emerges 
from the creative hands of God. 
The nature of this distinction is revealed more fully in the Demonstration, 
where the creation of man is contrasted with the remainder of God's 
creative work: 
But man He fashioned with His own hands, taking of the 
purest and finest of earth, in measured wise mingling 
with the earth His own power; for He gave his frame 
the outline of His own form, that the visible appearance 
too should be godlike - for it was as'an image of God 
that man was: fashioned and set on earth - and that he might 
come to life, so that the man became like God in inspiration 
as well as in frame. So he was free and his own master, 
having been made of God in order to be master of everything 
on earth. And this world of creation, prepared by God 
before Hefashioned man, was given to man as his domain, 
with all things whatsoever in it ..... (Dem. 11) 
So, having made the man lord ofthe earth and everything 
in it, He made him in secret lord also of the servants 
(that is, angels) in it. (Dem. 12) 
There are a number of interesting points here. The creation of man 
is presented as peculiarly the work of the hands of God, a contrast 
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being assumed with God's other creative activity. This is not to 
suggest that Irenaeus has a non-trinitarian understanding of the 
wider aspect of divine creativity, but there is an undeniable 
concentration on the creation of man, such that the actual appearance 
of man - presumably his erect stance - is to be regarded as 'godlike'. 
6 
The self-controlled freedom of man further illustrates and embodies his 
divine likeness, which grants man lordship over the rest of the earth. 
This open status--ýof--man as lord of creation is even extended to a 
rather mysterious, secret lordship over the angels appointed by God to 
exercise the divine governance of the world. 
7 
An assessment of this presentation of the place of man in creation must 
begin by acknowledging both that Irenaeus is, in large measure, guided 
by the position laid down in the early chapters of Genesis, yet that 
there are interesting points of divergence. For example, while it is 
clearly the case that the second creation story is focuse-4 primarily 
upon the earthiness of man, as Irenaeus depicts, and upon man as the 
centre of creation, the theme of dominion is qualified by the command 
to 'till and keep' thq garden, there being no indication that the garden 
was created simply for the sake of man. Taken together, Genesis 1 and 2 
characterise non-human creation both as adapted to serve man, and in 
need of man's service, yet also as having a positive goodness of its 
own. Arguably, the climax of the account in Genesis 1, the divine 
sabbath on the seventh day, is given insufficient due by Irenaeus. He 
tends to see the climax of creation as falling primarily on the sixth 
day, when man was created, even if the summons to participate in the 
seventh day is already implied in the nature of man as established on 
the sixth day. Had he given full due to the seventh day, without denying 
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the place of man as the crown of creation, Irenaeus. would have more 
readily seen that the whole of creation is charged with the glory 
of God. As it stands, his account leaves open the unfortunate 
developments which were to occur in later theology, wherein a sharp 
distinction between man and nature encouraged the exploitation - 
that is, the domination rather than the dominion - of the non-human 
world by man. 
8 
If this tendency is visible in Irenaeus, it must also be said that 
central aspects of his theology point in a different direction, not 
least the inclusive conception of the recapitulation. -. of,, Adam in Christ, 
and his realistic millenarianism with its accompanying renewal of the 
whole of. creation. 
9 The solidarity of man with non-human creation, 
which is undoubtedly implied here, and which from a modern perspective 
we would want to endorse, 
10 
received but mute development in Irenaeus', 
because of a range of factors, some of which we have already touched 
upon. The close relation of God with the world which he posits, works 
not only to establish the essential goodness of creation, but also to 
compromise its fundamental nature as creation. Too easily the goodness 
of creation becomes equated with its imaging of divine reality, or 
its necessary expression of a divine plan, Irenaeus' anti-Gnostic 
theology inadvertently adopting patterns of thought akin to those found 
in Gnosticism. 11, A small instance is1provided in the above extract 
by the comment that the erect stance of man visibly images God, and 
in the last chapter we discussed the problems associated with the 
attribution to man of a freedom of choice which images the'freedom of 
God. What is required, however, is not so much a withdrawal of God from 
the world, as a better understanding of the transcendence of God even - 
or, rather, precisely - in this immanence in the world; that is to say, 
Zctj- 
using the modern expression, we need to understand Irenaeus at this 
point better than he understands himself. 
12 In allowing a greater 
qualitative distinction between God and the world, Irenaeus' theology 
would thus be modified to recognise a greater solidarity of creatureliness 
between man and the world, while not -riUipquishing the special place 
which is given to man. 
Here, as elsewhere, it is instructive to give a brief consideration 
to the contemporary influences upon his theology, because the question 
of the place of man in creation was a subject much debated in both 
the theology and philosophy of the early patristic period. H. Chadwick's 
comments upon the general provenance of the arguments used by Celsus 
and Origen illustrate the point: 
In truth, the Stoa and the Academy had provided arguments 
and counter-arguments on a wide range of subjects, with the 
result that we frequently. find that where Celsus shows affinity 
with týe Academy, Origen has only to fall back on the traditional 
refutation provided by the Stoics, and vice versa ... An example 
of this occurs at the end of the fourth book where Celsus 
ridicules as naYve the Christian belief that the people of God 
are the aim and centre of creation and that the world was made 
for them; Celsus develops here a long attack on the view that 
the world exists for the sake of man any more than for the 
irrational animals. His arguments are almost certainly lifted 
straight out of some tractate deriving from the Academic tradition 
which contained a polemic against the Stoic doctrine that the 
animals exist for the sake of mankind. Origen's reply is simply 
based on the traditional Stoic answer to the Academy. 13 
Clearly, the philosophical debate over the traditional, anthropomorphic 
Greek cultus lies in the background, the interesting aspect of the 
situation being, the way in which Christian writers were drawn both to 
accept the high philosophical critique of the traditional mythology, 
and to affirm, albeit in a different form, the anthropocentricity 
rejected by the same philosophical tradition. In fact, Origen's 
speculative theological system is less anthropocentric than others, 
2-95 
and the tension is greater in writers who gave man a more central 
place in the universe. 
Justin Martyr, for example, presents the centrality of man along with 
the view that creation was out of unformed matter: 
And we have been taught that He in the beginning did of 
His goodness, for man's sake, create all things out of 
unformed matter. (I Apol. 10) 
Here we see how the belief that non-human creation exists solely, 
or primarily, for man's sake can readily lead, at least to some 
extent, to its downgrading. 
14 
Theophilus of Antioch appears to have a doctrine of creation ex 
nihilo (Ad Autol. 1.4), but his claim that the world exists for the 
sake of man exhibits its own problems: 
As for the creation of man, his fashioning cannot be 
expressed by man, yet the divine scripture contains 
a summary mention of it. When God said, 'Let us make 
man after our image and likeness', He first reveals 
the dignity of man. For after making everything else 
by a word, God considered all this as incidental; he 
regarded the making of man as the only work worthy of 
his own hands (i. e. the Word and Wisdom, Son and Holy 
Spirit). (Ad. Autol. II. 18) 
Athenagoras indicates how the distinction between man and the rest 
of creation, which was commonplace in second-century theology, was 
closely related to the concept of individual meritorious judgement, 
which we considered in the earlier chapter: 
But since we are aware that God knows what we think and say 
both night and day, and that he who is totally light sees 
also what is in our hearts; and since we are persttaded that 
when we depart this present life we shall live another 
life better than that here, a heavenly one, not earthly, so 
that we may then abide with God and with His help remain 
changeless and impassible in soul as though we were not body, 
even if we have one, but heavenly spirit; and, alternatively, 
since we are convinced that, if we fall with the rest of men, 
we shall live another life worse than that here-in realms of 
f ire (for God did not create us. like sheep or : ýbeasts, of -- burden, 
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and it would not be incidental if we were to be destroyed and 
disappear); since all this is so, it is not likely that we 
should want to do evil and deliver ourselves up to the great 
Judge to be punished. (Legatio 31.4) 
The relation of Irenaeus' thought to the positions adopted by these 
writers is interesting, for he accepts some aspects and modifies 
others. Thus, he largely agrees that creation is made for man, that 
the special place of man merits the recompensatory judgement of God, 
and that God is essentially changeless.; even if his presentation of 
each of these subjects is not identical with that provided by Justin, 
Theophilus and Athenagoras. Furthermore, by contrast with the respective 
views of these theologians, Irenaeus rejec ts the idea of creation out 
of pre-existent matter, the complete restriction of the creative action 
of the 'hands' of God to the creation of man, and the idea that the 
resurrection of the flesh was of little consequence. Each of these three 
divergences indicate the importance to Irenaeus of the earthly, bodily 
nature of man, and although formally he accepts the position that creation 
was made simply for man, in practice this is both qualified and in 
process of modification. The anthropocentricism of Gnostic thought is 
clearly influential here, stimulating Irenaeus to ponder the importance 
and value of the created universe. 
In the search for the correct theological position to be assigned to 
man in the God/world/man matrix, the opposite, but related, dangers 
are, on the one hand, of taking the world for granted, and, on the 
other hand, of taking God for granted. A theology which sees the sole 
purpose of creation as providing the appropriate environment to benefit 
man is likely to exalt him in such a way as to compromise the freedom 
and holiness of God. Our judgement, then, is that the theology of 
the second century did not avoid this twin danger, even if Irenaeus 
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comes closer-to doing so than other extant theologians. Yet the 
danger must not be overstated, for the Nicene and Apostles' Creeds 
which emerged in the early church formulated creation in terms of 
heaven and earth, of all things visible and invisible, without 
explicit mention, ofman, even if a certain centrality of the dealings 
of God with man in history, culminating in the coming of the man Jesus, 
was assumed in relation to the doctrine of creation. The bedrock for 
a healthy account of these issues lies in the concept both-of the 
freedom of the relation-between God and creation, including man, and 
of the active, loving presence of God to creation; Irenaeus points us 
towards such a concept of the relation between God, man and the world, 
but leaves open scope for significant development in subsequent theology. 
15 
The Nature of Man 
M Introduction 
We will now -investigate 
the extent to which the contours of Irenaeus, 
presentation of the place of man in creation are reproduced in his 
treatment of the nature of man. This aspect of his anthropology has 
received considerable attention in a modern era which has shown great 
interest in the doctrine of man, partly because, on the surface at 
least, Irenaeus is relatively favourably disposed towards the concept 
of evolution, and partly because of his extensive discussion of the 
nature o-f man as in the image and likeness'Of God. This latter feature 
of Irenaeus' thought has been claimed as one of the sources of the 
fundamental medieval distinction between nature and supernature, but 
considerable dispute surrounds such claims. 
16 
As elsewhere in the discussion of Irenaeus' theology, writers from 
rival confessional standpoints have been too concerned to claim early 
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patristic justification for their own views, for example, in 
regard to the possible distinction between the image and likeness 
of God. We cannot enter directly into these historical disputes, 
but wish, rather, to identify the fundamental shape of Irenaeus' 
understanding of the nature of man. 
Here, again, it is instructive to identify some of the relevant 
features of Gnosticism: three in particular are of concern to us. 
We note, firstly, the typical Gnostic distaste for bodily existence 
and, associated with this, secondly, the view that the essence of man 
lies in his possession of an inner spiritual dimension or part, which 
shares the nature of the divine Pleroma. 
17 The third significant 
feature of Gnostic anthropology is the division of men into different 
ontological classes, closely related to the tripartite division of 
man into body, from the earth; soul, from the Demiurge; \and a 
18 
pneumatic part, from Achamoth. 
We should recognise that, on the surface at least, there are certain 
parallels in the New Testament to each of these features of Gnostic 
anthropology. Thus, various passages assert that man belongs 
essentially to a higher, heavenly world, and that there are contrasts 
between V2ýlrcat. and 
. 
-r6XC'_O(_ (PU)((VOC_ and TrV(zýýTLWOL. 
19 
Arguably there are great differences between the use of these ideas, 
in the New Testament-and in Gnostic writings, the partly metaphorical, 
exhortatory character of the New Testament at this point being pressed 
in Gnosticism into fundamental ontological distinctions. Yet, as we 
have noticed elsewhere, there are interesting links here between 
aspects of Gnosticism and parts of the New Testament, which-presented 
a subtle challenge to Irenaeus not to depart from the New Testament in 
his attempt to expose and repudiate Gnostic error. 
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(ii) Man as Earthly 
We have already touched upon this theme in our consideration of the 
place of man in creation, where we interpreted Irenaeus' emphasis 
on the earthiness of man as counterbalancing his tendency to see man 
as too detached from creation as a whole. Certainly, from a 
perspective informed by both the Bible and modern thought, the stress 
upon the earthy, bodily nature of man lends a refreshing sense of 
wholeness to Irenaean anthropology, given the subsequent theological 
developments which tended to idealise or spiritualise man. This can 
be seen with greatest clarity in the Irenaean doctrine of the image 
of God in man. 
For Irenaeus, it is the totality of man which is made in the image 
of God, and hence there can be no restriction of the image of 
God to the soul or equivalent part of man. 
But if the Spirit be wanting to the soul, he who is 
such is indeed of an animal nature, and being left 
carnal, shall be an imperfect being, possessing 
indeed, the image of God in his formation, but not 
receiving the likeness through the Spirit : hence, 
this being is imperfect. Thus also, if any one take 
away the image and set aside the handiwork, he cannot 
then understand this as being a man, but as either 
some part of a man .... or as something else than a man. (V. 6.1) 
The physical dimension to the doctrine of the image of God does not 
generate an unduly anthropomorphic account of God, partly because 
Irenaeus is well aware of the limitations inherent in human speech 
about God, and partly because he has in mind man as bearing - or 
sharing - the image of the bodily, incarnate Christ, rather than the 
pure image of God. This is brought out in those passages which 
describe the Adam-Christ typology, the perfect manifestation of the 
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divine image being found only in Christ, this awaiting eschatological 
completion in man at the resurrection: 
For in times long past, it was said that man was created 
after the image of God, but it was not demonstrated; for 
the Word was as yet invisible, after whose image man was 
created. Wherefore also he did easily lose the likeness. 
When, however, the Word of God became flesh, He confirmed 
both these : for He both showed forth the image truly, 
since He became Himself what was His image; and He re- 
established the similitude after a sure manner, by 
assimilating man to the invisible Father through means 
of the visible Word. (V. 16.2) 
*'*** God made man in His image; and the image is the Son 
of God, in whose image man was made. And therefore, He 
was manifested in the last times, to show the image like 
unto Himself. (Dem-22) 
From this earth, then, while it was still virgin, God 
took dust and fashioned man, the beginning of humanity. 
So the Lord, summing up afresh this man, reproduced the 
scheme of his incarnation, being born-of a virgin by the 
will and %isdom of God, that He too might copy the in- 
carnation of Adam, and man might be made .... according to 
the image and likeness of God. 20 (Dem. 32) 
Although the precise relationship Irenaeus intends between the 
incarnation and Adam is not as clear as we might wish, two emphases 
are apparent. On the one hand, there is a great superiority of Christ 
over Adam, and the incarnation brings to light the incompleteness, or 
instability, of the original creation of man. On the other hand, the 
contrast between the first and the second creations is not allowed to 
override the complementary truth of the strong relationship which exists 
between them. These two aspects are held together by the Irenaean 
motif of growth: Adam is to grow towards the image in which, imperfectly, 
he was created, this earthy image reflecting, at least to some extent, 
the incarnate rather than a disincarnate Christ. For understandable 
reasons, Athanasius and other Nicene theologians drew a sharp contrast 
between Christ and creation, but, in the process, could easily lose 
sight of the relation between creation and incarnation. Despite the 
pressures of Gnosticism, which were not unlike those from Arianism 
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at a later date, with Irenaeus we are close to the 
Pauline teaching that in Christ we see the true nature of man, and 
that man is destined to participate in this nature by union with 
Christ. In other words, Irenaeus is maintaining that there is a 
close link between the doctrine of the incarnation and the doctrine 
of man, and, correspondingly, that the doctrine of creation is closely 
involved in the perfection of the image in Christ. The incarnation 
encloses the reality of creation, the incarnate Christ providing 
both the archetype for Adam, and the completion of what was begun in 
Adam. 21 On occasions Irenaeus can speak almost mystically of Adam, 
as if he is to be regarded as persisting until he comes to fulfilment 
in the incarnate Jesus Christ, Adam reflecting pre-eminently the 
rational, divinely given order which pervades the whole of creation. 
22 
This circle of ideas is closely related to those considered in our 
discussion of Irenaeus' account of the relation of Jesus Christ to 
time, the general imaging of God in the earthy humanity of man 
being secured by the unique imaging of God in the incarnate Logos. 
The image of God in the bodily reality of man is thus secured and 
demonstrated as each man grows into union with the God-man, realising 
in history the true reality of man, who was created through and after 
the-imageof the God-man. 
23 Just as the activity of God, in taking 
dust from the earth and forming, or moulding, man, fashioned him 
in the divine image, so the restoration, or deepening, of this image 
involves the whole pattern of divine activity in creation and 
redemption. 
24 
The import. -of Irenaeus' general approach to understanding the nature 
of the image of God in man with its historically orientated inclusion 
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of the bodily existence of man, lies chiefly in the implication that, 
through its solidarity with man, the whole of nature is of value to 
God, and destined for redemption. Arguably this is one of his most 
important contributions to theology, which contemporary theologians 
are struggling to rehabilitate after centuries of neglect-. 
25 
While we may prefer not to endorse the Augustinian conception of the 
image of God inman, at the expense of the Irenaean inclusion of the 
bodily existence of man, there is a danger inherent in his approach 
which relates to our basic thesis concerning his doctrine of creation. 
This is best seen by examining an aspect of Irenaeus' eschatology, the 
resurrection of the body, which will illustrate an excessive, or perhaps. 
simplisticlemphasis upon the bodily character of man. Significantly, 
Irenaeus'eschatology is presented in Book Five, in close connection 
with his most extensive treatment of the nature of man. 
Gnostic eschatology combined a belief that, through the gnosis, the ' 
spiritual man experienced perfection in - or despite - this life, 
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with the promise that, upon death, his purified spirit would enter 
the Pleroma. 
27 Irenaeus defends a doctrine of the resurrection of the 
physical body, as the sequel to a process of growth and judgement, td 
oppose both sides of Gnostic eschatology. 
He starts by acknowledging the weakness and infirmity of created 
bodily existence, referring to the 'thorn in the flesh' of St. Paul, 
28 
but sets two factors against a Gnostic interpretation : firstly, the 
educational argument that man could not have learned about immortality 
. had he not experienced mortality, 
29 
and, secondly, that it is inherent 
in the very idea of God that He be powerful enough to resurrect that 
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dead flesh which originally He had created from non-existence: 
And surely it is much more difficult and incredible, from 
non-existent bones, and nerves, and veins, and the rest of 
man's organization, to bring it about that all this should 
be, and to make man an animated and rational creature, than 
to re-integrate (redintegrar extant) 
again that which had been created and then afterwards 
decomposed into earth ..... having thus passed into that from 
which man, who had no previous existence, was formed. (V. 3.2) 
Irenaeus proceeds to expound the present harmony of the human body, 
concluding that: 
Numbers would fail to express the multiplicity of parts in 
the human frame, which was made in no other way than by the 
great wisdom of God. But those things which partake of the 
skill and wisdom of God, do also partake of His power ...... 
But if the present temporal life, which is of such an inferior 
nature to eternal life, can nevertheless effect so much as to 
quicken our mortal members, why should not eternal life, being 
much more powerful than this, vivify the flesh, which has 
already held converse with, and been accustomed to sustain, life? 
(V. 3.2f) 
Thus, after claiming that the extended lives of the patriarchs, the 
translation of Elijah and Enoch, and the preservation of Jonah, and 
of Shadrach, Meshach and Abednego are clear prophecies of the resurrection 
of the flesh, 
30 he-draws a direct parallel between the resurrection of 
Christ 'in the substance of flesh' and the future resurrection of the 
just. 31 Earthly life is a preparation for this resurrection, as 'we 
now receive a certain portion of His Spirit, tending towards perfection, 
and preparing us for incorruption, being little by little accustomed to 
receive and bear God', 
32 this preparation separating Christians from 
'carnal' men, as they 'make their way steadily towards the Father and 
the Son .... meditating day and night upon the words of God, that they may 
33 be adorned with good works' This emphasis upon the ethical distinct- 
iveness of the C-hristian life leads Irenaeus to the point from which to 
launch a detailed refutation of the Gnostic interpretation of lCorinthians 
15: 50, 'Flesh and blood cannot inherit the Kingdom of God, nor does the 
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perishable inherit the imperishable'. He begins the discussion in 
V. 9 and does not leave it. until V. 15, af ter over 4000 words of argument; 
no other biblical text and no other specific Gnostic argument 
receives comparable treatment in his extant works. Clearly he was 
anxious to establish a harmony between this apparently recalcitrant 
verse and his overall theological scheme, which heclaimed to be 
based, among other authorities, upon the Pauline epistles. In effect, 
Irenaeus argues that 'flesh and blood' can and will inherit the 
Kingdom of God, St. Paul's statement to the contrary being referred 
to 'carnal deeds, which, pervertingmanto sin, deprive him of life'. 
34 
Assessment of Irenaeus, understanding of the resurrection ofthe body 
must acknowledge that he was fundamentally correct in defending the 
positive place of created bodies in the ultimate purposes of God; 
yet questions related to those raised earlier in different contexts 
present themselves, for we are again witnessing the affirmation of a 
very close relationship between creation and redemption. Is there not 
a greater discontinuity between created and redeemed bodies disclosed 
in the New Testament? It is significant that in hislong discussion of 
lCorinthians 15: 50 Irenaeus does not mention the succeeding verses: 
Lo! I tell you a mystery. We shall not all sleep, but 
we shall all be changed, in a moment, in the twinkling 
of an eye, at the last trumpet. For the trumpet will 
sound, and the dead will be raised imperishable, and we 
shall be changed. 
In his theology the great change has already come with the incarnation 
of Christ, and, rather than a sudden possession of immortality, Irenaeus 
assigns to the hereafter a continuation of the gradual growth experienced 
in this life. 35 Alongside the Irenaean hope for a rationally purified 
creation we must set the New Testament hope for a new heaven and a new 
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earth, and the mysterious transformation of the prcsent heaven 
and earth, with the first last and the last first, which is entailed 
therein. 36 
Similarly, while not denying that a relationship exists between the 
resurrection of Jesus Christ from the tomb and the future resurrection 
of the just, it is not clear that the relation is as univocal as 
Irenaeus assumes, because to conceive it thus would be to underestimate 
the significance of the ascension. 
37 Irenaeus thus tends to establish 
too tight a link betwen creation and redemption : the Pauline emphasis 
upon the second Adam is modified into an emphasis upon the second 
Adam. 38 This change is illustrated by the passage from V. 3.2 which 
speaks of the relative ease of reintegrating, as compared to creating 
from non-existence, the human body. Again we see a certain weakening 
of the Pauline understanding of the resurrection as a new creation. 
Underlying Irenaeus here is a misconception about the nature of 
'bodies', and inparticular an assumption that a body can be defined 
in terms of its constituent matter, that is, to our modern understanding, 
its atoms and molecules. While bodies, so far as we know, necessarily 
contain atoms and molecules, no body can be defined simply in terms of 
the set of atoms and molecules which it comprises, because a continuous 
interchange is occurring between the atoms and molecules of a body and 
the atoms and molecules of the surrounding environment - via breathing, 
sweating, constant shedding of the top layer of skin, and so forth. A 
body which is recognisably the same over an extended period, both to the 
person to whom it 'belongs' and to others, in fact will have exchanged a 
large proportion of its constituent atoms with the environment. Therefore, 
to believe in the resurrection of the body does not require a belief that, 
30(. 
upon death, the individual atoms and molecules of a body are divinely 
labelled for reassembly. Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that a 
certain proportion ofthe atoms and molecules which currently comprise 
a body have been part of other bodies, but this need cause no embarrassment 
to a belief in the resurrectionDafthe body. Although a material, earthly 
reality, an individual body is defined primarily in terms of being a 
person's body, that is, it is fundamentally a personal concept and it 
is as such that belief in the resurrection is confessed, as an integral 
part of belief in the redemption of the whole person. Confidence that 
a redeemed body will be identifiably their body, need not imply that 
it will comprise a currently identifiable group of atoms and molecules. 
To use a crude analogy, a vintage car can be restored to its original 
condition by reconstruction accoiýding to a specified design, but the 
actual atoms and molecules in the reconstructed car will be very 
substantially different from those originally used. How much more true 
this may be when it is transformation and not simply restoration which 
is in prospect? 
39 
Discussion of the balance ofrestoration and transformation in Irenaeus' 
understanding of resurrection can be related to the central concept of 
o(YaY-Cq*0ALw*-!. S 
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for there has been a long dispute over whether 
restoration or transformation is fundamental to it. Arguably the theme 
of growth, or evolution, unites the elements of restoration and trans- 
formation, bothof which are present, the lack of a strong vision of 
a 'golden age'not resulting in an over-emphasis on transformation, but 
arguably the reverse, because of the emphatic earthiness of the Irenaean 
concept of man. It is always 'the same man' who is 'recapitulated'. 
40 
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In assessing Irenaeus I understanding of the resurrection of the body 
we should recognise that, in contrast to Gnosticism, his position 
matches a well established emphasis in second-century theology. Thus 
Justin, Theophilus of Antioch, and Athenagoras all give similar accounts. 
41 
The particular shape of this belief in the resurrection of the body 
derives in part from po. st-Maccabean Judaism, andin. part from the ethical 
teaching of these theologians. If evidence against theprovidence of God 
was cited by their opponents, recourse was needed to a system of reward 
and punishment to inaugurate and characterise a future life. Major 
difficulties with restricting this to a realm of the soul would be a 
sense either of injustice that souls were to be held fully responsible 
for their acts in the flesh, or that soul and body properly belonged 
together as partners in good and bad acts alike. 
42 Despite such justi- 
ification, however, these unrefined ideas had littleappeal for educated 
pagans such as Celsus and Plotinus, and it was Origen, above all, who 
attempted to formulate a more adequate doctrine of the resurrection. 
If, in reaction to the established teaching of the previous century, 
Origen erred in a different direction, this is hardly surprising. 
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These features of Irenaeus' conception of the resurrection of the body 
in part derive, and could receive further illustration, from his 
millenarianism. This was present in the Asiatic traditions to which 
Irenaeus was heir, and provided a useful contrast with two features 
of Gnostic eschatology : on the one hand the rejection of the 
redemption of the flesh and, on the other hand, the belief that upon 
44 death Gnostic spirits would immediately rise to the Pleroma. There 
has been considerable dispute over both the details of Irenaeus, 
millenarianism and their significance in his theology. It is not 
necessary to consider the disputed questions, besides affirming that 
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he does hold a form of millenarianism, 
45 
and observing that, in 
characteristic fashion, he modifies it to reflect certain of his 
own emphases, notably by making the thousand years of the millennium 
a period wherein the righteous will receive continued training for 
eternal life, 
46 
and by attributing to the millennium the fertility 
of creation which, in The Revelation of John, features in the new 
creation. 
47 
Therefore, we may summarise our discussion of the bodily nature of 
man by endorsing the comments of R. D. Williams upon Irenaeus: 'The 
only history to be taken seriously is bodily history; and so the .-- 
redemption of man must be located in bodily history ...... Characteristically, 
attention is drawn away from words and ideas to the "speech" of historical 
fact'. 48 We would only add that there are dangers and tensions inherent 
in this great emphasis upon the present reality of history and nature,, 
which we will now investigate from another perspective, that of man as 
soul and spirit, as well as body. 
(iii) Man as Body, Soul and Spirit 
If the Irenaean account of the bodily nature-of man has received in- 
sufficient attention, that has in large-measure resulted from the very 
considerable discussion of another aspect of his anthropology, the 
relation between the soul and spirit (or Spirit) of man. Later debates 
between so-called dichotomists and trichotomists, greatly stimulated 
by, on the one hand, the controversial views of Origen and Apollinaris 
of Laodicea, and, on the other hand, the anthropological assumptions 
underlying the Pelagian dispute, with its almost chronic recurrence 
in different forms, has caused attention to be focused on this aspect 
of his doctrine of. the constitution of man. Given, in addition, Irenaean 
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material which is both inherently ambiguous and not expressed in the 
categories of later thought, even if the language is similar, it is 
not surprising that, at this point: 
Endless discussion has arisen in Irenaean exegesis .... 
There are some, for instance, who maintain that 
Irenaeus has a dichotomous understanding of man, 
according to which man consists merely of body and 
soul, while the Spirit is something divine and super- 
human, and others again who insist that Irenaeus has 
in fact a trichotomous understanding of'man, according 
to which man, as man, consists of body, soul, and Spirit 
(sic). If such a contrastis maintained between two 
interpretations which are both static, we shall make 
nothing at all of Irenaeus' subject-matter. The Spirit 
is something which grows together with man, and in 
proportion as it does, man becomes what he was destined 
to become, viz. man. This goal has not yet been reached 
within the Church, but the Spirit strives against the flesh. 
Sin, the inhuman element still remains. But one day, in the 
resurrection, the Spirit will wholly penetrate the flesh, 
drive out sin, and make man man. 49 
We cannot review in-detail the relevant and much discussed Irenaean 
texts, but with the proviso that, as a Scandinavian Lutheran, he rather 
over-estimates Irenaeus' perception of warfare in the Church between 
the flesh and the Spirit, we will endorse Wingren's general judgement 
on the debate. However, he tends to avoid the tensions in, and 
Iý. 
problems with, Irenaeus' position. These derive in good measure from 
the characteristic way, in which Irenaeus both adopts and transforms 
the traditions he has received. ' This process can be seen most clearly 
when he presents the nature of man both as a unity and as a composition 
of separate parts. To a large degree the former emphasis is biblical, 
and especially Old Testament, in origin, and the latter Platonic. 
50 Yet 
even in a passage which readily recalls Plato, there is a clear assertion 
that the flesh is properly intrinsic to man: 
- .. there are three things out of which, as I have 
shown, the complete man is composed - flesh, soul, 
and Spirit. One ofýthese does indeed preserve and 
fashion - this is the Spirit; while as to another it 
is united and formed - that is the flesh; then that 
which is between these two - that is the soul, which 
sometimes indeed, when it follows the Spirit, is 
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raised up by it, but sometimes it sympathizes with 
the flesh, and falls into carnal lusts. (V. 9.1) 
Generally, Irenaeus assumes that the relationship between body, soul 
and Spirit is ordered in the manner indicated here, a positive and 
mutually beneficial relation, between-body and soul enshrining a 
priority, of the soul, the orderliness being guaranteed by the creative 
presence of the Spirit. 
51 Irenaeus! discussion of the nature of man 
as body, soul and Spirit arises primarily at two junctures in A. H.: 
towards the end of Book Two, in conjunction with a refutation of the 
philosophic and Gnostic 
ý2 idea of the. transmigration of souls, and, 
in Book Five, in his response to the Gnostic challenge that 'Flesh and 
blood shall not inherit the Kingdom of God'. Both contexts involved 
a defence of the goodness, and importance of the bodily nature of man 
against Gnostic dualism, and, this in part accounts for the close 
relationship into which Irenaeus brings body, soul and Spirit. Thus, 
he appeals to the, mingling of. soul and body when adducing the re- 
collection of dreaming as. evidence against the transmigration of souls: 
For as, when the body is. asleep and at rest, whatever 
things the soul sees for herself, and does in a vision, 
recollecting many of these,, she also communicates them 
to the body .... For if that which is seen .... by the soul 
alone, through means of, a dream is remembered after she 
has mingled again with the body, and been dispersed 
through all the members, much more would she remember 
those things in connection with which she stayed during 
so long-a time, even throughout the whole period of a 
previous life. (11.33.1) 
It is interesting to note that, although the soul is conceived as 
dispersed throughout the body, it is able to operate quite independently 
of the body when experiencing dreams. Yet in the normal situation body 
and soul operate together, occupying the same space as the soul takes 
the shape of the body. 
53 Irenaeus uses such pictures to illustrate 
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and explain his understanding of the constitution of man, but we must 
always be careful to heed Wingren's warning that such static descriptions 
need to be interpreted in terms of a dynamic process of bodily and 
spiritual growth, as God and creation interact. This is frequently 
presented in ethical terms, and never more so thaxi in the early chapters 
of Book Five where the response to Gnostic exegesis of lCor. 15: 50 
is an ethical counter-exegesis. 
54 Also in this context, - it is note- 
worthy that similar language to that used of the relation between body, 
soul and Spirit is used of the eucharist, 
55 the lack of visible change 
in the elements ofbread and wine being paralleled by the literal 
conception of the salvation of the flesh which we discussed in the last 
section. Indeed an interesting issue can be raised here, concerning 
Irenaeus' conception of the. eucharist, which may shed light upon a 
major question facing contemporary theology, namely, the fundamental 
accuracy of the challenging Idemythologisation' of the various 
1 56 historical concepts of the 4a, craments offered by Karl Barth. if 
I 
Barth's position, which has been largely endorsed by such distinguished 
successors as Moltmann and Jangel, is correct, the question which arises 
is when and how the mistakes were made which fed, in various forms, 
into later tradition. The inescapable suggestion posed by the present 
thesis is that Irenaeus, with his 'monistic' over-compensation for 
Gnostic dualism, provides an. interesting source of inquiry. We shall 
bear this in mind as we assess further aspa-ts of Irenaeus' account 
of the make-up of man. 
Especially relevant in this respect, is the relation Irenaeus posits 
between the Holy Spirit and, the essential being of man. As we have 
commented, he uses his anthropology as a tool-in the refutation of 
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Gnosticism, and, partly as a'result of this, references to the 
constitution of man do not readily slot into a single pattern, but 
his general position appearsclear : whereas body and soul are created 
parts of a man, without the active presence of the Holy Spirit man 
would not be alive. 
The flesh, therefore, when destitute of the Spirit of 
God is dead, not having life ..... But where the Spirit 
of the Father is, there is a living man .... Inasmuch, 
therefore, as without the Spirit of God we cannot be 
saved, the apostle exhorts us through faith and chaste 
conversation to preserve the Spirit of God, lest, having 
become non-participators of the Divine Spirit, we lose 
the kingdom of heaven.... (V. 9.3) 
For a living person inherits the goods of the deceased; 
and it is one thing to inherit, another to be inherited 
What, therefore, is it that-lives? The Spirit of God, 
doubtless. What, again, are the possessions of the 
deceased? The various parts of the man, surely, which 
rot in the earth. But these are inherited by the Spirit 
when they are translated into the kingdom of heaven... 
In order that we may not lose life by losing that Spirit 
which possesses us, the apostle, exhorting us to the 
communion of the Spirit, has said.... 'that flesh and 
blood cannot inherit the kingdon of God'. (V. 9.4) 
In order to be alive, man must participate in, which is to be 
possessed by, the Spirit of God. We notice how Ireneaus! thought 
moves directly from creation to redemption, and vice versa: the only 
life known to him is the eternal life of-which, at present, we have 
a partial share. 
57 In thus denying to man the intrinsic possession 
of a created spirit, Irenaeus is attempting both to maintain the 
essential difference between-created reality and God, and to establish 
a natural and necessary-relation between them. By contrast, Gnosticism 
claimed that while some men were intrinsically spiritual, this was 
by detachment from a spiritual realm, which 'naturally' had no relation 
to created reality. The difficulty inherent in Irenaeus' thought here 
is the closeness of the. relation between-God and man : can one, deny 
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.i to creation its own created life, even if this must be guaranteed by 
1 
58 God; ýwho upholds the universe by His word of power? Applied to 
4esus, Christ, Irenaeus' anthropology could be regarded as encouraging 
the7docetism and Apollinarianism which were to prove problematic in 
subsequent patristic theology. 
59 Despite his intentions to the 
contrary, in Irenaeus' psychology body and soul are conceived as too 
passive and instrumental before the continuing creative presence of 
God,,, reflecting the determinist, strand which we have identified else- 
where-in his theology. 
60 
Yet this determinist aspect must not be over-stated, by reading back 
into Irenaeus the subject-object. dichotomy. which has been a prominent 
feature of Western thought, particularly since the Enlightenment. The 
Western conception of spirit has been predominantly individual and 
subjective, striving to influence and dominate the world around it. 
Applied to the relation with God, this has polarised the dynamics of 
salvation by making either man the passive recipient of divine love 
or wrath, or salvation essentially dependent upon man. Irenaeus 
attempts to balance the determinism inherent in his theology with a 
strong ethical dimension: 'through faith, and chaste conversaCOrt. (we are) 
61ý to preserve tlýýSpirit of God'., His basic conception is of a subject- 
subject model of divine-human interaction, even if in it the human 
subject is rather encompassed by the presence, of the divine Subject, 
although, again, 'we must remember, that, for Irenaeus, God is to be 
regarded as gentle and long-suffering in his-dealings with man. 
62 
We'shall further investigate the-implications of this anthropology by 
considering how Irenaeus conceives of the relation between Christians 
andý'non-believers, as this poses a problem for him, given the difficulty 
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of maintaining that the latter are not alive, a difficulty compounded 
by the Gnostic and Marcionite background against which he wrote. This 
surfaces most clearly in his answer to Marcion, in the latter chapters 
of Book Four, where a central issue was the relation between the old 
and new covenants. While insisting that 'one and the same God' was 
responsible for events throughout history, Irenaeus accepts that a 
variety of Idispensations' have been involved, their harmony being 
di 
* 
scernible only to 'the spiritual disciple', as is described at 
-- I- ý, 
length in chapter thirty-three: 
A spiritual disciple, truly receiving the Spirit of God, 
who was from the beginning, in all the dispensations of 
God, present with mankind ...... (IV. 33.1) 
..... will interpret by pointing out, 
in regard to every 
one of the things which have been spoken (in the prophets), 
to what special point in the dispensation of the Lord, it 
referred... -. acknowledging also at all times the same Spirit 
of God, although He has been poured out upon us after a 
new fashion in these last times ..... (IV. 33.15) 
At'the conclusion of his argument, in the last chapter of Book Four, 
hý''links and distinguishes believers from the rest of mankind by a 
differentiated concept of sonship: 
According to nature, then - that is, according to 
creation, so to speak - we are all sons of God, 
because we have all been'created by; God. But with 
respect to obedience and doctrine we are not all 
the sons of God : those only are so who believe in 
Him and do His will. (IV. 31.2) 63 
When Inenaeus thus distinguishes, amid their relationship, creation and 
redemption, he offers an interpretation of his anthropology which avoids, 
at, least to some degree, the dangers inherent in his idea of humanity 
as constituted by being possessed by the Spirit of God. In other 
respects, as we have seen, he forges too close a connection between 
creation and redemption, implicitly denying to the created order a 
sufficient degree of independent, if nevertheless contingent, freedom. 
, 3(5 
To'insist upon this is not to question that there is an essential 
relationship between creation and the incarnation, but to suggest 
thaý-Ithe relationship is not as univocal as Irenaeus assumes. It 
is '. týue that Irenaeus' intention is to defend the grace and goodness 
oi God in His dealings with the world; our c-ontehtiori-is that this is 
best done not by emphasising that God continuously penetrates and 
possesses creation, which risks either making the presence of God 
purely natural to man, or making man supernatural, but by asserting 
'' I' ' that the gracious freedom of God creates and finds in man a corresponding 
freedom of response. Admittedly, there is a certain paradox inherent 
inthis conjunction of grace and response, a paradox irreducibly bequeathed 
us from the Bible. Up to a point, this paradox is implicit in 
Irenaeus, but is not properly reflected in his account of the nature of 
man. The perspective which is lacking is that of Romans 8: 15f: 'When 
we' cry, "Abbal Father! " it is the Spirit Himself bearing witness with 
our spirit that we are children of God'. Although he refers to verses 
from this chapter on a number of occasions, he avoids v. 16, with its 
cleýý'Lstinction between the Holy Spirit and the human spirit, and 
when quoting v. 15b, 'When we cry Abba! Father!, he always either omits 
64 
or paraphrases v-. 16 to avoid mention of a separate human spirit. 
Of'course, Romans 8: 16 speaks of a close, we might say synchronous, 
ýelation between the Holy Spirit and the human spirit when a child 
of God acknowledges his Father, andinsuch circumstances it might be 
ýelatively easy to speak of one Spirit rather than two, in the tenor 
of Galatians 2: 20: '1 have been crucified with Christ; it is no longer 
I'who'live, but Christ who lives in me. ' The real difficulty arises 
n ". i "the case of'a man who is not in this direct communion with God. Is 
&re 
not a case for claiming that it is in fallen man, above all, 
31(o 
that we need to speak of a spirit distinct from God? 
65 Does the 
radical mystery of the incarnation and atonement not assume such a 
situation? In a curious way, IrerWeusl over-compensation for Gnostic 
docetism can introduce precisely the error he seeks to excise, by 1- 
giving insufficient regard to the contingent freedom of creation, as 
exemplified above all in man. 
Assessment of the Irenaean account of the being of man is rendered 
difficult both by the ambiguities in his various statements, and by 
the controversies in this areaýof modern theology. Therefore we will 
k- ,' 
conclude this section with an attempt to clarify the issues, and to 
outline a satisfactory resolution of them. 
Earlier we drew attention to the different interpretations which can 
be given to the concept of a 'body'; the ambiguities here are much 
greater in relation to the, conaepts of 'soul' and 'spirit', and it is 
noteworthy how often this passes without remark. The problematic 
character of the use in Christian theology of the concept of 'soul' 
has been exposed, above all, by the progressive discovery of the degree 
to 
'which 
man shares a common nature with other members of the animal 
Yingdolm, far beyond the mere fact of being constructed from similar 
.11 
material. 
66 The traditional dual description of man asbody and soul 
both militates against a proper appreciation of the essential wholeness 
of manas a psycho-somatic unity, and provides an inadequate conceptual 
basis for expressing similarities and dissimilarities between man and 
T -1 - 
other creatures. To add spirit as a third created dimension of man 
offers more opportunity for drawing necessary distinctions, but at the 




The problems with the traditional categories are such that I would 
advocate a fresh approach to understanding the constitution and 
nature of man, using the insights offered by the scientific study of 
humanity which has helped so much to undermine the traditional views. 
In my judgement, of greatest relevance and use at this point is the 
remarkable work of Michael Polanyi, which builds upon a wide spectrum 
of scientific knowledge a distinctive account of the nature of man. 
Our concern here is not so much with Polanyi's relatively well-known 
epistemology, but with the ontology which he-. subsequently developed. 
68 
In introducing this he usually began from the analysis of a machine, 
which he then generalised to include successive realms of the animate 
world. A machine operates under the control of two logically independent 
sets of principles: on the one hand, the principles of construction and 
operation, which may be defined, for example, in a patent. Two broad 
conditions are then required to be satisfied for the successful working 
of a machine: that it is well designed to achieve its purpose, and 
that material is available which can be moulded to the required shapes, 
and withstand operational stresses and strains. An adequate description 
of the machine, which we may term its ontology, must refer to both sets 
of principles, while according to the higher level operational principles 
the meaning of the machine as a whole, the principles of the lower 
level setting constraints to the successful achievement of this meaning, 
and to a degree participating in it. As this citation explains, 
Polanyi's concept of ontological stratification claims wide 
applicability to the endeavour and structure of the universe alike: 
All these relations become clearer in the case of a skill which 
comprises a number of levels in the form of a hierarchy. The 
production of a literary composition, for example a speech, 
includes five levels. The first level, lowest of all, is the 
production of a voice; the second, the utterance of words; 
the third, the joining of words to make sentences; the fourth, 
the working of sentences into a style; the fifth, and highest, 
the composition of the text. 
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The principles of each level operate under the control of the 
next higher level. The voice you produce is shaped into words 
by a vocabulary; a given vocabulary is shaped into sentences 
in accordance with a grammar; and the sentences are fitted 
into a style, which in turn is made to convey the ideas of the 
composition. Thus each level is subject to dual control; first, 
by the laws that apply to its elements in themselves, and second, 
by the laws that control the comprehensive entity formed by them. 
Such multiple control is made possible again by the fact that 
the principles governing the isolated particulars of a lower 
level leave indeterminate their boundary conditions, to be 
controlled by a higher principle. Voice production leaves 
largely open the combination of sounds into words, which is 
controlled by a vocabulary. Next, a vocabulary leaves largely 
open the combination of words to form sentences, which is 
controlled by grammar; and so the sequence goes on. Consequently, 
the operations of a higher. level cannot be accounted for by the 
laws governing its particulars forming the next lower level. 
You cannot derive a vocabulary from phonetics; you cannot derive 
grammar from a vocabulary; a correct use of grammar does not 
account for good style, and a good style does not supply the 
content of a piece of prose. 
A glance at the functions of living beings assures us that they 
consist in a whole sequence of levels forming such a hierarchy. 
The lowest level is controlled by the laws of inanimate nature 
and the higher levels control throughout the boundary conditions 
left open by the laws of the inanimate. The lowest functions 
of life are those called vegetative; these vegetative functions, 
sustaining life at its lowest level, leave open - in both plants 
and animals - the higher functions of growth, and leave open in 
animals also the operations of muscular action; next in turn, 
the principles governing muscular action in animals leave open 
the integration, of such action to innate patterns of behaviour; 
and again such patterns are open in their turn to be'shaped by 
intelligence; while the working of intelligence itself can be 
made to serve in man the still higher principles of a responsible 
choice. 
We have thus a sequence of rising levels, each higher one 
controlling the boundaries of the one below it and embodying 
thereby the joint-meaning of the particulars situated on the 
lower level. The meaning of each successive rising level 
thus becomes richer at each stage andreaches the fullest measure 
of meaning at the top. 69 
This outline of Polanyi's ontology has been presented at some length, 
fo .r it has a significant bearing upon the issues raised in our discussion 
of Irenaeus' anthropology. It implies that Irenaeus' basically three 
level view of man as body, soul and Spirit needs to be replaced by a 
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multi-level view of man which acknowledges that he shares with the 
animal kingdom a number of levels of rational existence uppermost 
being that of intelligent behaviour, upon which, in man alone, is 
grafted an additional level of moral choice by his ability to respond 
to the abstract, transcendent values of truth,, --justice, love, and so 
forth, which we would wish to identify with the creative presence of 
God as Word and Holy Spirit. 
70 
AS-a result, it is possible to agree with Irenaeus and Barth that man 
is constituted distinctively as man by God, and that the man thus 
constituted is to be understood as a psycho-somatic, if nevertheless 
multi-levelled, organic unity. But we cannot agree with Irenaeus, or 
with the Barth of C. D. 111.2, that this implies a denial to man of his 
'own' spirit, evoked indeed by the creative and transcendent presence 
of God, yet logically, and ontologically, distinct from the transcendent 
God. Admittedly, the interplay of the human spirit and God is shrouded 
.. -r- 
in a providential and eschatological mystery of the divine will; further- 
more, any meaning or goodness achieved by man must be ascribed to the 
transcendent 'level' of God, as the New Testament itself indicates, but 
týis'does not imply that man is a puppet or passive participator in such 
achievement. This account certainly draws a clear and radical distinction 
between divine Spirit and human spirit, but the retention of the same 
ierm-for both is justified, if not demanded, provided that the ontological 
distinction between levels is not compromised, for example by the 
assumption that a master concept of spirit underlies both. Two reasons 
may'be given for retaining the concept of a human spirit. First, 
man is created in'the image of God, Polanyils account offering a, fresh 
appreciation of the meaning of this scriptural affirmation, and, secondly, 
there'is no satisfactory alternative which does not obscure the essential 
32-0 
relatedness between God and man, established categorically in the 
71 incarnation. 
From the perspective opened up by Polanyi, we have been able to endorse 
many of the distinguishing features of Irehakusl account of the nature 
of man : his earthy, yet historical character; his inherent and all- 
important relatedness to God; and his organic unity which cannot be 
described in terms of separate and separable parts. But running through 
even the very strengths of Irenaeus' doctrine of man we have identified 
a series of related weaknesses, deriving from his inadequate grasp of 
the essential createdness of man, with his contingent rationality and 
freedom of spirit. This conclusion poses a final area for consideration, 
which we have also approached at other stages of our investigation, 
namely the Irenaean understanding of sin and evil. 
The Problem of Evil 
'... ýt 
The problem of evil has long tormented Christian theology, not least 
72 
in the years since the Holocaust. As we have already noted, Gnosticism 
could be regarded as essentially an answer to the problem of evil, 
offering to the ancient world a more radical explanation along lines 
which had already been mapped in conventional philosophy. If it is 
not held that the universe is created, the natural approach to the 
pr oblem of evil is to single out a particular aspect of the universe 
as the source and basis of evil. In the philosophical thought of the 
ancient world this role usually fell, in one form or another, to matter. 
In one sense Gnosticism advanced a sharper dualism than those philosophies 
which nourished Middle Platonism, yet, in another sense, the Gnostics 
were less than strict dualists, as they did not hold that matter was 
eternal, this latter point illustrating once more the subtle - or not 
32-1 
so, subtlel - interaction between Gnosticism and mainstream Christian 
thought. ' Our discussion will focus, therefore, upon the role played 
in Irenaeus' theodicy by his understanding of the nature of created 
existence. Although this limits the scope of our investigation, it 
both takes us to the heart of Irenaeus' treatment of the problem of 
evil, and concentrates upon the area of greatest relevance to this 
thesis. 
Tnitially, however, we should note certain important aspects of his 
reflections on the issue of evil, which we cannot consider in any 
1. z-ý ý 
detail. Firstly, we must acknowledge that all Irenaeus has to say 
ILI 
about evil is qualified by his insistence that severe limitations are 
placed upon human thought when confronted with the questions which arise 
in this context, for the relevant information has not been disclosed 
to us. 
73 His reserve here derivesin)part from the a posteriori 
approach which. -As fundamental to his theology, which discourages hypo- 
thetical speculation, and in, part from the mystery of 'why, while all 
things were made by God, certain of His creatures sinned and revolted 
from a state of submission to God'. 
74 
This brief quotation leads to our second preliminary observation, 
that Irenaeus makes use of the belief, common to the Judaeo-Christian 
world of his day, that the ultimate origin of evil lay in a revolt of 
angels, which Irenaeus regarded as fundamentally inexplicable. 
75 
The 
use of this motif in his theology is problematic, for the mystery 
confessed by Irenaeus could be perceived by others as nonsense or 
contradiction. Indeed, the problem was identified,. by Irenaeus himself, 
when, in criticising the Gnostic account of the fall of the Aeon Sophia, 
he relied on the principle that 'like must produce like', a principle 
32.2- 
which arguably was violated in both his doctrine of creation and 
his avowal of the doctrine of the fall of angels: 
If, therefore, this Aeon was produced by the Pleroma of 
the same substance as the whole of it, she could never 
have undergone change, since she was consorting with 
beings similar to and familiar with herself, a spiritual 
essence among those that were spiritual. For fear, terror, 
passion, dissolution and such like, may perhaps occur 
through the struggle of contraries among such beings as 
we are, who are possessed of bodies; but among spiritual 
beings, and those that have the light diffused among them, 
no such calamities can possibly happen. (11.18.5) 
Although it could be argued that Irenaeus eases the problem by 
locating the fall in created angels rather than in the divine Pleroma, 
76 
to a large extent the problem of the 'creation of evil ex nihilol 
remains, as his apoPhatic comments elsewhere indicate. The nature 
of"the problem is illustrated by the contrast between Irenaeus and 
Origen here, for while Irenaeus is emphatic that the divine mercy 
does not extend to the devil, or to those men who choose to follow 
the devil rather than God, whereas His long-suffering does mercifully 
extend to others who are also deserving of punishment, Origen, by 
6ontrast, saw that such a position itself verged on Gnostic dualism, 
77 
his solution being that the devil could indeed be saved in the end. 
Neither approach is free of difficulty, the underlying problem being 
the reliance upon the largely inter-testamental idea of the fall of 
angels. This is not to say that it has no contribution to make to 
Christian reflection upon the question of theodicy, especially given 
its occasional use by the'New Testament writers, but it cannot itself 
býar the full weight which hbLs often been placed upon it. Although 
tfiý'intepretatiýon of evil in terms'of freedom is arguably :a major 
contribution to human thought upon the subject, the doctrine of an 
78 
angelic fall is too anthropomorphic, and ultimately involves the 
very confusion between evil and created reality which Gnosticism itself 
32.3 
manifested. The defence that the existence of a possible misuse of 
freedom does not imply or involve its actual misuse, while not without 
value, cannot be sustained, because some relation, at least, must 
obtain between actuality and possibility. In other words, if the so- 
called free will, defence which, to account for the full range of evils, 
must include something akin to the doctrine of the fall of angels, is 
logically plausible, which may be conceded, it is not theologically 
adequate. 
79 
A consequence of Irenaeus' espousal of thecfree will defencetheodicy, 
which extends from the fall of angels to analogous human misuse of 
freedom and the resultant punishment, as we saw in our earlier 
considerations of providence and the freedom of the will, is his belief 
so 81 that the devil was a 'creature of God',, and 'one among created things'. 
The contexts of both these statements include strong affirmations of the 
absolute sovereignty of God, and-from this basis the question naturally 
arises : does Irenaeus compromise the goodness of creation, the reality 
of evil, or both? 
v 
The blending of Platonism with a metaphysics of freedom certainly 
could lead towards understanding evil as, strictly speaking, unreal, 
if nevertheless necessary for the existence of its opposite, created 
goodness; we see this process occurring, in. the thought of Clement 
and, Origen. 
82 But,, if tempted in, this direction, Irenaeus stops well 
short of such a conclusion, resting with the conviction that the 
eternal damnation of the devil, his angels. and human disciplesis a 
mysterious fact with which we simply have to reckon. 
83 
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This willingness to bring the devil and his followers under a common 
rubric, as rebellious creatures of God, would naturally foster a 
tendency to minimise the radical perversity of sin and evil, but 
this is restrained precisely by the harshness of the judgement 
involved in this common classification, Irenaeus finding in Scripture 
justification for his decision, both from the New Testament teaching 
on eternal judgementand scattered Old Testament references to God 
creating evil: 
It is therefore one and the same God the Father 
who has prepared good things with Himself for 
those who desire His fellowship, and remain in 
subjection to Him; and who has prepared the 
eternal fire for the ringleader of the apostasy, 
the devil, and those who revolted with him, into 
which fire the Lord has declared those men shall 
be sent who have been set apart by themselves on 
His left hand. And this is what has been spoken 
by the prophet, 'I am a jealous God, making peace, 
and creating evil. things"(Is. 45: 7); thus making 
peace and friendship with those who repent and 
turn to Him .... but preparing for the impenitent, 
those who shun the light, eternal fire and outer 
darkness, which are evils indeed to those persons 
who fall into them. (IV. 40.1) 
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We do not dispute that the nature of evil is defined by the divine 
rejection of it, but a difficulty arises from the assigning to evil 
of a reality defined not in opposition to, but also in terms of, God's 
good creation, in effect dividing creation into two classes of reality, 
a procedure uncomfortably reminiscent of Gnosticism itself. The true 
alternative is not to deny the reality of evil, but rather to see 
everyone, indeed the whole of creation, as threatened by, and in need 
of redemption from it. The eschatological transformation promised to 
us will thus affect all creation, judgement beginning at the house 
of God ( lPeter 4: 17). On Irenaeus' view, can we really hold that 
evil will be destroyed, and not only punished eternally? In Chapter 
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One we approached this issue from the, perspective of Irenaeus, teaching 
on the relation between the justice and mercy of God, and concluded 
that the source of the problem of a rationalistic ontology of good 
and evil lay in his inadequate appreciation of the Jewish categories 
of the Bible. Later, in Chapter Four, we exhibited the consequences 
for his conception of the relation between providence and judgement, 
and we now begin to see a consistent pattern in the area of theodicy. 
The positing of this connection between freedom and evil leads to 
these results in Irenaeus' theology, involving a degree of confusion 
between evil and creation; we shall-now demonstrate how these conclusions 
cohere with another aspect of his theodicy, which has been called, the 
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necessary imperfection of creation This tends to act as a premiss 
which undergirds the freedom motif, as is illustrated by the fact that 
the clearest development of both themes occurs in the same part of A. H.: 
Book IV. chs. 37-41. 
The refutation of Marcion provides the important background to these 
chapters. In response to the Marcionite severance between Old and 
New., Testaments, with its associated impugning of the God attested in 
the former, Irenaeus has stressed, the progressive yet harmonious process 
of revelation and salvation, -relying upon a combination of divine fore- 
knowledge and a free will defence to 1absolve God of responsibility for 
unfortunate events-committed under the old covenant. Chapter 37 
emphasises the importance of the 'negative' freedom of the human will, 
chiefly to explain the existence and punishment of sin, its existence 
being justified because of the, higher value placed upon goodness which 
was. attained voluntarily rather than by coercion or, even less commendably, 
by nature: 
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But upon this supposition (that men had been created 
incapable of transgression), neither would they be 
grateful for the good they enjoy, 'nor communion with 
God be precious, norwould the, good be'very much to 
be sought after, which would present itself without 
their own proper endeavour, care, or study, but'would 
be implanted of its own accord and without their concern. 
Thus it would come to pass, ' that their being good would 
be of no consequence because they were so by nature, 
rather than by will ..... (IV. 37.6) 
Moreover, the perception and prizing of goodness and virtue is enhanced 
by knowledge, and perhaps direct experience, of the contrasting 
-I qualities: 
And indeed those things are'not esteemed so highly 
which come spontaneously, as those which are reached 
by much anxious care .... Moreover, the faculty of 
seeing would not appear to be so desirable, unless 
we had kncwn what a loss'it were to be' devoid of 
sight; and health, too, is rendered all the more 
estimable by an acquaintance'with disease; light, 
also, by contrasting it with dar kness and life 
with death. (IV. 37.7)' 
Irenaeus was doubtless aware'of'the objection that he was coming close 
to justifying evil as a necessary accompaniment to goodness, whereas 
in Book Two of A. H. he had aýjued at''length that good and evil were to 
be sharply distinguished and n6 . t: confused. ' Hence his position demanded 
that the state of affairs described thus far in Book Four should not 
be ascribed to the free decision of God, butto, some other necessity. 
86 
With his strong monotheism excluding. a dualistic option, he developed 
the idea that the decision to create, which was ascribable to the will 
of God alonenecessarily carried with it the imperfection of that which 
was created, because of the contrast between God and creation inherent 
in the very concept of creation. 
87 This precluded the possibility that 
God could have created a perfect universe: 
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If, however, anyone say, 'What then? Could not God 
have made man perfect from the beginning? o Let him 
know that, inasmuch as God is indeed always the same 
and unbegotten as respects Himself, all things are 
possible to Him. But created things must be inferior 
to Him who created them, from the very fact of their 
later origin; for it was not possible for things 
recently created to have been uncreated. But inasmuch 
as they are not uncreated, for this very reason do they 
come short of the perfect. Because, as these things are 
of a later date, so are they infantile; so are they 
unaccumstomed to, and unexercised in, perfect discipline. 
(IV. 38.1) 
There are two steps in Irenaeus' argument : created beings must be 
both less than perfect and, if they are endowed with free will, must 
be unstable - yet, as we have seen, this instability is also the pre- 
requisite for the attainment of created moral goodness. This im- 
perfection and instability of man, which Irenaeus appears to refer 
both to Adam and Eve as the first examples of mankind, and also to 
futureýgenerations, is employed to mitigate the culpability of human 
sin, and to explain the long-suffering and mercy of God: 
For this cause also God has banished from His presence 
him (the apostate angel) who did of his own accord 
stealthily sow the tares, that is, him who brought 
about the transgression; but He took compassion on man, 
who, through want of care no doubt, but still wickedly, 
became involved in disobedence.... (IV. 40.3) 88 
Precise analysis of Irenaeus' position is not easy, due to the brevity 
of his discussion, its lack of complete consistency, 
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and the partially 
foreign nature of the later conceptuality which we inevitably bring to 
bear upon it. The crucial question is : to what extent does Irenaeus 
anticipate the'view of Schleiermacher that experience of sin is 
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necessary for the operation of divine grace? Some of his statements 
certainly lead in this direction, as our extracts from these later 
chapters of Book Four have indicated, yet the view that the spiritual 
growth of man should be-seen as a smooth, one level process, upon which 
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one finds good and evil, virtue and sin, juxtaposed, has to reckon 
with the other side to Irenaeus' theology which speaks of the loathe- 
some discontinuity of evil, and its triumphant defeat by God in 
91 Christ. For Irenaeus, the life and death ofChrist is much more 
than an example of the making of a soul in the vale of rejection 
and crucifixion. 
92 Yet the assertion, natural to monotheism, of the 
control of God over creation could lead to an 'instrumental' view 
of evil, as necessary and beneficial to creation. The following 
comments, from the Martyrdom of Polycar , indicate the ideas which 
Irenaeus would have imbibed in his youth: 
Blessed therefore and noble are all the martyrdoms which 
have taken place according to the will of God (for it 
behoves us to be very scrupulous and to assign to God the 
power over all things). Martyrdom of Polycarp, 2. 
Indeed, the closing chapters of A. H. reproduce very similar thoughts: 
For it is just that in that very creation in which they 
(i. e. the righteous) toiled or were afflicted, being proved 
in every way by suffering, they should receive the reward 
of their suffering; and that in the creation in which they 
were slain because of their love to God, in that they should 
be revived again .... For God is rich in all things, and all 
things are His. (V. 32.1) 93 
We are now in a position to see how Irenaeus is driven to the view 
that good and evil have correlative roles in creation; the strongly 
asserted identity between this world and the new creation demands the 
close control of current events by God. To avoid thus implicating 
God in the obvious faults our present world contains, these are 
regarded as both inevitable and educative. The close presence of God 
to creation enhances the contrast between the created and Uncreated, 
yet also renders comprehensible the assertion that this contrast will 
not thwart the ultimate purposes of God. 
94 
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Once again we see how a strong emphasis upon the intimate presence 
of God to creation can tend to put in question its proper created 
goodness, the basic optimism of Irenaeus' approach evoking a counter- 
balancing pessimism, either in relation to the imperfection of creation 
which is necessary for the operation of divine grace, or in relation 
to the equation of the Gnostics, and other unbelievers, with the devil 
himself. An interesting example of the type of conclusion which was 
easily drawn within this rather rationalistic theological framework 
is provided by the anti-typology of Eve and Mary: 
But Eve was disobedient .... and having become disobedient, 
was made the cause of death, both to herself and to the 
entire human race; so also did Mary .... by yielding to 
obedience,. become, the cause-of salvation, both to herself 
and the whole human race. (111.22.4) 95 
A theology- which brings optimism and pessimism under-a common 
denominator will tend to produce neat categories for each. A further 
illustration of this is provided by his rather over-optimistic verdict 
upon the uniformity and veracity of the tradition associated with the 
I 
succession of bishops of the Church, and the associated rejection of 
all aspects of Gnosticism. 
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Finally, we should mention in this 
connection Irenaeus' description of the process of atonement: 
The Word ..... redeeming us by His own blood in a manner 
consonant to reason, gave Himself as a redemption for 
those who had been led into captivity. And since the 
apostasy tyrannized over us unjustly, and, though we 
were by nature the property of the omnipotent God, 
alien^,; ated us contrary to nature, rendering us its own 
disciples, the Word of God ...... did righteously turn 
against that apostasy, and redeem from it His own property, 
not by violent means, as the apostasy had obtained dominion 
over us at the beginning, when it insatiably snatched away 
what was not its own, but by means of persuasion ..... (V. 1.1) 
Although there is considerable value in the understanding*of atonement 
sketched here, does it do justice to the military metaphors employed 
in the New Testament, and to the essential mystery of the Cross? Here, 
3so 
again, we see a consequence of the confusion between evil and creation 
which 'results in the devil being regarded as a creature of God. 
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Although we have concentrated upon the element of rationalism in 
Irenaeus' account of creation, this should not be overstated. The 
considerable emphasis he gives to time and history attempts to secure 
a smooth transition from a world afflicted by sin and evil to a 
world that is free of such bl&mishes, and if this leads to a rather 
rationalistic account of the process of history, it also focuses 
attention onthe world of time and change. 
98 For Gnosticism the time 
and change which characterised material existence embodied anguish 
and disaster, and although Irenaeus does not avoid a certain 
depreciation of time and change as inevitably imperfect, his basic aim 
is to defend the salvation of the flesh, with an accompanying vision 
of a redeemed world which still experiences change and progress. This 
is an advance over the theology of the Apologists, which tended to 
retain a view of truth as the revelation of the eternal to time 
rather than in time; we may safely assume that Irenaeus would not 
have. endorsed as readily as Justin Martyr the desire of a Christian 
to be castratedl 
99 Although Irenaeus is by no means free of Platonic 
influence - how could this be true of a second-century theologian? - 
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we see in his theology a definite shift towards a more biblical position. 
Although the harmony of creation is guaranteed by the immediate divine 
presence, and therefore, as we have seen, is regarded as possessing an 
intelligibility which is insufficiently contingent, it is nevertheless 
a harmony of variety and activity, which inheres in its material 
existence. The intrinsically finite and imperfect world does not exist 
simply in a static inferiority to a 'higher' world, but rather is seen 
as its potentiality for transformation within the realm of time and 
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history. Thus, for Irenaeus, redemption always means growth and 
transformation amid the basic continuities of time and history, his 
fundamental doctrine of recapitulation enshrining both emphases. 
As we noted at the end of Chapter Three, Irenaeus often remarks upon 
the richness yet harmony of creation, reflecting, and being dependent 
upon, the richness of God. On several occasions he draws an analogy 
between the varied harmony of creation and that of music: 
But since created things are various-and numerous, they 
are indeed well fitted and adapted to the whole creation; 
yet, when viewed individually, are mutually opposite and 
inharmonious, just as the sound of the lyre, which consists 
of many and opposite notes, gives rise to one unbroken 
melody ..... proving the judgement, goodness and skill in the 
whole work. Those, too, who listen to the melody, ought 
to praise and extol the artist, to admire the tension of 
some notes, to attend to the softness of others, to catch 
the sound of others between both these extremes, and to 
consider the special character of others, so as to inquire 
at what each one aims, and what is the cause of their variety, 
never failing to apply our rule, neither faulting the artist, 
nor casting off faith in the one God who formed all things, 
nor blaspheming our Creator. (11.25.2) 101 
As we know today, there is music .. - and musicl If such analogies 
are to be used, should we not guard against limiting our reference to 
the rather urbane type of music which Irenaeus describes? Yet the 
reference to music is in itself suggestive, and serves to emphasise 
the goodness of creation precisely amid the change and movement of 
which it is comprised : the harmony of the music is heard, rather 
than being discovered by theoretical analysis. 
102 The difficulty 
with drawing an analogy from music is the vagueness thus imported into 
the discussion, given the wide range of possible music. Can evil be 
subsumed into creation, if the latter is regarded as a work of art, 
musical or otherwise? Does the harmony exist despite the marring of 
creation by evil, or is evil in some fashion to be included in the 
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harmony of creation? Even if sin is made instrumental to the 
achievement of good, and pre-eminently so on the cross, can we 
regard the cross as a work of art? 
The chief question inherent in Irenaeus' approach to the issue of 
theodicy thus returns : how is the tragic element or aspect of 
creation included in the harmony, without resolving tragedy into 
the good creation of God? Is the groaning intravail of creation a 
z. muaicalgroaning? St. Paul. considered the sufferings of this present 
time 'not worth comparing with the glory that is to be revealed to 
us' (Romans 8: 18) : is there not the danger that in Irenaeus the 
scales are weighed, and the comparisons drawn? The New Testament 
certainly speaks of God using sin and evil in a purposeful way, as 
well as opposing it, but the grief and emotion so frequently displayed 
by Jesus in the face of suffering and evil precludes us from developing 
a systematic explanation or justification of evil along these lines. 
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Yet, equally, we cannot simply see sin and evil as irruptions into 
creation which God could well have done without, given our adherence 
to monotheism and divine omnipotence, even if we allow a degree of 
voluntary self-limitation to qualify the latter. With characteristic 
insight, Austin Farrer has advocated anediating position: 
Let us say that God would never. have allowed evils to 
subsist in his creation, were it not that he might 
find in them the occasions to produce things unique 
in kind, and dependent for their unique aracter on 
the character of the evils in question. 
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The dependence of which Farrer speaks can only be partial, for the 
unique quality of the goodness satisfies the asymmetry indicated in 
Romans 8: 18. To what extent can we probe this asymmetry and partial 
dependence? Farrer wisely warns us that in discussion of such a 
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subject the law of diminishing returns can readily become a law of 
negative returns. 
105 Elsewhere I have indicated how the stratified 
ontology outlined earlier in this chapter could provide a useful 
clue to the relatedness amid unrelatedness of good and evil, 
106 but 
ultimately we cannot fully explain why creation is the way it is, 
except by reference to the inscrutable if revealed will of God. With 
Irenaeus we acknowledge that the present world has a temporary, 
provisional character, itsfashion passing away (lCor- 7: 31), 
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and that it is intended tobe renewed into a world which is fully 
conformed to the image of the glorifed Christ. But we are less sure 
than Irenaeus of the extent to which we can lay bare the precise 
reasons why creation takes its present form. The state of our present 
knowledge of the mystery of creation and redemption has been well 
expressed by H. Berkhof: 
**- we acknowledge that the world contains a tragic 
element ... There is much suffering which no one can 
remove. We know that all this is part of God's good 
creation, yet also that it will be eradicated from the 
new world as this is re-created in Christ. Therefore, 
if necessary, we can acquiesce in it, and wherever 
possible fight against it. What we cannot do is 
explain it. Why has God (provisionally) wanted some- 
thing which nevertheless (ultimately) he does not want? 
The only answer we can give is no answer : apparently 
it was never God's purpose to call into existence a 
ready-made and complete world. He evidently wants his 
creation to go through a history of resistance and 
struggle, of suffering and dying. If this is the will 
of him whom we have come to know as holy love, we may 
believe that some day it will become crystal clear that 
all the pains of childbirth and growing up of this world 
in process of being cannot be compared with the glorious 
outcome. 108 
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1.11.25.3 It is in the following chapters that Irenaeus expounds 
the limited knowledge attainable by men who have 'received grace only 
in part', for to strive to know too much falls foul of St. Paul's 
instruction, 'Knowledge puffs up but love builds up'. 
2. Cf. the very similar statement in IV. 7.4, where the context is 
a defence of the unity of creation and redemption, salvation-history 
unfolding under the care and control of the Creator, who has disposed 
and arranged all things for their culmination in Jesus Christ. 
3. This has been emphasised by D. E. Jenkins, 'The Make-up of Man 
according to St. Irenaeus', S. P., 6 (Berlin: 1962), pp. 91-95. It 
must be agreed that, 'Any in-t-erpreTation and evaluation of the thought 
of St. Irenaeus must take into very careful account the extremely 
literal and physical manner in which he visualises the make-up of man 
on the basis of Genesis 2.71 (p. 95). This account of the creation of 
man forms the basis for the 'literal and physical' presentation of the 
resurrection of the flesh, which is Irenaeus' dominant theme in Book 
Five. How these views relate to the more recent remarks of D. E. 
Jenkins upon the essential nature of man and on the resurrection, is 
not immediately clear! 
4. J. T. Nielsen, op. cit., p. 16f gives the details: 'Irenaeus uses 
the verbs KrLýC-, _v (=creare), (=fabricare) and irbtetv (=facere) mainly to aenote the creation of the world ...... For the 
creation of man Irenaeus uses the verb 10wo-crGIV (=plasmare) and its 
derivatives'. The chief exceptions are the quotations of Gen. 1.26 
'faciamus hominem' in 111.23.2; IV. Praef. 4; IV. 20.1; V. 1.3 and V. 15.4. 
5. There is a similar train of, thought in IV. Praef. 4 'Now man is a 
mixed organization of soul and flesh, who was formed after the likeness 
of God and moulded by His hands, that is, by the Son and Holy Spirit, 
to whom also He said, "Let us make, man". 1 The references to the hands 
of God are often in connection with the creation of man, as we noted 
in Chapter Two. 
6. The divine inspiration of man with the 'breath of life' reinforces 
the point, and should not go unnoticed in this context, although we 
will return to this subject in more detail later in this chapter. 
7. This secrecy is probably to be explained both by the fact that 
man was not yet able to exercise, the lordship which had been promised 
by God, as the continuation of Dem. 11 indicates, and, with less 
certainty, by the existence of a tradition that the fall of the angels 
was occasioned by a test consisting in a command to submit to man. 
See J. P. Smith, op. cit., p. 150, n. 69, for a fuller discussion. 
8. These questions are attracting very considerable attention in 
contemporary theology, after centuries of neglect. As T. F. Torrance 
has insisted, 'A theology that is restricted 
, 
to the relation between 
man and God is deficient and primitive, for it has not advanced from 
mythos to logos, from thinking out of a centre in the human subject 
to thinking out of a centre in objective reality, from thinking 
projectively in pictures and images to thinking in*terms of structured 
imageless relations. ' Reality and, Evangelical Theology, (Philadelphia: 
1982), p. 27. The anthropomorphic understanding of the divine basis 
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of the appearance and freedom of man which we have just noted from 
Dem. 11 is an indication that the 'projection' of which Torrance speaks 
is a problem even for the best writers of the patristic period. 
9. Cf. L. S. Thornton, op. cit., p. 138, 'For this reason St. Irenaeus 
insists that recapitulation is effected through the salvation of 
Adam. The whole race of man is to be restored in Christ to that 
headship over creation which is Adam's prerogative. The tragedy 
of creation lies in the fact that man by seeking to usurp divine 
prerogatives ceased to fulfil rightly his priestly service on behalf 
of the created world. The restoration of creation depends upon the 
restoration of man'. Characteristically, Thornton both portrays with 
insight an important aspect of Irenaeus' thought, but also fails to 
see the tension, and incipient problems, which are simultaneously 
present. 
10. A perspective which has yet to emerge in detail, but which is 
clearly being worked out by such theologians as J. Moltmann and G. S. 
Hendry, who have sought to go beyond Barth at this point, in giving 
a clearer place in the doctrine of creation to the world at large: 
in principle Barth set up his doctrine of creation in universal 
terms, but the concentration in the detailed exposition is largely 
upon man. Hendry has usefully exposed the danger in trying to 
revitalise the doctrine of creation by reducing its scope unduly to 
the relation between God and man - see his 'The Eclipse of Creation' 
and Theology of Nature, to which we have already referred. 
11. After the extensive polemic against Gnostic speculation upon the 
detailed imaging of the Pleroma in creation, it comes as a surprise to 
the reader to find Irenaeus attempting to prove that there were and 
only could be four Gospels, and four principal covenants between God 
and man, 'because there are four zones of the world in which we live, 
and four principal winds' (111.11.8). Such an argument points to 
the general truth that, 'since God made all things in due proportion 
and adaptation, it was fit also that the outward aspect of the gospel 
should be well arranged and harmonized' (111.11.9). 
12. A significant contribution to modern theology along these lines 
has been provided by R. S. Anderson, Historical Transcendence and the 
Reality of God, (London: Chapman, 1975). Anderson's scattered 
references to Irenaeus exhibit his relevance to the theme, if the 
difficulties of patristic theology are somewhat underplayed. A surer 
touch is exhibited in Anderson's more recent book, On Being Human : Essays 
in Theological Anthropology, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982), which 
identifies 'the legacy of patristic anthropology' as 'a somewhat 
static and highly abstract notion of human nature' (p. 5). In 
consequence, Anderson is able to offer, in Chapter Two of the later 
book, a perceptive account of the relation between human and non-human 
creation, which respects both the profound solidarity of man with the 
rest of creation, and the special place assigned to him in the Bible. 
13. Origen, Contra Celsum, ed. H. Chadwick (C. U. P. 1953) p. xf. 
14. Cf. the remarks of E. F. Osborn, Justin Martyr, p. 51, 'When the 
Fathers of the second century speak of man as the centre of creation, they are speaking from two impulses, one from the Bible and the other from the Stoics. ' These twin sources of inspiration evoked the tension which we are observing. 
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15. The Copernican and Darwinian revolutions have revitalised 
theological discussion of this subject. Medieval theology generally 
held that 'an examination of the universe as a whole certainly must 
begin with the study of pure intelligences'(E. Gilson, in God's 
Activity in the World, p. 213, reprinted from The Christianphilosophy 
of St. Thomas Aquinas), but divided over the relative priority of men 
and of angels. From this perspective alone, stiff if nevertheles's 
futile opposition was voiced to the theories of both Copernicus and 
Darwin, the nature of this opposition illustrating the problems with 
the traditional theology of the place of man in creation. Yet recent 
scientific research has cast new and surprising light on the debate, 
pointing up the complexity and subtlety of the issuesinvolved. 
The Copernican revolution, allied to the mechanistic view of the 
universe which grew from the developing science of astronomy, certainly 
contributed to that abasement of man which constitutes one stream 
issuing from the Enlightenment. Remarkably, the present consensus 
among cosmologists is that, whatever else may be said about it, the 
universe is 'designed' for man to evolve. To have the time which the 
universe has had, it needs to be as large as it is: space and time being 
inextricably linked. Furthermore, had various unique features of the 
universe been even slightly different, man could not have evolved: 
for example, in the early stages of cosmic evolution, the ratio of 
nucleons to photons, electrons and neutrinos must have been closely 
one to a thousand million. If that ratio had been either slightly 
larger or slightly smaller there would have been no nuclei heavier 
than hydrogen, and so no carbon and no possibility of life. For 
further examples simply explained, see P. E. Hodgson, Science and 
Creation, (Oxford Farmington Institute Occasional Paper 17,1985). 
Some cosmologists and by no means only those who are religious - 
even speak now of 'the anthropic principle', in connection with the 
specificity of our universe as a home for man. 
The case with Darwin is hardly less interesting. The establishment 
of the fact of the process of evolution has established with force 
the 'solidarity' between man and the world, and in various ways has 
fostered contemporary interest in the doctrine of creation, although 
this has been complicated by a widespread confusion between recognition 
of the fact of the process of evolution and the reductionist mechanism 
hypothesized by Darwin. The latter has an increasingly beleagured 
appearance, thus allowing the former insight its proper influence 
within a theology which confesses a providential, lanthropic, purpose 
informing the process of evolution. 
These recent developments in physics and biology throw an interesting 
light upon the account, modified from that of other second-century 
theologians, which Irenaeus gives of the relation between God, man 
and the world. Without the advantages afforded by our modern 
perspective, we may judge him to have been engaged in a genuine 
struggle with the underlying. issues involved. 
16. G. Wingren's Man and the Incarnation constitutes a thorough 
attempt to rejec ny significant association between Irenaeus and 
the later conceptual distinction between nature and supernature, and 
this book lists the numerous publications prior to 1946 devoted to 
this area of his theology. 
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17. This Gnostic claim is pilloried in 11.30-32, Irenaeus' chief 
argument being that the Gnostics are unable to demonstrate the 
possession of divine power which would necessarily accompany their 
divine nature. 
18. Achamoth, from the Hebrew chokmah, wisdom, the hypostatised 
desire, or intention, of the Sophia once she had fallen by searching 
for the supreme Father. Irenaeus discusses Valentinian anthropogony 
in 1.5-7. Subsequent research has endorsed Irenaeus' general 
description - see Jonas, op. cit. pp. 183 ff.; Wilson, op. cit. pp. 206 ff.; 
Nielsen, op. cit. pp. 28 ff and Rudolph, op. cit. pp. 88 ff. 
19. For example, Ephesians 2: 6,19; Philippians 3: 20; Hebrews 11: 13, 
13: 14 1 Peter 2: 11. 
20. As is customary in this thesis, we use the translation of J. P. Smith. 
He cites in a note (p. 168, n. 163) a more literal rendering of part of 
this chapter: 'reproduced the scheme of his incarnation .... copy the 
incarnation of Adam': more literally 'took up the same dispensation (O'c"YO ya, 
of incornaLloo- with him .... show the likeness of incarnation with 
respect to Adam! 
21. The link between the christology and anthropology of Irenaeus has 
been discussed recently by R. A. Norris, 'The Problem of Human 
Identity in Patristic Christological Speculation', S. P., 17 (Oxford: 
Pergamon Press, 1982), pp. 147-159. Norris shows how Irenaeus' 
discussion proceeds along the lines. we have indicated, in contrast to 
many later patristic authors who, saw Adam as fashioned in the image 
either of the Logos or of the humanity-of Jesus, and he also exhibits 
the tension, which results in a certain inconsistency, in Irenaeus 
himself - who, as we saw in an earlier chapter, can lapse into drawing 
rather a sharp distinction between the Logos and the humanity of 
Christ. For a related treatment, see, also, D. Cairns, The Image of Go4 
Man, (revised edn., London: Fontana, 1973), p. 82f. 
22. See, for example, V. I. 3, (The heretics)' ..... not considering 
that as, at the beginning of our formation in Adam, that breath of 
life which proceeded from God, having-been united to what had been 
fashioned, animated the man, and manifested him as a being endowed 
wi 
, 
th reason; so also, in the end, the Word of the Father and the 
Spirit of God, having become united with the, ancient substance of 
Adam's formation, rendered man liýing and perfect, receptive of the 
perfect Father, in order that as in the natural Adam we all were dead, 
so in the spiritual we may all be made alive. For never at any time 
did Adam escape the hands of God, to whom the Father speaking, said, 
"Let us make man in our image, after our likeness. " And for this 
reason in 
, 
the last times .... His hands formed a living man, in order 
that Adam might, be created'after the image of God. ' 
23. It is this dimension of history, of the bodily life of man, 
which is missing from the recent criticism of Irenaeus' doctrine of 
the image of God in man offered by H. D. McDonald, The Christian View 
of Man (London: M. M. & S., 1931), pp. 34ff. 
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24. 'For Irenaeus .... the process by which the image is moulded in 
history is vital to the significance of the image as actually 
manifested', L. S. Thornton, op. cit., p. 171. This aspect of Irenaeus, 
teaching forms a central theme of Thornton's book, which, so far as 
it goes, is most illuminating. Its chief weaknesses are, firstly, 
that it presents Irenaeus as too systematic and consistent, and, 
secondly, that it tends to ignore the radical significance of 
eschatology -a problem which Thornton shares with Irenaeus, as we 
shall shortly outline. 
25. Clement of Alexandria and Origen were influential in developing 
the view that the image of God in man lay primarily, even exclusively, 
in the soul, the soul mediating between the spirit and the body much 
as the disincarnate Logos was the proper mediator between God and 
humanity. The influence of this close association between the image 
of God and the soul in man is evident in Athanasius (Contra Gentes 34), 
even if he eschewed the distinction between the image and likeness 
of God which had also become embedded in the Origenist tradition (see 
T. F. Torrance, Theology in Reconciliation (London : G. Chapman, 1975) 
p. 242, referring to C. Kannengiesser). Augustine consolidated this 
association between the image of God and the soul (or, rather, the 
mens, the higher part of the soul, even if it be granted that 
Augustine's thought readily transcends such static distinctions), as 
J. E. Sullivan's study of Augustine, The Image of God (Iowa : 1963) has 
demonstrated in detail; cf. G. B. Lander, The Idea of Reform 
(Massachusetts : 1959) pp. 185ff. Calvin's discussion of the nature 
of the image of God in man (Institutes 1.15.1), sharpened by 
disagreement with Osiander, opts, albeit with caution and a certain 
correction, the Augustinian emphasis upon the soul as the proper seat 
of the image of God in man. As an illustration of the attempts of 
modern theology to recover the physical, bodily dimension of the image 
of God, we may refer to the interesting, if not yet established, thesis 
of D. Bonhoeffer and K. Barth that the image of God in humanity exists 
primarily in the relationship of man and woman, as the basic form of 
human relationship: see C. D., III. 1, pp. 194ff. 
26. For example, 11.31.2., 'And so far are they from being able to 
raise the dead, as the Lord raised them, and the apostles did by means 
of prayer, and has been frequently done in the brotherhood .... that they do not even believe this can possibly be done, for the 
resurrection from the dead is simply an acquaintance with that truth 
which they proclaim'. Clearly there is at least an affinity here with 
the error mentioned in 2 Timothy 2: 17f. 
27. For example, with particular reference to the Valentinian account, 
1.7.1, 'The spiritual seed, again, being divested of their animal 
souls, and becoming intelligent spirits, shall in an irresietible and 
invisible manner enter in within the Pleroma.... 1; cf. 1.30.14; 
11.30.5. For a broader account of Gnostic teaching on the 
'resurrection', see Resurrection, by P. Perkins (New York : Doubleday, 
1984)jpp. 356-362 . 
28. V. 3.1. of V. 2.3, 'strength of God is made perfect in weakness' 
29. - See, especially, V. 3.1. 
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30. See V. 5. 
3 1. V. 7.1. 
32. V. 8.1. 
33. V. 8.3. 
34. V. 14.4. 
35. See, for example, IV. 20.7,10; 28.2; V. 32.1. 
36. In fairness, it must be said that Irenaeus did envisage a certain 
transformation in the resurrection, as the comparison he draws in V. 10 
with the wild and cultivated olive trees indicates: 'But as the 
engrafted wild olive does not certainly lose the substance of its wood, 
but changes the quality of its fruit .... so also, when man is grafted 
in by faith and receives the Spirit of God, he certainly does not lose 
the substance of flesh, but changes the quality of the fruit of his 
works .... showing that he has become changed for the better, being not 
mere flesh and blood, but a spiritual man.... (V. 10.2). The point 
Irenaeus fails to acknowledge is that the transformation he speaks of 
will possibly or probably include a transformation of the substance of 
the flesh. Of course, to an age which understands the ambiguity of 
matter qua matter, the second law of thermodynamics, and the inherent 
instability of life based upon carbon and oxygen, such a transformation 
of the substance of matter coheres more easily with the belief in the 
goodness of creation. 
37. Irenaeus' scattered references to the ascension generally speak 
simply of Jesus, assumption into heaven (e. g. 1-10.1; 111.12.1, 
3,9,13; IV. 33.13; 34.3; Dem. 83ff. ), and tend to miss the mysterious 
dimension hinted at in the New Testament: that Christ ascended through, 
or above, the heavens (Hebrews 4: 14; 7: 26), that He might fill all 
things (Ephesians 4: 10). While it would be true to say that the 
Gospel of John appears, at least to some degree, to assimilate the 
ascension to the resurrection, this produces a more mysterious concept 
of resurrection than we find in Irenaeus. The adoption of too close 
an analogy between the resurrection of Christ and our resurrection 
tends to preclude satisfactory consideration of the eternal fate of such 
people as children who die young, Neanderthal man, etc.. 
38. Cf. the discussions of this point by J. T. Nielsen, op-cit., p. 82 
and J. Lawson, op. cit., pp. 229ff. 
39. C. S. Lewis has made some interesting remarks on this subject. 
He acknowledges with respect to the resurrection of the body that, 
'the old picture of the soul reassuming the corpse - perhaps blown to 
bits or long since usefully dissipated through nature - is absurd. 
Nor is it what St. Paul's words imply .... We are not, in this doctrine, 
concerned with matter as such at all: with waves and atoms and all 
that. What the soul cries out for is the resurrection of the senses. 
Even in this life matter would be nothing to us if it were not the 
source of sensations. ' (Letters to Malcolm, London: Geoffrey Bles, 
1964, p. 154f). Lewis continues with the interesting suggestion that 
our ability, through memory, to allow our present to contain yet 
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transform our past might provide an imperfect analogy to the 
continuity yet transformation implied in the doctrine of the 
resurrection of the body. These ideas have received further attention 
in recent work on 'narrative' theology: for example, see G. Stroup, 
op. cit.. Very similar thoughts to those of Lewis are expressed by 
A. Farrer, Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited, (London: Collins, 1962), 
ch. 5, 'Man Redeemed', esp. p. 110. 
40. V. 12.4 
41. Justin, I Apol. 19; Theophilus, Ad Autol., I. 7f; Athenagoras, 
Legatio 36.3. To Justin and Theophilus it is the apparent miracle of 
morphogenesis of a body from the seed of human semen which provides 
the analogy to the resurrection. We would note two things about this 
argument. Firstly, although superficially resembling that of St. Paul 
in lCor. 15, the contrasts of lCor. 15: 35-54 between the earthly and 
the spiritual bodies are largely missing. Secondly, the belief that 
growth is a miracle provides a further illustration of our thesis 
that orthodox writers in the second century too readily tended to 
confuse the activity of God with the contingent activity of creation. 
42. The justification for regarding the resurrection as embracing, 
at least as its first stage, reconstitution and resuscitation, is 
prominent in each of the three writers just mentioned. It is present 
in Irenaeus (see, for example, V. 32), but is less prominent, partly 
because the theme of growth and development has a clearer place in 
his theology. Similarly, there is less interest shown in Irenaeus in 
the resurrection of the wicked to judgement : it is the resurrection 
of the righteous which is normally under discussion. 
43. In expounding St. Paul, Origen made considerable use of lCor. 15: 5f. 
See, in particular Contra Celsum V. 18 ff (ed. H. Chadwick, pp. 277 ff), 
and DePrincipiis 11.10.3 (ed. H. de Lubac, Gloucester, Mass: Peter 
Smith, 1973, p. 140), where, after refuting 'the heretics', he directs the 
discussion to 'some of our own people', who either from poverty of 
intellect or from lack of instruction, introduce an exceedingly low 
and mean idea of the resurrection of the body'. 
44. V. 31.1 : 'For the heretics, despising the handiwork of God, and 
not admitting the salvation of their flesh .... affirm that immediately 
upon their death they shall pass above the heavens and the Demiurge, 
and go to the Mother (Achamoth) or to that Father whom they have 
feigned'. 
45. A certain contrast between Dem. 61 where the prophesied renewal 
of nature appears to be applied, at least in part, to the present time 
of the Church, and A. H. V. 32-35, has encouraged some to doubt Irenaeus, 
adherence to millenarianism: see the discussion in J. P. Smith, op. cit 
p. 129, n. 107; p. 196, n. 270, and G. Wingren, op. cit., pp. 188ff. But 
in order to weaken Irenaeus' millenarian doctrine, Wingren, for example, 
is less than fair to the evidence: on p. 190 he claims that, 'there is 
not a single mention of the words "thousand years" throughout Irenaeus, 
description of the Kingdom of the Son'; but even if we can agree that 
Irenaeus' millenarianism is less pedantic than that of some others, 
Wingren overlooks V. 28.3: 'For in as many days as this world was made, 
in so many thousand years shall it be concluded'. 
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46. V. 32.1; 35.2. cf. IV. 20.7, where the historical character of 
revelation is declared fundamental to the relation between God and 
man, 'lest man should at any time become a despiser of God, and that 
he should always possess something towards which he might advance 
and IV. 38.3 where the theme of growth is expounded at length: 'by 
continuing in being throughout a long course of ages .... man makes 
progress day by day, ascending towards the perfect, that is, 
approximating to the Uncreated One. ' 
'47. Compare V. 33.3 with Revelation 22: 2. For a fuller discussion 
of the setting of Irenaeus' millenarianism amid similar or related 
conceptions, see J. Danielou, The Theology of Jewish Christianit 
pp. 377-404. 
48. The Wound of Knowledge, p. 26., 
49. Wingren, op. cit., p. 153f. Wingren provides a selection of 
references to the literature before 1946. The issue here overlaps with 
another theological cause cele'bre for which Irenaeus has frequently 
been called to the witness stand, if to testify in different ways, that is 
the relation between the image and likeness of God in man. 
50. The astonishing range of meanings given in the Old Testament to 
nephesh, from 'corpse' to 'principle of life', illustrate the 
predominant Old Testament view that man is a psycho-somatic whole. 
Modern historico-critical study has shown that Hebrew anthropology 
began to suffer distortion by the imposition of Greek categories of 
soul and body when the Septuagint was produced: 'Nephesh occurs 
755 times in the Old Testament and on 600 occasions the Septuagint 
translates it by yvX-1 ..... Today we are coming to the conclusion 
that it is only in a very few passages that the translation 'soul, 
corresponds to the meaning of Inepheshl (H. W. Wolff, Anthropology of 
the Old Testament, London : S. C. M., 1974, p. 10). 
51. For example, 11.33.4: 'For the body is not possessed of greater 
power than the soul, since indeed the former is inspired, and vivified, 
and increased, and held together by the latter; but the soul possesses 
and rules over the body .... For the body may be compared to an 
instrument; but the soul is possessed of the reason of an artist'. 
This passage also illustrates the difficulty of giving a fully 
satisfactory account of Irenaean psychology, for he normally ascribes 
vivification to the Spirit, seeing the soul as the seat but not the 
source of human rationality and life. Elsewhere, Irenaeus can speak 
of salvation coming to the body through the soul: 'But the Word set 
free the soul, and taught that through it the body should be willingly 
purified'. (IV. 13.2) 
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52. K. Rudolph, op. cit , p. 109, discusses the importance of this idea in Gnosticism. 
53. This is stated explicitly in 11.19.6: 'Just as water when poured 
into a vessel takes the form of that vessel .... souls themselves 
possess the figure of the body.... I Cf. IV. Praef. 4: 'Now man is a 
mixed organization of soul and flesh, who was formed after the likeness 
of God, and moulded by His hands ..... I 
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54. For example, V. 6.1: 'Those, then, are the perfect who have had 
the Spirit of God remaining in them, and have preserved their souls 
and bodies blameless, holding fast the faith of God .... and maintaining 
righteous dealings with respect to their neighbours'. 
55. V. 2.2f: 'But if the flesh does not attain salvation, then neither 
did the Lord redeem us with His blood, nor is the cup of the eucharist 
the communion of His blood, nor the bread which we break the communion 
of His body .... When, therefore, the mingled cup and the manufactured 
bread receives the Word of God, and the eucharist of the blood and 
the body of Christ is made, from which things the substance of our 
flesh is increased and supported, how can they affirm that the flesh 
is incapable of receiving the gift of God, which is life eternal.... 
Cf. IV. 18.5. Mention should also be made of Irenaeus' interesting, if 
isolated, remark, that it is blood which forms 'the bond of union 
between soul and body' (V. 3.2). 
56. Unfortunately only his alternative account of baptism is 
available, in Church Dogmatics IV. 4. (fragment), although his general 
views are clear both from this and from the previous part-volumes of 
Volume IV, where his new understanding of the sacraments is implicit, 
and, on occasions, explicit - see, for example, C. D. IV. 2. p. 55f. 
The expression Idemythologisation' is Barth's own : C. D. IV. 4. p. v. 
The unwillingness of the Church to face the issues he has raised is 
perceptively commented upon by Barth himself, in the preface to 
C. D. IV. 4. 
57. Cf. V. 8.1. 'But we do now receive a certain portion of His 
Spirit, tending towards perfection .... This earnest, therefore, thus 
dwelling in us, renders us spiritual even now, and the mortal is 
swallowedup by immortality. ' 
58. Hebrews 1: 3. 
59. We recall here Irenaeus' Christology, discussed in Chapter Two, 
one'strand of which drew a sharp distinction between the divinity 
and humanity of Jesus Christ, this being balanced by a great 
emphasis upon the unity of Jesus Christ. 
60. An interesting comparison exists here with another notable 
aspect of the theology of Karl Barth. In C. D. 
, 
111.2, pp. 344-365, he 
developed the thesis that man is not spirit, except as he has the 
Spirit of God, or, better, as the Spirit of God has him (p. 354f). 
Much of Barth's exposition recalls Irenaeus, although his name does 
not feature in the text, and it might shed light upon the lively 
discussion of his anthropology if its relation with that of Irenaeus 
was explored. Certainly, the critique of Irenaeus offered here has 
parallels in those of Barth by G. S. Hendry, The Holy Spirit in 
Christian Theology, pp. 108-117, A. I. C. Heron, The Holy Spirit, pp. 140- 
144, and R. S. Anderson, On Being Human: Essays in Theological 
Anthropology, pp. 210-212. Among these authors only Hendry (op. cit., 
p. 116) relates Barth to Irenaeus, and, interestingly, Heron and 
Anderson do not remark upon the apparent shift in Barth's position in 
the posthumously published draft of C. D. IV. 4, The Christian Life 
(Edinburgh: T. &T. Clark 1981) p. 90, where he speaks of a human spirit 
as distinct from the Holy Spirit. This change perhaps relates to the 
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modification in eschatology which occurred during the writing to the 
Church Dogmatics, as a comparison with the earlier statement 
indicates: 'We have to see, then, that accurately and seriously 
understood the concept of conscience (like that of the "spirit" in 
man corresponding to the Holy Spirit and in contradistinction to body 
and soul) cannot be classed as an anthropological but only as an 
eschatological concept' (C. D. II. 2, p. 667f). Similarly, we have seen 
how in Irenaeus anthropology and eschatology are closely linked. 
61. V. 9.3. 
62. The impetus for a recovery of these ideas in modern Western 
theology derives in significant measure from the seminal books by 
J. Oman, 
, 
Grace and Personality (London : C. U. P., 1917,1919 and 1925), 
and M. Buber, I and Thou (originally translated into English in 1937, 
now issued in a revised translation by W. Kaufman, Edinburgh: T. & T. 
Clark, 1979). 
63. With this train of thought we may compare 11.33.5, where it is 
said that the righteous have spirits, but the unrighteous do not, 
since they have 'stood apart from the, grace of God', and Dei-. 8, 
where the God who is Isustainer and nourisher for all alike' grants 
to the faithful 'the testament of adoption of sons'. 
64.111.6.1; IV. 9.2; V. 8.1. 
65. At first sight, Irenaeus' position is at the opposite extreme: 
'And therefore, when the number is completed, which He had predetermined 
in His own counsel, all those who have been enrolled for life shall 
rise again, having their own bodies, and having also their own souls, 
and their own spirits, in which they had pleased God., Those, on the 
other hand, who are worthy of punishment, shall go away into i. t, they 
too having their own souls, and their own bodies, in which they stood 
apart from the grace of God .... so that the number of mankind, 
corresponding to the fore-ordination of God, being gomple'ted, may 
fully realise the scheme formed by the Father' (11.33.5). Caution 
is necessary, however, because it cannot be assumed that Irenaeus was 
using the term spirit in the same way as I am. 
66. Of course, the 
, 
philosophical background of the concept of 'soul' 
has always proved problematic at theýlevel'of philosophy and theology; 
it is the unrelenting force of the scientific challenge which has 
proved decisive. Nevertheless, the remarkable range, of the over- 
lapping terms used in the 
, 
Old Testament to describe the being of man 
should have been taken much'more seriously than has generally been the 
case. On these see H. Wolff, Anthropology of the Old Testament, 
pp. 7-79. 
67. The inevitable introduction of such confusion was the chief 
reason underlying the rejection of trichotomy at the Fourth Council 
of Constantinople in 869-870. 
68. The passage from epistemology to ontology is charted by Polanyi 
himself in the introduction to The Tacit Dimension (London: R. K. P., 
1967), and explained in detail in ch. 2 of The Tacit Dimension, as well 
as in a number of separately published essays. These are listed in 
Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Societ-, 23 (1977), p. 447. 
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69. 'On the Modern Mind', in Psychological Issues, 8, no. 4 (1974), 
P. 136f., first published in Encounter, 15 May 1965. 
70. In Polanyi'B view, it is the ability to acquire language which 
enables God - or the world of transcendent values - to summon human 
intelligence to responsible choice. This ability to acquire language 
he believes to be due simply to the higher general intelligence of 
man, granted to him by the astonishing increase in brain size which 
mysteriously accompanied his evolution from the apes. Hence we can 
understand - and readily acknowledge - the limited ability of some 
animals to reproduce certain features of humanity, in expression 
of feeling and even, in the case of highly trained apes, the first 
rudiments of language. What must be regarded as disastrous is the 
reception into Christian theology of a distinction between man as 
rational and the rest of the animal kingdom as irrational, a 
distinction we have seen in Irenaeus, albeit in a qualified form. 
Indeed, on Polanyi's view, it is man who is both the most rational 
and most irrational animal, for whereas plants are subject to malformation 
and disease, and animals to illusion and error, in man, in addition, 
we see a developed potential for moral evil, each ontological level 
possessing a distinctive double, potential for good and evil. From 
this perspective we can readily understand a curioLs feature of human 
existence, namely, that man is, ýthe creature who is both most 
vulnerable in his physical existence, as illustrated by his total 
dependence on his parents for a lengthy period, and yet, when adult, 
the creature who can best cope with physical ailment and disability. 
71. This relatedness is not itself destroyed by sin, although a 
radical change occurs in the. nature of the relation. Cf. Hendry, The 
Holy Spirit in Christian Theology, p. 115 '... there can be no immanent 
principle of a relation to God in sinful man. But, while sin alienates 
man from God, this does not mean that there is no spirit in man. Man 
remains a being endowed with, creative spirit (for spirit is the 
distinctive mark of man, and without it he would not be man); but 
spirit in sinful man becomes the principle of his lost relation to God; 
for man's relation to God is always a relation in freedom, and spirit 
is the principle of freedom'. Although fundamentally correct in his 
insistence that man essentially is, spirit, Hendry misses the depth of 
relation inherent in the nature of man as spirit. Man may reap what he 
has sown, but the nature of that which he reaps (and sows) is 
determined by the transcendent level of meaning, which is God. In 
this sense there is an 'immanent' principle of a relation to God in 
sinful man, as Ba7r-th, in particular, -would hold. Two recent 
publications have made proposals along the lines advocated here, 
although both fall short of the position I am advocating. R. S. 
Anderson, On Being Human, pp; 207-214, 'Body, Soul, Spirit', 
recognises the problem with, the Barth of C. D. 111.2, but allows only 
a definition of human spirit in a positive relation to the Spirit of 
God, the problem thus re-emerging. P. W. Newman, 'Humanity with 
Spirit', S. J. T., 34 (1981), pp. 415-426 recognises (p. 425) the need 
for theology to engage with 'the vast literature of the scientific 
study of humanity,, but does not himself attempt to do so. His 
suggestion (p. 424) that 'personality' replace human spirit lacks 
definition, as illustrated by his rather despairing claim that only 
humans have personality in the strict sense of the word'. If human 
beings cannot have spirit because of the essential difference between 
God and man, how can Newman retain a belief that God is personal, if 
personality is the essential distinguishing feature of man? 
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72. One of the few points of agreement between the contributors to 
the interesting collection of essays and responses, Encountering 
Evil : Live Options in Theodicy, ed. S. T. Davis (Edinburgh : T. & T. 
Clark, 1980), concerns the basic importance of the theodicy question, 
and the paradigmatic character of the Holocaust. The remarkable level 
of recent interest in the subject of theodicy is illustrated by the 
review article of M. L. Peterson 'Recent Work on the Problem of Evil', 
American Philosophical Quarterly, 20, (1983), pp. 321-339, which lists 
more than 150 mostly philosophical books and articles published since 
1965. This is apart from the many publications of a more fundamentally 
theological nature, which have been stimulated by the idea of the 
suffering of God. 
73. Questions concerning the origin and nature of evil figure 
prominently in the extended discussion, in 11.28, of the limitations 
of human knowledge in general, to which we have already referred. 
74.11.28.7. Thea posteriori approach to-theology is expressed with 
particularly clarity in 1.10.3, one of its aspects, which can only 
evoke the response, 10M, the depths of the riches both of wisdom and 
knowledge of God; how unsearchable are His judgments, and His ways 
past finding outP, being why 'God manifested long-suffering in regard 
to the apostasy of the angels who transgressed, as also with respect 
to the disobedience of men. ' 
75. While it is true that Irenaeus occasionally refers to the envy 
of the devil (e. g. IV. 40.3, V. 24.4), and to elements of the myth of 
the Fall of the Watchers (e. g. IV-36.4, Dem. 18), he does not use these 
ideas systematically to explain the origin of the malice exhibited in 
the emotion and activity thus described. For a discussion of the 
relation between Irenaeus and Jewish pseudepigraphical literature, see 
D. R. Schultz, 'The Origin of Sin in Irenaeus and Jewish Pseudepigraphical 
Literature', V. C., 32 (1978), pp. 161-190. Although illuminating, 
Schultz overstates one of his major conclusions, that Irenaeus 
'borrowed ideas solely from the pseudepigraphical tradition in formulating 
his theory of recapitulation' (p. 190). 
76. This is the expression of J. Hick, Evil and the God of Love 
(London: Fontana, 1968), p. 68f, ýwho comments: 'The basic and 
inevitable criticism is that the idea of an unqualifiedly good 
creature committing sin is self-contradictory and unintelligible. If 
the angels are finitely perfect,, then even though they are in some 
important sense free to sin they will never in fact do so. If they do 
sin we can only infer that they were not flawless - in which case 
their Maker must share the responsibility for their fall.... I This is 
the fundamental point developed by A. P. Hayman, 
, 
opera cit., in his 
account of the Rabbinic response to the Pauline understanding of sin. 
77. It has been disputed that Origen did hold such a view, but, 
although a degree of uncertainty must remain, his theological premisses 
do lead in this direction, as his discipleGregory of Nyssa certainly 
concluded. 
78. The anthropomorphism of the conception qualifies the purported 
mystery of the angelic fall, allowing the whole notion to undergird 
the attempt of Irenaeus to explain the co-operation of grace and free 
will, the blame for the fall of man being shared between the devil 
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and man, with the devil taking the greater share, and the salvation 
of man being ascribed in different proportions to both God and man. 
Hence the attraction of similar conceptions to a modern age which 
wishes to avoid the extremes of 'Pelagianism' and 'Calvinism', as is 
illustrated by the variation proposed by N. P. Williams (in The Ideas 
of the Fall and of Original Sin) of 'a collective fall of the race- 
soul of humanity at an indefinitely remote past' - see Hick's 
discussion of this proposal, op. cit., p. 287 f. The major 
difficulty with systematic treatments along these lines in that they 
attempt to explain too much -a charge which could similarly be 
laid before A. Plantinga and others who have revived the free will 
defence. 
79. The distinction commonly drawn in recent discussion between 
the 'logical problem of evil', and the 'emotional problem of evil,, 
with the free will defence applying to the former alone, seems to 
me to be most unsatisfactory : can human experience be divided in 
this fashion? For this distinction, see M. L. Petersen op. cit., and 
the contribution of S. T. Davis to Encountering Evil: Live Options in 
Theodicy, with the critique by J. H. Hick on p. 87. For a recent 
sustained critique of all attempts to explain and justify the 
existence of evil, including that of Hick, see K. Surin, 'Impassibility 
and Evil', S. J. T., 35 (1982), pp. 97-115 and 'Theodicy? ', H. T. R., 76 
(1983), pp. E-25-47. Surin is concerned that we should not confuse good 
and evil, the danger endemic in all theodicies. 
80. 
81. V. 22.2. 
82. See the discussion and comparison in E. F. Osborn, The Philosophy 
of Clement of Alexandria, p. 77f. The idea of the unreality of evil 
readily blends with that of the unreality of matter, as we see in 
those Christian theologians who were especially influenced by 
Platonism. 
83. See the extract from 1.10.3, quoted above. Presumably Origen 
would have regarded Irenaeus' account of the fall of angels, and 
their ultimate destiny, as Gnostic! Certainly Irenaeus is vulnerable 
to the charge of inconsistency : if the omnipotent God, who foreknows 
everything, can arrange to 'untie the knot of disobedience' (111.22.4; 
cf. V. 19.1) of man, could the same not have been arranged in respect 
of the disobedient angels? Could their 'fall' not also receive some 
amelioration in the light of their created nature, the defence which, 
as we shall see, Irenaeus uses for Adam? 
84. Cf. The similar train of thought in V. 26.2.111.7 is also 
instructive: Irenaeus attempts to show that 'the God of this world' 
of 2Cor. 4: 5, who has 'blinded the minds of them that do not believe,, 
is God Himself. While there are indeed other Pauline sayings which 
could support Irenaeus' interpretation, by forcing 2Cor. 4: 5 into their 
mould he misses the depth of the issue which engaged St. Paul. 
Irenaeus would have found John 12: 31,16: 11, difficult verses, with 
their reference to the judgment of 'the ruler of this world' he 
makes no reference to them. 
2, A--7 
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85. R. F. Brown, 'On the Necessary Imperfection of Creation', S. J. T., 
28 (1975), pp. 17-25. Brown acknowledges that other theologians had 
jarlier drawn attention to this feature of. Irenaeus' thought, notably, 
J. H. Hick, in Evil and The God of Love. 
86. Eusebius, Church History, V. 20, informs us that Irenaeus also 
devoted a lost letter to the 
- 
subject 'Concerning Monarchy', or 'That 
God is not the Author of Evil'. 
87.1 would emphasise the word 'developed', for one of the short- 
comings evident in discussion of these chapters of A. H. has been the 
assertion that the arguments they contain are incompatible with much 
of the rest of the work. Earlier German scholarship readily attributed 
these chapters to one of the 'sources' of A. H. into which many parts of 
the book were dissected, but without endorsing speculative literary 
reconstruction, R. F. Brown, in his recent article, op. cit. p. 18, 
maintains their incompatibility with other-parts of: --Irenaeus, theology 
'In his protracted rebuttal of Gnostic sects, Irenaeus repeatedly 
emphasises the unqualified goodness of the creation. But in IV. 38 he 
springs upon the reader the surprising contention that Adam, as first 
created by God, was imperfect'. That there is a tension between 
different ideas is true, as we shall show, but the theme of the 
contrast between God and creation, the Changless and change, is present 
through Irenaeus' writings, as we shall also demonstrate. 
88. In 111.23.5, Irenaeus presents the circumstances of Adam's fall as 
even more extenuating : 'For, having been beguiled by another under 
pretext of immortality, he is immediately seized with terror, and 
hides himself .... feeling unworthy to appear before and to hold converse 
with God. Now, "the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom; " 
the sense of sin leads to repentance, and God bestows His compassion 
on those who are penitent .... For God detested him who had led man 
astray, but by degrees, and little by little, He showed compassion to 
him who had been beguiled. Cf. Dem. 12,14 where Adam and Eve are 
spoken of as children who were easily led astray. 
89. To choose one obvious example, 11.5.4 argues that 'It is not 
seemly, however, to say of Him who is God over all, since He is free 
and independent, that He was a slave to necessity, or that anything 
takes place with His permission, yet against His desire'. The contrast 
with IV. 38 is not the conflict Meijering, op-cit. p. 34 asserts, for 
the Gnostic necessity attacked in Book Two is different from that 
defended in JV. 38, but a tension between the two accounts remains. 
Later in the same book (P. 71) Meijering attacks Irenaeus' position in 
IV. 38 as follows: 'To say that God could have made man perfect in the 
beginning, but that man could not yet have endured perfection since 
he had been newly created and was still a child is a nonsensical 
statement, since it is no answer to the question why man had not been 
created in such a way that even as a newly created being he could 
endure perfection'. If somewhat speculative, Irenaeus' argument is 
hardly nonsensical, especially when it is combined with the associated 
claim that God desires and wills a free response on the part of man - indeed, on p. 34 Meijering has already referred to Irenaeus' 
discussion as 'profound'. The answer to the question, 'could God have 
made man perfect? ', is surely that it all depends on what God's 
purpose was. Irenaeus' arguments are an attempt to explore the nature 
of God's purpose, even if he can speak too confidently in the process. 
34-18 
90. For expositions of Schleiermacher's position, see J. H. Hick, 
OP-cit'. pp. 225-241, and K. Barth, C. D. 111.3, pp. 319-334. Both Hick Tp-. 239) and Barth (p. 332f. ) acknowledge the crucial importance of our 
question. 
91. Even when giving his strongest defence of an 'instrumental' view 
of evil, Irenaeus clearly senses the problem, relying upon the state- 
ment of Scripture to silence doubts : 'What, therefore? (as some may 
exclaim: ) did the Lord wish, in that case, that His apostle (Paul, 
in relation to his illness) should thus undergo buffeting, and that 
he should endure such infirmity? Even so it was; the word says it. 
For strength is made perfect in weakness... I (V. 3.1) If Irenaeus does 
anticipate the optimism of Leibniz, it is not so systematically 
expressed. J. Hick (op. cit., p. 160) has endorsed K. Barth's statement 
that, 'at bottom Leibniz hardly had any serious interest (and from the 
practical standpoint none at all) in the problem of evil' (C. D. III. 
1; P. 392). Such an accusation could not so readily be levelled against 
Irenaeus. 
92. My basic question to Hick, therefore, concerns his lack of 
soteriology, or, perhaps, its postponement to an indeterminate, specul- 
ative, teleological, eschatology! Is atonement, for Hick, 'much more 
than the communication of God's timeless decree that all men shall be 
saved? 
The detailed accuracy of his treatment of IrenaeusIcannot be discussed 
here, except to note that he ignores Irenaeus' use of the idea of an 
angelic fall, and subsequent free will defence, omissions which are not 
unrelated 
* 
to the absence of soteriology in Hick's own theology. In 
his later writings, injact, he is more cautious in ascribing his own 
ideas to Irenaeus, as is illustrated by-his comments on p. 41ýin 
Encountering Evil :" Live Options in ThealLcy, although Irenaeus still 
retains the role of 'Patron saint'!. 
93. Although the theme of martyrdom is only introduced at the end of 
Book Five, the underlying principle employed here is invoked in relation 
to general theme of resurrection. Thus V. 2.3 and V. 3.1 use the strength 
is made perfect in weakness' and 'thorn in the flesh' statements from 
2Corinthians 12. 
, 
94. ' The inferiority of creation to the Creator is a particular theme 
of-Book Two of A. H. see, ý for example, 11.6.1,17.10; 25.3; 28.2; 
34.2. It also recurs in subsequent Books, before its presentation 
inýIV. 38 : 'see,, for example, 111.8.3; IV-11.2; 20.2. 
95. A related anti-typology exists in the parallel Irenaeus draws 
between the tree in the Garden of Eden, which helped to cause sin, and 
the cross of wood by which Christ has redeemed us (see V. 16.3; 17.3,4). 
These parallels have value in relation to the basic idea of AýýK6")PkcWv-tS 
, the achievement of Christ answering directly the Sin 
of Adam, but we see here'in Irenaeus a tendency for the theory to run 
ahead of the evidence. '. 
96. See especially 111.3. In Irenaeus' defence it must be acknowledged 
that his concept of tradition was more charismatic than that found in 
some later writers, but the claim to an exclusive monopoly of revealed 
truth remains. Mutatis mutandis, a similar critique could be applied 
to his understanTl-ng of the uniform witness of Scripture. 
3+9 
97. Some earlier writers drew the conclusion from V. I. 1 and other 
passages that Irenaeus held an early form of the theory of a ransom 
paid to the Devil. In this connection we can agree with J. Lawson 
(op. cit. P. 197) when he endorses the conclusion, 'that Irenaeus would 
allow some right to the Devil, as he is to be treated according to 
the rules of justice, but that he does not fall into the gross error 
of supposing that the blood of Christ was handed over as a ransom. 
There is no question of strict legal rights. ' 
98. An interesting partial contrast exists with Athanasius, who 
believed that when originally created, Adam and Eve were both more 
perfect and subsequently more culpable, than Irenaeus' account would 
suggest. See De Inc. 4f. Athanasius has less interest in the 
processes of history, with the growth of man to maturity. From our 
modern perspective we favour Irenaeus' basic outlook at this point. 
Athanasius' general attitude to creation was undoubtedly influenced by 
the sharp distinction he drew between the eternal begetting of the Son 
and the contingent creation of the world. The consequent emphasis 
upon the superiority of God over creation easily led to a certain 
denigration of the latter : 'Since the whole Creation had once begun, 
by the will and pleasure of God, "out of nothing", an ultimate I'meonic" 
tendency was inherent in the very "nature" of all created things ..... Their existence was precarious. If there was any order and stability 
in the Cosmos, they were, as it were, super-imposed upon its own, 
"nature", and imparted to created things by the Divine Logos', 
G. Florovsky, 'St. Athanasius' Concept of Creation', p. 49. 
99. See I Apol. 29. In the background here is the Platonic belief 
that truth is basically spiritually perceived, this being hindered by 
the deceptive images of sensible objects. The soul's attention 
should be fixed, therefore, upon the changeless forms of things, upon 
beauty which is above the space and time of our direct experience. 
The influence of this way of thinking upon the Apologists has been 
well described by H. B. Timothy, The Early Christian Apologists and 
Greek Philosophy. Associated with this greater valuation placedby 
Irenaeus upon this world of change and experience is his comparative 
lack of interest in the existence and activity of demons. By 
contrast, for the Apologists, 'demonology occupies an important place; 
and in their treatment of it there are distinct traces of 
philosophical influence.... I (J. Danielou, Gospel Message and 
Hellenistic Culture, p. 428). 
100. G. L. Bray, Holiness and the Will of God (London : M. M. & S., 
1979) p. 91, is therefore less than fully accurate with his recent 
criticism of Irenaeus' view of the nature of sin as 'thinly disguised 
Platonism'. 
101. Cf. 11.28.3, where 'through the many diversified utterances (of 
Scripture)shall be heard one harmonious melody', and V. 13.3 where 
is asserted the hymnic unity of body, soul and Spirit. IV. 14.2 
contains a reference to 'the symphony of salvation', alluding perhaps 
to the music which greeted the return of the prodigal son (Luke 15: 25), 
this parable being referred to in the same chapter. 
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102. For. further recent reflection upon the significance of musical 
analogies for understanding issues of theology, see, for example, 
C. E. Gunton, Yesterday and Today, (London : D. L. T., 1983) pp. 115-125, 
and T. F. Torrance, The Ground and Grammar of Theolo , pp. 134 ff. 
103. Irenaeus' exegesis in V. 15, of the story of the healing of the 
man born blind is instructive here. Although the story maintains the 
opposite, Irenaeus traces the man's blindness to sin, but then 
identifies the purpose of the man's healing as, 'that he might both 
know Him who had fashioned him, and that man might learn from Him who 
has conferred upon him life' (V. 15.3). But the story is not so 
anthropological : its emphasis is not upon the education of the man 
born blind, but upon his healing at the hand of God. The whole thrust 
of the miracle stories in the New Testament is that the suffering 
relieved is not a positive, useful feature of human life. 
104. Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited, p. 163. An earlier account along 
similar lines has been given in the rather neglected work of O. C. 
Quick, The Gospel of the New World, (London : Nisbet, 1944). Quick's 
careful analysis shows both the relatedness of evil to good, and their 
sharp differentiation, with a consequent critique of the view that 
evil is merely defect or privation. 
105. Op. cit., p. 184. 
106. Belief in Science and in Christian Life, pp. 119-122. I would 
suggest, albeit tentatively, that this approach, which sees 
'relatedness amid unrelatedness', is an improvement upon the much 
criticised Barthian doctrine of shadowside and nothingness. The 
problem with Barth's discussion is the lack of attention to the 
relation between the shadowside and nothingness, the great advantage 
being his attempt to hold together both the-reality of nothingness and 
its determination by God. The shadowside of creation is more tragic 
than Barth allows, and nothingness has a more 'comprehensible, status 
than he is prepared to admit. 
107. Quoted by Irenaeus in this context in V. 35.2; 36.1. 




H. Chadwick has written of Justin Martyr : 'The division between 
critics who have. found in Justin a great thinker and theologian and 
those who have dismissed him as a fool, if not a knave, goes back 
to the sixteenth-century debates'. 
1 An analogous division and debate 
has characterised Irenaean studies, especially since the nineteenth 
century. It is the suggestion of the present thesis that neither 
alternative offers a satisfactory assessment of the 
worth of Irenaeus' theology. 
2 While accepting the basic accuracy of 
his critique of Gnosticism, we have--also acknowledged a series of 
related problems and tensions in his theology. Even Irenaeus' 
most staunch defenders have admitted that he took into his theology 
opinions which were destined not to last, 
3 but we would go rather 
further and suggest that a more fundamental and far-reaching problem 
concerns the nature of the relation between God and creation which 
Irenaeus' theology assumes. In part this results from an over-reaction 
I 
to Gnostic dualism, but, inpart, it also reflects the adoption of 
the framework of thought which was commonplace in second-century 
philosophy and theology. G. L. Prestige has remarked that: 
'-* the Apologists were quite prepared to accept the 
existence of angelic forces whose function was to control 
and direct the operations of nature, in a manner which 
presents obvious similarities with Stoic doctrine, though 
they were careful to reckon such beings among creatures, 
and declined to confuse them with the transcendent God of 
the universe. Such a theory combined the advantages of 
maintainin& divine control and yet avoiding any taint of 
pantheism. 
In three related ways we have seen how Irenaeus modifies the theology 
of the Apologists : he brings these forcesz into a closer relation with 
God, develops thereby a less dualistic doctrine of God, and avoids 
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pantheism by exalting the divine will in such a way as to posit too 
'necessary' and close a relation between God and the world. 
Althoughý we can warmly endorse Irenaeus I 'intention to secure the 
doctrine of the essential goodness of creation, today we are less 
confident than many of our fore-runners -that providence can be proved 
and demonstrated as unambiguously as once was thought. It was left 
for Irenaeus, successors to develop a political theology which 
sanctified the existing social' order and even, to some degree, deified 
kings. For centuries such a conception of providence held sway, but 
contemporary theology has widely, challenged the assumptions upon which 
a position is built, recalling the prophetic critique of that hallowing 
of the existing religious and political order which afflicted ancient 
Israel. With Irenaeus we are seeing the adoption of certain 
ideas which were to bear such fruit in the fourth century and beyond. 
We have suggested that the roots of this development lie partly in the 
reaction to Gnosticism, partly in the espousal of a framework of 
thought provided by second-century philosophy, and partly (perhaps) 
in a waning of the more enthusiastic, eschatological expectation which 
characterised first-century Christianity. 
The process of institutionalisation in the Church of the early centuries 
is well documented, but adequate studies of the intellectual consequences 
- or causes - are only now beginning to appear. Irenaeus occupies an 
interesting intermediate position, which makes him a particularly 
important, if elusive', subject of study. In his writings we see a 
blanket appeal to the apostolicity of the historic succession of 
bishops, with a consequent suppression of the diversity of Scripture 
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and tradition, and a failure to appreciate the possibility that 
even good bishops could err in serious ways. However, we also find 
a certain flexibility of approach to theological and ecclesiastical 
questions, and an acceptance of a variety of traditions which could 
be serviceable in the articulation of the central truth of the Gospel. 
On several occasions Irenaeus refers naturally, and even with warmth, 
to the continuing charismatic dimension to the church, but prophets 
were already an endangered species, and they play no important role 
in his overall theological and ecclesiastical scheme. 
Yet the very receptivity of Christian thinkers to Greek philosophical 
ideas should not conceal from us the fact that they were often trying 
to articulate novel conclusions. The novelty derived from the 
particular conception of the nature of God which lay at the heart of 
earlyChristian experience, and especially from the doctrine of creation, 
which encouraged Christian thinkers to employ, in suitably adapted form, 
Philosophical ideas in the service of theGospel. For two related reasons, 
both of which are well exhibited by Irenaeus, this process of the 
articulation of Christian theology was inevitably slow: the faith of 
the Church was corporate and essentially implicit. 
The corporate nature of the Christian faith, as this found expression 
in the first centuries of our era, is well illustrated from the New 
Testament itself, where modern scholarship has laid bare the literary 
inter-dependence of documents, and the probable existence of a 
Pauline 'school' responsible for some epistles, which had erstwhile 
been attributed simply to the hand of St. Paul. In a similar way, 
Irenaeus clearly felt'no awkwardness in using thoughts and ideas, 
transmitted in either oral or written form (or both), provided by 
35'+ 
earlier writers. Older German scholars were led to disparage Irenaeus 
as a lesser theologian for his 'plagiarism', but, unless we are willing 
similarly to disparage St. Luke and St. Matthew, the charge derives 
from a misunderstanding of the nature of theology in the first and 
second centuries. 
Naturally, if often unconsdo-usly, we read the New Testament in the 
light of subsequent dogmatic developments, using these as signposts 
to guide our thinking. Christians of the earliest period did not 
have these advantages (even if, in some respects, they are a mixed 
blessing). Instead, ý they were rather like settlers of a new and 
exciting country, in full possession of it, but as yet but partially 
aware of the implications of the new life they were leading. The 
immediate task was to colonise the habitable regions of the area, 
this process having itsown dynamic, with many problems being faced and 
answered in a somewhat ad hoc fashion along the way. Subsequently, 
the need arises for a certain constitutional uniformity, and with 
the Church the analogous need arose, above all, as a consequence of the 
Gnostic crisis. With Irenaeus, we see the Church changing into a 
theological gear which previously had been left comparatively unexplored. 
In assessing the adequacy of Irenaeus' theology of God and creation, 
we were perhaps more impressed with his treatment of the doctrine 
of God., At various points in his doctrine of creation, we were forced 
to ask just how seriously he appreciated the essential paradox, or 
mystery, which the notions of creation and redemption enshrine. 
Yet, it might be argued that this problem is derivative from an under- 
lying inability of Irenaeus to break out of the philosophical idea of 
the changelessness ofGod, bequeathed to him from contemporary 
35s 
philosophical theology. Whichever way the problem is viewed, we 
have been impressed by the difficulty experienced by the early Church 
in giving adequate expression and attention to the theology of 
creation. The nature of the prevailing philosophical climate has to 
be taken into account here, for it is interesting to observe the 
1- 
inverse difficulty experienced by twentieth-century theology, 
in maintaining and expressing an adequate doctrine of God. As with 
Irenaeus, the doctrines of God and creation are closely linked, 
and, despite the concentration upon man and created reality since 
the enlightenment, we have also seen a great struggle in modern 
theology to cultivate a satisfactory doctrine of creation. 
For all their differences, then, we can observe certain parallels 
between the situation confronting theology in the second and twentieth 
centuries. Philosophical syncretism in the aftermath of a break up 
of established Greek philosophy; a certain stress upon this world, 
and therefore upon the humanity of Jesus Christ; an emphasis upon 
the soteriology inevitably posing, and yet also threatening, the 
question of creation; an age of anxiety, despite much comparative 
material wellbeing; a widespread tendency to conceive the relation 
between God and creation as dualistic; the ready development of myth 
to challenge historic Christianity; in these and other ways our era 
shares much in common with the time of Irenaeus. A proper appreciation 
of the tasks, achievements, and pitfalls of theology in the second 
century, especially at the hand of probably its greatest exponent, 
has much to teach us today. 
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1-I Justin Martyr's Defence of Christianity I, p. 276. 
2. A good example of the vigorous debate which has occurred over 
Irenaeus is provided by E. Brunner, The Mediator, E. T., Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1947, pp. 249-264, where Brunner attempts to 
demolish'Harnack's account of Irenaeus. 
3. For example, see E. Brunner, op. cit. , p. 263, and L. S. Thornton, 
Revelation in the Modern World, p. 287. 
4. God in Patristic Thought, p. 27f.. 
5. The character of the doctrinal exploration of the first Christians 
is well illustrated by St. Paul's grappling with the Christian attitude 
to the Law, a major problem posed for the leaders of the Gentile 
mission. C. E. B. Cranfield has commented perceptively upon the nature 
of the problem: I .... it will be well to bear in mind the fact (which, 
so far as I know, has not received attention) that the Greek language 
used by Paul had no word-group to denote "legalist", and "legalistic". 
This means not just that he did not have a convenient terminology to 
express a key idea, but that he had no definite, ready-made concept 
of legalism with which to work in his own mind. And this means, surely, 
that he was at a very considerable disadvantage compared with the modern 
theologian, when he had to attempt to clarify the Christian position 
with regard to the law. In view of this, we should, I think, be ready 
to reckon with the possibility that sometimes, when he appears to be 
disparaging the law, what he really has in mind may be not the law 
itself but the misunderstanding and misuse of it for which we have a 
convenient term. It should aslo be borne in mind that in tiFis very 
difficult terrain Paul was to a large extent pioneering. If we make 
due allowance for this fact, we shall not be so easily baffled or 
misled by a certain impreciseness of statement which we shall 
encounter'. (I St. Paul and the Law', S. J. T., 17(1964), p. 55. ) 
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